## EXHIBIT 22

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT - CHANCERY DIVISION

MICHAEL W. UNDERWOOD, et al., ) Plaintiffs,)
vs.
No. 13 CH 17450 Calendar 13
CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation,
and
Trustees of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago; Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago; Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago; and Trustees of the , Laborers' \& Retirement Board ) Employees' Annuity and Benefit ) Fund of Chicago, et al., Defendants.)

Record of proceedings had at the
hearing of the above-entitled cause, before the
Honorable NEIL H. COHEN, one of the Judges of said Court, on December 23, 2015, in Room 2308, Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois, commencing at 10:30
a.m.

plaintiffs, many of whom are here.
MR. GOLDSTEIN: Ken Goldstein for the plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Hi, Ken.
All right. Will everyone please be seated.

This is here on Mr. Krislov's request for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. More about that a little bit later and what the City's position is.

We had a conference, a telephonic conference, yesterday between the parties and among the parties, in which we discussed what was going to occur today. And what we said was -- what I expect to occur now is Mr. Krislov, as I understand it, wishes to call a couple of witnesses for examination, folks who gave affidavits on behalf of the City, submissions, in opposition to the issuance of a preliminary injunction.

And then what I expect to occur is, we'll have a discussion, you may call it an argument, I'll call it a discussion, with regard to the parties' respective positions concerning whether a preliminary injunction should issue or not.

THE COURT: You'll have an opportunity to argue in the future. But you didn't submit anything --

MR. KUGLER: We did not submit anything, no, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And that's intentional, correct?

And, Mr. Kennedy.
MR. KENNEDY: No, Your Honor. The Laborer's Fund has not filed any papers. We do oppose the entry of a permanent injunction, for the reasons we set forth in our original papers, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Would both of you, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Kugler, and Mr. Burke, would you all like to be heard in the future, when we discuss this, future today? I'll give you that opportunity.

Or would you like to rest on your previously stated positions and the positions stated by Mr. Burke in his submission.

Mr. Burke?
MR. BURKE: I would -- Judge, if I may, I will rely on my submission in this court and on my prior written submissions in the underlying

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litigation.
THE COURT: Very good. Mr. Kennedy.
MR. KENNEDY: On behalf of the
Laborers' Fund, I'd like to reserve the opportunity to address the Court, but I'm hoping that I don't need to.

THE COURT: Fine. And I'll reserve that for you as well, Mr. Burke. I won't hold you to that. In other words, if you think that something is it important for your clients, please feel free to do so.

But otherwise, I won't ask -- well, I'll ask you, but I'll expect nothing, unless there's something that you have to say.

Same with you, Mr. Kugler. Yes?
MR. KUGLER: Yes. We will rely on our previous submissions, also, Your Honor, reserving the right to respond if necessary.

THE COURT: That would be my honor to hear you again.

MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would --
THE COURT: Mr. Krislov, yes.
MR. KRISLOV: We would object to the
Funds' taking any position or making any arguments
today. They chose not to file anything --
THE COURT: Your objection's overruled.

Now, Mr. Krislov?
MR. KRISLOV: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: It's your motion. Would you like to go forward with it and call anybody. MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, may I make a suggestion?

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. PRENDERGAST: I think it would be helpful to the Court if each of the parties makes a 15-minute or less opening statement.

THE COURT: Denied. You can do that at the end.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Okay.
THE COURT: And the reason for that, Mr. Prendergast, is I'm well aware of the parties' positions. You've stated it to me in open court; you've stated it to me in prior submissions. I may agree or disagree. I have questions for everybody. We'll do that after we take a -- elicit any testimony from the witness stand.

I will not only allow you, permit you,

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but invite you to make a statement in closing and in opposition to this motion, and you may take as long as you like. You'll have every opportunity to be heard on that.

Is that all right with you?
MR. PRENDERGAST: Of course.
THE COURT: I think it's most
efficient if we bypass attorneys having every opportunity to speak about it and just consolidate it and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions.

Mr. Krislov, call your first witness.
MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would call, first, Ms. Alexandra Holt. And we would like -- I know Ms. Currier by face. I don't know Ms. Holt --

THE COURT: Ms. Holt, are you present?
MS. HOLT: I am.
THE COURT: Would you come up, please.
One second before you go further.
MR. KRISLOV: No, I'm not going to --
I just wanted Ms. Currier to leave the courtroom while the testimony is going --

THE COURT: It's called a motion to
exclude. Is that what you want?
MR. KRISLOV: We would like her to be excluded during Ms. Holt's testimony.

THE COURT: I'll hear about that in one second.

Ms. Holt, please come up here. Watch your step, please.

Are we on the record, Ms. Reporter?
THE COURT REPORTER: Yes, we are.
(Witness sworn.)
THE COURT: Would you please state your name for the record -- please sit down -- and spell your last name for the record.

THE WITNESS: Alexandra Holt, H-o-l-t.
THE COURT: Now, with regard to the motion to exclude witnesses, would you like to elaborate on it?

MR. KRISLOV: Yes. Ms. Currier is the other affiant who I would like to cross-examine, and I would rather that they not be able to -- that she not get a heads up from what my questions are to Ms. Holt. I just don't think it's appropriate for her to listen to testimony before she gives hers regarding her affidavit.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor?
THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Prendergast.
MR. PRENDERGAST: I would normally not object to a motion to exclude witnesses, except what Mr. Krislov is doing here is moving to exclude his own witness. We are not calling this witness. He's calling this witness. We have no objection to this witness remaining in court, and I don't think he has any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay.

THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse witness, a hostile witness, because he isn't necessarily vouching for the credibility of the witness. He wishes to discuss with the witnesses their -- the substance of their affidavits.

However, that being said, Mr. Krislov, I've read both an annotated -- both of these affidavits, as I promised you I would. I'm familiar with the substance of it.

Ms. Holt's affidavit is not very long, and it merely discusses, and I believe it addresses, the hardship aspect which would allegedly befall the City if I were to issue this preliminary injunction,
one of the factors that I should consider in terms of issuing an injunction or not. It talks about only that aspect.

It doesn't talk about the same substance, that which Ms. Currier's affidavit discusses, which is the nuts and bolts, the meat of retirees' benefits right now, what they would be if the injunction were to issue, what different avenues retirees would have. So they seem to me to be completely not -- there's no overlapping subject matter, except that it concerns this issue.

So I'm a little -- for that reason, your motion to exclude is denied. I don't find that they really deal with the same subject matter at all. And you may proceed.
MR. KRISLOV: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: You're welcome.

ALEXANDRA HOLT,
having been called as a witness and having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Ms. Holt, good to meet you finally in person. I think we've read about each other over the
revenue, correct?
A I believe what I said was that if we were to keep the subsidy levels for the retiree healthcare at the same level that they were at 2015, the City would need to identify an additional $\$ 30$ million. That can be done through revenue, or it can be done through cuts and expenses.

Q Well, let me just read your statement.
A Uhm-hmm.
Q And the statement says:
[AS READ:
If the City were required to maintain
subsidies at the 2015 levels, it would need to identify an additional $\$ 30$ million in revenue.]

Right?
A That's correct.
Q Okay. So this 30--- it's actually, I think, 30.1 million. This was in the 2015 appropriation?

A There was funding in the 2013 appropriation to pay for --

THE COURT: Two thousand what?
THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 2015
appropriation to pay for approximately $\$ 60$ million
years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name.

You gave an affidavit, which is
Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion.

A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary -- as part of this court case, yes.

Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge?

A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess -- I'm not trying to be difficult --

THE COURT: Will the parties stipulate it is Exhibit 8 without Mr. Krislov having to show the exhibit?

MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes, it is Exhibit 8.

THE COURT: All right. Very good. BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q Now, as I understand it, what you're saying is that in order to -- in order to satisfy this injunction, the City would need to identify, you say in paragraph four, an additional $\$ 30$ million in

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worth of retiree healthcare.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Approximately how much --
A About $\$ 60$ million in 2015.
Q Right. I have \$62,912,845.
Does that jibe with your recollection?
A It's approximately 60 million, yes.
Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget.

A Well, then I hope it's accurate.
Q Me too.
MR. KRISLOV: May I?
THE COURT: You may approach the witness, and neither attorney needs to ask me for permission to approach during this hearing.

MR. KRISLOV: Thank you.
THE COURT: But you do need to lay a foundation for the introduction of evidence.

MR. KRISLOV: Will do.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Ms. Holt, would you take a look at --
(Brief pause.)

THE COURT: Let's go.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Would you take a look at the chart, and --
A Uhm-hmm. Ms. Holt, from now on, we don't take uh-huhs in here because the court reporter can't take that down. It's either yes or no, okay?

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q So what I've taken from your budget, annual budget books that are issued by the City, that for -THE COURT: Whoever has a cell phone, turn it off.

THE COURT REPORTER: Your Honor, it was my laptop.

THE COURT: Oh, then, you're going to have to leave. (Laughter.)
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q For 2012 --
THE COURT: Before you start reading from a document, you need to get it into the record. MR. KRISLOV: Well, I don't think I need -THE COURT: Well, I'm telling you,
despite what you think.
You know, show it to the witness, ask her if she can identify it and knows what it is, and accepts it as real and truthful. Otherwise, it's not coming in.

MR. KRISLOV: Well, the information -THE COURT: I don't know that. You're not testifying.

MR. KRISLOV: I'm not testifying. THE COURT: Ask her questions. MR. KRISLOV: Yes, I will. BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q Ms. Holt, would you agree -- you would agree that the 2012 expenditure for retiree healthcare was $99,639,866$, would you not?

A Yes, I guess -- I would like to caveat that. This is a chart that you prepared. I assume you've taken it from the City's budget.

Q Yes.
A I would want to -- assuming that this is where the information has come from, then the information in the appropriation ordinance --

THE COURT: Not good enough. THE WITNESS: -- is correct.

THE COURT: I'm not dealing with assumptions in the issuance of an injunction. I'm not dealing with "I believe" or "may." This is not the way we do things under our system of justice.

You have to lay a foundation.
Let me ask you, Ms. Holt.
Do you know if that document in front of you truly and accurately represents the figures it purports to represent in the City's budget for, in this case, per the last question, 2012? Yes or no?

THE WITNESS: No. I didn't put it together, so, no, I do not know that.

THE COURT: All right. Next question. BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q You would agree, though, the City spent -that the City's expenditure in 2012 was about $\$ 99$ million for retiree healthcare?

A I would agree that it was about -- around $\$ 100$ million, yes, I would agree with that.

Q And for 2013, it was $\$ 102$ million, right?
A I believe that to be generally correct.
Q And for 2014, it was reduced to $80,609,880$, and I have the 2015 budget overview which you can refer to, and I think it will corroborate -- I think
you probably know this book better than anybody else in the room.

A Yes. Again, speaking in rounded numbers, I do agree that 80 million is correct in terms of our retiree healthcare expenditure in 2014.

Q And that would reflect a reduction of 21 million, as I calculated from your figures, 21,716,545 that the City reduced its expenditure for retiree healthcare for 2014?

A Yes. We did reduce our expenditure between ' 13 and '14 by approximately $\$ 20$ million.

Q And that was done -- who calculated -- who figured how much to reduce? How did you do that?

A It was based on a change in the subsidy level for retirees.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, let me interpose a general objection here to this line of questioning.

The purpose of this hearing is to determine whether or not you should freeze the 2015 subsidy levels and keep them for 2016, or allow the 2016 reductions to go into effect.

The questions he's asking here about
2012 and 2013 are not relevant to this proceeding.

They may have some argumentative value for him in context of the overall case. But the purpose of this preliminary injunction hearing is quite narrow.

The question is, what's the impact on the retirees going from 2015 to 2016. That's the only relevant inquiry.

THE COURT: Mr. Krislov?
MR. KRISLOV: I think we can ask our questions, and --

THE COURT: No, it has to be relevant to --

MR. KRISLOV: It is relevant, Your Honor --

THE COURT: Clint.
MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor.
THE COURT: Clint. Stop interrupting me when I'm talking. I don't like being bullied, and I won't let you bully me or anybody else. You can't just cut me off when you think you know what I'm going to say. It's just as a matter of courtesy. I grant you, you know everything I'm going to say. But you're going to let me say it without interrupting me because it's just a kind and courteous thing to do, okay?

So tell me why these questions as to how they arrived at it is important.

MR. KRISLOV: Because, Your Honor, if it is just -- if there are other factors which require them to reduce this, that's one thing. If this is just a unilateral decision in each year to just reduce this, that takes away from their equities.

If Mr. Prendergast is going to interrupt the questioning every other question, he can argue relevance. It's not -- I'm not going to take a long time with Ms. Holt, but I have a right to establish that the only reason the City chooses to do this is because it chooses to do this. And that undercuts its equities in saying that it has to raise additional money, because it had the money before. It had the money in each of the years. It just chose to cut the money that it spent for retirees.

THE COURT: But you're not alleging in any complaint that this is done by caprice or by whim or without a factual foundation for it, albeit one that the City chooses to believe rather than you.

The City has argued to the contrary, by the way, in their submission that this is

MR. KRISLOV: I apologize, Your Honor. THE COURT: What relevance does this have to the freeze vel non between 2015 and 2016 that you're requesting through the issuance of this preliminary injunction?

MR. KRISLOV: The City's decision to reduce the amount that it appropriates is a unilateral decision, and that is the unilateral decision that we're dealing with today.

And so showing how that is done each year, that it is just a unilateral decision of the City to do that, and that that's what it is in each one of the years that's involved, is relevant to whether it can do it this year.

THE COURT: Well, I don't think there's any objection on behalf of the City that it is done by the City and it is unilateral, after taking into consideration all sorts of factors, I suppose, would hope, but don't know.

But that's not the issue as to how they arrive at it. The issue is not whether -- how they arrive at it and whether it's right or wrong. The issue is, they've done it, should it go on or not?
something that they had to do. But that's neither here nor there. The only fact here, conceded fact, is that they've done it, and you wish to enjoin it having been done.

You haven't alleged that it's been done without a reason.

MR. KRISLOV: Yes, I have.
THE COURT: Yes?
MR. KRISLOV: Yes. In violation of the Constitution, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, but I've ruled against that.

MR. KRISLOV: No, you haven't. You have not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I have.
MR. KRISLOV: With all due respect, Your Honor, your ruling -- I mean, we can get to this, but if you would indulge me a few minutes the opportunity to question Ms. Holt, I think we'll have her out of here in ten minutes or less.

THE COURT: That's not the point. The point is relevance.

MR. KRISLOV: Relevance he can argue or not. I can argue it is relevant. But this
questioning, I believe I have a right to question her on how the City arrived -- why the City does --

THE COURT: I disagree, and that's my ruling.

MR. KRISLOV: It's relevant to the balance of equity, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, it's not.
MR. KRISLOV: The reasons for doing
it?
THE COURT: No, it's not.
MR. KRISLOV: Their motivation isn't relevant?

THE COURT: No, it's not. We're only dealing with what is, not the reason therefore.

MR. KRISLOV: May I ask about the reason --

THE COURT: Ask a question, and if there's an objection, I'll deal with it, and we'll deal with it that way.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q The amount of money that we show is appropriated for 2015 was $\$ 62,912,845$.

Would that jibe with your recollection?

A Well, in a couple of ways. First, it was part of our budget balancing. The City has a long-term, standing structural deficit that we had to address in 2015. It meant that in this case, we had to find over $\$ 300$ million to pay both our operating bills plus increased debt service that came from legacy borrowing.

THE COURT: How much?
THE WITNESS: There was 232 million in a structural deficit, Your Honor, and another hundred million dollars in debt service payment -- increased debt service payment that we need to make.

THE COURT: Understood.
THE WITNESS: None of which addressed our pension issues, which is a separate discussion.

And so we did a couple of things. We go through the entire budget. We look at both revenue opportunities. We also look at expense reductions, which, of course, expense reductions come with, often, service reductions. So we try to balance that.

And, you know, our single biggest source of expense in the city is our employees and

A Yes, that jibes with my recollection.
Q And that you reduced that -- what you've done in the budget -- recommendation of the budget that was adopted by the City, reduces that from -THE COURT: Which budget? I'm just asking --

MR. KRISLOV: 2016.
THE COURT: For which -- 2016.

## BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q The 2016 budget reduces that 62.9 million by - - to an appropriation of $32,700,910$; is that right?

A As part of balancing the 2016 budget, we did reduce the expenditure down to approximately $\$ 30$ million.

Q And there was, indeed, previously, 62 million appropriated and spent in 2015 , right?

A Yes, there was 62 million spent in ap- -well, we don't have the final 2015 numbers. But the budgeted number for 2015 was 62 million, and that was appropriated for 2015.

Q And the reason for, as I take it from your affidavit -- that figure of $\$ 30$ million, how was that arrived at?
the benefits for both our employees as well as our

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retirees.
And so we look through all of those and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and, particularly, the concerns of the taxpayers and the residents of the city of Chicago who have an expectation of a certain level of services. All of that goes in together in terms of how we make the decision.

In this case, with respect to the subsidy, the subsidy went down by 25 percent, which is consistent with the amount that it had gone down in prior years.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q According to the 2016 budget overview, the cuts -- the spending cuts for personnel savings and reforms total 57.1 million.

Would that --
A That's correct.
Q And that was attributed to vacancy eliminations.

Does that mean we're not paying people who aren't there?

A Yes. We eliminated positions that weren't currently occupied, about 150 of them.

Q And how much did that save in dollars?
A About $\$ 12$ million.
Q And then retiree healthcare was 30.1 million.

That leaves other healthcare savings of how much?

A There's about $\$ 10$ million of other healthcare savings. That's for our active employees.

Q And so your position is that the 30.1 million reflected a 25 percent reduction from what?

A No, it's -- you can't -- you can't look at the -- if you don't mind, let me explain for a second.

You can't look at the number itself. The number was arrive- -- the 30 million is the result of reducing the subsidy for the retirees who retired after 1989 by 25 percent. That, then, generated an additional thirty -- that generated $\$ 30$ million in savings.

THE COURT: So let me ask you a question.
personnel-related costs.]
Right?
A That's correct.
Q And then you say:
[CONTINUING:
91 percent of the City's total positions are union members covered by collective bargaining agreements that preclude salary reductions and other personnel changes, except through layoffs.]

Right?
A That's correct.
Q Okay. So your position, as I take it, is we had all these other people we couldn't do anything about, but the retirees, we could.

A I don't think that's an accurate characterization of my position.

When we look at the reductions that we need to make to address the City's structural deficit -- and by "structural deficit," we're in a situation -- the City's in a situation that we've been in for, really, a better part of the last decade, where the expenses primarily are people -because we deliver services through people -- have

This $\$ 30$ million that you saved, this only deals with the retirees who retired after 1989; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Did you save any from the retirees who retired before August 23rd of 1989 ?

THE WITNESS: No. In fact, our expenses related to those retirees have been increasing because all of our healthcare expenses increase each year.

THE COURT: So this number just deals with the folks who retired as of August 23 rd of 1989, correct?

THE WITNESS: That's correct.
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q You would not dispute that most of these people started working before August 23, 1989?

A I wouldn't know otherwise.
Q Okay. In paragraph seven, you say:
[AS READ:
81 percent of the City's general
operating funds, excluding debt service, are
been growing faster than the revenues. The recession exacerbated that situation. There have been previous decisions by the prior administration to deal with that through one-time revenue sources. So we've really had to make all of that up over the last five budgets.

For us it's a balancing act between how much we can increase taxes. We have some residents of the city who can afford to pay more in taxes; we have a lot of people who can't afford to pay more. So we have to balance that.

The other choice for us is to reduce expenses. Given the number of cuts that we've made over the last five budgets, we're now at a point where in the work that I've been doing, that I believe that cutting services -- cutting expenses further actually will go directly to decreasing -cutting expenses further will go directly to decreasing services that the City provides.

So all of those factors have to go in together. The $\$ 30$ million that we're talking about with respect to retirees is only a portion of the structural deficit that the City had to close for 2016.

And so we had to go look at vacancy reductions, we had to look at cutting contracts, we had to look at new revenues. We had to look at a whole series of things to continue to pay our employees, to continue to provide services, and continue to make pension payments.

Q And so was the $\$ 30$ million figure -- who set the $\$ 30$ million figure?

A As I indicated, it wasn't a determination of $\$ 30$ million. The decision was made to reduce the subsidy that was provided by 25 percent. The end result of that was $\$ 30$ million in savings.

Q Okay. The -- what I don't understand, really, is the 25 percent, we've reduced the people that we do it for, or we reduce the money, or we do -- I don't know -- it's 25 percent of what?

A Of the subsidy level that's provided by the City.

Q Okay. But the subsidy level was, the year before, 62 million nine, and the subsidy level -- for 2015 , and the subsidy level for 2016 is 32 million. If I divide the 32 into 62 , I get lots more than 25 percent.

A I think that's because you and I are
talking about a different subsidy. You're talking about the cash subsidy that's provided. I'm referring to the subsidy level that's provided to the individual.

So the City pays X percent of the cost, they pay Y percent of the cost, and the pension funds obviously pay a share as well. I'm talking about the reduction in the percentage of the City's subsidy, not in the dollar amount.

But it's sort of -- in some ways, it's neither here nor there. The fact is that in looking at this year's budget, the 2016 budget, we obviously look at a range of factors. In the case of retiree healthcare, it's both the phaseout that was announced -- the change in the subsidy levels that was announced by the City back in 2013 and how we were going to address that and how that was going to work, and then also the other factors that I had talked about in terms of balancing the budget.

Q What's the -- how do you get 25 percent? You divide 30 million into what to get 25 percent?

A You don't divide 30 million into anything. You take the individual subsidy level that's provided to each tier of retiree based on when they retired
and the number of years of service that they have, and you reduce that subsidy that's provided to them on an individual basis by 25 percent.

If you do that, then the ultimate
savings is $\$ 30$ million.
Q Okay. When you talk about a subsidy, you know that the City is a self-insurer, right?

A That's correct. I know that.
Q So the City is the insurer. It's not
subsidizing somebody. The City is the providers of the insurance, right?

A We pay for the healthcare cost directly. We don't -- since we are self-insured --

Q Yes or no.
THE COURT: Excuse me. You're going to let her finish her answer.

MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, I'd like to strike the answer --

THE COURT: You may not. You're going to wait till it's done. I'll see whether it should be stricken or not, but I have to let the witness finish.

Again, courtesy.
Please finish your answer, Ms. Holt.

THE WITNESS: We do -- we are self-insured. We do pay for the healthcare costs of our employees and retirees directly. I would still say, though, that it is a subsidy, because it is a share that we are paying for that either our retirees or our own employees do not have to pay for. BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q And Blue Cross is hired on an administrative-services-only basis, correct?

A That's my understanding.
Q And so the benefit -- the programs that are provided under the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan is what you refer to as a subsidy, right?

A I'm referring to the subsidy as the share the City pays for the overall cost of a particular retiree's healthcare through the City plan.

THE COURT: That's how she defines it. People could argue whether it is or is not, but that's what she means when she says "subsidy." MR. KRISLOV: Okay. BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q You say the -- in order to -- paragraph seven, you say:

## [AS READ:

Because the average city employee earns $\$ 73,000$ annually, more than 400 employees would have to be terminated in order achieve $\$ 30$ million in savings.]

What you're doing there is saying that if you were to find $\$ 30$ million in additional revenues by chopping positions, you would have to chop 400 positions, right?

A That is one option. We would need to cut expenses in some way, whether it's people or services that we provide.

Q And had you left the budget at the same amount that you had in 2015, you wouldn't have -- you would have had to just raise the revenues that would be indicated, right?

A No, I'm not sure I agree that.
We have two choices in trying to pay
for expenses that the City has: One is to cut expenses, which is, as I had stated, really, at this stage, it's about either cutting people or cutting services; the other choice is to increase taxes or fees.

If we had left the subsidy where it

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was for 2015 and carried that additional 30 million into 2016, we would have had to find money someplace, either through increased fees or taxes, or through cutting expenses to pay for that $\$ 30$ million.

Q Okay. But it wasn't -- you wouldn't have necessarily had to do that by firing 400 employees?

A There are lots of options that are available. If we go towards reducing services, then our choice -- if we go towards cutting expenses, then our choices are firing employees, or eliminating jobs, or cutting other kinds of programs that the city provides.

Q Right. But you're not -- the -- sticking the sentence in there as if you had to cut 400 employees. That would -- that's one of your options, but that isn't required, right?

A No, it's not required. It's one of our options. Cutting our after-school program is another option. Cutting back garbage service is another option. I mean, there are options available to us, but all of them do result in some kind of service reduction at this point.

Q And the total corporate -- the total corporate budget, there's -- as I understand, there
are two budgets in the city. One is the corporate budget, which is basically the general spending, and the other are reserve moneys, from whether it's project deals, bond deals, whatever, that are sort of separate. If we just focus on the corporate side, that's sort of the City's general operating account; would you agree?

A The corporate fund is our generating account.

Q Okay. And the total in the -- the total budget for the corporate fund in each year is about $\$ 31 / 2$ billion, right?

A No, I wouldn't say in each year. It was $31 / 2$ billion in 2015.

Q And 3 1/2 billion, a little more. It's like 3.6 billion in 2016 ?

A Yes, it did increase in 2016 due to raises that were required under the union contracts.

Q So that's $\$ 100$ million that it went up. And the total of $\$ 30$ million to the City's annual corporate budget is, as I calculate it, about 1 percent; would that be right?

A That's correct.
Q Or is it $1 / 10$ of 1 percent?

Q And did you consider in not raising taxes by that additional $\$ 30$ million that the retirees might actually be protected by the Illinois Constitution against such a diminution?

A I'll defer to the lawyers on the legal issues. As I -- the City, back in 2013, when the settlement agreement that had provided the healthcare -- retiree healthcare expired, announced that it was going to be reducing the subsidies over time, proposed a three-year phaseout, certainly, from, you know, the legal advice that we had, that we believed that that's within our rights to do that.

Q Okay. When you raise the idea that you're going to have to -- that cutting summer and after-school programming, that if you chose to do it by cutting summer and after-school programming, you'd have to cut 12,500 , or 17,500 positions, these are not the only -- these and cutting 400 people from their jobs are not the only options that you had open to you, right?

A We certainly have other options open to us, but as I indicated, they are options that will reduce -- result in service reductions.

Other options that I have, for

One second, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sure. (Brief pause.)

## BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q You said you left the issue of whether or not these people were -- the retirees were protected by the Illinois constitution to the lawyers?

A Uhm-hmm.
Q Right?
A Yes, I did say that.
Q You are a lawyer?
A Iam.
Q And so you understand the concept of constitutional protection, right?

A I do.
Q But you did not -- and what I asked was whether -- or what I'd like -- did you consider whether it would be constitutionally -- whether retirees were constitutionally protected against a reduction in the subsidy?

A Do you mean as a personal matter or in my official role? I'm not sure I understand.

Q In your capacity as the budget director of City of Chicago.

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A So my capacity as a budget director of the City of Chicago is -- not to be difficult -- is not to provide legal advice.

In this case, you know, the attorneys who advise the City, who both work for the City and who advise the City, outside attorneys, provided us with the advice on what we could and could not do.

Certainly, we took that into consideration when we announced the phaseout of the subsidies back in 2013. And we always take that advice into consideration when we make decisions, whether it's related to retiree healthcare, or it's, you know, transitioning to grid garbage or whatever it might be doing that the City -- whatever we might be doing to save money. And I rely on their advice in this case because they're the experts.

I'm the expert in the budget, and how we pay for things, and how we spend our money, and operational issues. But I would obviously rely on the expertise of our attorneys to advise on constitutional issues. BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q Did you consider this back in 2013, or did you consider it more recently, the constitutional
issue more recently? Was that taken into account, in, say, 2015?

A Legal issues around this, including the constitutional issues, have been taken into account all the way through the decision-making process.

Q But what I'm asking is during 2015, was that aspect considered?

A And as I indicated, yes, it's been considered from day one, and it continues to be considered.

Q The answer that --
THE COURT: The answer is yes.
MR. KRISLOV: The question is, is it considered now in the 2015 reduction, in the reduction from 2015 to 2016.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Actually, that wasn't the question.

THE COURT: No, that wasn't the question. The question was about the 2015 budget, not the 2016.

But you may rephrase.
MR. KRISLOV: Thank you.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q For the 2016 budget, was that reviewed

A I am aware of none.
Q So the City could have ceased right then and there to provide any subsidies based upon the expiration of the prior statute?

MR. KRISLOV: Objection. She is not being --

THE WITNESS: It's my understanding -THE COURT: One second.
MR. KRISLOV: She's not a legal -she's not a legal -- she disavows being a legal expert in this respect, and he wants her to testify as to the legality.

THE COURT: That objection is
sustained. BY MR. PRENDERGAST:

Q Assume for me that the City's obligation under those time-limited statutes expired in the middle of 2013, for the purposes of my question.

Do you have that assumption in mind?
A I do have that assumption in mind.
Q When in 2013 the City extended subsidies to the end of 2013 and then introduced a phaseout program over the next four years, why -- do you know why the City did it in a phaseout process rather than
again?
A Yes, it was reviewed again.
Q And the decision was that you could keep on reducing it at the City's unilateral decision?

A The advice was that the City was able to continue to reduce and that we were not obligated to continue to provide that subsidy.

MR. KRISLOV: No further questions of Ms. Holt, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Cross.

## CROSS-EXAMINATION

## BY MR. PRENDERGAST:

Q Ms. Holt, you were asked about 2013 in the last question you were just asked, what was considered.

In mid 2013, are you aware that a statute which provided for subsidies expired, that was provided to the City that provides the subsidies expires as a matter of law?

A I am aware that that statute expired.
Q Okay. At that point in time, after that point in time, were you aware of any statutory obligation on the part of the City to provide subsidies?

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just stopping subsidies altogether?
A We did it for a couple of reasons: First, with respect to 2013, when we chose to continue to extend the subsidy at its current levels to the end of 2013, we were in the middle of a plan year. We did that specifically because we didn't want to be in a position of asking retirees to go out in the middle of the year, in the middle of a plan year, and try to find a new healthcare plan. We knew that that would be difficult for them to do, particularly for those that didn't have a second job or didn't have a spouse that could provide that healthcare, and we wanted to provide that bridge.

We then, at the same time, as I had noted, announced that we would be doing the phaseout over the following three years. We did that phaseout intentionally, again, to provide people an opportunity to look for other options, but also because we knew that the Affordable Care Act was coming into play over a couple of years and that there would be more options widely available to retirees; hence both the extension in 2013 that the City chose to do, as well as the phasedown over the following three years.

Q And each of those programs, whether it was the extension to the end of 2013 or the phaseout over the next three years each year, each of those was time limited, was it not?

A They were time limited. We do our healthcare programming, in this case, fiscal years or calendar years, because they're the same for us.

So when we put out, either for retirees/employees, the healthcare plan for the next year, it is just for the next year.

Q So what you did for 2013 was time limited for 2013, correct?

A That's correct.
Q What you did for 2014 was time limited for 2014, correct?

A That's correct.
Q What you did for 2015 was time limited for 2015, correct?

A That's correct.
Q And what you're doing for 2016 was time limited through the end of 2016; is that correct?

A That is correct.
MR. PRENDERGAST: I have no further questions, Judge.

A That's correct.
Q You mentioned the Affordable Care Act, and as I understand it, the City's desire in this phaseout is basically to put the retirees onto the Affordable Care Act rather than have the City pay for their healthcare, correct?

A I'm not sure that's fully accurate. I would say that I don't think it's necessarily our desire to put them on the Affordable Care Act.

The Affordable Care Act relates to the fact that we did a three-year phaseout. Knowing that the Affordable Care Act was coming into play, we knew that retirees who didn't have another option, such as secondary employment, or, again, a spouse or a partner who provides healthcare, would have another -- yet another option available to them, other than the insurance plans that were available on the market when we started in 2013, so that was one of the guiding principles behind why we chose to do the phasedown the way that we've done it.

Q And did you consider as well that the -you're aware that Blue Cross has dropped its individual PPO plans from the Illinois insurance exchange, are you not?

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## THE COURT: Redirect.

## REDIRECT EXAMINATION

## BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q So for each year after 2013, after midyear of 2013, for each year, there's an ordinance that sets out what the City's going to do on its annuitant healthcare plan for the year?

A It's part of our appropriations ordinance.
Q Okay. And that's the ordinance that each year sets what you're going to do, right?

A That ordinance sets what we're allowed to spend each year for our retiree healthcare.

Q And you don't need another ordinance in order to have the retiree healthcare plan for that year, correct?

A I do need the appropriation ordinance which authorizes me to spend money. That appropriation ordinance is only good for that particular fiscal year.

Q So for each year, there's an appropriation ordinance -- for each year, there's -- the ordinance is the appropriation ordinance. That's what authorizes you to do the annuitant healthcare plan for that year?
programs?
A I can't speak to that specifically.
Q Okay. So if the retirees have inferior plans at the conclusion of your phaseout, that's really not your problem?

THE COURT: Would you repeat it so I could hear? I didn't hear the verb.

If the retirees what?
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q I said if the retirees have, after the City has phased this out, inferior plans to choose from, that's not your problem as far as the City's concerned?

MR. PRENDERGAST: Objection. Lack of foundation.

THE COURT: No.
You can answer the question.
THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know if I would say it's not our problem, per se. I mean, obviously, all of these are very difficult decisions that have to be taken seriously.

THE COURT: Answer the question, Ms. Holt.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honor.

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I don't know whether they're going to have inferior plans or not. I can't speak to that. THE COURT: That's not the question, Ms. Holt. The question is --

THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: -- after you decide to phase them out, ending in 2017, it's the City's position that they're on their own and the City's not concerned about it, correct?

THE WITNESS: That's --
THE COURT: Yes or no.
THE WITNESS: Yes. That is correct.
THE COURT: From a financial point of view. We're not talking about heart. We all care about our people, but this is the City speaking. You're an agent of the City. You just care -- you're just talking about the financial concern of the City.

And after the total -- the termination of the phaseout period, the City, from what you're just saying, is only concerned with the financial aspect, not the heart aspect, correct?

THE WITNESS: That is correct.
MR. KRISLOV: No further questions, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Any redirect -- recross, I'm sorry.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. PRENDERGAST:
Q If, Ms. Holt, the City of Chicago had only been concerned about the financial --

THE COURT: Say that again. I'm hearing coughing, I didn't hear the question, Richard. I'm sorry.
BY MR. PRENDERGAST:
Q If the City had only been concerned about the financial aspect of the reduction of healthcare costs, would that have been the only consideration, and not caring one thing about the retirees, as the Court notes, the heart issue, okay, then in mid 2013, purely on a financial basis, what would the City have done?

A We would have completely cut the subsidy for all retirees at that point in time.

Q Thank you.
Second question. Counsel talked to
you about various appropriation ordinances.
Do you recall his questions?
A I do recall his questions.

Q Were each of those appropriation ordinances time limited?

A Yes. Each appropriation ordinance was time limited to the fiscal year for which it relates.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you.
MR. KRISLOV: The only question --
just one question on the --
THE COURT: Proceed.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q The appropriation ordinance, each year's appropriation ordinance is the amount to be spent for that year, right?

A Yes, it's the amount to be spent for that year and that year only.

THE COURT: Okay. You're done.
MR. KRISLOV: Wait. Let me -- she threw in the "that year only." BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q The ordinance doesn't say "in that year only," the ordinance says for that year, right?

A No. It is for that year only, both based on the ordinance, as well as state appropriation law, as well as the accounting laws that we have to spend.

The money that is collected and spent in 2015 has to be collected and spent in 2015.

Q Understood. But the ordinance, the appropriation ordinance says for this year, for the year -- whatever year we're talking about, it is the ordinance to be -- this is what is to be raised for this year, right? This is what is to be raised for this year, this is what is authorized to be spent for this year, right?

A Yes, for that year and that year only, that is correct.

Q You keep adding "for that year only."
THE COURT: That's your answer,
whether you like it or not. You can argue to me later.

MR. KRISLOV: I just want to get whether --

THE COURT: You want to get the answer you want, and she's not giving it to you.

MR. KRISLOV: Well, I don't know that.
THE COURT: It happens. You may inquire further.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Do you know whether the language of the

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ordinance says "and for that year only" or it just says "for that year"?

A I don't know that it says either of those sentences. The fact is --

Q Okay. Thank you. That's --
THE COURT: Let the woman finish her answer, please.

MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor.
THE COURT: Don't "Your Honor" me. If you ask a question, you got to wait and have courtesy and let the witness just finish. We're not cutting people off.

Go ahead. Finish, Ms. Holt.
THE WITNESS: From an appropriation perspective, given the rules we have to follow and the accounting rules, for that year versus for that year only, have no practical difference. And so I just want to be clear, and perhaps I'm not, is that the money that we collect in a particular year and the authority to spend is limited to that year, and it can't be used, the appropriation authority cannot be used for the following year.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q I'm with you on that.

But, if you are constitutionally prohibited from reducing or diminishing a benefit, then the appropriation for one year could very well be, if the Constitution protects against that benefit being diminished --

THE COURT: It's a hypothetical, and you're talking to me about that one, and we'll argue that. I'll let you argue that.

I'm not going to ask -- and to be quite honest, without trying to insult you, Ms. Holt, or anyone else here, I don't care what her opinion is on it. I'm the giver of the law and the maker of the law today. And you can take it to a higher court. We're going to argue it today if you and I disagree. But Ms. Holt's not in the position of deciding this case, I am. So you're asking a legal question for her to opine on; the answer of which, from her, I could care less about -- about which I could care less.

MR. KRISLOV: Okay. With that, I have no further questions of Ms. Holt.

THE COURT: I do. Have a seat, Mr. Krislov.

So tell me about the City's policy

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that was instituted. And I don't know the answer to these questions, and I have no horse in this race.

But when you decided to phase things out over time, from 2013 to -- the middle of 2013 first to the end of 2013, and then for four years thereafter, what notice did you give the retirees, the retirees who retired after August 23rd, 1989, because that's the group we're talking about?

And, secondly, as part of that, what efforts did the City make to help in the -- in a human -- in an HR point of view to be available to the retirees, to answer their questions, help them find ACA alternatives, other options? This goes to my heart question. What did the City do, if anything, to mitigate the situation and try and help the retirees, if it did or not. And I don't -honestly, I don't know the answer to it.

THE WITNESS: Okay. So the first notice that went out to retirees and employees came after the retiree health commission issued their report recommending that the City sort of get out of the business of providing retiree healthcare.

That happened -- that first notice
happened sometime in the summer of 2013. And then
that announced that we would be going through a phaseout period but that we would be maintaining the subsidies at their current levels to the end of 2013.

Then the retirees would have all received a package in the fall, you know, late summer or fall of 2013, announcing what the subsidy level would be for 2014 and again reiterating the changes that we would be making over time.

There was then a subsequent letter that went to them in the fall of 2014 and another one that went to them in the fall of 2015.

We have a benefits hotline that retirees can call and have questions answered. One thing that we did do over the course of this, starting in 2015, is instead of providing a one-size-fits-all healthcare program, our health plan, we actually provided for different plans this year that tried to balance, because as the subsidies were going down, we recognized that for some retirees, the increase in the premium was going to be difficult to maintain the plan that they've had before, and tried to give them four different options that allowed them to balance both -- if they have different healthcare needs, or healthcare needs and

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also their financial needs, because they all had a different mix of deductibles and premiums, and, in fact, even provided a plan that would allow people to pay less than they had paid the prior year.

So it's been that. It's been the work that -- you know, deferring to Nancy Currier and her team, who manage benefits, and the questions that they've answered and the information that they've been providing to retirees to try to explain to people what their options are.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Holt.
Any questions based upon that, Mr. Krislov?

MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
THE COURT: By the way, I noted for the record in my opinion of December 3rd that the retiree healthcare report -- is it the benefits -RHBC --

THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: -- came out January 11th, 2013, for the record.

Go ahead, Mr. Krislov, just based upon my question alone.
BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q The chairman of the Retiree Health Benefits Commission, that was Mr. Amer Ahmad?

A He was the comptroller at the time. And, yes, I believe he was the chairman of the commission.

Q And his current residence?
A I don't know where he is currently.
THE COURT: I know where it is, Clint. It's in the federal penitentiary. What a surprise. (Laughter.)
THE COURT: I would note, however, you haven't attacked the substance of that January 11th, 2013 report made not only by him but by, I guess, a whole lot of folks, in your petition, but it's an interesting point.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Whether that -- the letter that you're talking about is the May 2013 letter advising -- that went out to retirees -- I think it's an exhibit that we got here. And the package in two thousand -- when you say fall of 2013, '14, '15, you would not dispute that that went out in October of each year?

A I would dispute that. I believe it went out earlier. I certainly know this year it went out, I believe, in August or September. But it went out
in the late summer. I would agree that it went out late summer, early fall of each year.

Q And the four different plans that are offered, one has a very limited network, right?

A That's correct.
Q One has a very high deductible?
A Yes, that's correct.
Q And one has a combination of both a high deductible and a limited network?

A That's correct.
Q Okay. And you would not -MR. KRISLOV: And that's -- I think we have no more questions of Ms. Holt. THE COURT: Okay. Anything on that? RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PRENDERGAST:

Q Do you recall the credentials, how many members there were of that commission?

A I believe there were somewhere between eight and ten members.

Q And do you remember -- recall the credentials of the people on that committee? Not of all of them, but it was a -- it had both academic advisors who were well known in the healthcare area.

We had labor and union representation and other people who had both financial, as well as healthcare, qualifications to review the City's retiree
healthcare plan and make recommendations based on both what --

MR. KRISLOV: Objection. The report speaks for itself.

THE COURT: Oh, no, no, no, sir. You attacked the credibility of the report by attacking the gentleman who's now in the school of hard knocks, as we say.

So you opened the door. He's entitled to rehabilitate.

MR. KRISLOV: Fair enough.
THE WITNESS: And so they were charged with, as I said, looking at both the current state of healthcare, as well as the options that would be available both today, as well as going forward and making a series of recommendations.
BY MR. PRENDERGAST:
Q The gentleman who was the chairman, do you have any knowledge as to whether any criminal difficulties that he had had anything to do with his work on the commission?

Do you have another question? I'm not going to let her comment on the credibility of that gentleman. You've already made your point. I understand that.

MR. KRISLOV: Well, Mr. Prendergast asked her if his wrongdoing had any connection to the committee, his work on the committee.

And the fact is, he put in false reports when he was in the Ohio State treasurer's office. And falsifying reports is a --

THE COURT: If you have any evidence that this report was false, I would have assumed you would have filed that in your petition, and you didn't, but that's okay.

If you want to attack the credibility of the other eight to ten members, try and do it. If you think that they were a mere rubber stamp for this guy who's in the finishing school, whatever federal penitentiary you want to call it, be my guest. Go ahead and try.

But this witness doesn't know any of that.

MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Well, let's try this one.

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A To my knowledge, they did not. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q You did mention that on the membership of the committee, you said there were union representatives.

A They were labor representatives, yes.
Q And you know that the unions do not represent the retirees, right?

A That's my understanding.
Q Okay. And the -- and as far as his work on the committee, his credibility is of some importance, would you agree, his honesty?

THE COURT: You can argue that to me. I'm not going to let a witness comment on the honesty vel non of anybody else.

MR. KRISLOV: Well, she's already said --

THE COURT: No, you did. So that's sustained by the Court.

MR. KRISLOV: She already testified -THE COURT: It's sustained. What do you want from me? You want to keep going? It's going nowhere. That question is sustained.

BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q You are aware that there were some people on the board who disagreed with the board's conclusion that the retiree healthcare should be terminated?

A I'm not aware of that.
Q And that the -- you're not aware of that at all?

A No. I know that they issued a report that had a range of options and recommendations to the City.

My assumption about the report was that since it was issued under all of their names, that everybody agreed with the variety of recommendations that were made.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q And, finally, was there someone on there who represented retirees?

THE COURT: If you know.
THE WITNESS: I don't recall.
MR. KRISLOV: Okay. No further questions.

MR. PRENDERGAST: May I? THE COURT: Sure.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you. RECROSS-EXAMINATION

## BY MR. PRENDERGAST:

Q There were labor representatives on the committee, right?

A That's correct.
Q They represented people who are currently in labor unions?

A That's correct.
Q Labor unions with the employees of the City, correct?

MR. KRISLOV: Objection. Calls for a conclusion that she has no knowledge of, and she's not --

THE COURT: Really? The purpose of cross-examination in any examination is for you to determine what her knowledge is.

If you want to testify, and you are her conscience, you may so testify. That objection is utterly overruled, because you don't have firsthand knowledge of that.

So you may inquire, though.
Go ahead.
BY MR. PRENDERGAST:

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Q The labor union representatives represented people who are in unions who are future retirees, correct?

A That is correct.
Q And that commission report had a profound impact on the pensions of future retirees, did it not?

A I would say it had a profound impact on the retiree healthcare of future retirees.

MR. PRENDERGAST: No further questions.

THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Krislov.
You may attack her firsthand knowledge as to that subject matter of that report only, nothing more.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q The fact is, you don't know who they were representing on the board, do you?

A No. Our labor representatives represent the employees of the City of Chicago. We have well over 30 labor unions, all of whom represent different factions of our city employees.

The labor representative who are on it represent those employees.

MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, could I have everything stricken after "yes"?

THE COURT: No. You ask a question, you get the answer.

MR. KRISLOV: Yeah, but, Your Honor, to take issue with you on this --

THE COURT: Don't bother. My ruling is the same. Your objection is noted for the record. You may do whatever you want with it, but let's move on.

Anything else on her firsthand
knowledge as to who the labor unions represented? BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q You don't have firsthand knowledge as to who the labor unions repre- --

THE COURT: Asked and answered. She said yes, she does, and the employees of City of Chicago.

Next question.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q You would agree that they do not represent, because I think you said this before, they don't represent --

THE COURT: Then why ask it again?

BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q The people who were, then --
THE COURT: Asked and answered.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q -- retirees --
THE COURT: Asked and answered, Clint. MR. KRISLOV: Okay, you --
THE COURT: I heard her testimony.
She did say that.
MR. KRISLOV: Okay. We're done.
THE COURT: Well, Ms. Holt, have a
Merry Christmas.
THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Witness excused.)
THE COURT: Call your next witness.
MR. KRISLOV: Nancy Currier.
THE COURT: All right.
Ms. Court Reporter, do you need a
break?
THE COURT REPORTER: Only if you do.
THE COURT: I don't. I'm good.
Hello.
THE WITNESS: Hi. How are you?
THE COURT: I'm very good. Would you
raise your right hand, please.
(Witness sworn.)
THE WITNESS: I do.
THE COURT: Very good.
Would you have a seat, and would you speak up. Everyone's voices are starting to --

THE WITNESS: And I have a very soft voice.

THE COURT: Well, you're not going to today. Pretend that the person who needs to hear your testimony, me, is at the rear of this courtroom, and keep your voice up.

Would you do that?
THE WITNESS: I will do my best.
THE COURT: Well, I can't ask for more than that.

Mr. Krislov, Ms. Currier is your witness, and she's sworn.

MR. KRISLOV: Always good to see you. Sorry it's under these circumstances.

NANCY CURRIER,
having been called as a witness and having been first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION
cover.
MR. LAYDEN: I'm just asking the year
since --
THE WITNESS: I was --
MR. LAYDEN: -- Ms. Currier didn't join the City until 1991.

THE WITNESS: I was not the benefits manager at the time of that handbook.

THE COURT: We're having a nice discussion.

THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
THE COURT: You only answer questions that are put to you.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: You don't volunteer anything.

Do you understand?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: All right. Next. Ask your question, Mr. Krislov.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q In order to be eligible for coverage under the City of Chicago Annuitant Health -- excuse me. The City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan,

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as I understand it, you -- a person will be eligible for coverage if you are an annuitant of the City of Chicago. "Annuitant" means a former employee who is receiving an age and service annuity from one of the four retirement funds; is that accurate?

A That's accurate.
MR. PRENDERGAST: Counsel, just -- you probably thought you gave us that, but did you give me a copy of the exhibit?
(Document tendered.)
MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Number two, the -- under the plan, the City is the insurer, is it not?

A I wasn't the benefits manager at that time.
Q Now.
A Now, the City self-funds the medical plan.
Q Meaning that the City acts as the insurer, right?

A The City self-funds the insurance, correct.
Q The City is the insurer?
A The City self-funds the plan.
Q Yes, or no, the City is the insurer?
THE COURT: No, it's not a yes or no.

She gave you the answer that you asked. You asked a question, she gave you the answer.

If you two are going to spend the rest of the day fencing over semantics, we're going to be here -- I have no problem being here Christmas Day, but let's not fence on semantics and move on.

I understood her answer, and so did you, so let's move on.

MR. KRISLOV: Well, I think I have a right to get a yes or no to --

THE COURT: And I think you don't. I think you have a right to an answer that is an answer to the question. And if the witness does not accept the premise of your question, she can elucidate. She can explain, and she did. If you don't like it, I'm sorry. But you asked the question.

MR. KRISLOV: I believe I'm entitled to an answer to the question I asked, but we'll move on.

## BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q The City doesn't pay an outside insurer to be the insurer, right?

A The City pays a third-party administer to pay the claims, and then we pay for the claims.

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MR. KRISLOV: Would you read the question again?

THE COURT REPORTER: Your Honor?
THE COURT: Ms. Currier, Mr. Krislov is asking for a yes-or-no answer. It didn't ask for an explanation as to the process. I took your answer as yes. You pay the claims. You have a third-party administer, but the -- it's Blue Cross.

But Blue Cross doesn't dip into their
own pocket. You do. The City, does right?
THE WITNESS: Correct.
THE COURT: Then answer the question.
Let's not fence.
Do you understand me?
THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.
THE COURT: If you can answer the question yes or no, do it.

THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: We don't want -- I don't want -- if I asked you what day it is today, you wouldn't say, "It's cold outside, it's raining, I don't want to be here, and I want to go shopping and take care of my family instead of talking to Mr. Krislov." The answer would be "It's Wednesday,"
right?
THE WITNESS: Correct.
THE COURT: Answer accordingly.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
THE COURT: Next question.
MR. KRISLOV: Thank you, Your Honor.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q You're familiar with the rate changes that the City has announced for January 1, 2016, are you not?

A Yes, I am.
Q And you were involved in setting those rate changes?

A Yes.
Q And those rate changes result directly from reduction in the City's appropriation for retiree healthcare?

A The increases in the premium are a result of the reduction in the subsidy, as well as the projected cost of the medical care in 2016.

Q Okay. Let me give context, because I think I understand how this occurs, but perhaps we can do it -- in the past, under the settlement, what happened was the City would have the Segal Group

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estimate what costs were likely to increase in the coming year, and then, for want of a better term, reverse engineer from that back to what that amount would then, taking into consideration the City's subsidy, or contribution, or what the City paid, its percentage, the pension fund subsidy, and the annuitants would pay the rest, right?

A Correct.
Q For two thousand and -- was that done for -- the rest of 2013, they just continued the rates?

A Correct. We did not reset the rates for July 1st, 2013.

We reset the rates January 1st, 2014; January 1st, 2015; January 1st, 2016.

Q Okay. Were those done with the same -- by the same calculation mode, or is it just that you set the rates?

A Those were done with the same methodology.
Q Okay. So you did use the Segal methodology for each of those years?

A Yes, Segal projects a cost.
Q And the same thing for 2016?
A Correct.

Q Okay. And so there is -- okay.
You are also aware of the reconciliation process that took place during the settlement period?

A Yes, I am.
Q That's where we met.
A Yes.
Q And during that ten years, you would agree, would you not, that every single one of those years, when audited and reconciled, resulted in a refund to retirees?

A I believe it was every year.
Q Okay. And you would not dispute that the total was an average of slightly in excess of $\$ 5$ million a year?

A I think it actually went up and down. I couldn't --

Q Okay. The aggregate -- you would not dispute that the aggregate, whether you call it an overcharge or a refund or reconciliation, that totaled $\$ 51$ million over ten years?

A That sounds reasonable.
Q Okay. The special disenrollment, re-enroll ment plan --
(Document tendered.)
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q As I understand, this was voted on by the benefits committee of the Chicago City Council, right?

A It's the benefits committee for the City.
Q Okay. And you're on it?
A Yes, I am. The benefits manager is on it, yes.

Q Okay. Yeah, you're on it by your office. This was -- why did this pop up? Why did this occur?

A Apparently, there was -- I mean, there's been a concern that people that disenrolled for 2016 because of the rates wouldn't be allowed to come back in without proving good health.

So we decided -- we had a discussion.
We decided that we would give them an opportunity to re-enroll in the plan without providing proof of good health.

Q And when was -- and when was this considered and done?

A It was done on Friday, December --
Q This past --

A Amendment?
Q The -- I'm not sure you're aware -- I don't know, but I presume you are.

The provision under which the City -sorry. This is Exhibit 6 to the City's submission. It says, amendment -- this is December 18th Amendment to the City of Chicago Non-Medicare Eligible Retiree Healthcare Plan and Medicare Supplement Retiree Healthcare Plan special Disenrollment and Reinstatement Periods.

Are you familiar with that?
A Yes, I am.
MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, if counsel's going to question her on this document, which is attached to our response, can he at least have her use my copy so she can see the document?

THE COURT: If necessary. Are you going to question Ms. Currier about the substance of this document, Mr. Krislov?

MR. KRISLOV: I guess so. I'm glad to give her a copy.

THE COURT: Here. Take mine. I've read it. I'm aware of the substance.

Go ahead.

A December 18th, yes.
THE COURT: So now folks can opt back in without regard to their -- any subsequent healthcare problems or anything until September '17, two thousand -- September 2017; is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Right. I believe it's --

MR. KRISLOV: I believe it's '16. THE COURT: I'm so sorry. MR. KRISLOV: It's September '16. THE WITNESS: Through September 30th, 2016.

THE COURT: Okay. It was my
understanding that this has been extended to 2017, no?

MR. KRISLOV: No. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q This has not been passed by the Chicago City Council, has it?

A It doesn't need to be. It's been signed by the people that need to sign it.

Q And it also -- as I read it, it says that -- under number three --
[AS READ:
The annuitant may reinstate coverage for any person who is covered on December 1, 2015, with the following exceptions: (A) If during the time of absence from the plan the annuitant's dependent reaches the plan's limiting age, the dependent is not eligible for reinstatement.] Right?
A That's correct.
Q So if you drop their coverage, and their child passes the age, they can't come back in for the expenses that the child would have incurred during that drop period, right?

A Well, the child has reached the limiting age. They'd no longer be eligible to be covered by the plan.

Q But they wouldn't be able to come back in for the drop period, right?

A No. It's prospective coverage.
Q It's only prospective?
A Uhm-hmm.
Q Second:
[CONTINUING:
If during the time of absence from the

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plan the annuitant divorces his or her spouse, the former spouse is not eligible for reinstatement.]

A That's correct. They're divorced. They're not eligible under the plan anyway, a divorced spouse.

Q But if they had been on the plan, they would remain?

A No. You can't cover a divorced spouse. They're not eligible.

Q And once again, it would not cover the drop period?

A Correct. Its prospective coverage. They can come back prospectively.

Q And the other thing is, this doesn't -this doesn't -- you have no idea whether the people, if they decide to drop the City coverage because they can't afford it, and so they sign up with another plan, you have no control over whether they can drop that plan without penalty?

A You can drop an ACA plan without penalty.
Q At any time?
A Yeah. I believe within 14 days' notice, you can drop it.

Q And you're also aware that the ACA -- that

United Healthcare has dropped it's PPO individual purchasable plans?

A I heard something about United Healthcare, not all the specifics.

Q And you heard about Blue Cross dropping its individual purchase PPO plans, right?

A Correct.
Q And so the fact of the matter is that if they drop the City coverage because they can't afford it, they may, indeed, wind up in an inferior plan?

A I don't think all those -- I don't agree that those plans are inferior.

Q You don't agree that any plans are inferior or --

A I'm sure there are some inferior plans, and I'm sure there are some that are superior.

Q And have you checked that out?
A We have done some research on that, my team and I.

Q Did you know that --
A There are some advantage to those ACA plans. They cover some things that we don't cover in the standard medical plan that we offer.

They have drug copayments that go into
the out-of-pocket limit, for instance. Our drug copayments do not.

Q And some of their copay and some of their out of pockets are generally as much as $\$ 6,000$ for an individual; $\$ 12,000$ for a family?

A It depends on the plan. There's different levels in the ACA.

Q And you would not dispute that the plan that was in effect -- and you're familiar with the plan that was in effect in 1987, are you not?

A No, I'm not.
Q Not at all?
A No.
Q And at least you would concede that if that plan has a $\$ 1,000$ deductible, that cost of $\$ 55$ a month or $\$ 21$ a month paid for by whomever, that that is a superior plan to one that you have to pay $\$ 2,200$ a month for, would you agree?

A Depends what that plan covered. I can't speak to what the plan covered in 1989.

Q Okay. But when we talk about saving money by going into the ACA, you're focusing on premium cost, correct?

A This premium cost that you have to look at,
in the ACA plans, you can see a doctor and pay a copayment. You don't have to meet the deductible. So there are some advantage to some of those ACA plans, like I said.

Q If you can --
A So there's always a tradeoff between premium and out-of-pocket deductibles.

Q Okay. The -- let's see.
Now, when you say in your view -you're familiar with your affidavit that was submitted as Exhibit 5 to the City's submission?

THE COURT: Ms. Currier, can I have that back? Do you need to see your affidavit, or -THE WITNESS: Well, it depends what I can remember.

THE COURT: Well, we'll both look at it together, unless you have an extra copy.
(Document tendered.)
THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Take a look at that, and tell me if that's the affidavit that you signed.

THE WITNESS: Yes, it is.
THE COURT: Mr. Krislov, you've
tendered to the witness Plaintiffs' Exhibit D for

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purpose of identification, yeah?
MR. KRISLOV: No, I think -- yes.
It's now our Exhibit D, but it is the City's Exhibit 5 to its submission.

Either way, we have the same document.
THE COURT: It's the Currier affidavit that's part of the City's submission, which you have now tendered as your Exhibit D.

Proceed.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Your comparison of -- at page -- I guess it's paragraphs four through six. What I think you're saying is that their out-of-pocket costs, if all that they get is the subsidy that the Funds provided -- if the City only provided today the subsidy that the Funds provided under the 1983 and ' 85 amendments, that the retirees would have to pay more than -- would have to pay less in 2016 than they would have had to pay if 2016 only had the subsidy obligations of the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments?

A I believe that's what I'm saying, yes.
Q Okay. But for purposes of -- and you're -aren't you comparing apples to oranges there? Because in the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments, the City --
your position is that the City didn't have any
obligation under the explicit terms of the statute to make a contribution, right?

A That's what this is saying, yes.
Q Okay. Are you a lawyer?
A No, I'm not lawyer.
MR. KRISLOV: Okay. So I would move
to strike her conclusions as to -- I think these conclusions require a legal opinion, but Your Honor can deal with that later.

THE COURT: Okay, I will. Motion to
strike is denied. But I'll certainly take into account, in terms of the weight of what she's saying, that which you just elicited from the witness stand. BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q And when you say Exhibit 9 is incomplete, you say that the --

THE COURT: Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9, you mean?

MR. KRISLOV: Correct.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Sorry. You refer at your paragraph seven to Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9, which is our spreadsheet and the statements of the retirees as to their -- and

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I think what you're referring to is a comparison of their premium to their annuity, right?

A Correct.
Q Okay. And you're saying that it's
incomplete because it doesn't take into account other sources of income that retirees or their spouses may have?

A Correct.
Q Okay. Now, it is not your -- it is not your position that the retirees are entitled to healthcare only if they have a certain amount of income or less, is it?

A No.
Q Their entitlement -- if they have an entitlement --

A I'm not -- I wouldn't agree with the word "entitlement." They're eligible for coverage under the plan if they're an annuitant of one of the four city pension plans at the current time.

Q Okay. And their entitlement to partici- -sorry. Their right to participate under the plan is not dependent on making more or less income. They have a right --

A Right. If they're an annuitant of the
plan --
Q If they're -- sorry. If they're an annuitant --

A Right. If they're receiving an annuity of one of the four pension plans --

Q Then you're eligible to be a participant in the annuitant healthcare plan?

A Correct.
Q Regardless of your income?
A Correct.
Q Okay. So their entitlement isn't
determined by their income.
What you're saying is that the -- in evaluating whether they can afford these premiums or whether they should apply for a means test cap shows that the -- that they are not being subjected to an unfair burden, right?

A That's right. We don't know the family income.

Q Okay. And you don't have a right to demand that, do you?

A No. People can apply for a means test if they want to.

Q Okay. How many people have applied -- you

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would know how many people have applied?
A I would have to research that. I don't know --

Q You have no idea?
A I think it's around a thousand, but I don't know. Over the ten-year period -- or we've had it in effect longer than that since the settlement plan -we've had a means test. So I don't know the number of individuals that have applied, no.

Q Okay. And you don't know whether any -you don't know if any of the people have applied for 2015 or ' 16 ?

A The number? I don't know off the top my head, no.

Q Ballpark?
A (No response.)
Q No idea?
A I'd be guessing.
Q Okay. And you say that the fact that they have not received cap premium coverage under the City's means test suggests that these retirees have sources of income beyond their annuities which would disqualify them from receiving cap premium costs and other benefits pursuant to the City's means test.

What you're saying is, since these people are on a list, your conclusion is that they must have other income, otherwise they'd have applied, right?

A That's the statement, yes.
Q And have you reviewed -- have you done any statistical analysis to determine if people actually understand their ability to do this?

A Well, we get a fair number of applications every year, so I do believe that -- and we do tell them in the mailing that we send out in the fall to tell them about what's coming up for the next year, we tell them about the means test, and we also do a means test mailing to a good third of the annuitants, I believe.

Q And -- but you say that -- how do you pick that third?

A I just -- that was just a pick. We pick -we base it on everybody's annuity below a certain amount. I don't know the number off the top of my head.

Q So you'll know -- the City knows what each person's annuity is, right?

A Yes.

Q And so the City sends out to one third of the people --

A I'm just speculating it's about a third. But it's everybody below a certain number.

Q Below a certain annuity or --
A I know it's -- we probably go to, like, 300 percent of the federal poverty level, according to the annuity, because you can apply if it's 250 percent or less. I mean, you can apply regardless. But it goes up to 250 percent now. So go over that.
Q Is it possible -- you would agree, would you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not really aware of it?

A I don't know.
Q Okay.
A They've been notified many, many, many times.

Q Well, if they've gotten a notice, then they understand, I mean -- right?

A Correct.
Q And over the years, there are, currently, about what, 22,000 ?
A There's about 22,000 .
Q Retirees on the City's annuitant healthcare plan?
A Correct.
Q And about a thousand over ten years --
A It's probably more than that individually. I'd rather research that number for you than guess.
Q But you don't know that?
A I don't know that.
Q So your conclusions as to what's motivating them -- and you're just talking about -- sorry.
Your conclusions as to what's motivating them, your belief that they have sources of income beyond their annuities which would disqualify them from receiving cap premium costs and other benefits pursuant to the City's means test, you haven't done any study to, you're just saying that --
A I don't have access to everybody's family income, no.
Q Nor to their -- you haven't done a study to find out their motivation in not applying?
A No, I haven't.
Q So you don't know whether they're not applying because they don't really know and

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understand --
THE COURT: It's been asked and answered, Clint. That was answered about 90 seconds ago.

MR. KRISLOV: Okay. And you believe we've got an affirmative one to that?

THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. KRISLOV: Okay.
THE COURT: I'm sorry you didn't hear
it.
MR. KRISLOV: I try, Your Honor, but thank you.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q You have not audited and reconciled the two thousand -- the actual expenditures versus premium charges for the last half of 2013 , right?

A We looked at it, yes.
Q You haven't audited -- it's not been audited and reconciled, has it, the last half of 2013?

A We looked at it, yes.
THE COURT: You looked at it. The question is has it been audited?

THE WITNESS: Not an official audit,
no.
THE COURT: Ms. Currier -THE WITNESS: Sorry. Sorry.
THE COURT: It's called English. Let me give you the question.

Has it been audited and reconciled for
the last half of 2013? Yes or no?
THE WITNESS: Yes.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Who audited it?
A Shurong Tong. She's the manager of audit and finance in the benefits office.

THE COURT REPORTER: Excuse me, Your
Honor. I did not hear the answer.
THE COURT: Ms. Currier, would you mind keeping your voice up just a touch more, please.

THE WITNESS: Shurong Tong, T-o-n-g.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Is she a CPA?
A Yes, she is.
Q And she provided an audit?
A Not an official audit. She looked at the numbers. She reconciled the numbers.

Q Okay. So is there a report to that effect?

A No, there is not a report.
Q Did she do a report on that?
A No, she did not.
Q So she just looked at it --
A There's no official report on that, Clint.
We weren't required to do a reconciliation past June 30th.

THE COURT: So the answer is now "no"?
THE WITNESS: The answer is no.
BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q Right. Okay. So for 2014, same question, same answer.

A No, we did not do a reconciliation for 2014.

Q Or an audit?
A Or an audit, no.
Q And for 2015, we're --
A We're not done.
Q -- in your view, there won't be one done?
A Correct.
Q Okay. So the actual -- and for 2016, you don't anticipate doing that, either?

A Correct.
Q And you would agree that -- you would not
dispute that for every year that has been subjected to an audit, there has been a refund because the charges were more than would reflect the actual, right?

A Correct.
MR. KRISLOV: Okay. No further questions of this witness.

THE COURT: City.
MR. LAYDEN: Yes, Your Honor. CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. LAYDEN:
Q Good morning, Mrs. Currier.
Let's start with the means test.
Mr. Krislov asked you some questions about that.
Does your office get inquiries from retirees about the means test?

A Yes.
Q And when you get an inquiry from a retiree about the means test, what does your office do?

A We mail out an application.
Q And do they sometimes ask you questions on the telephone about the means test?

A Yes. My assistant is the one who actually handles all the means test applications, inquiries.

A We send a package every year that has charts to show what the benefits are for the next -for the following year, the rates that would apply to that individual, a letter from myself that has all the information about the means test. There's usually several pieces of information in there. In addition, we do a mailing of means test applications.

Q Can you briefly explain how the City's means test works for retirees.

A The person applies. They have to fill out, I believe it's a 4506T, so we can get a transcript from the IRS.

So once we get the transcript from the IRS, we do a calculation to compare the adjusted gross income to what the premium would be. And if they meet the premium test -- sometimes they meet the premium test, and they get a reduction in the premium, or -- and/or they could get premium copayments.

Sometimes people don't get the premium reduction, but they do qualify for copayment reductions at mail order.

Q At what level of income does a retiree have

Q And does your office try to work with
to have to qualify for the City's means test, Ms. Currier?

A Less than 250 percent of an adjusted gross income.

Q Is that of the federal poverty level.
A Of the federal poverty level, correct.
Q And does the Affordable Care Act have similar provisions for people at certain income levels?

A The federal government's means test actually goes to 400 percent of the federal poverty level, and they provide premium assistance, as well as reductions in plan out of pockets and deductibles.

Q So with the Affordable Care Act, are more people able to qualify for these reductions in premiums?

A I would think so, based on the fact that it goes up to 400 percent of the federal poverty level?

Q And is the percent of income under the ACA lower or higher than the City's means test?

A The percent of income that they can get capped at?

Q Yes.
A Yes. It's better under the federal
government.
Q So there's more generous subsidies under the ACA?

A Correct.
Q Do you have, I think it's Exhibit 3, the special disenrollment and reinstatement --

A I think the judge took it back.
THE COURT: Exhibit 3 is the Illinois
Revised Statutes. Is that what you want?
MR. LAYDEN: No, no. I wanted to give back the SBDR.

THE COURT: Oh, yes. That is
Exhibit 6.
(Document tendered.)
BY MR. LAYDEN:
Q Ms. Currier, I wanted to ask you a question about something Mr. Krislov raised. Mr. Krislov asked you about the conditions set forth in paragraph 3A and 3B. Do you see that?
A Yes.
Q Those conditions there about a divorce from a spouse and an annuitant's dependent hitting the age limit, are those requirements that already exist in

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the City's current plan?
A Yes, they do.
Q So this isn't -- is this a new --
A No. When you get divorced, you're supposed to take your divorced spouse off.

When your child reaches the limiting age, they come off the plan. They're no longer eligible for coverage.

Q So these are conditions that already existed under the City's plan?

A Correct.
Q Now, Ms. Currier, staying with the plan, then, that we're talking about here, am I right, this has been fully approved by the benefits committee?

A Correct.
Q So this is in effect now?
A Correct.
Q So I want to talk about non-Medicare eligible retirees for a minute.

Are non-Medicare eligible retirees able to obtain coverage from sources beyond the City?

A Yes. They can get coverage under the Affordable Care Act.

Q And are there plans under the ACA where
retirees can pay lower premiums as compared to the premiums that they currently pay under the City's 2015 plan?

A Yes, there are plans out there.
MR. LAYDEN: Your Honor, this is
Exhibit C to our opposition. Would you like a copy? THE COURT: That's probably a good
idea. (Document tendered.) MR. LAYDEN: Your Honor, if it's okay, we'll mark this as City's Exhibit No. 1. THE COURT: Sure. (Marked City Exhibit No. 1 for ID.)

## BY MR. LAYDEN:

Q Can you identify this exhibit, Ms. Currier?
A Yes. This is some research we did on some of the plans that are available, or the number of plans that are available under Get Covered Illinois.

Q And was this an exhibit that was attached to your affidavit?

A Correct.
Q All right. I'd like to review this for a moment.

Why is there a vertical column for the
age of retirees?
A Under the ACA, the age factors into the calculation on the premium.

Q Okay. Now how about the vertical column for smoking status?

A Smoking status also plays into the premium.
Q And can you explain the fourth column that's labeled "Number of Exchange Plans Available."

A According to our research, there's 69 plans available for 2016 through the state of Illinois -- I mean, through the Get Covered Illinois, Illinois exchange.

Q Are these 69 plans that are available to non-Medicare eligible retirees under the ACA?

A Correct.
Q And can you explain the next vertical column that's titled "Lowest Available Exchange Plan Premium."

A For the age category, these are the premiums that are available on the exchanges in Illinois. These are some of the premiums available in some of the plans.

Q And where was this information obtained from?

A Get Covered Illinois plan comparison tool.
Q So is the lowest cost in premium plan under the ACA less than the lowest cost in premium plan under the City's plan?

A Yes, it is.
Q So if a retiree was concerned about premiums under the 2016 plan, he or she could seek coverage under the ACA and obtain coverage with lower premiums for 2016?

A Correct.
THE COURT: Is that for every individual retiree's case? Do you have firsthand knowledge that any one of these people can actually do that from any given plan?

Did you audit every retiree to know that that's the case, or is this just a generalization, Ms. Currier?

THE WITNESS: This is from some research we did on the website, Get Covered Illinois. I can't --

THE COURT: You've answered my question. Thank you.

## BY MR. LAYDEN:

Q Let's talk about the research.

THE COURT: What's your objection, without telling me a story? Do you have an objection?

MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
THE COURT: What is it?
MR. KRISLOV: I have an objection that whether -- I'd like voir dire to determine who put this together.

THE COURT: Denied. You may cross.
MR. KRISLOV: Okay.
THE COURT: You may redirect.
MR. KRISLOV: As long as I've got everything on cross, I'll just let them go.

THE COURT: Well, that's nice of you. You may redirect. I'm not stopping you from inquiring into anything they elicit, as I didn't last time.

Go ahead.
Your objection's overruled.
Proceed.
BY MR. LAYDEN:
Q So based on that research, you looked at the fifth vertical column here that's titled "Lowest Available Exchange Plan Premium"?

So you took somebody who has an age of 55, correct?

A (Nodding.)
Q And then you took -- another thing you did is you looked at their smoking status, correct?

A Correct.
Q Then you went to an ACA -- the ACA website, correct?

A Correct.
Q And you put in that data.
A (Nodding.)
Q And as a result of that, you got the corresponding premium associated for coverage for that person under the ACA, correct?

A Correct.
Q You did that for each age, each smoking status identified on this exhibit, correct?

A Correct.
MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, can I -- I mean, I'm letting him go on in the --

THE COURT: That's nice of you, but I'm the one who lets him.

MR. KRISLOV: I understand, but I don't want --

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A Yes.
Q And are those the premium that you found based on the research that you performed.

A Yes.
Q And then if you look at the second to last vertical column that says "Lowest Available City Retiree Plan Premiums," are those the current available plan premiums to retirees under the City plan?

A For non-Medicare eligible --
THE COURT: One second, please.
Whoever's talking, stop. If you can't be in this courtroom without talking, that's okay. Just leave and talk. But I'm trying to listen, read, understand. And the constant murmuring in the background is presenting a problem to me.

So I would really appreciate it if you
stopped talking, whoever it is -- whomever it is.
Okay. Go ahead.
BY MR. LAYDEN:
Q Besides lower-costing -- besides the availability of lower-costing premiums under the ACA, are there any other advantages to coverage under the ACA as compared to the City's plans?

A As compared to the City's standard plan, for example, the ACA plans do have some advantages.

They cover preventive care. They have office visits. You can go to the doctor's office and pay a copayment and not have to meet the deductible.

The drug copayments go into the out of pocket, which they don't do on any of the City plans for retirees.

They cover immunizations. There's well-baby care that they cover.

Q How about for dental services and vision services for children under the ACA? Is that covered?

A They cover basic dental and basic vision services under the ACA for children under 19.

THE COURT: One second.
What is it that you didn't understand about me saying not talking and laughing? You, young lady? You two were just talking.

MR. KUGLER: If that was the --
THE COURT: I don't care who it was or what you were saying. It applies to attorneys, it applies to the folks in this courtroom. Next time, you're getting kicked out and be held in contempt of
you're no longer eligible for coverage.
Q And does the ACA plan have a lifetime maximum?

A No, it does not.
Q And in terms of the out-of-pocket expenses between the ACA and the City's plan, are there differences?

A There are differences, and it really depends on how a person utilizes or what their medical needs are in terms of whether or not they'll ever meet their deductible or their out-of-pocket expense limit.

Q Mr. Krislov asked you some questions about whether or not some of the ACA plans have higher deductible and out-of-pocket limits, right?

A Correct.
Q And just because a plan under the ACA has a higher deductible or out-of-pocket limit, does that mean that a retiree who has coverage under that plan will, in fact, pay more in out-of-pocket and deductible expenses?

A No, it does not mean that.
Q Can you explain how that works?
A Well, it depends. If somebody's just going

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court. Happy Christmas. CVLS will get a donation from you, and I mean it.

Do you understand, you, young lady?
UNIDENTIFIED GALLERY MEMBER: Yes.
And I apologize.
THE COURT: All right. Don't do it again.

## Proceed.

BY MR. LAYDEN:
Q I was asking you, Ms. Currier about, under the ACA, are dental services and vision services for children covered?

A Under the age of 19, basic vision and basic dental are covered.

Q And are dental services and vision services for children under the City's plan covered?

A Dental and vision aren't covered for anyone under the City's retirement plan.

Q And does the City standard plan have a lifetime maximum?

A Yes, it does. $\$ 1.5$ million.
Q Could you explain what a lifetime maximum is.

A Once the plan has paid out $\$ 1.5$ million,

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to the doctor, and they just go, like, three times a year and they're in the ACA plan, they pay a copayment, then that would be it.

Or if they had prescription drugs, they're getting them generic or something, they'd pay those copayments, and that would be it. Copayments and the doctors' bills.

Q Let's talk about the difference of the copayments and the deductibles.

Under the ACA, how does a copay work?
A So if you go to the doctor's office, you would generally pay a copayment, $\$ 30, \$ 40, \$ 50$, whatever they set their copayment at. Depending if it's the primary care doctor or specialist, there would be different copayment levels. You would not have to meet the deductible.

Q And under the City's standard plan, do you have to meet the full deductible before the cost of going to the doctor is paid for under the plan?

A Correct.
Q One of the things that you talked about is that the ACA plan covers preventive care, right?

A Correct.
Q Can you explain what kind of things are
covered under preventive care under the ACA that are not covered under the City's plan?

A Screening for detection of diabetes; cholesterol, your screening for cholesterol; your annual exam, a woman's annual gyne exam, those types of care are preventive, and they're not covered in the City's plan; they're covered in the ACA plans.

Q 100 percent under the ACA plan?
A Yes. I believe there's no copayment in those plans for preventive services.

Q Now, does the City also offer different plan types?

A For the non-Medicare people, we have four plan types: Two basic plan designs on two different networks.

Q And can we talk a little bit about the different networks for a minute.

Is one of the networks called your PPO network?

A Correct. One is on a PPO network.
Q Is another network called the Choice network?

A And we have the Blue Choice network, which is a select group of hospitals and fewer doctors in

I can't think of any more right off the top of my head.

Q And are there lower premiums under the City's Choice network plan as opposed to its PPO network plan?

A Yes, it is.
Q And in addition to differences in networks, you said there are two different plans, I believe a standard and a value plan.

A Correct.
Q Can you briefly describe the difference between the City's standard plan and its value plan?

A Sure. The value plan has higher deductibles, higher out-of-pocket limits. It has office visit copayment. It covers preventive care. There's different copayments based on the service. And all four plans have the same drug coverage.

Q Has the City always had four plan alternatives for non-Medicare eligible retirees?

A No. Prior to 2015, there were two plan alternatives. There was the Medicare supplement, and there was a non-Medicare -- a plan for non-Medicare eligible retirees.

Q And, Ms. Currier, why did the City come up
that network.
Q Can you describe the difference between the breadth of the networks between the PPO plan under the City and its Choice plan.

A In terms of the size of the network?
Q Yes. How many doctors are under the City's PPO plan?

A There's a -- on the comparison chart that we sent out with the 2015 and 2016 annual mailing, there's the exact -- there's the number of primary care physicians, the number of specialists, and the number of hospitals in each network.

I don't have that sheet in front of me, but I believe it's 10,000 primary care and 15,000 specialists in the PPO, 200-some-odd hospitals. And in the Choice, the Select network, there's 96 hospitals and a similar number of specialists, I think 14,000 . And I believe primary care is between 4- and 5,000.

Q And what are some of the hospitals under the City's Choice network plan?

A Some of those hospitals are Loyola, Resurrection, Little Company of Mary, La Rabida Children's.

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with four plan alternatives for non-Medicare eligible retirees starting in 2015?

A To provide people with alternatives, and to provide some plans that have lower premiums.

MR. LAYDEN: I think we're done, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Krislov, redirect.

## REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. KRISLOV:
Q The Choice plan is the one with the --
A Blue Choice.
Q Blue Choice has the more limited network?
A Yes.
Q And that doesn't include Advocate?
A No, it does not.
Q Northshore?
A I don't know about Northshore.
Q Northwestern?
A No, Northwestern is not in there.
Q University of Chicago?
A No.
Q And Rush?
A No.

Q Okay. Those five are the premier hospital groups in town right now, right?

A Those are some of the premier.
Q The -- and for someone who makes the bad choice to happen to move out of the Chicago area -you can retire anywhere in the country, right?

A Correct.
Q And you're still free to move from --
A You can move out of the country, I believe.
Q Even in.
But let's say they stay in the country so we keep this a domestic problem.

That Choice network would be utterly worthless to the people, right?

A Right. It's for the people in -- I believe it's a six-county region.

Q Okay.
A In Illinois.
Q And only for those hospital groups within that network?

A Correct.
Q And -- oh, also, for the rates with -- for the rates for a single person without Medicare, that would not include their children, right?

Q Your team being?
A The people in the benefits office.
Q Okay. But you did not -- this wasn't your -- did you put this -- physically, who put the chart together?

A People on my team --
Q People -- representatives --
A -- put this chart together.
Q You did not --
A I reviewed the chart.
Q You reviewed the chart, but have you compared it to the actual data? I presume you took this as your people do an accurate job, and you generally rely on them?

A I rely on them, yes.
Q Okay. As far as the deductible that will vary, you aren't saying -- your focus -- sorry. Strike all that; start fresh with you.

What these figures focus on is the premium?

A Correct.
Q It does not address, for any given policy, or individually, or in the group, what the deductibles are for those policies, the chart

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A Correct. That's single person.
Q Right. So if they wanted to have their kids covered for -- what did you talk about? Dental and other preventive care?

A Right.
Q They would be extra. They'd have to pay extra for that?

A Correct.
Q Yeah. So that's not in the -- and if they wanted their spouse in, too, that's not in these rates either? This is just --

A Which chart are you referring to, Mr. Krislov?

Q The one that you've been -- the one that you've testifying for --

A This one with the --
Q Yes. This is -- this just --
A This is a single person at age 55 .
Q Right. So if they want dependent or spouse coverage, that's an additional charge?

A Correct.
Q Okay. And so we could agree -- oh, let me ask you. Who put this chart together?

A My team.
doesn't?
A The chart does not.
Q The chart doesn't talk about out of pocket?
A No, it does not.
Q Doesn't talk about networks?
A No, it does not.
Q So all this chart deals with is just the premium?

A Correct.
Q And you would agree, as we all in the room would agree, I think, that the evaluation of a particular policy is not just based on the premium. It would be based on the premium, of course; the out of pockets; the deductibles; the network is certainly important as well; the lifetime maximum. All sorts of stuff, right?

A Yes, including your own health status.
Q Including your own health status, although for these purposes, I guess -- so why would it matter if your health status -- because you can't be rated under the Affordable Care Act, right?

A Well, you know yourself how many times you're likely to go to the hospital. You should have a good idea how many visits to the doctor you're
going to use, whether you're sickly, whether you're healthy.

Q Fair enough. Okay.
A How many drugs you use. You know how many you're using in the fall that you're probably going to have to use in the following year.

Q Sure. Your health condition factors into the equation as well, based on what you need?

A Correct.
MR. KRISLOV: I think we're done with Ms. -- oh, sorry. Almost. BY MR. KRISLOV:

Q The -- in order to get the cap, the means test cap, you have to -- I take it from your testimony, you have to fill out a form 4506T, which gives the City a transcript of your tax returns.

A Correct.
Q You full tax return?
A No, just the transcript. Just a basic transcript of your tax return. It's not the full thing.

Q It's got all of your revenue from all sources. It must have --

A It's got your adjusted gross income on

BY MR. LAYDEN:
Q Ms. Currier, going back to this exhibit, the one that has the comparison of the ACA premiums and the City premiums.

Mr. Krislov asked you some questions about whether the premium would go up under the ACA if a particular person applying had a spouse or dependent.

Do you remember that question?
A Correct.
Q And if they had a spouse or dependent, the premium would be greater than what's reflected here?

A This is just for single coverage.
Q So the premium could go up under the ACA if they added a dependent or a spouse; is that right?

A Correct.
Q And, similarly, if you were doing an apples to apples comparison, and you looked under the City plan, and they're adding a spouse or dependent, do their premiums go up?

A Correct.
MR. LAYDEN: Nothing further, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: Ms. Currier, I release

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there, so I know we get that. But it -- I don't believe it's the full thing. It's the transcript of it.

Q Okay. So whatever comes in the transcript, whatever data the IRS sends out in respect to the request for a person's transcript, and you're essentially looking for -- you get, whether you're looking for it or not, you get all that person's -- a summary of all that person's reports to the IRS?

A Right. But we just look at the AGI. We're not examining sources of income.

Q Well, but it might be a concern for a retiree to give you all that information if you --

A If they apply for a means test under the -excuse me. You didn't ask me that question.

Q That's okay.
That's the only way they get that is if you get a transcript of their --

A Correct.
MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Okay. Then I'm done.

THE COURT: Recross.
MR. LAYDEN: Just a few, Your Honor. RECROSS-EXAMINATION

THE WITNESS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Thanks for coming in. I appreciate it. Please have a happy holiday. Thank you.
(Witness excused.)
THE COURT: Any other witness you'd like to call?

MR. KRISLOV: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Any witness that the City would like to call?

MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, the City doesn't have any witnesses.

I take it that the affidavits that
have been questioned here are in evidence.
THE COURT: They are.
MR. PRENDERGAST: Okay. And I take it that the Court is looking at the exhibits attached to their --

THE COURT: I have.
MR. PRENDERGAST: -- submissions and ours as in evidence for purposes of this hearing.

THE COURT: I'm considering them all in evidence for purposes of this hearing.

Any objection to that, Mr. Krislov?
MR. KRISLOV: No objection.
THE COURT: All right. And the Funds, any witnesses the Funds would like to call to the stand?

MR. BURKE: Judge, we have no witnesses.

MR. KENNEDY: Judge, the Laborers'
Fund has no witnesses.
MR. KUGLER: No witnesses, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Very good. Both sides -or all sides rest.

Are you ready to argue?
MR. KRISLOV: Judge, if we can have five minutes before we do the argument.

THE COURT: Ms. Court Reporter, how much time would you need?

THE COURT REPORTER: Five minutes will be fine, Judge.

THE COURT: We'll see you all at five after 1:00.
(Brief recess.)
THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed?
MR. KRISLOV: We are, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right, Mr. Krislov. You're the movant. You may argue.

MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, while I might think that we're entitled to summary judgment, all we're looking for today is a preliminary injunction to block the change in rates from going into effect January 1st.

And if you want -- I know, because of our conversation with my colleagues on the other side we had yesterday, who we're asking for it for is a little -- differs a bit. So let's put them into two categories.

THE COURT: Differs from what?
MR. KRISLOV: Differs a little bit from what I --

THE COURT: What you filed in your motion?

MR. KRISLOV: No, no. I mean, I -what I filed in the motion.

Our view is that all people who were pre- -- were participants, meaning their hire date was before August 23 of 1989 , are covered by your decision which holds that their interest is protected by the Constitution, their benefit is protected by
the Constitution --
THE COURT: I said all people who retired.

MR. KRISLOV: No, you didn't say
either. What you said is all people who --
THE COURT: Let's stop right there.
MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
THE COURT: On page ten of my opinion, and I quote, I said:
[AS READ:
The 1983 and 1985 amendments were in effect when the Korshak subclass, the Window subclass, and subclass 3 entered into the Funds' retirement system. There does not appear to be any dispute between the parties that the 1983 and 1985 amendments apply to these subclasses.

The Court notes that in its May 15th, 2013, letter, the City states that it would continue to provide a healthcare plan with a continued contribution from the City for the lifetime of the annuitants who retired prior to August 23rd, 1989.

I then concluded:
[CONTINUING:

Therefore, Count 1 clearly states a cause of action for declaratory relief as to the City's and Funds' obligations under the 1983 and 1985 amendments. The exact nature of these obligations, however, I said, is not properly decided on a 2-615 motion.]

But all of those amendments dealt with folks, per your complaint, who retired before August 23rd, 1989, as I said.

And I think my ruling was clear that not only for that reason, but for the reason that the 1989 and the years thereafter amendments, were all time limited, I specifically said they did not apply. Not because I want it that way, but because that's what the law requires, I said, and I concluded, for the reasons enunciated in there, which I'll go through again.

So it's clear to me that the parties who were -- who are covered under the 1983 and 1985 amendments is every retiree who retired prior to August 23rd, 1989, and those are the ones who have the lifetime benefits to be supplied by the City; that the City -- another discussion -- does not claim that they're not going to give. They claim they
don't have to, but they claim they're going to, so -as I understand their position.

But everyone after that date, per my ruling, is covered by the 1989, the 1997, and the 2003 amendments to the Illinois Pension Code, which I said at page 11 were time limited at creation. I also added, for good reason. They were enacted solely to codify the time-limited settlement agreements between the parties, to wit, these folks' unions who bargained in good faith with the City, and they bargained for time limitations. They were time limited by their own terms.

Regardless of the basis of it factually, the only important thing is what the legislature did. This Court, I, even though I'd like to be, I am not a super-legislature. I cannot change the terms of enactments decided by the Illinois House and Senate.

By the express terms of the amendments in 1989, 1997, and 2003, they were time limited, and that's at creation, and by their express terms. Therefore, I said the amendment specifically did not provide the annuitants with lifetime or permanent healthcare benefits.
the ' 89 , '97 and 2003 amendment.
You may disagree, and I know you do, and I know that's going to be subject to review, most likely, but that's my ruling, and that's what I held.

So your objection to the contrary, or your read to the contrary, you're wrong, much to my regret. But that's the way of the law.

MR. KRISLOV: I don't want interrupt you, but do I get a chance to talk?

THE COURT: Thanks for that. I appreciate it.

MR. KRISLOV: I don't want start until you're done.

THE COURT: Ball's in your court.
MR. KRISLOV: Here's where your decision is right, but your interpretation is wrong, with all due respect. And I do, frankly, enjoy practicing before you, because it may be combative, and I apologize for my seeming -- or my coming off as combative with you at times.

THE COURT: I don't feel that.
MR. KRISLOV: I enjoy the interplay with you.

Here's where your -- the statement you

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Not my doing, just my read of the statutes, which are clear and don't require any interpretation.

Because they were time limited at creation, I have to enforce the specific terms of those amendments, which means that they were time limited, non-permanent, non-lifetime, and they lapsed on their own accord. Therefore, there's nothing to diminish or impair.

It's true, the pension clause
grants -- guarantees a right to have pension benefits, but not -- to be not diminished or impaired, but it doesn't -- as I've said, it doesn't magically create a right to receive a lifetime benefit, a forever friend in healthcare.

My politics aside, and what I think should be done aside, it doesn't serve to magically create a right to receive benefits that have not been specifically granted, and that's what I said.

So that's why I found that although Count 1 does state a cause of action for everyone, August 23rd, 1989, and before, who retired that date, it does not -- it does not state a cause of action for declaratory relief as to obligations under
just made is right, that the people who can claim --
THE COURT: Well, let me ask you a question before you opine on whether I'm right or wrong.

That's my decision.
MR. KRISLOV: If I can --
THE COURT: You have not filed a motion for reconsideration -- let me finish -- a motion for clarification. The City has; you could have, you did not.

If you think of this as a motion -- as we said yesterday in our conversation with all the parties, if you think of this as a motion for reconsideration of my decision, then you should have stylized it that way. I'm not going to review my decision. I think I'm right for the reasons enunciated, much to my regret. But I am bound to follow the law, and that's my decision.

It's not an interpretation of my decision, Clint. It's my decision. If you don't like it, you know what to do. Not that. You know what to do. You can appeal me, and you will. But that's my decision.

MR. KRISLOV: On the preliminary --

THE COURT: I haven't interpreted anything.

MR. KRISLOV: Do I get a closing argument?

THE COURT: Yeah, sure.
MR. KRISLOV: Okay.
Your Honor's decision that people who were -- Your Honor's decision, I believe, and I was interpreting until maybe yesterday and this morning, was that people who could claim protection because they were participants under the 1983 and 1985 amendments have a protected benefit. That is what Buddell says. It is participants. It is not that you retired before that date. It's that you were a participant in the Fund on that date.

And in that respect, what we're talking about is the people who were participants in the -- one of the four pension funds, meaning a hire date before August 23rd of 1989. That's what this battle is about.

If it were just over the retirees, the people who -- the Korshak and Window classes who retired by that date, there would not be a dispute, because the City says they're going to honor that.

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And that was the class that I represented then.
But here's what Buddell says -- and we do have that in our motion. Buddell says that you are protected throughout your participation -- from your participation. And Kanerva basically says that as well.

Kanerva says that the benefits flow from your being a participant in the Funds. They do not -- they're not limited. The City's whole argument, really, in response to our motion is that all you should enforce is what the four corners of the Pension Code imposes on somebody.

And on the ' 83 and ' 85 statutes, I have acknowledged that the Pension Code provisions say that the Funds are obligated to get coverage for their participants. That was fulfilled by the City providing that coverage.

Now, the other thing that is from Kanerva is that Kanerva --

THE COURT: So let me stop you there for a second.

MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
THE COURT: With regard to your argument that it's participants who -- it's folks who
participated during the ' 83 and ' 85 amendment period, not necessarily retired by August 23rd.

MR. KRISLOV: Right.
THE COURT: Then is it your corollary position that it's the Funds who are responsible for those participants' health benefits?

Because you've already -MR. KRISLOV: Not only -THE COURT: Let me finish. MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
THE COURT: You've already taken the position, you've conceded here in court during our last argument, for one, that you were not going against the City on the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments; you were going against the Funds. So if that's the case, isn't it also true that it's the Funds who are responsible for the participants, the folks who started to participate during the ' 83 and ' 85 amendment period?

MR. KRISLOV: Yes, but not solely. Because if you read Kanerva, Kanerva talks about a group healthcare plan that the state adopted. It was not a pension plan -- it was not a Pension Code plan. It was a group health plan that the state provided to

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its former employees, conditioned on their being annuitants, or eligible to become annuitants --

THE COURT: So how does that play here where the statutes say it's the Funds that shall supply, and it's the City that shall just finance it through tax levies, but it's the Funds that shall supply -- and you conceded that it was the Funds who should do so and not the City.

MR. KRISLOV: No, I didn't say not the City. I conceded --

THE COURT: You did, actually.
MR. KRISLOV: No. I said that the statute does not require the City to provide the healthcare coverage, but Kanerva says where the City does that. I mean, the City does this by ordinance. The state does it by state statute. You don't have to have it in the Pension Code.

But Kanerva is absolutely clear.
That's where you and I differ. Kanerva says that the state provided benefit to people who are participants in the Funds, in one of the state retirement funds -that's all that makes you eligible to participate in the state group health benefit -- that that is protected as well by Article 13, Section 5.

And so the City, having provided the -- what it's providing now, the annuitant -- the City of Chicago Annuitant Health Benefit plan, that by doing that, that is a benefit which is limited in its eligibility to -- conditioned on people who are receiving an annuity or will receive an annuity from one of the four Funds.

It is the same thing. The City having signed onto that deal, the City having created a retirement benefit of the annuitant healthcare plan is obligated to continue providing that without reduction. That's what Kanerva says Article 13, Section 5 protects.

THE COURT: What's the effect -taking your position, what is -- as gospel, excuse me -- what is your position with regard to the effect, then, of employees who began after August 23rd, 1989, where their -- wherein the amendment stated that it was time-limited benefits? Brand new employees. What's your position about that? Once given, they're lifetime, regardless of time limitations?

MR. KRISLOV: They're a different -they're in a different category for three reasons.

THE COURT: Well, first -- I'm not interested in what category. I'm interested in your conclusion. What's your position?

MR. KRISLOV: We will show in our amendment that we think the City's --

THE COURT: I don't have an amendment before me.

MR. KRISLOV: I know. I know.
THE COURT: I'm asking you what your position is now, today, on your motion for preliminary injunction.

MR. KRISLOV: Well, for the motion for a preliminary injunction, if we limit it to the showing of likelihood that you said that people have under the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments, that would be -there is an exceedingly strong entitlement to people who were participants on that date.

To people who were not participants on that date, I would agree the ' 89 , not the ' 97 , but the ' 89 and the 2003 settlements we are bound by and that they were settlements that for people who were in the class on the settlement date, those were negotiated for those periods of time with a revival of whatever rights.

The 1997 was a different bird because we were temporarily out of it because that was during the period when Judge Green had refused to reinstate the case, but before the appellate court ordered the case reinstated. So no one knows exactly what the effect -- and it wasn't a union-negotiated deal, any of these three.

The ' 89 was imposed over our strenuous objections. Went up to the Supreme Court. While we disagree with the due process of it, I concede we are bound by it. The pre-' 89 class is bound by it.

THE COURT: So the post-'89 class, you agree, then, are subject to the time limitations, and, therefore, Kanerva does not apply?

MR. KRISLOV: Here's the -- with an asterisk.

Somebody who just came into -- let's say they were hired in 2004. They did not agree to waive their rights. They're sort of stuck with -- I understand --

THE COURT: What rights?
MR. KRISLOV: Well, whatever rights they have as a participant --

THE COURT: What rights do they have

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in 2004? Every right they have to any healthcare benefits are time limited by the statute. It's not a right. It's not a right. It was given by the City with a time limitation.

MR. KRISLOV: Sorry. I was referring to whatever benefits they had --

THE COURT: Well, you think of things in terms of rights and entitlements, and I don't think that's the right way to think of this.

MR. KRISLOV: Well, they had a -their rights are to have the protection of whatever interest is protectable under the Pension Code.

THE COURT: That's what I'm asking you.

MR. KRISLOV: I understand Your Honor's conclusion that people who started during a time-limited statute, that that only covers that period, think there is an argument to be made, and I will make it in our amended complaint, that whatever is provided during the period service as a floor, and that it can't be that -- it could be increased, but it can't be decreased.

For purposes of today, the core that deals with virtually every -- maybe not everybody,
but the bulk of the people who's -- who are concerned today, and the City as well, I think would not dispute this --

THE COURT: Isn't the bulk of the people those who retired before August 23rd, 1989?

MR. KRISLOV: No. Those who retired -- those who started working before August 23 of 1989.

THE COURT: I see.
MR. KRISLOV: That's the bulk of the 22,000 people. If you think about it, if they started working for the City before August 23rd of ' 89 , police and fire people could not start retiring on full benefits until 2009.

So the earliest of the subsequent people -- or the earliest of the hired people wouldn't have started retiring until six years ago. And for municipal and laborers, probably most of them are still working for the City.

But here's -- and this is where I think it's fundamental. And I think if you reread -if you read Kanerva, if you read Buddell, the deal is your rights are determined from when you became a participant to when you die. And so limiting it to

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the retirees would also -- the City's effort to limit it to the pre 8-23-89 retirees would violate the Illinois Constitution's protections of equal protection.

The City cannot make a distinction between who gets protections under Article 13, Section 5.

THE COURT: Well, that's something you haven't raised --

MR. KRISLOV: Well, we've raised the --

THE COURT: -- the equal protection argument between classes.

MR. KRISLOV: Right. No, we haven't, except that it's only -- well, we raise that in our reply because the City says --

THE COURT: I'm talking about in your complaint.

MR. KRISLOV: In our complaint, we assert that everybody -- I believe that we assert that everybody is covered.

THE COURT: I'm talking about an equal protection argument.

MR. KRISLOV: No, I don't think we've
done it, because I don't think we have it -- I don't think that we were aware of the City's.

THE COURT: Okay, so we're just not going to play it on the run here. We're going to deal with what you've raised.

MR. KRISLOV: So in any event, if you accept -- because I think if you read Buddell, you must, that the protections apply for whatever the plan -- whatever plan the City provided when you were -- while you were a participant, date of hire to date of death. That's what's protected, and that's what Kanerva says is protected.

Now, what I think you have done in your decision is satisfy that there is a clearly ascertainable right that requires protection. Irreparable injury, the forcing them off of their coverage. It's one thing to say, well, they're going to have to pay more, but we can pay you back. Some people will forego their coverage because they can't afford it, and some people will wind up in lesser plans, and some people will drop coverage altogether, or have to do whatever.

This is -- going without your healthcare is an irreparable injury. And the City

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can't always recover. If it turns out that the City wins in the end, there is no limitation period on the City going back after, or the pension funds going back after somebody who didn't pay the appropriate amount.

All it really had -- and there's -so -- and giving you back money, and even with interest after you lose your healthcare coverage, is not an adequate remedy at law. We have a likelihood of success on the merits, because Kanerva -- this is the City parallel to Kanerva, period. It is --

THE COURT: I know you say that, but I am still stuck in terms of a distinction between the subclasses of plaintiffs. And there's a distinction between them. You would like to paint with a large brush, and I understand that. That enures to your benefit to do that.

But I have to shoot with a rifle, not a shotgun, and it seems to me that there is a distinction between the subclasses. You just conceded, actually, that there are. That folks who were -- even under your theory folks that were hired, who entered into the program post-August 23 rd , 1989, may, during the time-limited aspects -- are not
covered by this preliminary injunction. And yet you seek to have an order which does cover that.

How do you jibe that?
MR. KRISLOV: Because we acknowledge that their entitlement is a little different. You know, call it scalpel, call it rifle, shotgun, we acknowledge that their entitlement is a little -- is different than the pre-8-33-89 hires.

We do think that when it comes down to it, the City's determination in the 2013 letter, where it says the settlement's over, we're unilaterally going to extend your plan -- extended term and benefits of the settlement through the end of the year, once the City unilaterally chose to do that, it was stuck with that permanently, and that it says --

THE COURT: Really?
MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
And that it says, but we're going to phase you out between now and 2017 --

THE COURT: What analogy in life or law do you have by which you could argue that if I give you the right to enter into my theater free of charge until December 31st of this year, I have

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magically given you the right to enter into my theater forever?

MR. KRISLOV: If you as a public employer gives me a benefit that is --

THE COURT: That's time limited by its own terms.

MR. KRISLOV: Well, it's not time limited by its -- the mere fact that it's --

THE COURT: Yes, it is, Clint. We all know it's time limited. It is time limited. It's time limited by its specific terms, and it's time limited by the legislation.

I can't rewrite legislation, and I'm not going to, to give you a preview.

But tell me, what right do you have under the law to claim that something that's time limited is for life?

And if that's the case, and if you are going to argue that, wouldn't the City be entitled to some sort of reformation because they didn't know that? There wasn't a meeting of the minds? There was no deal? Because they didn't know they were giving it for life.

And there's no law saying that they

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MR. KRISLOV: And we'll find out from the appellate court whether giving it in a time limited way was effective under that letter.

Because when the City says, we're going to extend things to the end of the year, and then we're going to phase them out and drop you off by the end of 2016 --

THE COURT: Sure. Of course. You're going to have a reviewing panel review my decision. So this really is, really, a motion for reconsideration.

MR. KRISLOV: No.
THE COURT: But I'm not going to change that, because I think it's right.

MR. KRISLOV: It's fine.
THE COURT: Much to my regret, but there's nothing I can do about that, because I'm duty-bound to follow the law.

MR. KRISLOV: I understand how Your Honor interprets that --

THE COURT: And that's what I will do.
MR. KRISLOV: I understand that. But that doesn't require -- that doesn't require you to do that with respect to the people who were hired
before August 23 of ' 89.
THE COURT: I'm going to listen to what the City has to say about that, in this, your motion to reconsider.

MR. KRISLOV: It's not a motion to reconsider.

THE COURT: It is, because I've already excluded those folks, but you think I'm wrong. Now you're arguing they should be included it.

MR. KRISLOV: No, with all due respect, Your Honor, your decision says that people claiming their entitlement under the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments. And that means people who were participants during that time.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KRISLOV: Not people who had retired before that.

THE COURT: All right. Maybe the City will agree. Who knows. But let's hear what they have to say.

MR. KRISLOV: In any event, the City's argument is basically that all that you can enforce are what is specified in the Pension Code, and that's
that they were members of on August 23rd, 1989, is one the four funds. It is not -- they don't have to be a retiree by that date to be protected.

THE COURT: I understood that. I understand your position on that. But now we're going to the other question I asked you, the folks who joined afterwards.

MR. KRISLOV: For the people whose first hire was afterwards, I don't think that they can claim -- if a date limitation is effective --

THE COURT: Subject to my being right about that.

MR. KRISLOV: Subject to your being -subject to -- you know, and we'll probably challenge that in the appellate court.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. KRISLOV: If the date limitation is effective, their entitlement really stems more from the 2013 extension by the City, and the City --

THE COURT: Which you think giving it for six months meant that, willy-nilly, it magically becomes life, yes?

MR. KRISLOV: I would delete the term
"willy-nilly," and "magically." I would say that

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not right. That's not what Kanerva says.
Kanerva dealt with a group health benefit that was outside the Pension Code, and they acknowledge that in their decision. They say that --

THE COURT: Well, we're not talking about what was granted or not granted. We're just talking about the time limitation. And the reason we're talking about that is because the first aspect -- there's four aspects before I can grant the issuance of a motion for preliminary injunction, and that is that there is an ascertainable claim of relief.

MR. KRISLOV: Right.
THE COURT: And it seems to me that you're acknowledging that there's an argument, if you agree with what I said, that these folks who joined the program after August 23rd, 1989, were not members, and, therefore, have no standing for this preliminary injunction, right?

MR. KRISLOV: Is "program" meaning the healthcare program or the retiree --

THE COURT: Yeah, the one that's the subject of your class action.

MR. KRISLOV: No, no. The program
when the public employer grants a benefit --
THE COURT: For a day, it becomes for life; for six months, it becomes for life.

MR. KRISLOV: If it is done for partici- -- if eligibility is determined solely by their being a participant in one of the Funds, that may be the result.

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KRISLOV: If they said, instead, we will grant people who work for us -- who no longer work for us, we'll grant them a benefit. We'll give them $\$ 1,000$. We'll give them whatever.

THE COURT: Not the case here.
MR. KRISLOV: If eligibility is not referenced to their participation in the Funds, then the City can probably turn it on and turn it off.

Once you make eligibility determined by their being a participant in the Funds, but by definition, they do that. They're stuck. And that, I think, is what Kanerva says.

THE COURT: That's where you and I disagree.

MR. KRISLOV: Maybe so.
THE COURT: No, it's clearly so.

MR. KRISLOV: All right. We disagree about other things, too.

THE COURT: Probably not many, but that one we do.

MR. KRISLOV: Okay. So anyway, if I can go back to the pre-August 23 , '89, participants.

THE COURT: Folks who were participants in the program before that date.

MR. KRISLOV: Participants in their pension fund.

THE COURT: That's what I meant.
MR. KRISLOV: They are the ones who are protected for, and the benefit that's protected is the annuitant healthcare plan.

THE COURT: I understand.
MR. KRISLOV: That's what's protected. And that's why, for those people who are the bulk of the people -- if you said we would grant an injun- -we can grant a preliminary injunction only for those people whose hire date precedes August 23rd of '89, for preliminary injunction purposes, that's fine.

And the Funds can't tell you that that's a prob- -- all that you have to do is tell the Funds that they are not to withhold at the higher
that the rates were higher than were appropriate, every year, the settlement -- the audit reconciliation resulted in an average of $\$ 5$ million being returned to retirees.

THE COURT: Sure. But if you have limited benefits, what's there to reconcile?

MR. KRISLOV: If the benefits of
the --
THE COURT: If the benefits are time limited, and the City can do -- if I'm right, and the City can do whatever they want with regard to that, including nothing as of December 31st, 2013, and give no extensions -- they did -- but then what's there to reconcile after 2013?

MR. KRISLOV: If the rates are not reflective -- what they said is they do a ballpark. They do an estimate based on the same reports -- the same estimate that they've done in the past. The rates they're charging them are excessive. They're more than would be done if they did the rates in an audited, reconciled fashion.

The rates that they want to impose are suspect as it is. The City says -- and the City artfully changed things from at least 50 percent
rates beginning January 1st. That is the sum -the total sum that you have to do.

The other thing is that the City cannot just pick -- I told you, I argued that the City cannot just pick which among those people it will honor under Article 13, Section 5 between the pre-' 89 retirees and the pre-' 89 hires. The City also -- the City paints this as a subsidy, and it's not.

## The City, as --

THE COURT: I've talked about that. That's just semantics. We know what it is.

MR. KRISLOV: Right, but it's important to say that, to recognize that it is the City who's the insurer, and that's how it comes into its obligation in a secondary fashion, which is, by agreeing with the Funds. The Funds should have, and their obligation was to go out and find coverage for their participants, which they did by the City's agreement. And the City, once having entered into that, is stuck with it.

Further, the new rates are as suspect as the old rates were. We have been coming back for the ten years of the settlement, after we discovered
to -- or at least 55 percent to as much as 50 percent. And it may still be, we don't know the legitimacy of the rates, but based on the past, the future rates are no more reliable than the past ones.

The bottom line to most of this is that for the pre-August 23, '89 hires, they have a right to enforce the plan as it was on August 22nd. '89. And the City, as Ms. Holt basically said, we couldn't raise -- and most of the other people's rates, because they were -- sorry.

We couldn't deal with most of the other people's salaries, benefits, whatever, because they were protected by unions. Our participants have only the Constitution of the State of Illinois and this Court for their protection.

THE COURT: I'm just one of many courts. And I'm going to do my best to get it right, and what can I tell you? You're going to have to just trust in my desire to get it right.

I'm not the only court, as you've proven many times.

MR. KRISLOV: They say trust but appeal.

THE COURT: Sure. Trust but verify is
the old expression.
MR. KRISLOV: I think that that's what that guy said.

THE COURT: That's what he said.
MR. KRISLOV: But the bottom line, Your Honor, is that in terms of -- until this Court decides the merits of the issue, and we have until January to file our amended complaint, which I believe will address everything fine, for the time being, we ask that you hold the City off in increasing the rates.

All that we're talking about is delaying the City's imposition of these new rates for a few months until this Court deals with the issue on the merits. If Your Honor doesn't agree with me on everything today, it's not necessary, but we certainly have created a fair question. And there's nothing, really, in the City's equities to say that holding them off for a couple of months until you decide what the merits are so we can get it teed up for them to appeal or us to appeal, whatever --

THE COURT: Well, if it's only a couple of months, and if they can be made whole by money with interest, only a couple months, why is

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damages at law not adequate to your clients, and, thereby, as a matter of law, say that an injunction should not issue?

MR. KRISLOV: Because going without your City coverage -- and of all the plans that people may prefer to keep their City coverage live, going without your City coverage, is irreparable injury. And it isn't even -- and for those people that go off, they won't be addressed retrospectively. They'll only be addressed prospectively if they come back.

There is no -- and giving them -refunding them the additional amounts if they're gone is no replacement. And refunding it with interest doesn't replace the risk, the fear of having to go without your health insurance that you depend on.

These people are, for the most part, we're talking about 22,000 , or the bulk of them, who are retirees. Their health is not great. The older they get, the older they are, the sicker they get in numbers. And so between the balance of equities, is it fairer to say to the City, hold off for a few months. We'll get this worked in whatever way we think -- whatever way the Court deems to be
appropriate. Whoever can appeal at that time can appeal. But for the moment, the City can hold off on raising the rates, because it can always get the money back from the retirees.

As I understand it, the Funds assert there's no limitation period on correcting the amount that they withhold from people.

All that we need to do -- and some of these people have had massive increases -- some of the increases are such that their premium is more than their annuity. And for others, they're paying as much as $\$ 26,000$ for family coverage. That's a lot of money.

And having to forego your family coverage, or having to go with a lesser plan in which none of your doctors are in -- I mean, what they've testified to is the networks you can go in with these -- the Choice plan -- you know, everything, if there's a fairness statute, you know who things are being done to. If there's a choice statute, you know that you're reducing your choices. They have bee taken out of the plan. You no longer have a network, Northshore, Northwestern, University of Chicago, Rush, Advocate. If you take those out, you may have

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a few nice hospitals, but you have eliminated the bulk of the medical care that is done by the premier institutions in the Chicago area.

And so when you balance the equities, who's undergoing a hardship? Not for the City. The City just has to put off its phaseout for another couple or three months. For the retirees, for the participants in the plan, they have real risk. They have real life, human experiences that the City doesn't.

As I've said, Your Honor, the retirees only have the Illinois Constitution and this Court. And so for the time being, we ask this Court to hold the City off in raising its rates January 1st.

THE COURT: Thanks.
MR. KRISLOV: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Mr. Prendergast, may I
start with a question to you, or you start with a question for me.

MR. PRENDERGAST: I'm happy to answer any questions.

THE COURT: I'm rereading my opinion of December 3rd, and I read that before the federal district court, page five, the plaintiffs filed their
amended complaint which identified the four putative subclasses of plaintiffs, the Korshak subclass, those retiring prior to December 31st, 1987; the Window subclass, those retiring between January 1st, 1988, and August 23rd, 1989; and the third subclass was subclass 3. And that was any participant who contributed to any of the four Funds before August 23rd, 1989's, amendments to the Pension Codes -- forget the fourth one for a second -- which would encompass the class of folks that Mr. Krislov just referred to as the hirees, anyone who was hired before August 23rd, 1989, because they would have been a participant, a participant who contributed before that date.

You then go to my opinion at page ten, and I say the 1983 and ' 85 amendments were in effect when the Korshak subclass, the Window subclass, and the subclass 3 entered into the Funds' retirement system. That means the hirees that Mr. Krislov referred to.

The ' 83 and ' 85 amendments were in effect when the hirees entered into the Funds' retirement system as participants before August 23rd, 1989, and I wrote:
centers on the fact that those retirees, you have to be relying on the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments.

THE COURT: I'm talking about the hirees, not the retirees.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Yeah, they're hired but, at that point, the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments are the amendments in place.

THE COURT: Yes. We are relying on those.

MR. PRENDERGAST: And for purposes of the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments, the one thing that counsel has conceded, at least ten times, including this morning, is that they're not relying on the ' 83 and '89 [SIC] amendments, because for good reason -I'll give two reasons. One is the ' 83 and ' 89 amendments don't impose any obligation on the City. We've talked about that.

THE COURT: '83 and '85.
MR. PRENDERGAST: '83 and '85, I'm sorry, don't impose any obligation on the City.

And, two, because even if they did -and this is where I'd kind of like to start. Even if they did, the amount that the City would pay under the 2016 plan is greater than the amount that the

## [AS READ:

There does not appear to be any dispute between the parties that the amendments from '83 and ' 85 apply to these subclasses.]

That means the hirees. So doesn't the -- these are lifetime benefits I held, according to my opinion, through the ' 83 and ' 85 amendment, because they were not time limited. And Kanerva holds that that which is given cannot be diminished or impaired.

Doesn't that mean that the City cannot diminish or impair any benefits that enure to the benefit, for lack of another word, of the hirees before August 23rd, 1989?

In other words, doesn't that mean that Mr . Krislov is absolutely right, that with regard to his request for a preliminary injunction, it should issue with regard to raising the subsidies, the rates to be charged these folks, including the folks of the hirees, the people who entered as participants into the Funds' retirement system before August 23rd, 1989?

That's my question.
MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, the answer

City would pay under either the ' 83 or ' 85 amendments. The amount is greater.

Now, this case is about the pension clause. It is about whether or not there is a diminution, or a reduction, or whatever word we want to use, in a pension benefit. We're accepting the fact that under Kanerva healthcare costs are pension benefits.

But as you mentioned just now in your conversation with Mr. Krislov, rights must -- using your words, rights must be specifically granted in order to be protected.

So if the rights that they were granted are the rights under the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments, in other words, if we lose our motion to reconsider, so I'm not going there right now --

THE COURT: But it is inextricably bound with his request for the issuance of preliminary injunction, so you can go there if you want.

MR. PRENDERGAST: And I will, with my prepared remarks.

But to answer your question, and jumping a little bit ahead of them, the ' 83 and ' 85
amendments require the City to pay less than the 2016, okay? Therefore, there is no diminution. There is no reduction. You cannot --

THE COURT: So you're saying that assuming Mr. Krislov is right, and all hirees before August 23rd, 1989, are included as participants, and their right to receive paid benefits for healthcare is immutable, it cannot be diminished or impaired, you're saying that, nevertheless, it is subject to the terms of the ' 83 or ' 85 amendments; is that correct?

MR. PRENDERGAST: That's correct.
THE COURT: In terms of the amount that the City has to pay?

MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes, because that's the statutory basis. And I'm going to jump around here a little bit from my prepared remarks, because I really think it's important to go to this.

We are talking about the diminution or reduction in a pension benefit.

So you have to look at ' 83 and ' 85 and say what were they. In ' 83 , the police department --

THE COURT: You mean what was that which was granted?
to pay, whether it's the City or the Funds, paid \$55 for the firemen and police officers who were non-Medicare, and $\$ 21$ for those that were Medicare. And under the ' 85 amendment for labor and for municipal, it was $\$ 25$ a head across the board. THE COURT: Regardless of Medicare or not.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Exactly, right. Okay. That amount is considerably less than what the City paid in 2015 and what's considerably less than what the City will pay in 2016. Therefore, the City is paying more in 2016 than under the only possible statutory bases that they can rely upon for a diminution or reduction in pension benefits.

If they're paying -- if the City is paying more -- they're paying more than they used to pay, then that's not a diminishment in what the City is contributing. It is an enhancement of what the City is contributing. There's no way you can do the math any other way.

THE COURT: Explain that to me again. MR. PRENDERGAST: Sure. I'm a fireman. I'm 1986. We're going to use this -- I got

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MR. PRENDERGAST: What was it that the City was required to do, or what anybody was required. City wasn't required to do anything under the ' 83 amendment or the ' 85 amendment.

But let's just use the numbers. Let's suppose that you hold that the City does have obligations to do what the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments require. I don't think that is correct, but that's okay. Let's assume that.

THE COURT: I've already said that.
MR. PRENDERGAST: Under the ' 83 amendment, the City of Chicago had to contribute $\$ 55$ for police and fire who were not Medicare -- I'm sorry, the Funds. The Funds had to do that. But, again, I'm only assuming for purposes of argument --

THE COURT: Take for the sake of argument the truth of what I said in my opinion, that the Funds are an instrumentality of the City, and there's really no substantive difference between the two. So it's the City that had to do it. Take that as granted.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Right. So we're working in that framework for purposes of my answer.

And my answer is, the party that had
hired in 1986. We're using "hire." That's what he wants to use. I'm hired in 1986.

I say I've got pension benefits. My pension benefits include healthcare. I say, what makes you think so? The answer is 1983. They passed a statute. I'm entitled for the City -- the argument being for the City rather than the Funds, but we'll stay with that. I'm entitled for the City to pay $\$ 55$ because I'm not on Medicare. The City has to contribute $\$ 55$ a month. The City contributes a lot more in 2016 than $\$ 55$ dollars a month.

So for purposes of a preliminary injunction, that is one that pertains to only 2016, the City is now paying more than it would have had to pay under the 1993 amendment to the Pension Code. Consequently, there is -- there cannot be a diminution in the benefit --

THE COURT: So there's no reason for the issuance of a preliminary injunction --

MR. PRENDERGAST: Absolutely.
THE COURT: -- with regard to those now raised rates relative to the ' 83 or ' 85 , because it's no harm, no foul, vis-a-vis the retirees.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes. If the only
basis that can be cited, and, obviously, it can't be the later statutes because it's time limited, if the only basis, statutory basis, and there has to be one, for the healthcare right is the ' 85 statute, or the '83 statute if you're a fireman or policeman, you're getting more now from the City than you got back then. There can be no diminution.

We've covered that as clearly as we can in our response to his request for preliminary injunctive relief. He hasn't given us much of an answer. But his answer seems to be, well, that's not what Kanerva holds. You don't have to just look at Pension Code. Kanerva makes it clear. You don't look at just the Pension Code.

That's true. Kanerva wasn't based on the Pension Code. What happened in Kanerva was, the state argued that if it's not in the Pension Code, there's no entitlement. And the court said, not so. There's another statute. And that other statute was the Group Health Insurance Act.

And under the Group Health Insurance Act, that's the act under which they were entitled, the state employees, were entitled to healthcare benefits. There was a statutory basis.
reaction is no good act goes unpunished.
THE COURT: Well, that's absolutely true. But here's another one. A deal's a deal. MR. PRENDERGAST: Okay. So let's talk about the deal. What was the deal? We will extend benefits to a specific date, no magic about it, the end of 2013. We will then wean you off this process over a period of four years, through 2016, each year, each step down being time limited.

Each one, the 2013 limitation ended in 2013, next 2014, 2015, 2016. They're all time limited. There's absolutely no difference --

THE COURT: What about -- I'm not talking about the folks who entered into the system during those time limiteds. I'm talking about the folks who entered into the system before they went into effect.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, yeah, and so am I. I'm talking about --

THE COURT: Let's just talk about those folks. Everybody in class 1, 2, and 3 being the hirees, those who participated in the system prior to August 23rd, 1989, you gave them benefits, benefits as stated in those statutes. You chose to

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So the Supreme Court said, we don't care if it's in the Pension Code. There's another statute here. Well, here, there isn't another statute. The only statute for the people we're talking about here is the ' 83 and the ' 85 statute. And it, number one, in our view, doesn't apply to the City of Chicago. But if it did impose obligations on the City of Chicago, those obligations are far less than what the City is doing now. Therefore, there can be no diminution, and, therefore, there cannot be a preliminary injunction.

THE COURT: Understood, your position.
Let me ask you a question, and getting more to the core and the substance.

Mr. Krislov has said that that may be, but you've given, and you've given without -- for these ' 83 , ' 85 participants, including the hirees, you've given more than those enactments require, and because they're not time limited at creation, it was something you just gave, and you cannot take away that which you've already given at the levels that you've given it.

What's your response?
MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, my gut
increase them. And as you said, no good benefit goes unpunished.

Was that not immutable?
MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, no.
THE COURT: Why not?
MR. PRENDERGAST: Because they were time limited. In the middle of 2013, the limitation on the extension was the end of 2013.

THE COURT: Can you time limit something that's been given for life? Can you just change in midstream -- I understand why the City wants to. No one loves the City more than me or any of these folks here, I assume. No one wants the City to be destitute. We all know what's going on. We all know what the cause of it is, and we're all looking for an answer. And I do understand that.

But when you've given something for life, as you acknowledge has been given -- forget the numbers. This is what Mr. Krislov's point is. Forget the numbers. You gave the benefits for life. Can you now take them away?

MR. PRENDERGAST: We didn't give them benefits for life.

THE COURT: There's no time
limitations in the ' 83 and ' 85 statutes.
MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, those benefits?
THE COURT: Yes. That's the ones I'm talking about.

MR. PRENDERGAST: My point is, if that's the benefits -- Your Honor, time and again, they've said the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments don't apply to them. Do you know why? The ' 83 and ' 85 amendments -- they don't want the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments.

THE COURT: Because they don't want to be stuck at lower amounts.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Not only do they not want to be stuck at the lower amount, they know they have no constitutional claim if you're relying on the ' 83 and ' 85 , because the City pays less under the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments than it's going to pay for 2015. We're now in 2015. They're seeking an injunction for 2016, where the City's going to pay more than the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments would require the City to pay. That can't be a diminution, period.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's get to the answer to my question.

By giving it to them, how can you take

THE COURT: They're subject to the conditions that were stated in the ' 83 and ' 85 statute. Everyone agrees about that. There are no time limitations on those benefits. So how can you start weaning them off something about which there were no time limitations?

MR. PRENDERGAST: We didn't wean them off of that, Your Honor. We weaned them off of what they were paid under the settlement statute that ended in 2013. We're paying them more than 1983 and 1985. We don't have to wean them off of that. For 2016, we're paying more than we're required to by statute, under the ' 83 and ' 85 statutes, if you hold us accountable to the ' 83 and ' 85 statutes.

THE COURT: Let's assume I hold you accountable for the subclass 1,2 , and 3 . That means, as I was discussing with Mr. Krislov, the hirees before August 23rd, 1989. And they're in the Korshak class and the Windows class.

What do you owe them?
MR. PRENDERGAST: Korshak and Windows are classes 1 and 2 .

THE COURT: Yes. Class 3 is everyone who participated before August 23.

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it away?
MR. PRENDERGAST: Because, for the very reason that part of the your question said time limited, and that's why I said they weren't. They were not time limited. They had six -- they were extended by six months, and six months only, to the end of 2013.

And then they announced that they were going to go through three years or four years of stages of reductions for the very reason that Ms. Holt testified to, and that is, they wanted to give people a time to wean off of this and get into the Affordable Care Act and give them an opportunity.

THE COURT: How can you wean people off of something that they've been given for life?

MR. PRENDERGAST: It wasn't given for life.

THE COURT: In '83 and '85, those participants.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, no.
THE COURT: Let's keep our eye on the ball. I'm talking about subclass 1,2 , and 3 , those who began as participants before August 23rd, 1989.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor --

MR. PRENDERGAST: That's what they say, so --

THE COURT: Yes, that's what they say. But that's what we're dealing with.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Your opinion is still otherwise, but we're not going to get into revisiting it. Let's stay with one and two for a minute.

What else has the City done that it's now apparently being punished for?

Korshak and Windows class members, have been extended lifetime healthcare by the City.

THE COURT: Yes.
MR. PRENDERGAST: Okay. They're gone.
They're taken care of. There's no injunction you have to enter for them. They're going to get lifetime healthcare for -- that's what they asked for them. They cannot use a settlement statute that was time limited as a basis for a diminution claim, because, as you held, when it was time limited, the rights under that statute ended, so you have to go back to ' 83 and ' 85.

When you go back to '83 and '85, you find that the City was paying less for ' 83 and ' 85 ,
or the Funds were paying less --
THE COURT: Than they are now --
MR. PRENDERGAST: The numbers are less.

THE COURT: -- under the time limited enactments.

MR. PRENDERGAST: So there's no diminution.

THE COURT: Does that then, also then apply to the subclass 3 ?

MR. PRENDERGAST: It would apply to any retiree that claims a diminution of healthcare benefits.

THE COURT: Well, I'm asking specifically. Is it your position that applies to the hirees, people who were hired and participated in the program, and may still be working, before August 23rd, 1989?

MR. PRENDERGAST: A person who, in this case, it's brought on behalf of the retirees, so let's stay with retirees if I could.

THE COURT: Yes, who was hired before August 23rd, 1898 and retired thereafter.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Retired thereafter.
applies to 2016 only. So it's not a question of lifetime benefits. It's a question of whether the City has to give up $\$ 30$ million that is appropriated --

THE COURT: I understand.
MR. PRENDERGAST: -- for 2016. And in this case, the City's -- the amount the City would pay under the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments is so much less than what it's going to pay for 2016, that there's nothing to enjoin. That's our position with respect to that.

So it's really much more, Judge, in my opinion, a question of -- put in that context. That is a question of which class is covered or not. We're at a preliminary injunction stage. They have to prove everything necessary for preliminary injunction.

THE COURT: Well, but,
Mr. Prendergast, Mr. Krislov has just acknowledged, or conceded earlier today, that the post-hirees, post-August 23rd, 1989, hirees would not be included in his request for a preliminary injunction because they're not entitled to anything.

MR. PRENDERGAST: It doesn't say that

Okay. What are they entitled to? The only statute that applies to them is the ' 83 and ' 85 statute.

THE COURT: Are those the benefits you're giving for the lifetimes of the class 1 , class 2 folks, those same benefits?

MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, for purposes of the preliminary injunction, we're only dealing with 2016. For the purpose -- as this case proceeds, you're going to hear a lot of evidence going a lot of different ways. A lot of arguments about whether you can stop altogether at 2016, or whether you have to pay the ' 83 or ' 85 benefits.

Although I must say to you, Judge, if all they're looking for is the ' 83 and ' 85 benefits, this case isn't going to last very long.

THE COURT: From your mouth.
MR. PRENDERGAST: To God's ears. And they're clearly not. They are running away from '83 and ' 85 at record speed. They've done everything they can to tell you that's not where they're going, and the reason is because it doesn't get them anywhere.

And so -- but for purposes of a preliminary injunction, the preliminary injunction

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in his papers, I must say.
THE COURT: Well, I understand. But he argued that today, if we accept my version of what the law is vis-a-vis Kanerva, with that exception, which, by the way, I'm accepting, he acknowledged that if I'm right on that, then the post-August 23rd, 1989 class has no ascertainable claim of relief. They have no standing to complain, because they're not covered. So that's done. I accept that.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Maybe one and two is done.

THE COURT: So now we're just dealing with the hirees.

MR. PRENDERGAST: We're just dealing with people who --

THE COURT: Who were part of the program, who participated in the program before August 23rd, 1989.

And it seems to me your argument is that a preliminary injunction should ensue vis-a-vis those at least -- so your argument is, it should be granted in part, denied in part, but it should be granted vis-a-vis those folks to the extent of the benefits that they were entitled to under the ' 83 and
'85 amendments, yes?
MR. PRENDERGAST: No. The reason is because this is an injunction for 2016. There's no need for an injunction because they're going to get more --

THE COURT: Because they're going to get that anyway.

MR. PRENDERGAST: That's right.
THE COURT: At least at this point.
MR. PRENDERGAST: At this point, they're going to get that.

THE COURT: But in the end, there's a claim that those -- even those benefits are going to be extinguished.

MR. PRENDERGAST: And in the end, at the end of 2016, they may be back here, if necessary, talking about an injunction if it's needed --

THE COURT: To prevent that from happening.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Yeah, but that's not today. And by the way, Judge, I expect, based upon your remarks the last time we were here, and based upon my assessment of what's got to be done in this case, this case is going to be over before 2016.

Judge, I do think that --
THE COURT: That's why throughout your brief, you argue in the alternative, that even if the City's implicated in this, or part of this -- and I understand.

MR. PRENDERGAST: And I have to argue in the alternative until we get past that point.

THE COURT: Of course you do.
MR. PRENDERGAST: But I have to say that it's been my experience that parties are held to their pleadings, and they are held to what they say, especially when they say it time and time again.

So they have said that the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments don't apply, and we all know, there has to be a statutory basis. Even under Kanerva, there was a statute that the Supreme Court relied upon, because it's got to come from some basis, either a contract, or it's got to come from a statute.

And the contract claim is out on your ruling. And by the way, I know Mr. Krislov has said on several occasions here, something -- one thing or another is going to be in his amended complaint. That's not the complaint that's before the Court right now. That's the complaint we're dealing with

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THE COURT: Once again, from your mouth.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Yeah, right. But, I mean, you know, there will be some discovery, I suppose, and there will be motions and the like.

But we're not talking preliminary injunction motions. Preliminary injunction motions are to address an immediate need, and there is no immediate need.

THE COURT: I understand.
MR. PRENDERGAST: Mike points out, I think something I thought was implicit in my remarks, and that is, remember, please, this preliminary injunction that they're seek is against the City, and they concede that the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments don't apply to the City.

THE COURT: Well, that's true. They concede that. It's really an interesting case. They concede that.

But, I held that the Funds are an instrumentality of the City. So from my point of view, the City's in it. That's my ruling, which you want me to revisit.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, you know,
for preliminary injunction purposes.
So let me go to -- some of this has been covered, but if I could go to what I expected to talk about -- maybe I'll be redundant, but that's the lawyer's prerogative, especially when you give them unlimited time.

Under the Pension Code, pension benefits cannot be impaired or diminished. We all agree on that. That's understood. Under Kanerva, retiree healthcare benefits can be pension benefits, as long as, like any other benefits, they are created by statute or contract. We're good with that. We're not trying to revisit you -- we don't want you to revisit Kanerva on the central issue of Kanerva, which is can healthcare benefits be pension benefits. The Supreme Court's answered that question for us.

The plaintiffs' contract claim, that's been dismissed. It was dismissed by the district court. It's been dismissed by this Court. Plaintiffs' have not asked you to reconsider that ruling, even in argument today.

The plaintiffs' reliance on the McDonough affidavit and deposition and the Kordeck affidavit from back 30 years ago was raised before
you made your ruling, and you still held that doesn't establish the basis for a contractual claim. The materials, of course, were before you when you dismissed the contract.

Plaintiffs cannot claim a likelihood of success on the merits, on the limited settlement statutes, because you have ruled on that as well and dismissed those counts. So that argument about success on the merits goes out.

I do want to emphasize, by the way, that that first requirement is a requirement for them to establish a likelihood of success on the merits. It is not a requirement just to establish that they've stated a claim.

Mr. Krislov has a habit, and I'm not being pejorative, but he does have a habit of characterizing every denial of a motion to dismiss as if he's won the case. That's not the case here. He has to establish, for purposes of preliminary injunction, a likelihood of success on the merits.

And the contract claim can't do it. The time limited statutes can't do it. The estoppel claim can't do it, because since you have dismissed them, they can't possibly establish a likelihood of

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success on the merits. So that leaves the constitutional claim, which was Count 1.

And so what he has to establish is if there's been a diminution or impairment of pension benefits. And if he doesn't have a likelihood of success on that one, and he talked about summary judgment. But I have to tell you, Judge, if he's not relying on the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments, that summary judgment motion comes from our side, not his.

So as we've just discussed --
THE COURT: And even if he does, according to our colloquy during the last half hour, it's coming from you, too, to the extent that it was offered by those amendments.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes. So that leaves him -- when you get rid of the contract -- there was a reason they had a contract claim, because they wanted to say well, we'll anchor this on a contract. And there was a reason why they wanted to go to those others statutes, because they wanted to say we want to anchor these on a statute that we can use.

But what's left is the '83 and '85
statutes. We've already talked about that, and that's their statutory basis for a claim.

In terms of the likelihood of success on the merits, at least for purposes of preliminary injunction, since they're getting more on their 2016 plan, 2016 plans than they would ever get under the '83 and '85 amendments, they can't possibly show a basis for a success on the merits under the ' 83 and '85 plan.

And, therefore, on that ground alone, and they have to satisfy all the criteria, on that ground alone, the motion for preliminary injunction has to be denied.

As we pointed out, this is their sixth attempt to get a preliminary injunction with respect to this phaseout program.

Mr. -- counsel states that, well, the previous ones all involved a finding that the pension benefits were not -- I'm sorry -- healthcare benefits are not pension benefits, and Kanerva reversed all that, but that's not correct. There's been -- all of the arguments that he's making now were made in all of those motions for preliminary injunctive relief. And no one parsed out that, well, maybe you'll win on some other ground.

But the point is, we're here today.

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We're here on this motion for preliminary injunction. I don't mean to suggest the last five or six times that he's lost sets precedent, but it is getting to be habit for him.

I've talked about why the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments don't apply. Talked about it doesn't make any difference whether they apply or not. There's no irreparable harm.

And you have raised a very significant point, and that is, if the pensioners have to pay in in 2016 amounts greater than 2015 because of the reduction in the subsidy, they have an adequate remedy at law. And they clearly do. If they ultimately win, the difference, plus interest, gets paid back to them.

They have not made a compelling argument why that's not an adequate remedy at law. They have argued that people are retired, they have less money than people who are working. That's also true, but it still doesn't mean they don't have an adequate remedy at law, especially in the context of a class-action claim.

I mean, we're not talking about one plaintiff in front of you where you can parse that
out. There's 23,000 members of this class. So that concern no longer justifies a preliminary injunction.

And so now we turn to the one thing that they hammered on in this case, since they filed it. They've hammered on the idea that people would have to make choices. That's why this January date is critical. People would have to make choices of staying in or getting out.

But if they get out, and they went to one of those lower-priced Affordable Care Act plans, or even one of the premier plans that has all the bells and whistles you want, they wouldn't be able to get back in without an ability to prove insurability. That has been the irreparable harm argument here since day one.

So finally, we decided, you know, that one's got come off the table. We went back to the City, and we said let's revise that. Can you revise that? Is that impossible? That won't require you to do anything. It won't require the Funds do anything in January of 2016 to unscramble the eggs.

But it would extend people the opportunity if they become uninsurable because they have bad health to still come back to the City plan

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if they wanted to.
And so the exhibit, which I forget the number of, and you saw it, which is only dated the 18th of this month. That's when it became official, but it addresses --

THE COURT: It's your Exhibit 6 in your submission.

MR. PRENDERGAST: That's correct, Judge.

That program now allows people, if they leave and they go into an Affordable Care Act plan, or any other plan, if for some reason they find out this wasn't really good for me, this wasn't -- I don't like the deductibles here, I don't like the copay, or whatever their concern is, they can come back. They can come back anytime between September 30th -- until September 30th of this year, nine months out. And I know you point up when say this.

THE COURT: 2016.
MR. PRENDERGAST: 2016.
THE COURT: Not this year.
MR. PRENDERGAST: I'm sorry. 2016.
But there's nothing about this case that can't be
resolved with the cooperation and effort of everyone, including the Court, and your calendar, to resolve this case by September 30th, 2016.

I'm authorized to tell you one other thing. It's not in that document, but I'm on the record as an officer of the court, representing the City of Chicago.

If at the end of the day they win this case, and then they say -- but it's January 2017, and it's after September, and they say, we won, I want back in the City plan, they're going to be allowed to go back in the City plan.

So this irreparable harm argument they have made from the beginning is no longer existent. All they have to do -- that gives them all the choices they want. They can stay with the plan, in the City plan if they want to. They can get out if they don't want to. I'm happy you heard the testimony of witnesses today that Mr. Krislov thought would be helpful to the Court, because I think one thing you should have come away with, I believe, from that testimony is that the City makes a great deal of effort to deal with its retirees, to put them on notice of everything from change -- any changes, any

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options that they have, they're fully aware of it. They've got a phone bank ready to answer any questions that they have.

And certainly, you know, to the extent that they ask questions of Mr. Krislov and he wants to send those questions in, the City is going to answer them.

The point is, they have all the basis that they need to make choices. But if they make, in their view, the wrong choice, and they get out of the City plan, they can get back in. And that has not been before you before this. I thought --

THE COURT: What limitations are you putting upon their ability to get back in? You say you've extended it now, as an officer of the court, to -- at least into 2017. What limitations?

MR. PRENDERGAST: The same limitations as are in the plan right now. For example --

THE COURT: No, what time limitations?
MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, I think there will --

THE COURT: Up until the end of this case, whatever that's defined as; isn't that right?

MR. PRENDERGAST: I should clarify.

If they win this --
THE COURT: If this goes up the Supreme Court and takes two or three years, and it comes back, and they won, the City is game, yes?

MR. PRENDERGAST: The City is game. The City will let them back into the plan, whatever the plan is, if there is a plan.

If they lose the case, they'll say we have to have a plan. If they win -- I'm sorry. If they win the case, they're going to say, we have to have a plan, and it's going to be ordered.

If they lose the case, there won't be a plan to come back to. Which is one of the reasons that it would be very prudent for those who have a concern, and I mean the pensioners, to explore, like a lot of people who are in the private sector, explore the Affordable Care Act.

Because, as you heard in the testimony today, there are considerable advantages to the Affordable Care Act. Counsel points out that there are going to be hospitals that are not covered by the Affordable Care Act, and that's true. They can't go to Northwestern or Chicago. People in Peoria don't go to Northwestern or Chicago either, generally
that got in. If they want to stand up here when I'm through and show it to you, it will surprise both of us. But that's not there. There has not been a city ordinance that grants healthcare benefits to anyone, and there's no state statute that does so, with the possible exception, possible exception, because we have a motion to reconsider, of the ' 83 and the ' 85 amendments to the Pension Code.

And since the Kanerva case relied upon another statute, there was a statutory basis. And as this Court has said, there has to be. You have to have a basis for the claim before the pension clause can protect it. If there's nothing to protect, you can't say there's a pension clause, so I get a pension. That's not how it works. You've got to have a basis for doing that.

In terms of the balancing of the equities, if an injunction is entered requiring the City to subsidize at the 2015 rates rather than the 2016 rates, the cost to the City will be approximately $\$ 30$ million.

That 30--- Ms. Holt, I was happy that she was called. I didn't -- if I had put her on direct, I would have spent the first five minutes

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speaking. But they have good hospitals in Peoria. Loyola's an excellent hospital. There are a lot of excellent hospitals that are covered by the Affordable Care Act.

So the idea that they can't get healthcare -- I mean, there's a difference between saying people should be able to get healthcare and saying they should able to get healthcare, forget networks, forgetting limitations on hospitals, forgetting limitations on doctors that don't want to provide that healthcare, that's not a constitutional claim. That's a beef. That's a political argument. That's something they can take to their legislature.

But speaking of the legislature, I do want to mention something, because I'll probably forget to mention it.

In their papers, they say that Mr. McDonough, in his affidavit or his deposition, I think it's his deposition, testified that there was a city ordinance that was passed that granted healthcare.

Not only was there no such city ordinance, it's not in his affidavit or in his deposition. I don't know where that leaked in, how

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going through her credentials, and they would have been impressive. But it's not important, because I think she's an impressive witness. She knows the budget. She knows how to balance the budget. She knows what's happened in the City of Chicago in previous years when they haven't balanced the budget, and they've gone off and sold the Skyway, sold parking meters, found other things to sell in order to raise money.

The objective now is to get the City back on a solid footing, fair to the taxpayers, fair to the residents of the city in a way that will make the city great and keep it from going in the wrong direction fiscally.

So she explained what goes into the budget, and that means we looked at everything. And one of the exhibits they talked about were the cuts that they have to make. They aren't only cuts in -it isn't just a step down in the amount that they paid to subsidize healthcare. It cuts across the board. Elimination of positions. Cutting programs.

I think it's -- I forget the number -$\$ 3$ - or $\$ 400$ million in new real estate taxes were enacted this year. Other fees were enacted this year
pursuant to the budget that they passed for 2016 so they could balance that budget. $\$ 30$ million is an imbalance. It's not an imbalance you make up by snapping your fingers or flipping a switch. There's a lot that goes into that, and it may mean cutting 300 jobs, or it may mean cutting 150 jobs and \$15 million worth of programs.

But it is an impact on the taxpayers, on the residents. As she pointed out correctly, when you raise taxes, you have to raise taxes across the board. There's people up in Lincoln Park that afford the tax increase. I can afford a tax increase. I'll make it. There's lots of people who can't. A lot of them are retirees. A lot of people who are going to be put to the test of paying the other way in taxes.

And so balance that against the hardship to the retirees. Well, we have before you a fair amount of evidence for a preliminary injunction hearing on the alternatives that the retirees have. The alternatives would be the Affordable Care Act, the opportunity to get insurance at lower prices so they don't have to.

And in context of the discussion about the breaks you get if you are below the poverty
income, because if they don't, then they're not going to get hit as hard under the Affordable Care Act or under the City plan. And, basically, what we were told is, that's an unreasonable intrusion into their privacy.

Well, it's a relevant fact. We'll develop it in the course of discovery in this case to find out what the real impact is, and we will make our judgments accordingly.

But fact of the matter is when you balance the availability of lower-priced insurance under the Affordable Care Act, the availability of insurance under the City plans, the lower-level City plans, against the fiscal hit that the City has for the $\$ 30$ million adjustment, I think the balance of the equities falls in favor of the City.

And I know it's more popular to talk about how people on pensions are hurt more, but I'm saying to you that when you take $\$ 30$ million out, everybody gets hurt. Taxpayers get hurt, residents who do not have excess income see their taxes go up even more than the $\$ 347$ million, I believe it was, in new real estate taxes this year, more than the new water fees, more than the other new fees that went up
level, I should say below two and a half times the poverty level, or on the Affordable Care Act side, four times the federal poverty level, four times the federal poverty level is $\$ 46,500$. If you're making $\$ 46,500$ or less, that's -- then you get substantial additional breaks under the Affordable Care Act.

It's only two and a half times, but it is two and a half times for the poverty level for the city program, which, you know, if you're making $\$ 30$ million, people making less than that.

One of the things that the witnesses were asked here today was, how do you know? You know, how do you know what people are making, you know? Well -- and the only ones we know are the ones that ask for the break, you know, that say, I'm eligible to pay less.

So they send -- they -- basically, their entire tax return is not sent to the City. The first page, or the summary on the first page gives your adjusted gross income is what does it.

So when they provided you with this book full of various annuitants' letters and a summary they put in the front, we were interested in knowing whether or not those annuitants have other

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this year in order to balance the budget in 2016. It's a significant impact.

And, you know, the case law on that, Your Honor, particularly when you get into the public sector, is pretty clear that the public harm, the impact of an injunction to the extent that it creates a public harm, or public burden, has to be considered by the Court. It's not just a question of, well, why don't you write a check for $\$ 30$ million.

To a certain extent, in fact, to a large extent throughout their reply brief, I think that's the most important document that they filed, they try to -- as was much the discussion that we had with counsel, they tried to run away from the ruling dismissing most of the case, and now they're down to carving out, trying to carve out some group of class members that are maybe part of a class and saying we should enter an injunction for them.

But for the same reasons that we've discussed at length here today, they don't have a colorable claim under the ' 83 or ' 85 statutes.

So they turn to Kanerva, and I just discussed Kanerva. Kanerva was based upon the statute. There is no statute basis here. It's that
simple. This is not, as counsel said, a photocopy of the Kanerva case. This is a different case. There is no ordinance, there is no statute on which to rely.

Had there been no statute in Kanerva, the state would have won. Had there been no statute establishing the state's obligation to pay pension benefits, the state would have won the Kanerva case. It's absolutely clear from the opinion.

I don't want to sound patronizing, but this is a preliminary injunction; it's not the case.

THE COURT: I understand.
MR. PRENDERGAST: Okay. I need to go no further on that.

There is an argument that they make, and he alluded to it, because we've decided -- the City has decided that the Korshak and the Window classes are going to have coverage for life, even if the City otherwise gets out of the business.

They've thrown in an argument that there's a denial of equal protection here. Now, that argument has not previously been made, and I saw it for first time when we got their papers fairly recently, and so we really haven't had a chance to go

We talked about irreparable harm.
THE COURT: You have.
MR. PRENDERGAST: And I won't go back to it, other than --

THE COURT: Good.
MR. PRENDERGAST: Good. I hope that means I've persuaded you.

THE COURT: It means I've heard it
all.
MR. PRENDERGAST: You've heard it all, yes.

THE COURT: We've been here since 10:30, it's now quarter to $3: 00$.

MR. PRENDERGAST: You have been awfully patient, and I appreciate that.

THE COURT: I'm sorry? I didn't hear that.

THE COURT REPORTER: Do you want me to read it back?
(Laughter.)
THE COURT: No, no, no. I want to
give everyone an opportunity to argue.
MR. PRENDERGAST: One argument they have made is that it -- and it was rebutted by the
into it in any depth.
THE COURT: And there's no need to, because new ideas brought up in a reply brief are not going to be considered by the Court. And I'll just note that the equal protection argument, as I noted to Mr. Krislov, is not pled.

So, as Mr. Krislov says, it may be in the future, but that's not what I'm dealing with now, so no need.

MR. PRENDERGAST: They argue with respect to the handbook. Are you familiar with what I'm referring to?

THE COURT: I sure am.
MR. PRENDERGAST: Plaintiffs
incorrectly argue that the City abandoned its argument that under the handbook, the City maintained the right to terminate its retiree healthcare plan. That's just not what we've done. It's not correct.

Plaintiffs' opening brief did make claims in support of a likelihood of success on the merits based on the handbook for the straightforward reason that the Court dismissed that contract claim, so we had no reason to revisit it in our response to the preliminary injunction.

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sworn testimony today, is that, well, what's going to happen if a retiree goes to an ACA plan and then says, I want to go back to the City, and the ACA insurer says, well, you have to pay for the next --

THE COURT: The uncontradicted evidence is there's a 14-day period, notification period, and there can be no -- at least according to the evidence I hear, no penalty for that.

I don't know to the contrary, but that's what the evidence is that was elicited from the stand.

See, I remember, Richard.
MR. PRENDERGAST: So Mike Layden, my colleague who's one of the best lawyers I know, just handed me a note that said let's end it.

THE COURT: He's not only good, he's wise.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you for your time.

THE COURT: You're welcome.
Mr. Burke.
MR. BURKE: Your Honor, I was going to argue for another five hours, but I've changed my mind, and we will rely on our filings, both in the
underlying litigation and the one that we just pled.
THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Kennedy.
MR. KENNEDY: Thank you, Your Honor. On behalf of the Laborers' Fund, we join in the City's request that you deny the motion for preliminary injunction.

THE COURT: Mr. Kugler.
MR. KUGLER: Yes, Your Honor. Well, granting we've been here for four hours or more, granting your preliminary injunction in full or in part is now -- there's nothing further that the Pension Fund can add to it. The Court has heard it. It's in your hands.

The only thing I would say, Your Honor is, as I understand it, I believe the timing of this month, the deductions have already been made with regard to the City, or are in effect, so whatever the Court does, there may have to be some adjustment with the check that's going out currently.

THE COURT: Thank you.
Mr. Krislov, you've got last ups.
MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, I mean, we obviously, as we have said before, object to the
response.
THE COURT: What's this?
(Indicating.)
MR. KRISLOV: No, no. The City.
THE COURT: That's what I'm talking
about.
MR. KRISLOV: I'm talking about the Funds.

THE COURT: Oh, well. Okay. I thought we were just talking -- my eye was on the City, not the Funds.

MR. KRISLOV: Okay. As I say, you can ignore that.

THE COURT: But it does call into question where your eye is. Mr. Prendergast has asserted, as I know, and I was here when he did it, you conceded the City had no obligation under the '83 and ' 85 amendments. That, just so you know, is key to my answer to this problem raised by your motion. And you conceded the City has no obligations under that.

Apart from my ruling, what's your response to Mr. Prendergast's argument about that?

MR. KRISLOV: Our position is that

Funds taking a positions today, especially to say that it's some sort of hardship or difficulty to not -- they've not asserted anything like this before. All that they have to do is just not withhold from their people the January premiums at the higher rates.

If they're now saying that that would be difficult, they could have spoken about this before and not blindsided us today with that argument, because they haven't made this argument before.

THE COURT: They haven't made which argument before?

MR. KRISLOV: They haven't made the argument that it would be difficult for them to comply with not raising the healthcare rates beginning January 1st.

THE COURT: Is it not in their submission?

MR. KRISLOV: They didn't make a submission.

THE COURT: Is it not in the response to your --

MR. KRISLOV: They didn't make a
while the specific language of the Pension Code provisions do not obligate the City to provide healthcare, the City has in two ways subjected itself to that obligation: Number one, by being the insurer that the Funds have obtained that insurance from; and, number two, by providing -- and this is what we seek to enforce -- the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan. That is Exhibit 4 to our reply, but it's been in everything. It's attached to the complaint, it's attached to lots of things throughout.

And it says eligibility. You will be eligible for coverage if you are an annuitant of the City of Chicago. Annuitant means a former employee who is receiving an age and service annuity from one of the four retirement funds. And here's what the -here's where Kanerva comes in.

Once you provide as a governmental employer, whether you regard the Funds as an instrumentality of the City, or the City just does it, because the state just did it in Kanerva, once you provide a benefit that is conditioned on exclusively whatever to people who are annuitants, participants in one of the four pension funds, you
are stuck with it for life because Article 13, Section 5 doesn't say we protect benefits of pension -- we don't protect benefit -- excuse me. We don't protect pension benefits. It says, membership in any pension or retirement system of the state or any unit of local government, dot, dot, dot.

THE COURT: Shall not be diminished or impaired.

MR. KRISLOV: The benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. KRISLOV: That's the key language. That's why when the City provides the plan, and it's the plan that we're seeking to enforce, it's the plan that is the benefit.

Once they provide it to people conditioned on their being members of the retirement system --

THE COURT: They don't disagree, really.

MR. KRISLOV: Then they're stuck.
THE COURT: They're just saying that they're limited by the amounts that were granted by the ' 83 and ' 85 legislation. They're capped at that

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in terms of what they have to do, even for the hirees.

MR. KRISLOV: That's what they have to do under the Pension Code. That is not what they are limited in having to do because they are -- because they have taken it on.

That's why in Kanerva, the state, by enacting a group healthcare plan, that, for these people was conditioned --

THE COURT: But unlike Kanerva, here it was time limited. It was not a, here, you're getting it all for life. Apart from all your assertions to the contrary in your briefs, they've never said you can have it for life. In fact, they didn't say it in the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments. I found it, without it being in there, because it was given without any --

MR. KRISLOV: Time limit.
THE COURT: -- limitation, to the extent that it was given in those statutes.

MR. KRISLOV: See, that's where you and I differ on this one, because --

THE COURT: There you go, and when you wear the robes, I'll listen to you.

But I'll tell you, it's just ordinary rules of statutory construction. You look at the four corners of the statute and the contract. You look at the four corners of the contract, and you are limited by those terms as to what was given. That's just the ordinary rules of construction, whether it's a constitutional amendment provision, statutory provision or a contract.

You're asking me to read into that that which is not there. You're asking me to do it because of Kanerva, and I understand that.

But Kanerva didn't just give carte blanche. It doesn't say that which has been given with limitations is, carte blanche, given for life. It just said that which is given is guaranteed. It's not guaranteed for life. It's guaranteed within the ambit in which it was given, and that's up to the legislature. It's not up to you, and it's not up to me. I wish it were up to me; then we'd have a real nice, platonic republic, and lots of things would be changing. But we don't have that, and I'm somewhat limited by that which is the -- by the separation of powers in that regard.

MR. KRISLOV: Here's what I don't

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understand and maybe missing the point.
Our view of Kanerva is that Kanerva says where a public employer has granted a benefit that is conditioned on --

THE COURT: Participation.
MR. KRISLOV: -- participation in one of the retirement systems, it is a protected benefit for life. And giving it --

THE COURT: What if the nature of that which has been given is limited? I'm giving you $\$ 5$ every week for the rest of your life. Somehow, because you need more money, or because things change -- and I'm not trying to insult anybody here, believe me, I'm not -- are you trying to tell me that it should be $\$ 10$ or $\$ 20$ because the value of the dollar has gone down? Does it ipso facto mean that I have to give you $\$ 100$ a week? Isn't it limited to that which I give?

MR. KRISLOV: If I'm a public employee, and I say here is a benefit that I will give to people who are participants in the retirement system, I will provide your healthcare -- I will provide the following benefit. I will provide, the City of Chicago --

THE COURT: I will give you \$55 a month.

MR. KRISLOV: But that's not what I'm seeking to enforce.

THE COURT: I know. But that's what it says. I understand you're trying to go beyond that.

MR. KRISLOV: That's what the Pension Code wording says. That's what I concede that the Pension Code wording says.

What I'm saying is that by
providing -- and Ms. Holt said all they need is an ordinance, and all they need is the appropriation ordinance, and they could be -- no one said that the City of Chicago annuitant healthcare plan was being illegally provided. Once it is provided to people based solely on their being annuitants or participants in the plan, you're stuck with it for life. Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. I got it. I got your ideas.

MR. KRISLOV: So what we're trying to enforce is not the $\$ 55$ subsidy. The subsidy is the Funds. Providing the plan is what the City did.
balancing. I don't even get to adequate remedy at law. I'll let you go on. You've said it before, and I don't want to stop you. But I don't even get to that if you don't pass the standing issue, which is the first prong of the injunctive inquiry.

MR. KRISLOV: And our view is if we interpret your ruling, people who were participants on August 23rd, ' 89 , have enforceable rights to enforce a benefit whose parameters you said are to be determined. And that's what you said, that on a 2-615 --

THE COURT: Yes. Oh, yes. That have yet to be determined under 2-615. I did say that.

MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
THE COURT: Absolutely.
MR. KRISLOV: Those -- the exact nature of those obligations, however, is not properly decided on a 2-615 motion to dismiss. That's where we figure that -- that explaining what we think the obligations are is for later in the case.

At this point, the people who were participants as of August 23rd, '89, have enforceable rights. What they are entitled to protect you left to be determined, and that's what I

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There are differences. The City is saying, look, all interpret your ruling to be.

THE COURT: Then how does that jibe with the likelihood of success and an ascertainable claim if I haven't yet determined what rights enure to those three classes?

MR. KRISLOV: Because at this stage of the proceedings, we need -- we don't have to prove summary judgment. We just have to show that there's a reasonable basis that we might --

THE COURT: No, that's not true, and that's not the law, and you know that.

MR. KRISLOV: Oh, I --
THE COURT: For purposes of injunctive relief, you have to show a likelihood of success. Not a reasonable probability that there's a conflict here, or it's been interpreted as being a fair question, at least.

MR. KRISLOV: Fair question, at least. We've done that. And I believe that you will say that you will agree that at least for these purposes -- whether you disagree with me ultimately or not is for the Court to decide -- but the fact is, I think we have raised an absolutely, at least a fair question. I think we're right. I think we will
ultimately prevail on that. But I think we've shown enough to justify hurdle number one.

And it's not an all -- and failing one. It is an overall -- we shouldn't fail any of them by a significant amount, but it is a balancing test overall, and it is to maintain --

THE COURT: No, it's not. I don't even get to the balancing test unless you can prove the first four.

MR. KRISLOV: Well, I think we have satisfied --

THE COURT: And that's the law, too.
MR. KRISLOV: Fair enough. But we've sat- -- I believe we've satisfied the first one, at least, sufficient to preserve the status quo, until we get to the merits of the case.

In terms of the post-'89 hirees, in our view, is that when you give things to people after that, whatever you give them, again, conditioned on their being participants, that's a floor.

But we can -- we may disagree with that, and that's why for purposes of this injunction that we're requesting, it's for the pre-8-23-89

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hires.
THE COURT: You're not asking for it to be imposed as to the post-August 23rd, 1989, hirees, or participants, correct?

MR. KRISLOV: We concede that that is a weaker claim that you, by your ruling, do not accept. How is that?

THE COURT: That means you want me to rule. Okay. I will.

Anything else?
MR. KRISLOV: Yes. This whole business of you can't get -- you know, you can still get healthcare. Too bad you can't get your doctor, too bad you can't get any of the hospitals you've been dealing with. These are hardships. These are unique hardships that everybody has been recognizing is a big problem.

If you can't deal with the doctor that you have been dealing with for years, if you must go to a lesser, far distant place -- people in Peoria don't necessarily go to Northwestern, but people in the city go overwhelmingly, it may be 80 percent of the patient treatment or more, I don't know, goes to the five or six institutions that I named who are all
off of the Choice.
So if you want to get lesser
coverage -- and I probably should have asked Ms. Currier -- but if she's elected out of the coverage and to go in the ACA, everybody who says, oh, you'll be better off in the ACA is generally not in it.

The only ordinance needed is the appropriation ordinance. We're looking to enforce the plan, and at this point, I think we've shown, certainly for the pre-8-23-89 hires, a sufficient showing of likelihood of harm, balance of equities, hardship. I don't think we've missed any of the six on that.

But I think, overall, we're not asking for much. Just put off the increase until we find out who's entitled to do what. And until then, we -all we can rely on, that's all these people have to rely on is the Constitution and this Court, and we ask you to do so.

THE COURT: Thanks.
First, I'd like to compliment
Mr. Krislov and Mr. Prendergast and the other attorneys here on their submissions. They were as

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well written as anything I've ever seen as a judge, and certainly better than I've ever written, and they helped me focus on what the issues were.

The Court is guided by the law with regard to issuance of injunctions. And for the sake of the folks here who do not know the law as well as the attorneys, let me just spend a few moments explaining to you what it is and what I'm guided by.

An injunction is called an equitable remedy. It's an order by which a party is directed to perform some act or is ordered to refrain from doing some act, which is what Mr. Krislov is asking for here.

A request for a preliminary injunction is called an interlocutory remedy. That means that they're intended to provide immediate but durational, that means not forever, relief prior to the final adjudication of a controversy on the merits.

And by definition, that means I can't, by the giving of the issuance of a preliminary injunction, make a ruling on the merits. And as Mr. Krislov just suggested, I have not -- with regard to the motion to dismiss, I do not know, have not yet decided, have not yet discussed with the attorneys
what the nature and extent of the folks' interest is under the ' 83 and ' 85 amendments to the Pension Code.

An interlocutory injunction is also called an extraordinary remedy by our Supreme Court. And that means that I shouldn't grant one unless I've taken great care to assure that it is needed under the circumstances.

What the circumstances are is
dependent on every case, and being equitable in nature, that means not being guided by law, but being guided by aspects of equity. They're addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In this case, that's me.

The elements which must be shown by the movant for the issuance of a preliminary injunction and calling upon this Court's discretion to issue an extraordinary order is, first, there must be an ascertainable claim for relief by the plaintiffs.

Secondly, there has to be showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, without ruling on those merits, or, as I said just a few moments ago, at least a fair question that the plaintiff will succeed.

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Third, there has to be irreparable harm to the plaintiff if -- or in this case, a class of plaintiffs -- if the injunction is not given.

Fourth, there has to be an inadequate remedy at law. And that means, according to the law, as our Supreme Court has said, that means that money damages will not suffice if it's not given.

Lastly, or -- not lastly, but the courts say that if it comes down to it, I should balance the equities, the hardships to both sides. I should consider that in terms of giving or not giving the injunctive relief.

And, also, some cases have said that I should consider the public interest, and the harm to the public, and public policy.

As you've heard, and I compliment you all for, (a), being here. Obviously, you're concerned, and it's a concerning matter. I've noticed your attention to it.

With regard to the first element, the ascertainable claim for relief, the plaintiffs must clearly establish an ascertainable right and need of protection, and the failure to do so obviates the need to go further.

As I've ruled in my December 3rd opinion, I find that the participants, post-August 23rd, 1989, that means the hirees thereafter, do not have an ascertainable claim for relief.

And the reason for that, so you know, is, as I said before, alluded to, I'm guided by the law. And the law says that, yes, pension benefits shall not be diminished or impaired.

But it doesn't grant pension benefits. To that, I have to look at the core body, the body which issued that. In this case, it's the legislature. And for the post-August 23rd, 1989 hirees, whatever protections they were given, whatever benefits they were given were a matter of statute.

As I said before, if it were me, it would be different. But I'm not a super-legislature. I've been told, every court has been told, I cannot impose my will on the legislature. And there's a reason for that in democratic theory. They're your representatives. They're the ones who decide what the law is going to be; I decide whether they did it right or not, and I look at it. As I said before, I use statutory construction, if needed. But the first

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rule is, I just look at the ordinary words that are in the statute.

And in the statutes in '89 and thereafter, it was clearly limited, the benefits that were given to the folks post- -- who were hired post-August 23rd, 1989. So that's the core grant.

And Mr. Krislov's argument notwithstanding, the Constitution protects that which was granted. It doesn't add to it. It doesn't magically create a right that was not given. The problem therein lies with the legislature if you have a beef, not with anybody else. And that was a long time ago.

So, clearly, as to the -- it seems to me, as to the post-August 23 rd, 1989 group, the fourth subclass, they do not have an ascertainable claim for relief, and I need go no further.

With regard to the prior groups, the 1983 and ' 85 amendments were in effect when the Korshak subclass and the Windows subclass and subclass 3 entered into the Funds' retirement systems, as I stated.

Although Mr. Krislov and I argued about the issue, I do find, of course, that those who
were participants prior to August 23rd, 1989, do have an ascertainable claim for relief. And that's what I said earlier in my December 3rd opinion.

What that claim for relief is, as I mentioned earlier, and Mr. Krislov mentioned, is going to be subject to further discussion between the parties, arguments, etcetera. But as I have alluded to, I use rules of statutory construction, and I cannot write into a statute that which is not there, even if I want to.

And I look at the 1983 and the 1985 statutes, and much as Mr. Prendergast has as argued, they are limited. They are limited by their terms. And the ascertainable claim for relief for those three subclasses is, thus, limited thereby.

Therefore, they do have an ascertainable claim for relief, but I have to go on to see their likelihood of success on the merits as to that which is being asked of me today and is being asked of me in the complaint. That's the second element, as you may recall I said to you.

Much as Mr. Prendergast has argued, and I accept his argument, those retirees are subject to the limitations of the statute that gave them the
evidence, based on myself, that the older you get, the less you like change. And as my father used to say, "these newfangled ways, I just don't understand them, and they're confusing." And I find that there is a hardship to retirees, the elderly folks, to change the way things are, and to go out and look at this mysterious ACA, and have to go into the marketplace when it's already and always been given to you. That's the problem with our paternal structure of government as it's been in the past.

I understand things have changed for all sorts of reasons, a lot of which have been alluded to today. And I just wanted to say that I'm sensitive to that, and I do understand that it's a problem for folks to go out into the marketplace and start looking and thinking, instead of just taking it as it's been given to them all these years. I understand that, and I've taken that into consideration.

But it doesn't throw the balance off or replace the lack of a factor, in this case, the claim for relief, which is limited by that which was granted by the legislature, and the lack of a likelihood of success on the merits for that reason.
benefit, the ' 83 and the ' 85 statute, which is clearly less than that which is being given by the 2016 enactment, or appropriation.

Therefore, I do not find that there would be a likelihood of success on the merits with regard to that which is before me today.

I might say to you all who are seriously interested in this, my ruling today is not with prejudice. If there is some other evidence that comes before me, I'm open to that. But I'm trying to give you the analysis that I have gone through and my thinking on the subject so you know that I cannot give you that beyond which the legislature has given you, as much as I would like to. And I would. And I did in my opinion of December 3rd, but only to the extent that the legislature gave it to you.

With regard to the third element, irreparable harm, in this case, I find that there is some harm that would occur to the retirees. I find that that element mitigates in favor of the plaintiffs. This is inextricably bound with the hardship that would befall the retirees. And let me talk about that just a little bit.

I find, as a matter of anecdotal

The fourth element is the inadequate remedy at law. There is case law that's been cited to me that Illinois law is clear that a preliminary injunction, which is being requested here, cannot be premised upon a temporary loss of benefits or income.

The case law is cited in the parties' submissions to me, especially the City's, and I have read it, and it's actually true, wherein Knott versus Illinois Racing Board, the court said the loss of income for a brief period does not constitute irreparable harm.

And wherein Kurle versus Evangelical Hospital Association -- by the way, the citation for the first case is 198 Ill.App.3d 364 at page 368, and in Kurle, the citation is 89 Ill.App. 3 d 45 at page 53 , which vacated an order granting a preliminary injunction as is being asked of me today, because the relief requested sought back pay and benefits, which is a purely economic benefit, and the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law for the back pay and the back benefits, which is true here.

Everything Mr. Krislov said is absolutely accurate. It's just a few months, maybe. And I hope everything Mr. Prendergast said is
accurate, that there's a chance that this is going to be resolved without going much further and causing more heartache to the retirees.

But I have to follow the law, regardless of my heart, which I've been accused of leading with too much. But I have to follow the law. And when there's a remedy at law, as a matter of law, an adequate remedy at law will prevent me from issuing an injunction. In fact, injunctive relief is proper when money damages are adequate to remedy the wrong, absent a showing that it would be impossible. And there has been no showing here. There hasn't even been an argument about that here.

So three of the elements have not been proven to me by a satisfactory burden by the plaintiffs, the ascertainable claim of relief, past that which was given by the ' 83 and ' 85 statutes. Therefore, the likelihood of success on the merits and the inadequate remedy at law, that's enough for me to deny this, with my sorrow, especially on Christmas, as we're approaching that.

I have considered the balance of the equities. I have considered the hardships. And as I mentioned, I'm aware of the hardships that befall the
right, or wrong -- but I truly believe the City is implicated in this, and so that they are a proper party with regard to the ' 83 and ' 85 . That's something that will be subject to review by the City's motion to reconsider, which I will review and keep an open mind on.

But that's my ruling as of today. So
for all those reasons, and with great respect for the job that's been done by Mr. Krislov and
Mr. Prendergast and the attorneys for the Funds, the motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction is denied.

What's next?
MR. KRISLOV: We need to do some scheduling. And one of them -- at the moment, our response to their to motion to clarify is due tomorrow --

THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I know that you're done and you want to go. But I need for you to still be quiet so that I can listen to Mr. Krislov, your attorney, about what it is he wants to do to help protect your rights. I promise it's going to be over in no more than three minutes. Just give me the three minutes, please.
elderly. And by the elderly, I mean anyone over 30. (Laughter.)
THE COURT: But I am duty-bound by my oath to follow the law, and that's the way I see it. Although I understand intellectually and viscerally, Mr. Krislov and I disagree on that. That's the way I see it for the reasons I've stated.

Now, does this apply to the City, or is it true, as Mr. Prendergast said, and as my review of the record shows, Mr. Krislov conceded that he wasn't going against the City, just against the Funds.

MR. KRISLOV: I disagree with your characterization, but...

THE COURT: You're entitled, and you've made a record about it, and it's clear.

But the City is implicated in this. I've ruled in my prior decision that the City was used as an instrumentality of the Funds, and vice versa, and, actually, the Funds of the City. And the City agreed to tax levies for these ' 83 and ' 85 amendments.

And as Mr. Prendergast disagrees with me, so does Mr. Krislov -- I must be doing something

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Go ahead.
MR. KRISLOV: We're due tomorrow to respond to their motion to clarify.

I would like, and I don't think
Mr. Prendergast has a problem with this, if we could deal with that on the same schedule as our amended complaint, which is due in January, January 11th.

So if we could --
THE COURT: How would you like to modify the briefing schedule, Clint?

MR. KRISLOV: What we would do is, we would file our brief and our amended complaint, and we'll probably -- if our amended complaint is permitted to incorporate all the things which we're allowed to replead, we can deal with all of that in our January 11 th filing.

THE COURT: Well, one side of me says if you're going to file an amended complaint, this is all moot. Another side of me says that we should keep things on parallel tracks but not together.

Because I think it's important for me to file a written memorandum opinion and order with regard to the City's motion for clarification.

So let's -- I'm going to separate
that, and that's my ruling. Just tell me when you would like to file your response.

MR. KRISLOV: I guess on the motion to clarify, we'd probably like to file on the same day as we file the amended complaint.

THE COURT: Have I given you leave to file the amended complaint?

MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
THE COURT: What is that date? What day is that?

MR. KRISLOV: January 11th.
THE COURT: Any objection to the motion to extend time to file the response to January 11th?

MR. PRENDERGAST: No objection.
THE COURT: When would you like to
file your reply?
MR. PRENDERGAST: 14 days thereafter.
MR. KRISLOV: I think that's already
set, actually.
THE COURT: But aren't we pushing
things forward? I don't have the briefing schedule. MR. KRISLOV: Their response was -THE COURT: Oh, I do have --

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MR. KRISLOV: -- February 16th, I
think.
THE COURT: No, I've got it here.
They were asking -- you were going to
file your response tomorrow. That pushes things up. Now you want it to the 11th. I'm going to commensurately give a further extension to them to file a response, a reply, since their reply was due on the 8th, and I'm not going to have them file it before your response is due.

MR. KRISLOV: Obviously.
THE COURT: Okay. We're on the same page. You want 14 days, Richard?

MR. PRENDERGAST: 14 days.
THE COURT: I'm going to give you a little bit more, because 14 days brings us the 25th, and on that day, that's -- my clerk's status days are on Monday. So I'm going to give you until January 29th to file your reply, and the clerk status day will now be on February 1st at 9:00 a.m.

Does that meet your with your schedule, Clint?

MR. KRISLOV: I think that's no problem. I think our only thinking is what happens
next. If we're going to --
THE COURT: Well, that's with the motion for clarification. So I'll throw it in the book on then, and show up so that Deborah can ask you about your schedules, and choose a ruling date that's commensurate with your personal and professional schedule with regard to your motion to amend. And I said it would be due by 1-11.

Do you wish to change that?
MR. KRISLOV: No. We would still file that on January 11th.

THE COURT: Okay. And they're to answer or otherwise plead by $2-16$, which is the date I gave you. Is that still all right?

MR. KRISLOV: Could they answer the Count 1 that's been upheld?

THE COURT: No. No, they can't. No. Let me explain to you why.

No. They're going to answer or otherwise respond, per our schedule, by 2-16. That's what I gave the last time. That was without objection then. And then we have a clerk's -- a status date before me of 2-24, and that still sounds good to me. Is that okay for you?

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MR. KRISLOV: What I don't understand, Your Honor, is why they don't have to answer the count that's been upheld.

THE COURT: Because it's going to be superseded by your amended complaint. It's going to be mooted out. It's going to be nonexistent.

That's why.
MR. KRISLOV: I understand the Court's ruling.

THE COURT: Okay. That's as much of an, "oh, I get it," from you I get.

MR. KRISLOV: Well, no, I get it. But usually if a count's been upheld, then usually you proceed to answer the count that's been upheld.

THE COURT: No, there is no "usual" about that, and certainly not in front of me. It's a complaint, which I'll take as a whole. They're going to answer or otherwise plead.

Who knows what you're going to do with regard to the first count and whether you're going to amend it or modify it. You're entitled to. I don't want to prevent you from doing that.

So we'll take every step as it comes, and we'll give everybody an opportunity to be heard.

MR. KRISLOV: Okay. So we file our amended complaint and our response to their motion to clarify on January 11th.

THE COURT: Yes, sir.
MR. KRISLOV: They then file their response to the reply on the clarification on January 29th.

THE COURT: Correct.
MR. KRISLOV: And they have until February 16th in which to answer or otherwise plead with respect to the amended complaint.

THE COURT: Correct.
MR. KRISLOV: There is a clerk status, I guess, on February 1, with respect to the clarify?

THE COURT: Correct. And there is a -- and if you tell Deborah when you come on February 1st, tell her there's a status date on the new, amended complaint of 2-24-16 at 9:30.

Are we all on the same page, schedule-wise?

MR. KRISLOV: We are.
MR. KENNEDY: The 2-24 had been on our schedule as a ruling date on the reconsideration, but now it's just --

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THE COURT: Well, it's not now.
MR. KENNEDY: I understand.
THE COURT: Things have been pushed up. Who knows? If I can get to it, believe me, I will. But I can't guarantee that, so I don't want to lie to you about anything.

MR. PRENDERGAST: Should we put that in the order, Your Honor?

THE COURT: Put in the "I don't want to lie to you about anything" in the order.

MR. KENNEDY: Strike the --
THE COURT: Yes, please strike the -which date are we striking?

MR. KENNEDY: The ruling date, which is not --

THE COURT: Yeah, 2-24 is not a ruling date. You're going to have to fill out another briefing schedule, a modified briefing schedule as to the motions to clarify.

Is anyone going to be around tomorrow? I will. Is anyone going to be around?

MR. KRISLOV: I will.
THE COURT: So maybe you can put all of these -- get a confirming order in writing for
everything that's occurred today, and you can go home, and all these people can go home. And we have a transcript anyway.

MR. PRENDERGAST: That will be fine, Judge.

THE COURT: I will not be here next week, so I can't sign off on anything, but Judge Allen will be around. And I wish you well.

Happy holidays to everybody.
(Proceedings adjourned at 3:25 p.m., December 23, 2015.)

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