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DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CITY OF CHICAGO

May 15, 2013

IMPORTANT NOTICE - PLEASE READ CAREFULLY

Dear City of Chicago Annuitant:

I am writing to update you of developments regarding retiree healthcare benefits. Under the Korshak Settlement Agreement, the City of Chicago agreed to provide support for healthcare coverage to annuitants through June 30, 2013. The Settlement Agreement also required that the City establish a Retiree Healthcare Benefits Commission ("RHBC") that, among other duties, was to make recommendations on the state of retiree healthcare benefits, their related cost trends, and issues affecting the offering of retiree benefits after July 1, 2013. Earlier this year, the RHBC fulfilled its duties and provided Mayor Emanuel with its report. Those recommendations can be found online at <u>http://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/fin/provdrs/ben.html</u>.

After reviewing the findings of the report, and after hearing many of the concerns expressed by retirees, employee representatives and industry experts, the City has decided the following:

- The City will extend current coverage and benefit levels through December 31, 2013. This additional time will allow retirees to maintain coverage for a full plan year, recognizing what we heard from many retirees who have planned deductible and out of pocket expenditures based on an expectation of full year coverage. The City will, however, adjust the benefit levels provided under the current plan starting January 1, 2014.
- 2. After January 1, 2014, the City will provide a healthcare plan with a continued contribution from the City of up to 55% of the cost for that plan for their lifetimes to the City retirees who are members of the Korshak and "Window" Sub-Classes, meaning those City annuitants who retired prior to August 23, 1989. In short, the City will continue to substantially subsidize these retirees' healthcare plan as it does today.
- 3. For all annuitants who retired on or after August 23, 1989, in light of the evolving landscape of national healthcare and challenges faced by Chicago taxpayers, the City will need to make changes to the current retiree healthcare plan. These changes will likely include some adjustments in premiums and/or deductibles, some benefit modifications and, ultimately, the phase out of the plan by the beginning of 2017. The City expects to announce the details of this revised structure this summer, so that all retirees, current and future, will have all the information they need to appropriately prepare for this important component of retirement planning. With the changes taking place in the national healthcare market, we will ensure retirees have the information needed to navigate the options available for their healthcare needs going forward, both for Medicare and non-Medicare eligible retirees. As you know, retirees who are eligible for Medicare will continue to receive Medicare coverage, and supplemental Medicare plans are available from many insurance companies as there are today for retirees who wish to purchase additional coverage. And retirees who are not eligible for Medicare will have a broad range of healthcare plan options available to them as the Illinois health insurance exchange goes into effect in 2014.

One additional note – as you may know, the current retiree healthcare subsidy provided by the four Chicago pension systems is set to expire on June 30, 2013. If this subsidy is not reauthorized, retirees will likely be responsible for bearing any additional cost for their healthcare plan that is currently borne by their respective pension funds.

We look forward to working with you in the coming months to ensure you have all the information you and your family will need to make sound decisions regarding your retiree healthcare.

Respectfully,

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT - CHANCERY DIVISION MICHAEL W. UNDERWOOD, et al.,) Plaintiffs,) vs.) No. 13 CH 17450 Calendar 13 CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant,) and Trustees of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of) Chicago; Trustees of the) Firemen's Annuity and Benefit) Fund of Chicago; Trustees of) the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of) Chicago; and Trustees of the) Laborers' & Retirement Board) Employees' Annuity and Benefit) Fund of Chicago, et al., Defendants.)

Record of proceedings had at the hearing of the above-entitled cause, before the Honorable NEIL H. COHEN, one of the Judges of said Court, on December 23, 2015, in Room 2308, Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois, commencing at 10:30 a.m.

	Page 2	Page 4
	raye 2	
 A P P E A R A N C E S KRISLOV & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 20 North Wacker Drive, Suite 1300 Chicago, Illinois 60606 (312) 606-0500 BY: Mr. Clinton A. Krislov clint@krislovlaw.com, Mr. Kenneth T. Goldstein ken@krislovlaw.com for the plaintiffs; RICHARD J. PRENDERGAST, LTD. 111 West Washington Street, Suite 1100 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 641-0881 BY: Mr. Richard J. Prendergast rprendergast@rjpltd.com, Mr. Michael T. Layden mlayden@rjpltd.com, *** and *** LANER MUCHIN, LTD. 515 North State Street, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60654 (312) 467-9800 BY: Ms. Jennifer A. Naber jnaber@lanermuchin.com for the City of Chicago; 		Image: Particle of the system Image: Particle of the system </td
	Page 3	Page 5
1 A P P E A R A N C E S (Continued) 2 DAVID R. KUGLER & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 3 6160 North Cicero Avenue 3 Suite 308 5 Chicago, Illinois 60646 6 (312) 263-3020 7 BY: Mr. David R. Kugler davidkugler@comcast.net for the Trustees of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago; 9 10 <td></td> <td>1 THE COURT: Well, good morning. Merry 2 Christmas to everyone. Happy New Year. This is 3 Underwood versus the City of Chicago. 4 Will the attorneys for the parties 5 please stand and acknowledge themselves for the 6 record. 7 MR. PRENDERGAST: Good morning, Your 8 Honor. Richard Prendergast on behalf of the City. 9 MR. LAYDEN: Mike Layden on behalf of 10 the City. 11 MR. BURKE: Ed Burke on behalf of the 12 Fire Fund and the Municipal Fund. 13 THE COURT: Mr. Burke. 14 MR. KENNEDY: John Kennedy with Cary 15 Donham on behalf of the Laborer's Fund. 16 THE COURT: Hi. How are you? 17 MR. KUGLER: David Kugler. 18 THE COURT: I see you. But for the 19 record, go ahead, David. Announce yourself. 10 MR. KUGLER: For the Police Pension 12 MS. NABER: Jennifer Naber for the 13 City of Chicago. 14 MR. KRISLOV: Clint Krislov for the</td>		1 THE COURT: Well, good morning. Merry 2 Christmas to everyone. Happy New Year. This is 3 Underwood versus the City of Chicago. 4 Will the attorneys for the parties 5 please stand and acknowledge themselves for the 6 record. 7 MR. PRENDERGAST: Good morning, Your 8 Honor. Richard Prendergast on behalf of the City. 9 MR. LAYDEN: Mike Layden on behalf of 10 the City. 11 MR. BURKE: Ed Burke on behalf of the 12 Fire Fund and the Municipal Fund. 13 THE COURT: Mr. Burke. 14 MR. KENNEDY: John Kennedy with Cary 15 Donham on behalf of the Laborer's Fund. 16 THE COURT: Hi. How are you? 17 MR. KUGLER: David Kugler. 18 THE COURT: I see you. But for the 19 record, go ahead, David. Announce yourself. 10 MR. KUGLER: For the Police Pension 12 MS. NABER: Jennifer Naber for the 13 City of Chicago. 14 MR. KRISLOV: Clint Krislov for the

2 (Pages 2 to 5)

	Page 6	Page 8
1	plaintiffs, many of whom are here.	¹ THE COURT: You'll have an opportunity
2	MR. GOLDSTEIN: Ken Goldstein for the	² to argue in the future. But you didn't submit
3	plaintiffs.	³ anything
4	THE COURT: Hi, Ken.	⁴ MR. KUGLER: We did not submit
5	All right. Will everyone please be	⁵ anything, no, Your Honor.
6	seated.	⁶ THE COURT: And that's intentional,
7	This is here on Mr. Krislov's request	⁷ correct?
8	for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. More	⁸ And, Mr. Kennedy.
9	about that a little bit later and what the City's	⁹ MR. KENNEDY: No, Your Honor. The
10	position is.	¹⁰ Laborer's Fund has not filed any papers. We do
11	We had a conference, a telephonic	¹¹ oppose the entry of a permanent injunction, for the
12	conference, yesterday between the parties and among	¹² reasons we set forth in our original papers, Your
13	the parties, in which we discussed what was going to	¹³ Honor.
14	occur today. And what we said was what I expect	¹⁴ THE COURT: Would both of you, Mr.
15	to occur now is Mr. Krislov, as I understand it,	¹⁵ Kennedy, Mr. Kugler, and Mr. Burke, would you all
16	wishes to call a couple of witnesses for examination,	¹⁶ like to be heard in the future, when we discuss this,
17	folks who gave affidavits on behalf of the City,	¹⁷ future today? I'll give you that opportunity.
18	submissions, in opposition to the issuance of a	¹⁸ Or would you like to rest on your
19	preliminary injunction.	¹⁹ previously stated positions and the positions stated
20	And then what I expect to occur is,	²⁰ by Mr. Burke in his submission.
21	we'll have a discussion, you may call it an argument,	²¹ Mr. Burke?
22	I'll call it a discussion, with regard to the	²² MR. BURKE: I would Judge, if I
23	parties' respective positions concerning whether a	²³ may, I will rely on my submission in this court and
24	preliminary injunction should issue or not.	²⁴ on my prior written submissions in the underlying
	Page 7	Page 9
1	With regard to that, the discussion,	¹ litigation.
2	I've received submissions from Mr. Krislov on behalf	² THE COURT: Very good. Mr. Kennedy. ³ MR. KENNEDY: On babalf of the
3	of the plaintiffs; Mr. Prendergast on behalf of the	WR. KENNEDT. On behan of the
4	City, and others on behalf of the City; and also Mr.	Laborers Fund, Fu fike to reserve the opportunity
J		
6	Burke on behalf of the members of the Firemen's	⁵ to address the Court, but I'm hoping that I don't
6	Annuity and Benefit Fund, as well as the Municipal	⁶ need to.
7	Annuity and Benefit Fund, as well as the Municipal Employees.	 ⁶ need to. ⁷ THE COURT: Fine. And I'll reserve
7 8	Annuity and Benefit Fund, as well as the Municipal Employees. MR. BURKE: Yes, sir.	 ⁶ need to. ⁷ THE COURT: Fine. And I'll reserve ⁸ that for you as well, Mr. Burke. I won't hold you to
7	Annuity and Benefit Fund, as well as the Municipal Employees. MR. BURKE: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Mr. Kugler, you did not	 ⁶ need to. ⁷ THE COURT: Fine. And I'll reserve that for you as well, Mr. Burke. I won't hold you to that. In other words, if you think that something is
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7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Annuity and Benefit Fund, as well as the Municipal Employees. MR. BURKE: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Mr. Kugler, you did not give anything, but I assume you've received everything and that you wish to join in on Mr. Burke's submission, as well the City's; is that correct? MR. KUGLER: We received everything, Your Honor. Our position is, we have not filed anything. Our position is, simply, that the preliminary injunction really doesn't ask for any relief with regard to the Police Fund, at any rate. We are complying with the statute as it exists and will continue to THE COURT: I didn't ask for an argument, Mr. Kugler. I merely asked whether you	 ⁶ need to. ⁷ THE COURT: Fine. And I'll reserve ⁸ that for you as well, Mr. Burke. I won't hold you to ⁹ that. In other words, if you think that something is ¹⁰ it important for your clients, please feel free to do ¹¹ so. ¹² But otherwise, I won't ask well, ¹³ I'll ask you, but I'll expect nothing, unless there's ¹⁴ something that you have to say. ¹⁵ Same with you, Mr. Kugler. Yes? ¹⁶ MR. KUGLER: Yes. We will rely on our ¹⁷ previous submissions, also, Your Honor, reserving the ¹⁸ right to respond if necessary. ¹⁹ THE COURT: That would be my honor to ¹⁰ hear you again. ²¹ MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would ²² THE COURT: Mr. Krislov, yes.

3 (Pages 6 to 9)

	rage 10		rage 12
1 '	today. They chose not to file anything	1	exclude. Is that what you want?
2	THE COURT: Your objection's	2	MR. KRISLOV: We would like her to be
3	overruled.	3	excluded during Ms. Holt's testimony.
4	Now, Mr. Krislov?	4	THE COURT: I'll hear about that in
5	MR. KRISLOV: Yes, Your Honor.	5	one second.
6	THE COURT: It's your motion. Would	6	Ms. Holt, please come up here. Watch
7	you like to go forward with it and call anybody.	7	your step, please.
8	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, may I	8	Are we on the record, Ms. Reporter?
9	make a suggestion?	9	THE COURT REPORTER: Yes, we are.
10	THE COURT: Sure.	10	(Witness sworn.)
11	MR. PRENDERGAST: I think it would be	11	THE COURT: Would you please state
12	helpful to the Court if each of the parties makes a	12	your name for the record please sit down and
13	15-minute or less opening statement.	13	spell your last name for the record.
14	THE COURT: Denied. You can do that	14	THE WITNESS: Alexandra Holt, H-o-l-t.
15	at the end.	15	THE COURT: Now, with regard to the
16	MR. PRENDERGAST: Okay.	16	motion to exclude witnesses, would you like to
17	-	17	elaborate on it?
18	THE COURT: And the reason for that,	18	
19	Mr. Prendergast, is I'm well aware of the parties'	19	MR. KRISLOV: Yes. Ms. Currier is the
20	positions. You've stated it to me in open court;	20	other affiant who I would like to cross-examine, and
20	you've stated it to me in prior submissions. I may	21	I would rather that they not be able to that she
21	agree or disagree. I have questions for everybody.	22	not get a heads up from what my questions are to Ms.
22	We'll do that after we take a elicit any testimony	22	Holt. I just don't think it's appropriate for her to
	from the witness stand.		listen to testimony before she gives hers regarding
24	I will not only allow you, permit you,	24	her affidavit.
	Page 11		Page 13
1	but invite you to make a statement in closing and in	1	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor?
2	opposition to this motion, and you may take as long	2	THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Prendergast.
3	as you like. You'll have every opportunity to be	3	MR. PRENDERGAST: I would normally not
4	heard on that.	4	object to a motion to exclude witnesses, except what
5	Is that all right with you?	5	Mr. Krislov is doing here is moving to exclude his
6	MR. PRENDERGAST: Of course.	6	own witness. We are not calling this witness. He's
7	THE COURT: I think it's most	7	calling this witness. We have no objection to this
8	efficient if we bypass attorneys having every	8	witness remaining in court, and I don't think he has
9			witness remaining in court, and I don't think he has
10		9	-
	opportunity to speak about it and just consolidate it	9 10	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be
	and clearly focus on the issues as they become	10	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay.
11	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions.	10 11	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling
11 12	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions. Mr. Krislov, call your first witness.	10 11 12	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse
11 12 13	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions. Mr. Krislov, call your first witness. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would	10 11 12 13	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse witness, a hostile witness, because he isn't
11 12 13 14	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions. Mr. Krislov, call your first witness. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would call, first, Ms. Alexandra Holt. And we would	10 11 12 13 14	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse witness, a hostile witness, because he isn't necessarily vouching for the credibility of the
11 12 13 14 15	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions. Mr. Krislov, call your first witness. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would call, first, Ms. Alexandra Holt. And we would like I know Ms. Currier by face. I don't know Ms.	10 11 12 13 14 15	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse witness, a hostile witness, because he isn't necessarily vouching for the credibility of the witness. He wishes to discuss with the witnesses
11 12 13 14 15 16	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions. Mr. Krislov, call your first witness. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would call, first, Ms. Alexandra Holt. And we would like I know Ms. Currier by face. I don't know Ms. Holt	10 11 12 13 14 15 16	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse witness, a hostile witness, because he isn't necessarily vouching for the credibility of the witness. He wishes to discuss with the witnesses their the substance of their affidavits.
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions. Mr. Krislov, call your first witness. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would call, first, Ms. Alexandra Holt. And we would like I know Ms. Currier by face. I don't know Ms. Holt THE COURT: Ms. Holt, are you present? MS. HOLT: I am. THE COURT: Would you come up, please.	10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse witness, a hostile witness, because he isn't necessarily vouching for the credibility of the witness. He wishes to discuss with the witnesses their the substance of their affidavits. However, that being said, Mr. Krislov, I've read both an annotated both of these affidavits, as I promised you I would. I'm familiar
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions. Mr. Krislov, call your first witness. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would call, first, Ms. Alexandra Holt. And we would like I know Ms. Currier by face. I don't know Ms. Holt THE COURT: Ms. Holt, are you present? MS. HOLT: I am. THE COURT: Would you come up, please. One second before you go further.	10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse witness, a hostile witness, because he isn't necessarily vouching for the credibility of the witness. He wishes to discuss with the witnesses their the substance of their affidavits. However, that being said, Mr. Krislov, I've read both an annotated both of these affidavits, as I promised you I would. I'm familiar with the substance of it.
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions. Mr. Krislov, call your first witness. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would call, first, Ms. Alexandra Holt. And we would like I know Ms. Currier by face. I don't know Ms. Holt THE COURT: Ms. Holt, are you present? MS. HOLT: I am. THE COURT: Would you come up, please. One second before you go further. MR. KRISLOV: No, I'm not going to	10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse witness, a hostile witness, because he isn't necessarily vouching for the credibility of the witness. He wishes to discuss with the witnesses their the substance of their affidavits. However, that being said, Mr. Krislov, I've read both an annotated both of these affidavits, as I promised you I would. I'm familiar with the substance of it. Ms. Holt's affidavit is not very long,
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions. Mr. Krislov, call your first witness. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would call, first, Ms. Alexandra Holt. And we would like I know Ms. Currier by face. I don't know Ms. Holt THE COURT: Ms. Holt, are you present? MS. HOLT: I am. THE COURT: Would you come up, please. One second before you go further. MR. KRISLOV: No, I'm not going to I just wanted Ms. Currier to leave the courtroom	10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse witness, a hostile witness, because he isn't necessarily vouching for the credibility of the witness. He wishes to discuss with the witnesses their the substance of their affidavits. However, that being said, Mr. Krislov, I've read both an annotated both of these affidavits, as I promised you I would. I'm familiar with the substance of it. Ms. Holt's affidavit is not very long, and it merely discusses, and I believe it addresses,
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions. Mr. Krislov, call your first witness. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would call, first, Ms. Alexandra Holt. And we would like I know Ms. Currier by face. I don't know Ms. Holt THE COURT: Ms. Holt, are you present? MS. HOLT: I am. THE COURT: Would you come up, please. One second before you go further. MR. KRISLOV: No, I'm not going to I just wanted Ms. Currier to leave the courtroom while the testimony is going	10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse witness, a hostile witness, because he isn't necessarily vouching for the credibility of the witness. He wishes to discuss with the witnesses their the substance of their affidavits. However, that being said, Mr. Krislov, I've read both an annotated both of these affidavits, as I promised you I would. I'm familiar with the substance of it. Ms. Holt's affidavit is not very long, and it merely discusses, and I believe it addresses, the hardship aspect which would allegedly befall the
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	and clearly focus on the issues as they become apparent and are apparent from the submissions. Mr. Krislov, call your first witness. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we would call, first, Ms. Alexandra Holt. And we would like I know Ms. Currier by face. I don't know Ms. Holt THE COURT: Ms. Holt, are you present? MS. HOLT: I am. THE COURT: Would you come up, please. One second before you go further. MR. KRISLOV: No, I'm not going to I just wanted Ms. Currier to leave the courtroom	10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	any basis to exclude his own witness. She should be allowed to stay. THE COURT: Well, he's really calling the witness as what used to be called as an adverse witness, a hostile witness, because he isn't necessarily vouching for the credibility of the witness. He wishes to discuss with the witnesses their the substance of their affidavits. However, that being said, Mr. Krislov, I've read both an annotated both of these affidavits, as I promised you I would. I'm familiar with the substance of it. Ms. Holt's affidavit is not very long, and it merely discusses, and I believe it addresses,

4 (Pages 10 to 13)

	raye 14		rage 10
1 '	one of the factors that I should consider in terms of	1	revenue, correct?
2	issuing an injunction or not. It talks about only	2	A I believe what I said was that if we were
3	that aspect.	3	to keep the subsidy levels for the retiree healthcare
4		4	
	It doesn't talk about the same	5	at the same level that they were at 2015, the City
5	substance, that which Ms. Currier's affidavit		would need to identify an additional \$30 million.
6	discusses, which is the nuts and bolts, the meat of	6	That can be done through revenue, or it can be done
7	retirees' benefits right now, what they would be if	7	through cuts and expenses.
8	the injunction were to issue, what different avenues	8	Q Well, let me just read your statement.
9	retirees would have. So they seem to me to be	9	A Uhm-hmm.
10	completely not there's no overlapping subject	10	Q And the statement says:
11	matter, except that it concerns this issue.	11	[AS READ:
12	So I'm a little for that reason,	12	If the City were required to maintain
13		13	
14	your motion to exclude is denied. I don't find that	14	subsidies at the 2015 levels, it would need to
	they really deal with the same subject matter at all.	15	identify an additional \$30 million in revenue.]
15	And you may proceed.		Right?
16	MR. KRISLOV: Thank you, Your Honor.	16	A That's correct.
17	THE COURT: You're welcome.	17	Q Okay. So this 30 it's actually, I
18	ALEXANDRA HOLT,	18	think, 30.1 million. This was in the 2015
19	having been called as a witness and having been first	19	appropriation?
20	duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:	20	A There was funding in the 2013 appropriation
21	DIRECT EXAMINATION	21	to pay for
22	BY MR. KRISLOV:	22	THE COURT: Two thousand what?
23		23	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry. 2015
24	Q Ms. Holt, good to meet you finally in	24	
27	person. I think we've read about each other over the	27	appropriation to pay for approximately \$60 million
	Page 15		Page 17
1		1	Page 17
1	years without meeting in person, so it's good to put	1	worth of retiree healthcare.
2	years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name.	2	worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV:
2 3	years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is	2 3	worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much
2 3 4	years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name.	2 3 4	worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015.
2 3	years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is	2 3	worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much
2 3 4	years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion.	2 3 4	worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845.
2 3 4 5	years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the	2 3 4 5	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection?
2 3 4 5 6	years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case,	2 3 4 5 6	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes.
2 3 4 5 6 7	years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess I'm 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget. A Well, then I hope it's accurate.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess I'm not trying to be difficult 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 12 13	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget. A Well, then I hope it's accurate. Q Me too.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess I'm not trying to be difficult THE COURT: Will the parties stipulate 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget. A Well, then I hope it's accurate. Q Me too. MR. KRISLOV: May I?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess I'm not trying to be difficult THE COURT: Will the parties stipulate it is Exhibit 8 without Mr. Krislov having to show 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget. A Well, then I hope it's accurate. Q Me too. MR. KRISLOV: May I? THE COURT: You may approach the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess I'm not trying to be difficult THE COURT: Will the parties stipulate 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget. A Well, then I hope it's accurate. Q Me too. MR. KRISLOV: May I?
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess I'm not trying to be difficult THE COURT: Will the parties stipulate it is Exhibit 8 without Mr. Krislov having to show 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget. A Well, then I hope it's accurate. Q Me too. MR. KRISLOV: May I? THE COURT: You may approach the
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess I'm not trying to be difficult THE COURT: Will the parties stipulate it is Exhibit 8 without Mr. Krislov having to show the exhibit? 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget. A Well, then I hope it's accurate. Q Me too. MR. KRISLOV: May I? THE COURT: You may approach the witness, and neither attorney needs to ask me for
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess I'm not trying to be difficult THE COURT: Will the parties stipulate it is Exhibit 8 without Mr. Krislov having to show the exhibit? MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes, it is Exhibit 8. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget. A Well, then I hope it's accurate. Q Me too. MR. KRISLOV: May I? THE COURT: You may approach the witness, and neither attorney needs to ask me for permission to approach during this hearing. MR. KRISLOV: Thank you.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess I'm not trying to be difficult THE COURT: Will the parties stipulate it is Exhibit 8 without Mr. Krislov having to show the exhibit? MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes, it is Exhibit 8. THE COURT: All right. Very good. 	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget. A Well, then I hope it's accurate. Q Me too. MR. KRISLOV: May I? THE COURT: You may approach the witness, and neither attorney needs to ask me for permission to approach during this hearing. MR. KRISLOV: Thank you. THE COURT: But you do need to lay a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess I'm not trying to be difficult THE COURT: Will the parties stipulate it is Exhibit 8 without Mr. Krislov having to show the exhibit? MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes, it is Exhibit 8. THE COURT: All right. Very good. BY MR. KRISLOV:	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget. A Well, then I hope it's accurate. Q Me too. MR. KRISLOV: May I? THE COURT: You may approach the witness, and neither attorney needs to ask me for permission to approach during this hearing. MR. KRISLOV: Thank you. THE COURT: But you do need to lay a foundation for the introduction of evidence.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	years without meeting in person, so it's good to put a face with the name. You gave an affidavit, which is Exhibit 8 to the City's opposition to our preliminary injunction motion. A I did provide an affidavit as part of the City's preliminary as part of this court case, yes. Q And that is the Exhibit 8 that is the attachment, to the best of your knowledge? A I don't know if it's Exhibit 8 or not. I know that I provided an affidavit. I guess I'm not trying to be difficult THE COURT: Will the parties stipulate it is Exhibit 8 without Mr. Krislov having to show the exhibit? MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes, it is Exhibit 8. THE COURT: All right. Very good. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Now, as I understand it, what you're saying	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 worth of retiree healthcare. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Approximately how much A About \$60 million in 2015. Q Right. I have \$62,912,845. Does that jibe with your recollection? A It's approximately 60 million, yes. Q Let me show you what we'll call Exhibit A, which is a spreadsheet, which I hope you'll find it's accurate, because I did it by copying from your own budget. A Well, then I hope it's accurate. Q Me too. MR. KRISLOV: May I? THE COURT: You may approach the witness, and neither attorney needs to ask me for permission to approach during this hearing. MR. KRISLOV: Thank you. THE COURT: But you do need to lay a foundation for the introduction of evidence. MR. KRISLOV: Will do.
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5 (Pages 14 to 17)

	Page 18	Page 20
1	THE COURT: Let's go.	¹ THE COURT: I'm not dealing with
2	BY MR. KRISLOV:	² assumptions in the issuance of an injunction. I'm
3	Q Would you take a look at the chart, and	³ not dealing with "I believe" or "may." This is not
4	A Uhm-hmm. Ms. Holt, from now on, we don't	⁴ the way we do things under our system of justice.
5	take uh-huhs in here because the court reporter can't	⁵ You have to lay a foundation.
6	take that down. It's either yes or no, okay?	⁶ Let me ask you, Ms. Holt.
7	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.	⁷ Do you know if that document in front
8	BY MR. KRISLOV:	⁸ of you truly and accurately represents the figures it
9	Q So what I've taken from your budget, annual	⁹ purports to represent in the City's budget for, in
10		¹⁰ this case, per the last question, 2012? Yes or no?
11	budget books that are issued by the City, that for THE COURT: Whoever has a cell phone,	¹¹ THE WITNESS: No. I didn't put it
12	turn it off.	¹² together, so, no, I do not know that.
13	THE COURT REPORTER: Your Honor, it	together, so, no, i do not know that.
14		 THE COURT: All right. Next question. BY MR. KRISLOV:
15	was my laptop.	DI WIK. KKISLOV.
16	THE COURT: Oh, then, you're going to have to leave.	Q I ou would agree, mough, me city spent
17		 that the City's expenditure in 2012 was about \$99 million for retiree healthcare?
18	(Laughter.) BY MR. KRISLOV:	¹⁸ A I would agree that it was about around
19		A I would agree that it was about around
20	Q For 2012 THE COURT: Defere you start reading	\$100 minion, yes, 1 would agree with that.
21	THE COURT: Before you start reading	
22	from a document, you need to get it into the record. MR. KRISLOV: Well, I don't think I	A i believe that to be generally confect.
23		Q Alia 101 2014, it was reduced to 80,009,880,
24	need THE COURT: Well, I'm telling you,	 and I have the 2015 budget overview which you can refer to, and I think it will corroborate I think
	THE COOKT. wen, Thi tenning you,	Telef to, and I timik it will contoborate I timik
	Page 19	Page 21
1	despite what you think.	¹ you probably know this book better than anybody else
2	You know, show it to the witness, ask	
	I OU KHOW, SHOW IT TO THE WITHESS, ASK	² in the room.
3	her if she can identify it and knows what it is, and	² in the room. ³ A Yes. Again, speaking in rounded numbers, I
3 4	her if she can identify it and knows what it is, and	in the room.
		³ A Yes. Again, speaking in rounded numbers, I
4	her if she can identify it and knows what it is, and accepts it as real and truthful. Otherwise, it's not	³ A Yes. Again, speaking in rounded numbers, I ⁴ do agree that 80 million is correct in terms of our
4 5	her if she can identify it and knows what it is, and accepts it as real and truthful. Otherwise, it's not coming in.	 A Yes. Again, speaking in rounded numbers, I do agree that 80 million is correct in terms of our retiree healthcare expenditure in 2014.
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6 (Pages 18 to 21)

	Page 22		Page 24
1	They may have some argumentative value for him in	¹ So tell me why thes	e questions as to
2	context of the overall case. But the purpose of this	2 how they arrived at it is impo	
3	preliminary injunction hearing is quite narrow.	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	ecause, Your Honor, if
4	The question is, what's the impact on	⁴ it is just if there are other fa	
5	the retirees going from 2015 to 2016. That's the	⁵ require them to reduce this, th	
6	only relevant inquiry.	⁶ this is just a unilateral decisio	
7	THE COURT: Mr. Krislov?	⁷ just reduce this, that takes aw	
8	MR. KRISLOV: I think we can ask our	 ⁸ equities. 	uy nom men
9	questions, and	⁹ If Mr. Prendergast i	s going to
10	THE COURT: No, it has to be relevant	^o interrupt the questioning even	
11	to	¹ can argue relevance. It's not	
12	MR. KRISLOV: It is relevant, Your	2 take a long time with Ms. Ho	
13	Honor	³ establish that the only reason	
14	THE COURT: Clint.	⁴ this is because it chooses to d	
15	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor.	⁵ undercuts its equities in sayin	
16	THE COURT: Clint. Stop interrupting	⁶ additional money, because it	
17	me when I'm talking. I don't like being bullied, and	⁷ It had the money in each of th	5
18	I won't let you bully me or anybody else. You can't	⁸ to cut the money that it spent	
19	just cut me off when you think you know what I'm	5 1	you're not alleging in
20	going to say. It's just as a matter of courtesy. I	^o any complaint that this is don	
21	grant you, you know everything I'm going to say. But	¹ or without a factual foundation	
22	you're going to let me say it without interrupting me	2 that the City chooses to belie	
23	because it's just a kind and courteous thing to do,	³ The City has argued	
24	okay?	⁴ by the way, in their submission	
	onuj.		
	Page 23		Page 25
1	-	1 comothing that they had to d	Page 25
1 2	MR. KRISLOV: I apologize, Your Honor.	¹ something that they had to d	o. But that's neither
2	MR. KRISLOV: I apologize, Your Honor. THE COURT: What relevance does this	2 here nor there. The only fac	o. But that's neither t here, conceded fact,
	MR. KRISLOV: I apologize, Your Honor. THE COURT: What relevance does this have to the freeze vel non between 2015 and 2016 that	 ² here nor there. The only fac ³ is that they've done it, and ye 	o. But that's neither t here, conceded fact,
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2 3 4	MR. KRISLOV: I apologize, Your Honor. THE COURT: What relevance does this have to the freeze vel non between 2015 and 2016 that you're requesting through the issuance of this preliminary injunction?	 ² here nor there. The only fac ³ is that they've done it, and ye ⁴ having been done. ⁵ You haven't alleged 	o. But that's neither t here, conceded fact, ou wish to enjoin it
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7 (Pages 22 to 25)

	Page 26	Page 28
1		
2	questioning, I believe I have a right to question her	The weak, in a couple of ways. This, it was
3	on how the City arrived why the City does THE COURT: I disagree, and that's my	 ² part of our budget balancing. The City has a ³ long-term, standing structural deficit that we had to
4	8	⁴ address in 2015. It meant that in this case, we had
5	ruling.	address in 2015. It meant that in this case, we had
6	MR. KRISLOV: It's relevant to the	to find over \$500 minion to pay both our operating
7	balance of equity, Your Honor.	 ⁶ bills plus increased debt service that came from ⁷ legacy borrowing.
8	THE COURT: No, it's not.	⁸ THE COURT: How much?
9	MR. KRISLOV: The reasons for doing it?	⁹ THE WITNESS: There was 232 million in
10		¹⁰ a structural deficit, Your Honor, and another hundred
11	THE COURT: No, it's not. MR. KRISLOV: Their motivation isn't	¹¹ million dollars in debt service payment increased
12	relevant?	¹² debt service payment that we need to make.
13		¹³ THE COURT: Understood.
14	THE COURT: No, it's not. We're only	¹⁴ THE WITNESS: None of which addressed
15	dealing with what is, not the reason therefore.	¹⁵ our pension issues, which is a separate discussion.
16	MR. KRISLOV: May I ask about the	¹⁶ And so we did a couple of things. We
17	reason	And so we did a couple of unligs. We
18	THE COURT: Ask a question, and if	go unough the entire budget. We look at both
19	there's an objection, I'll deal with it, and we'll	revenue opportunities. We also look at expense
20	deal with it that way. BY MR. KRISLOV:	 reductions, which, of course, expense reductions come with, often, service reductions. So we try to
21		²¹ balance that.
22	Q The amount of money that we show is appropriated for 2015 was \$62,912,845.	²² And, you know, our single biggest
23	Would that jibe with your	 ²³ source of expense in the city is our employees and
24	recollection?	the benefits for both our employees as well as our
		the benefits for both our employees as well as our
	Page 27	Page 29
1	A Yes, that jibes with my recollection.	¹ retirees.
2	Q And that you reduced that what you've	² And so we look through all of those
3	done in the budget recommendation of the budget	And so we look unough an of mose
3	done in the budget recommendation of the budget	³ and look where there's an opportunity to take down
	that was adopted by the City, reduces that from	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns
4 5	that was adopted by the City, reduces that from THE COURT: Which budget? I'm just	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and,
4	that was adopted by the City, reduces that from THE COURT: Which budget? I'm just asking	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and, particularly, the concerns of the taxpayers and the
4 5 6	that was adopted by the City, reduces that from THE COURT: Which budget? I'm just asking MR. KRISLOV: 2016.	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and, particularly, the concerns of the taxpayers and the residents of the city of Chicago who have an
4 5 6 7	that was adopted by the City, reduces that from THE COURT: Which budget? I'm just asking MR. KRISLOV: 2016. THE COURT: For which 2016.	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and, particularly, the concerns of the taxpayers and the residents of the city of Chicago who have an expectation of a certain level of services. All of
4 5 7 8	that was adopted by the City, reduces that from THE COURT: Which budget? I'm just asking MR. KRISLOV: 2016. THE COURT: For which 2016. BY MR. KRISLOV:	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and, particularly, the concerns of the taxpayers and the residents of the city of Chicago who have an expectation of a certain level of services. All of that goes in together in terms of how we make the
4 5 7 8 9	<pre>that was adopted by the City, reduces that from THE COURT: Which budget? I'm just asking MR. KRISLOV: 2016. THE COURT: For which 2016. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q The 2016 budget reduces that 62.9 million</pre>	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and, particularly, the concerns of the taxpayers and the residents of the city of Chicago who have an expectation of a certain level of services. All of that goes in together in terms of how we make the decision.
4 5 7 8 9 10	that was adopted by the City, reduces that from THE COURT: Which budget? I'm just asking MR. KRISLOV: 2016. THE COURT: For which 2016. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q The 2016 budget reduces that 62.9 million by to an appropriation of 32,700,910; is that	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and, particularly, the concerns of the taxpayers and the residents of the city of Chicago who have an expectation of a certain level of services. All of that goes in together in terms of how we make the decision. In this case, with respect to the
4 5 7 8 9 10 11	that was adopted by the City, reduces that from THE COURT: Which budget? I'm just asking MR. KRISLOV: 2016. THE COURT: For which 2016. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q The 2016 budget reduces that 62.9 million by to an appropriation of 32,700,910; is that right?	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and, particularly, the concerns of the taxpayers and the residents of the city of Chicago who have an expectation of a certain level of services. All of that goes in together in terms of how we make the decision. In this case, with respect to the subsidy, the subsidy went down by 25 percent, which
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12	<pre>that was adopted by the City, reduces that from</pre>	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and, particularly, the concerns of the taxpayers and the residents of the city of Chicago who have an expectation of a certain level of services. All of that goes in together in terms of how we make the decision. In this case, with respect to the subsidy, the subsidy went down by 25 percent, which is consistent with the amount that it had gone down
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 that was adopted by the City, reduces that from THE COURT: Which budget? I'm just asking MR. KRISLOV: 2016. THE COURT: For which 2016. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q The 2016 budget reduces that 62.9 million by to an appropriation of 32,700,910; is that right? A As part of balancing the 2016 budget, we did reduce the expenditure down to approximately \$30 million. Q And there was, indeed, previously, 62 million appropriated and spent in 2015, right? A Yes, there was 62 million spent in ap well, we don't have the final 2015 numbers. But the budgeted number for 2015 was 62 million, and that was appropriated for 2015. Q And the reason for, as I take it from your affidavit that figure of \$30 million, how was that 	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and, particularly, the concerns of the taxpayers and the residents of the city of Chicago who have an expectation of a certain level of services. All of that goes in together in terms of how we make the decision. In this case, with respect to the subsidy, the subsidy went down by 25 percent, which is consistent with the amount that it had gone down in prior years. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q According to the 2016 budget overview, the cuts the spending cuts for personnel savings and reforms total 57.1 million. Would that A That's correct. Q And that was attributed to vacancy eliminations.
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 that was adopted by the City, reduces that from THE COURT: Which budget? I'm just asking MR. KRISLOV: 2016. THE COURT: For which 2016. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q The 2016 budget reduces that 62.9 million by to an appropriation of 32,700,910; is that right? A As part of balancing the 2016 budget, we did reduce the expenditure down to approximately \$30 million. Q And there was, indeed, previously, 62 million appropriated and spent in 2015, right? A Yes, there was 62 million spent in ap well, we don't have the final 2015 numbers. But the budgeted number for 2015 was 62 million, and that was appropriated for 2015. Q And the reason for, as I take it from your 	 and look where there's an opportunity to take down expenses. But we also have to balance the concerns of our employees, the concerns of the retirees, and, particularly, the concerns of the taxpayers and the residents of the city of Chicago who have an expectation of a certain level of services. All of that goes in together in terms of how we make the decision. In this case, with respect to the subsidy, the subsidy went down by 25 percent, which is consistent with the amount that it had gone down in prior years. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q According to the 2016 budget overview, the cuts the spending cuts for personnel savings and reforms total 57.1 million. Would that A That's correct. Q And that was attributed to vacancy eliminations.

8 (Pages 26 to 29)

	Page 30		Page 32
1	A Yes. We eliminated positions that weren't	1	personnel-related costs.]
2	currently occupied, about 150 of them.	2	Right?
3	Q And how much did that save in dollars?	3	A That's correct.
4	A About \$12 million.	4	Q And then you say:
5		5	
6	Q And then retiree healthcare was 30.1	6	[CONTINUING:
7	million.	7	91 percent of the City's total
8	That leaves other healthcare savings	8	positions are union members covered by collective
9	of how much?	9	bargaining agreements that preclude salary
10	A There's about \$10 million of other	10	reductions and other personnel changes, except
11	healthcare savings. That's for our active employees.	11	through layoffs.]
12	Q And so your position is that the	12	Right?
13	30.1 million reflected a 25 percent reduction from	13	A That's correct.
13	what?	14	Q Okay. So your position, as I take it, is
	A No, it's you can't you can't look at		we had all these other people we couldn't do anything
15	the if you don't mind, let me explain for a	15	about, but the retirees, we could.
16	second.	16	A I don't think that's an accurate
17	You can't look at the number itself.	17	characterization of my position.
18	The number was arrive the 30 million is the	18	When we look at the reductions that we
19	result of reducing the subsidy for the retirees who	19	need to make to address the City's structural
20	retired after 1989 by 25 percent. That, then,	20	deficit and by "structural deficit," we're in a
21	generated an additional thirty that generated	21	situation the City's in a situation that we've
22	\$30 million in savings.	22	been in for, really, a better part of the last
23	THE COURT: So let me ask you a	23	decade, where the expenses primarily are people
24	question.	24	because we deliver services through people have
	Page 31		Page 22
			Faue
1		1	Page 33
1 2	This \$30 million that you saved, this	1	been growing faster than the revenues. The recession
2	This \$30 million that you saved, this only deals with the retirees who retired after 1989;	2	been growing faster than the revenues. The recession exacerbated that situation. There have been previous
	This \$30 million that you saved, this only deals with the retirees who retired after 1989; is that correct?	2 3	been growing faster than the revenues. The recession exacerbated that situation. There have been previous decisions by the prior administration to deal with
2 3 4	This \$30 million that you saved, this only deals with the retirees who retired after 1989; is that correct? THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your	2 3 4	been growing faster than the revenues. The recession exacerbated that situation. There have been previous decisions by the prior administration to deal with that through one-time revenue sources. So we've
2 3	This \$30 million that you saved, this only deals with the retirees who retired after 1989; is that correct? THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honor.	2 3 4 5	been growing faster than the revenues. The recession exacerbated that situation. There have been previous decisions by the prior administration to deal with that through one-time revenue sources. So we've really had to make all of that up over the last five
2 3 4 5	This \$30 million that you saved, this only deals with the retirees who retired after 1989; is that correct? THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Did you save any from the	2 3 4	been growing faster than the revenues. The recession exacerbated that situation. There have been previous decisions by the prior administration to deal with that through one-time revenue sources. So we've really had to make all of that up over the last five budgets.
2 3 4 5 6	This \$30 million that you saved, this only deals with the retirees who retired after 1989; is that correct? THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Did you save any from the retirees who retired before August 23rd of 1989?	2 3 4 5 6	been growing faster than the revenues. The recession exacerbated that situation. There have been previous decisions by the prior administration to deal with that through one-time revenue sources. So we've really had to make all of that up over the last five budgets. For us it's a balancing act between
2 3 4 5 6 7	This \$30 million that you saved, this only deals with the retirees who retired after 1989; is that correct? THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Did you save any from the retirees who retired before August 23rd of 1989? THE WITNESS: No. In fact, our	2 3 4 5 6 7	been growing faster than the revenues. The recession exacerbated that situation. There have been previous decisions by the prior administration to deal with that through one-time revenue sources. So we've really had to make all of that up over the last five budgets. For us it's a balancing act between how much we can increase taxes. We have some
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	This \$30 million that you saved, this only deals with the retirees who retired after 1989; is that correct? THE WITNESS: That's correct, Your Honor. THE COURT: Did you save any from the retirees who retired before August 23rd of 1989? THE WITNESS: No. In fact, our expenses related to those retirees have been	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	been growing faster than the revenues. The recession exacerbated that situation. There have been previous decisions by the prior administration to deal with that through one-time revenue sources. So we've really had to make all of that up over the last five budgets. For us it's a balancing act between how much we can increase taxes. We have some residents of the city who can afford to pay more in
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9 (Pages 30 to 33)

Dago	31
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	Page 34		Page 36
1	And so we had to go look at vacancy	1	and the number of years of service that they have,
2	reductions, we had to look at cutting contracts, we		and you reduce that subsidy that's provided to them
3			
	had to look at new revenues. We had to look at a	4	on an individual basis by 25 percent.
4	whole series of things to continue to pay our		If you do that, then the ultimate
5	employees, to continue to provide services, and		savings is \$30 million.
6	continue to make pension payments.	6	Q Okay. When you talk about a subsidy, you
7	Q And so was the \$30 million figure who	7	know that the City is a self-insurer, right?
8	set the \$30 million figure?	8	A That's correct. I know that.
9	A As I indicated, it wasn't a determination	9	Q So the City is the insurer. It's not
10		10	
11	of \$30 million. The decision was made to reduce the		subsidizing somebody. The City is the providers of
12	subsidy that was provided by 25 percent. The end	12	the insurance, right?
	result of that was \$30 million in savings.		A We pay for the healthcare cost directly.
13	Q Okay. The what I don't understand,		We don't since we are self-insured
14	really, is the 25 percent, we've reduced the people	14	Q Yes or no.
15	that we do it for, or we reduce the money, or we do	15	THE COURT: Excuse me. You're going
16	I don't know it's 25 percent of what?	16	to let her finish her answer.
17	A Of the subsidy level that's provided by the	17	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, I'd like to
18	City.	18	strike the answer
19	Q Okay. But the subsidy level was, the year	19	THE COURT: You may not. You're going
20	before, 62 million nine, and the subsidy level for	20	to wait till it's done. I'll see whether it should
21			
22	2015, and the subsidy level for 2016 is 32 million.		be stricken or not, but I have to let the witness finish.
23	If I divide the 32 into 62, I get lots more than	23	
24	25 percent.	24	Again, courtesy.
24	A I think that's because you and I are	24	Please finish your answer, Ms. Holt.
	Page 35		Page 37
1		1	-
1	talking about a different subsidy. You're talking	1	THE WITNESS: We do we are
2	talking about a different subsidy. You're talking about the cash subsidy that's provided. I'm	2	THE WITNESS: We do we are self-insured. We do pay for the healthcare costs of
2 3	talking about a different subsidy. You're talking about the cash subsidy that's provided. I'm referring to the subsidy level that's provided to the	2 3	THE WITNESS: We do we are self-insured. We do pay for the healthcare costs of our employees and retirees directly. I would still
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10 (Pages 34 to 37)

Page 3	38
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	Page 38		Page 40
1	[AS READ:	1	are two budgets in the city. One is the corporate
2	Because the average city employee	2	budget, which is basically the general spending, and
3	earns \$73,000 annually, more than 400 employees	3	the other are reserve moneys, from whether it's
4	would have to be terminated in order achieve \$30	4	project deals, bond deals, whatever, that are sort of
5	million in savings.]	5	separate. If we just focus on the corporate side,
6	What you're doing there is saying that	6	that's sort of the City's general operating account;
7	if you were to find \$30 million in additional	7	would you agree?
8	revenues by chopping positions, you would have to	8	A The corporate fund is our generating
9	chop 400 positions, right?	9	account.
10	A That is one option. We would need to cut	10	Q Okay. And the total in the the total
11	expenses in some way, whether it's people or services	11	budget for the corporate fund in each year is about
12	that we provide.	12	\$3 1/2 billion, right?
13	Q And had you left the budget at the same	13	A No, I wouldn't say in each year. It was
14	amount that you had in 2015, you wouldn't have you	14	3 1/2 billion in 2015.
15	would have had to just raise the revenues that would	15	Q And 3 1/2 billion, a little more. It's
16	be indicated, right?	16	like 3.6 billion in 2016?
17	A No, I'm not sure I agree that.	17	A Yes, it did increase in 2016 due to raises
18	We have two choices in trying to pay	18	that were required under the union contracts.
19	for expenses that the City has: One is to cut	19	Q So that's \$100 million that it went up.
20	expenses, which is, as I had stated, really, at this	20	And the total of \$30 million to the
21	stage, it's about either cutting people or cutting	21	City's annual corporate budget is, as I calculate it,
22	services; the other choice is to increase taxes or	22	about 1 percent; would that be right?
23	fees.	23	A That's correct.
24	If we had left the subsidy where it	24	Q Or is it 1/10 of 1 percent?
			-
	Page 39		Page 41
1	was for 2015 and carried that additional 30 million	1	A It's approximately, yes, about 1 percent.
2	into 2016, we would have had to find money someplace,	2	Q Okay. And of the total even if you had
3	either through increased fees or taxes, or through	3	to raise taxes for that \$30 million, that would raise
4	cutting expenses to pay for that \$30 million.	4	the average property tax by \$30?
5	Q Okay. But it wasn't you wouldn't have	5	A It would raise it by \$30. But you can't
6	necessarily had to do that by firing 400 employees?	6	look at it on its own. You really do have to look at
7	A There are lots of options that are	7	what's happened in the budgets over the past four
8	available. If we go towards reducing services, then	8	years, including 2016.
9	our choice if we go towards cutting expenses, then	9	The City has just enacted a
10	our choices are firing employees, or eliminating	10	\$544 million property tax increase to pay for pension
11	jobs, or cutting other kinds of programs that the	11	obligations that the City has, in addition to other
12	city provides.	12 13	tax and fee increases that went in 2015.
13	Q Right. But you're not the sticking		You need to look at what the impact of
14	the sentence in there as if you had to cut 400	14	even an additional \$30 million has on our taxpayers,
15	employees. That would that's one of your options,	15 16	and particularly those taxpayers who are lower income
16	but that isn't required, right?	17	and have a more difficult time paying their bills.
17	A No, it's not required. It's one of our	18	So when we do tax increases each year
18	options. Cutting our after-school program is another	19	as part of the budget process, we do try to look at
19 20	option. Cutting back garbage service is another	20	it as a whole. And we look at it not just for that particular year. We also look at what we've done
20	option. I mean, there are options available to us,	21	over the last four years, of five year five
21	but all of them do result in some kind of service	22	budgets in this case and try to balance that in a way
22	reduction at this point. Q And the total corporate the total	23	which is hopefully sustainable for the people who
24	-	24	
24	corporate budget, there's as I understand, there	24	have to pay the bills.

11 (Pages 38 to 41)

	Page 42		Page 44
1	Q And did you consider in not raising taxes	1	One second, Your Honor.
2	by that additional \$30 million that the retirees	2	THE COURT: Sure.
3	might actually be protected by the Illinois	3	(Brief pause.)
4	Constitution against such a diminution?	4	BY MR. KRISLOV:
5	A I'll defer to the lawyers on the legal	5	Q You said you left the issue of whether or
6	issues. As I the City, back in 2013, when the	6	
7		7	not these people were the retirees were protected
8	settlement agreement that had provided the healthcare	8	by the Illinois constitution to the lawyers? A Uhm-hmm.
9	retiree healthcare expired, announced that it was	9	
10	going to be reducing the subsidies over time,	10	Q Right?
11	proposed a three-year phaseout, certainly, from, you	11	A Yes, I did say that.
12	know, the legal advice that we had, that we believed	12	Q You are a lawyer?
13	that that's within our rights to do that.	13	A Iam.
14	Q Okay. When you raise the idea that you're	14	Q And so you understand the concept of
15	going to have to that cutting summer and	15	constitutional protection, right?
16	after-school programming, that if you chose to do it	16	A I do.
17	by cutting summer and after-school programming, you'd	17	Q But you did not and what I asked was
18	have to cut 12,500, or 17,500 positions, these are		whether or what I'd like did you consider
19	not the only these and cutting 400 people from	18	whether it would be constitutionally whether
	their jobs are not the only options that you had open	19	retirees were constitutionally protected against a
20	to you, right?	20	reduction in the subsidy?
21	A We certainly have other options open to us,	21	A Do you mean as a personal matter or in my
22	but as I indicated, they are options that will	22	official role? I'm not sure I understand.
23 24	reduce result in service reductions.	23	Q In your capacity as the budget director of
24	Other options that I have, for	24	City of Chicago.
		<u> </u>	
	Page 43		Page 45
1	example, would be, you know, impacting the healthcare	1	A So my capacity as a budget director of the
2	programs that the health department provides to	2	
3			City of Chicago is not to be difficult is not
	low-income residents. I could also cut our gasoline	3	to provide legal advice.
4			
4 5	low-income residents. I could also cut our gasoline budget by reducing garbage collection to, say, every other week.	3	to provide legal advice. In this case, you know, the attorneys
	budget by reducing garbage collection to, say, every other week.	3 4	to provide legal advice.
5	budget by reducing garbage collection to, say, every other week. I mean, we do have a series of options	3 4 5	to provide legal advice. In this case, you know, the attorneys who advise the City, who both work for the City and
5 6	budget by reducing garbage collection to, say, every other week. I mean, we do have a series of options available to us. I think the point of that affidavit	3 4 5 6	to provide legal advice. In this case, you know, the attorneys who advise the City, who both work for the City and who advise the City, outside attorneys, provided us with the advice on what we could and could not do.
5 6 7	budget by reducing garbage collection to, say, every other week. I mean, we do have a series of options available to us. I think the point of that affidavit and that statement is that none of them are really	3 4 5 6 7	to provide legal advice. In this case, you know, the attorneys who advise the City, who both work for the City and who advise the City, outside attorneys, provided us
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12 (Pages 42 to 45)

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1 '	issue more recently? Was that taken into account,	¹ A I am aware of none.
2	in, say, 2015?	² Q So the City could have ceased right then
3	A Legal issues around this, including the	³ and there to provide any subsidies based upon the
4	constitutional issues, have been taken into account	⁴ expiration of the prior statute?
5	all the way through the decision-making process.	⁵ MR. KRISLOV: Objection. She is not
6	Q But what I'm asking is during 2015, was	⁶ being
7	that aspect considered?	⁷ THE WITNESS: It's my understanding
8	A And as I indicated, yes, it's been	⁸ THE COURT: One second.
9	considered from day one, and it continues to be	⁹ MR. KRISLOV: She's not a legal
10	considered.	¹⁰ she's not a legal she disavows being a legal
11	Q The answer that	¹¹ expert in this respect, and he wants her to testify
12	THE COURT: The answer is yes.	12 as to the legality.
13	MR. KRISLOV: The question is, is it	¹³ THE COURT: That objection is
14	considered now in the 2015 reduction, in the	¹⁴ sustained.
15	reduction from 2015 to 2016.	¹⁵ BY MR. PRENDERGAST:
16	MR. PRENDERGAST: Actually, that	¹⁶ Q Assume for me that the City's obligation
17	wasn't the question.	¹⁷ under those time-limited statutes expired in the
18	THE COURT: No, that wasn't the	¹⁸ middle of 2013, for the purposes of my question.
19	question. The question was about the 2015 budget,	¹⁹ Do you have that assumption in mind?
20	not the 2016.	²⁰ A I do have that assumption in mind.
21	But you may rephrase.	²¹ Q When in 2013 the City extended subsidies to
22	MR. KRISLOV: Thank you.	the end of 2013 and then introduced a phaseout
23	BY MR. KRISLOV:	²³ program over the next four years, why do you know
24	Q For the 2016 budget, was that reviewed	²⁴ why the City did it in a phaseout process rather than
	Page 47	Page 49
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1 2	again?	¹ just stopping subsidies altogether?
	again? A Yes, it was reviewed again.	 just stopping subsidies altogether? A We did it for a couple of reasons: First,
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	again? A Yes, it was reviewed again. Q And the decision was that you could keep on reducing it at the City's unilateral decision? A The advice was that the City was able to continue to reduce and that we were not obligated to continue to provide that subsidy. MR. KRISLOV: No further questions of Ms. Holt, Your Honor. THE COURT: Cross. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. PRENDERGAST: Q Ms. Holt, you were asked about 2013 in the last question you were just asked, what was considered. In mid 2013, are you aware that a statute which provided for subsidies expired, that was provided to the City that provides the subsidies expires as a matter of law? A I am aware that that statute expired. Q Okay. At that point in time, after that point in time, were you aware of any statutory	1just stopping subsidies altogether?2AWe did it for a couple of reasons: First,3with respect to 2013, when we chose to continue to4extend the subsidy at its current levels to the end5of 2013, we were in the middle of a plan year. We6did that specifically because we didn't want to be in7a position of asking retirees to go out in the middle8of the year, in the middle of a plan year, and try to9find a new healthcare plan. We knew that that would10be difficult for them to do, particularly for those11that didn't have a second job or didn't have a spouse12that could provide that healthcare, and we wanted to13provide that bridge.14We then, at the same time, as I had15noted, announced that we would be doing the phaseout16opportunity to look for other options, but also19because we knew that the Affordable Care Act was20coming into play over a couple of years and that21there would be more options widely available to22retirees; hence both the extension in 2013 that the

13 (Pages 46 to 49)

	Page 50		Page 52
1	Q And each of those programs, whether it was	1	A That's correct.
2	the extension to the end of 2013 or the phaseout over	2	Q You mentioned the Affordable Care Act, and
3	the next three years each year, each of those was	3	as I understand it, the City's desire in this
4	time limited, was it not?	4	phaseout is basically to put the retirees onto the
5	A They were time limited. We do our	5	Affordable Care Act rather than have the City pay for
6	healthcare programming, in this case, fiscal years or	6	their healthcare, correct?
7	calendar years, because they're the same for us.	7	A I'm not sure that's fully accurate. I
8	So when we put out, either for	8	would say that I don't think it's necessarily our
9	retirees/employees, the healthcare plan for the next	9	desire to put them on the Affordable Care Act.
10	year, it is just for the next year.	10	The Affordable Care Act relates to the
11	Q So what you did for 2013 was time limited	11	fact that we did a three-year phaseout. Knowing that
12	for 2013, correct?	12	the Affordable Care Act was coming into play, we knew
13	A That's correct.	13	that retirees who didn't have another option, such as
14	Q What you did for 2014 was time limited for	14	secondary employment, or, again, a spouse or a
15	2014, correct?	15	partner who provides healthcare, would have another
16	A That's correct.	16	yet another option available to them, other than
17	Q What you did for 2015 was time limited for	17	the insurance plans that were available on the market
18	2015, correct?	18	when we started in 2013, so that was one of the
19	A That's correct.	19	guiding principles behind why we chose to do the
20	Q And what you're doing for 2016 was time	20	phasedown the way that we've done it.
21	limited through the end of 2016; is that correct?	21	Q And did you consider as well that the
22	A That is correct.	22	you're aware that Blue Cross has dropped its
23	MR. PRENDERGAST: I have no further	23	individual PPO plans from the Illinois insurance
24	questions, Judge.	24	exchange, are you not?
	Page 51		Page 53
1	THE COURT: Redirect.	1	MR. PRENDERGAST: Objection. No
2	THE COURT: Redirect. REDIRECT EXAMINATION	2	MR. PRENDERGAST: Objection. No foundation for that, and it's beyond the scope of my
2 3	THE COURT: Redirect. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KRISLOV:	2 3	MR. PRENDERGAST: Objection. No foundation for that, and it's beyond the scope of my cross
2 3 4	THE COURT: Redirect. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KRISLOV: Q So for each year after 2013, after midyear	2 3 4	MR. PRENDERGAST: Objection. No foundation for that, and it's beyond the scope of my cross THE COURT: It's not beyond the scope
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2 3 4 5 6	THE COURT: Redirect. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KRISLOV: Q So for each year after 2013, after midyear of 2013, for each year, there's an ordinance that sets out what the City's going to do on its annuitant	2 3 4 5 6	MR. PRENDERGAST: Objection. No foundation for that, and it's beyond the scope of my cross THE COURT: It's not beyond the scope since you brought up the ACA as Affordable Care Act as a reason, as another option for the annuitants
2 3 4 5 6 7	THE COURT: Redirect. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KRISLOV: Q So for each year after 2013, after midyear of 2013, for each year, there's an ordinance that sets out what the City's going to do on its annuitant healthcare plan for the year?	2 3 4 5 6 7	MR. PRENDERGAST: Objection. No foundation for that, and it's beyond the scope of my cross THE COURT: It's not beyond the scope since you brought up the ACA as Affordable Care Act as a reason, as another option for the annuitants and retirees to take advantage of. Ms. Holt said it.
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14 (Pages 50 to 53)

	Page 54	Page 56
1 '	programs?	¹ THE COURT: Any redirect recross,
2	A I can't speak to that specifically.	² I'm sorry.
3	Q Okay. So if the retirees have inferior	³ RECROSS-EXAMINATION
4	plans at the conclusion of your phaseout, that's	⁴ BY MR. PRENDERGAST:
5	really not your problem?	⁵ Q If, Ms. Holt, the City of Chicago had only
6	THE COURT: Would you repeat it so I	⁶ been concerned about the financial
7	could hear? I didn't hear the verb.	⁷ THE COURT: Say that again. I'm
8	If the retirees what?	⁸ hearing coughing, I didn't hear the question,
9	BY MR. KRISLOV:	 ⁹ Richard. I'm sorry.
10	Q I said if the retirees have, after the City	¹⁰ BY MR. PRENDERGAST:
11	has phased this out, inferior plans to choose from,	¹¹ Q If the City had only been concerned about
12	that's not your problem as far as the City's	¹² the financial aspect of the reduction of healthcare
13	concerned?	¹³ costs, would that have been the only consideration,
14	MR. PRENDERGAST: Objection. Lack of	¹⁴ and not caring one thing about the retirees, as the
15	foundation.	¹⁵ Court notes, the heart issue, okay, then in mid 2013,
16	THE COURT: No.	¹⁶ purely on a financial basis, what would the City have
17	You can answer the question.	¹⁷ done?
18	THE WITNESS: Well, I don't know if I	¹⁸ A We would have completely cut the subsidy
19	would say it's not our problem, per se. I mean,	¹⁹ for all retirees at that point in time.
20	obviously, all of these are very difficult decisions	20 Q Thank you.
21	that have to be taken seriously.	²¹ Second question. Counsel talked to
22	THE COURT: Answer the question, Ms.	²² you about various appropriation ordinances.
23	Holt.	²³ Do you recall his questions?
24	THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Your Honor.	²⁴ A I do recall his questions.
	THE WITNESS. TH Sorry, Tour Honor.	
	Page 55	Page 57
1	I don't know whether they're going to	¹ Q Were each of those appropriation ordinances
2	have inferior plans or not. I can't speak to that.	² time limited?
3	THE COURT: That's not the question,	³ A Yes. Each appropriation ordinance was time
4	Ms. Holt. The question is	⁴ limited to the fiscal year for which it relates.
5	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.	⁵ MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you.
6	THE COURT: after you decide to	⁶ MR. KRISLOV: The only question
7	phase them out, ending in 2017, it's the City's	⁷ just one question on the
8	position that they're on their own and the City's not	⁸ THE COURT: Proceed.
9	concerned about it, correct?	9 REDIRECT EXAMINATION
10	THE WITNESS: That's	¹⁰ BY MR. KRISLOV:
11	THE COURT: Yes or no.	¹¹ Q The appropriation ordinance, each year's
12	THE WITNESS: Yes. That is correct.	¹² appropriation ordinance is the amount to be spent for
13	THE COURT: From a financial point of	¹³ that year, right?
14	view. We're not talking about heart. We all care	¹⁴ A Yes, it's the amount to be spent for that
15	about our people, but this is the City speaking.	¹⁵ year and that year only.
16	You're an agent of the City. You just care you're	¹⁶ THE COURT: Okay. You're done.
17	just talking about the financial concern of the City.	¹⁷ MR. KRISLOV: Wait. Let me she
18	And after the total the termination	¹⁸ threw in the "that year only."
19	of the phaseout period, the City, from what you're	¹⁹ BY MR. KRISLOV:
20	just saying, is only concerned with the financial	²⁰ Q The ordinance doesn't say "in that year
21	aspect, not the heart aspect, correct?	²¹ only," the ordinance says for that year, right?
22	THE WITNESS: That is correct.	²² A No. It is for that year only, both based
23	MR. KRISLOV: No further questions,	²³ on the ordinance, as well as state appropriation law,
24	Your Honor.	²⁴ as well as the accounting laws that we have to spend.

15 (Pages 54 to 57)

	Page 58	Page 60
1	The money that is collected and spent	¹ But, if you are constitutionally
2	in 2015 has to be collected and spent in 2015.	² prohibited from reducing or diminishing a benefit,
3	Q Understood. But the ordinance, the	³ then the appropriation for one year could very well
4	appropriation ordinance says for this year, for the	⁴ be, if the Constitution protects against that benefit
5	year whatever year we're talking about, it is the	⁵ being diminished
6	ordinance to be this is what is to be raised for	⁶ THE COURT: It's a hypothetical, and
7	this year, right? This is what is to be raised for	⁷ you're talking to me about that one, and we'll argue
8	this year, this is what is authorized to be spent for	⁸ that. I'll let you argue that.
9	this year, right?	⁹ I'm not going to ask and to be
10	A Yes, for that year and that year only, that	¹⁰ quite honest, without trying to insult you, Ms. Holt,
11	is correct.	¹¹ or anyone else here, I don't care what her opinion is
12	Q You keep adding "for that year only."	¹² on it. I'm the giver of the law and the maker of the
13	THE COURT: That's your answer,	¹³ law today. And you can take it to a higher court.
14	whether you like it or not. You can argue to me	¹⁴ We're going to argue it today if you and I disagree.
15	later.	¹⁵ But Ms. Holt's not in the position of
16	MR. KRISLOV: I just want to get	¹⁶ deciding this case, I am. So you're asking a legal
17	whether	¹⁷ question for her to opine on; the answer of which,
18	THE COURT: You want to get the answer	¹⁸ from her, I could care less about about which I
19	you want, and she's not giving it to you.	¹⁹ could care less.
20	MR. KRISLOV: Well, I don't know that.	²⁰ MR. KRISLOV: Okay. With that, I have
21	THE COURT: It happens. You may	²¹ no further questions of Ms. Holt.
22	inquire further.	²² THE COURT: I do. Have a seat, Mr.
23	BY MR. KRISLOV:	²³ Krislov.
24	Q Do you know whether the language of the	²⁴ So tell me about the City's policy
	Q Do you know whether the language of the	so ten nie about the erty's poney
	Page 59	Page 61
1	ordinance says "and for that year only" or it just	¹ that was instituted. And I don't know the answer to
2	says "for that year"?	² these questions, and I have no horse in this race.
3	A I don't know that it says either of those	³ But when you decided to phase things
4	sentences. The fact is	⁴ out over time, from 2013 to the middle of 2013
5	Q Okay. Thank you. That's	⁵ first to the end of 2013, and then for four years
6	THE COURT: Let the woman finish her	⁶ thereafter, what notice did you give the retirees,
7	answer, please.	⁷ the retirees who retired after August 23rd, 1989,
8	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor.	⁸ because that's the group we're talking about?
9	THE COURT: Don't "Your Honor" me. If	⁹ And, secondly, as part of that, what
10	you ask a question, you got to wait and have courtesy	¹⁰ efforts did the City make to help in the in a
11	and let the witness just finish. We're not cutting	¹¹ human in an HR point of view to be available to
12	people off.	¹² the retirees, to answer their questions, help them
13	Go ahead. Finish, Ms. Holt.	¹³ find ACA alternatives, other options? This goes to
14	THE WITNESS: From an appropriation	¹⁴ my heart question. What did the City do, if
15	perspective, given the rules we have to follow and	¹⁵ anything, to mitigate the situation and try and help
16	the accounting rules, for that year versus for that	¹⁶ the retirees, if it did or not. And I don't
17	year only, have no practical difference. And so I	¹⁷ honestly, I don't know the answer to it.
18	just want to be clear, and perhaps I'm not, is that	¹⁸ THE WITNESS: Okay. So the first
19	the money that we collect in a particular year and	¹⁹ notice that went out to retirees and employees came
20	the authority to spend is limited to that year, and	²⁰ after the retiree health commission issued their
21	it can't be used, the appropriation authority cannot	²¹ report recommending that the City sort of get out of
22	be used for the following year.	²² the business of providing retiree healthcare.
23	BY MR. KRISLOV:	²³ That happened that first notice
24	Q I'm with you on that.	happened sometime in the summer of 2013. And then

16 (Pages 58 to 61)

	Page 62		Page 64
1	that announced that we would be going through a	1	Q The chairman of the Retiree Health Benefits
2	phaseout period but that we would be maintaining the	² Co	mmission, that was Mr. Amer Ahmad?
3	subsidies at their current levels to the end of 2013.	3	A He was the comptroller at the time. And,
4	Then the retirees would have all	4 V0	s, I believe he was the chairman of the commission.
5	received a package in the fall, you know, late summer	5 yC.	Q And his current residence?
6			•
7	or fall of 2013, announcing what the subsidy level	7	A I don't know where he is currently.
8	would be for 2014 and again reiterating the changes		THE COURT: I know where it is, Clint.
9	that we would be making over time.	° It's	in the federal penitentiary. What a surprise.
	There was then a subsequent letter		(Laughter.)
10	that went to them in the fall of 2014 and another one	10	THE COURT: I would note, however, you
11	that went to them in the fall of 2015.		ven't attacked the substance of that January 11th,
12	We have a benefits hotline that		13 report made not only by him but by, I guess, a
13	retirees can call and have questions answered. One		ole lot of folks, in your petition, but it's an
14	thing that we did do over the course of this,	¹⁴ int	eresting point.
15	starting in 2015, is instead of providing a	¹⁵ BY	/ MR. KRISLOV:
16	one-size-fits-all healthcare program, our health	16	Q Whether that the letter that you're
17	plan, we actually provided for different plans this	17 tal	king about is the May 2013 letter advising that
18	year that tried to balance, because as the subsidies		nt out to retirees I think it's an exhibit that
19	were going down, we recognized that for some	¹⁹ we	got here. And the package in two thousand when
20	retirees, the increase in the premium was going to be		u say fall of 2013, '14, '15, you would not dispute
21	difficult to maintain the plan that they've had		t that went out in October of each year?
22	before, and tried to give them four different options	22	A I would dispute that. I believe it went
23	that allowed them to balance both if they have	23	t earlier. I certainly know this year it went out,
24	different healthcare needs, or healthcare needs and		elieve, in August or September. But it went out,
	different nearlifeare needs, of nearlifeare needs and	10	eneve, in August of September. But it went out
	Page 63		Page 65
1	also their financial needs, because they all had a	¹ in	the late summer. I would agree that it went out
2	different mix of deductibles and premiums, and, in		e summer, early fall of each year.
3	fact, even provided a plan that would allow people to	3	Q And the four different plans that are
4	pay less than they had paid the prior year.	⁴ of	fered, one has a very limited network, right?
5	So it's been that. It's been the work	5	A That's correct.
6	that you know deferring to Nancy Currier and her	6	
6 7	that you know, deferring to Nancy Currier and her team who manage benefits and the questions that	6 7	Q One has a very high deductible?
	team, who manage benefits, and the questions that		Q One has a very high deductible?A Yes, that's correct.
7 8	team, who manage benefits, and the questions that they've answered and the information that they've	7 8	Q One has a very high deductible?A Yes, that's correct.Q And one has a combination of both a high
7 8 9	team, who manage benefits, and the questions that they've answered and the information that they've been providing to retirees to try to explain to	7 8 9 de	Q One has a very high deductible?A Yes, that's correct.Q And one has a combination of both a high ductible and a limited network?
7 8 9 10	team, who manage benefits, and the questions that they've answered and the information that they've been providing to retirees to try to explain to people what their options are.	7 8 9 de 10	 Q One has a very high deductible? A Yes, that's correct. Q And one has a combination of both a high ductible and a limited network? A That's correct.
7 8 9 10 11	team, who manage benefits, and the questions that they've answered and the information that they've been providing to retirees to try to explain to people what their options are. THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Holt.	7 8 9 de 10	 Q One has a very high deductible? A Yes, that's correct. Q And one has a combination of both a high ductible and a limited network? A That's correct. Q Okay. And you would not
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17 (Pages 62 to 65)

both what	⁵ MR. KRISLOV: Well, Mr. Prendergast
MR. KRISLOV: Objection. The report	⁶ asked her if his wrongdoing had any connection to the
speaks for itself.	⁷ committee, his work on the committee.
THE COURT: Oh, no, no, sir. You	⁸ And the fact is, he put in false
attacked the credibility of the report by attacking	⁹ reports when he was in the Ohio State treasurer's
the gentleman who's now in the school of hard knocks,	¹⁰ office. And falsifying reports is a
as we say.	¹¹ THE COURT: If you have any evidence
So you opened the door. He's entitled	¹² that this report was false, I would have assumed you
to rehabilitate.	¹³ would have filed that in your petition, and you
MR. KRISLOV: Fair enough.	¹⁴ didn't, but that's okay.
THE WITNESS: And so they were charged	¹⁵ If you want to attack the credibility
with, as I said, looking at both the current state of	¹⁶ of the other eight to ten members, try and do it. If
healthcare, as well as the options that would be	¹⁷ you think that they were a mere rubber stamp for this
available both today, as well as going forward and	¹⁸ guy who's in the finishing school, whatever federal
making a series of recommendations.	¹⁹ penitentiary you want to call it, be my guest. Go
BY MR. PRENDERGAST:	²⁰ ahead and try.
Q The gentleman who was the chairman, do you	²¹ But this witness doesn't know any of
have any knowledge as to whether any criminal	²² that.
difficulties that he had had anything to do with his	²³ MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Well, let's try
work on the commission?	²⁴ this one.
Page 67	Page 69
	Page 69 ¹ BY MR. KRISLOV:
	¹ BY MR. KRISLOV:
A To my knowledge, they did not.	¹ BY MR. KRISLOV:
A To my knowledge, they did not. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KRISLOV:	¹ BY MR. KRISLOV: ² Q You are aware that there were some people
 A To my knowledge, they did not. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KRISLOV: Q You did mention that on the membership of 	 ¹ BY MR. KRISLOV: ² Q You are aware that there were some people on the board who disagreed with the board's
A To my knowledge, they did not. REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KRISLOV:	 BY MR. KRISLOV: Q You are aware that there were some people on the board who disagreed with the board's conclusion that the retiree healthcare should be
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1 /	Q And, finally, was there someone on the
18	who represented retirees?
19	THE COURT: If you know.
20	THE WITNESS: I don't recall.
21	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. No further
22	questions.
23	MR. PRENDERGAST: May I?
24	THE COURT: Sure.

18 (Pages 66 to 69)

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Do you have another question? I'm not

going to let her comment on the credibility of that

gentleman. You've already made your point. I

		-	
Paq	e	66	5

We had labor and union representation and other

qualifications to review the City's retiree

people who had both financial, as well as healthcare,

healthcare plan and make recommendations based on

THE COURT: No, you did. So that's

MR. KRISLOV: She already testified --

THE COURT: It's sustained. What do

you want from me? You want to keep going? It's

going nowhere. That question is sustained.

sustained by the Court.

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understand that.

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	Dama 70	Dama 70
	Page 70	Page 72
1	MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you.	¹ MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, could I have
2	RECROSS-EXAMINATION	² everything stricken after "yes"? ³ THE COURT: No. You ack a question
3 4	BY MR. PRENDERGAST:	THE COOKT. NO. TOU ask a question,
4 5	Q There were labor representatives on the	you get the answer.
5	committee, right?	WIK. KKISLOV. Teal, but, Tour Honor,
ю 7	A That's correct.	to take issue with you on this
8	Q They represented people who are currently	THE COOKT. Don't bother. Wy fulling
9	in labor unions?	is the same. Tour objection is noted for the record.
10	A That's correct.	
11	Q Labor unions with the employees of the	UII.
12	City, correct?	Allyuning else on ner firstnand
13	MR. KRISLOV: Objection. Calls for a	 knowledge as to who the labor unions represented? BY MR. KRISLOV:
14	conclusion that she has no knowledge of, and she's	DT WK. KKISLOV.
15	not	¹⁴ Q You don't have firsthand knowledge as to ¹⁵ who the labor unions repre
16	THE COURT: Really? The purpose of	¹⁶ THE COURT: Asked and answered. She
17	cross-examination in any examination is for you to	¹⁷ said yes, she does, and the employees of City of
18	determine what her knowledge is.	¹⁸ Chicago.
19	If you want to testify, and you are	¹⁹ Next question.
20	her conscience, you may so testify. That objection is utterly overruled, because you don't have	²⁰ BY MR. KRISLOV:
21	firsthand knowledge of that.	²¹ Q You would agree that they do not represent,
22	So you may inquire, though.	²² because I think you said this before, they don't
23	Go ahead.	²³ represent
24	BY MR. PRENDERGAST:	²⁴ THE COURT: Then why ask it again?
	Page 71	Page 73
1		
1 2	Q The labor union representatives represented	¹ BY MR. KRISLOV:
	Q The labor union representatives represented people who are in unions who are future retirees,	¹ BY MR. KRISLOV: ² Q The people who were, then
2	Q The labor union representatives represented people who are in unions who are future retirees, correct?	 ¹ BY MR. KRISLOV: ² Q The people who were, then THE COURT: Asked and answered.
2 3	Q The labor union representatives represented people who are in unions who are future retirees, correct? A That is correct.	 ¹ BY MR. KRISLOV: ² Q The people who were, then ³ THE COURT: Asked and answered. ⁴ BY MR. KRISLOV:
2 3 4	Q The labor union representatives represented people who are in unions who are future retirees, correct?A That is correct.Q And that commission report had a profound	 ¹ BY MR. KRISLOV: ² Q The people who were, then THE COURT: Asked and answered. ⁴ BY MR. KRISLOV: ⁵ Q retirees
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19 (Pages 70 to 73)

	Page 74	Page 76
1	raise your right hand, please.	¹ cover.
2	(Witness sworn.)	² MR. LAYDEN: I'm just asking the year
3	THE WITNESS: I do.	³ since
4	THE COURT: Very good.	⁴ THE WITNESS: I was
5	Would you have a seat, and would you	⁵ MR. LAYDEN: Ms. Currier didn't
6		MR. LATDEN MS. Cutter didn't
7	speak up. Everyone's voices are starting to	John the City than 1991.
	THE WITNESS: And I have a very soft	THE WITNESS. I was not the benefits
8	voice.	manager at the time of that handbook.
9	THE COURT: Well, you're not going to	⁹ THE COURT: We're having a nice
10	today. Pretend that the person who needs to hear	¹⁰ discussion.
11	your testimony, me, is at the rear of this courtroom,	¹¹ THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.
12	and keep your voice up.	¹² THE COURT: You only answer questions
13	Would you do that?	¹³ that are put to you.
14	THE WITNESS: I will do my best.	¹⁴ THE WITNESS: Okay.
15	THE COURT: Well, I can't ask for more	¹⁵ THE COURT: You don't volunteer
16	than that.	¹⁶ anything.
17	Mr. Krislov, Ms. Currier is your	¹⁷ Do you understand?
18	witness, and she's sworn.	¹⁸ THE WITNESS: Yes.
19	MR. KRISLOV: Always good to see you.	¹⁹ THE COURT: All right. Next. Ask
20	Sorry it's under these circumstances.	²⁰ your question, Mr. Krislov.
21	NANCY CURRIER,	²¹ BY MR. KRISLOV:
22	having been called as a witness and having been first	22 Q In order to be eligible for coverage under
23	duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:	the City of Chicago Annuitant Health excuse me.
24	DIRECT EXAMINATION	the City of Chicago Annutant Hearth excuse me.
21	DIRECT EXAMINATION	²⁴ The City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan,
	Page 75	Page 77
1	-	
1	BY MR. KRISLOV:	¹ as I understand it, you a person will be eligible
2	BY MR. KRISLOV: Q You're familiar with the City of Chicago	 as I understand it, you a person will be eligible for coverage if you are an annuitant of the City of
2 3	BY MR. KRISLOV: Q You're familiar with the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan, are you not?	 as I understand it, you a person will be eligible for coverage if you are an annuitant of the City of Chicago. "Annuitant" means a former employee who is
2 3 4	BY MR. KRISLOV: Q You're familiar with the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan, are you not? A I am.	 as I understand it, you a person will be eligible for coverage if you are an annuitant of the City of Chicago. "Annuitant" means a former employee who is receiving an age and service annuity from one of the
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2 3 4 5 6	 BY MR. KRISLOV: Q You're familiar with the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan, are you not? A I am. Q And you you need the according to the handbook that I have and I'll be glad to give you 	 as I understand it, you a person will be eligible for coverage if you are an annuitant of the City of Chicago. "Annuitant" means a former employee who is receiving an age and service annuity from one of the four retirement funds; is that accurate? A That's accurate.
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20 (Pages 74 to 77)

	Page 78	Page 80
1	She gave you the answer that you asked. You asked a	¹ right?
2	question, she gave you the answer.	² THE WITNESS: Correct.
3	If you two are going to spend the rest	³ THE COURT: Answer accordingly.
4	of the day fencing over semantics, we're going to be	⁴ THE WITNESS: Okay.
5	here I have no problem being here Christmas Day,	⁵ THE COURT: Next question.
6	but let's not fence on semantics and move on.	⁶ MR. KRISLOV: Thank you, Your Honor.
7	I understood her answer, and so did	⁷ BY MR. KRISLOV:
8	you, so let's move on.	⁸ Q You're familiar with the rate changes that
9	MR. KRISLOV: Well, I think I have a	⁹ the City has announced for January 1, 2016, are you
10	right to get a yes or no to	¹⁰ not?
11	THE COURT: And I think you don't. I	¹¹ A Yes, I am.
12	think you have a right to an answer that is an answer	¹² Q And you were involved in setting those rate
13	to the question. And if the witness does not accept	¹³ changes?
14	the premise of your question, she can elucidate. She	¹⁴ A Yes.
15	can explain, and she did. If you don't like it, I'm	¹⁵ Q And those rate changes result directly from
16	sorry. But you asked the question.	¹⁶ reduction in the City's appropriation for retiree
17	MR. KRISLOV: I believe I'm entitled	¹⁷ healthcare?
18	to an answer to the question I asked, but we'll move	¹⁸ A The increases in the premium are a result
19	on.	¹⁹ of the reduction in the subsidy, as well as the
20	BY MR. KRISLOV:	²⁰ projected cost of the medical care in 2016.
21	Q The City doesn't pay an outside insurer to	²¹ Q Okay. Let me give context, because I think
22	be the insurer, right?	²² I understand how this occurs, but perhaps we can do
23	A The City pays a third-party administer to	²³ it in the past, under the settlement, what
24	pay the claims, and then we pay for the claims.	happened was the City would have the Segal Group
	Page 79	Page 81
1	_	
2	MR. KRISLOV: Would you read the	estimate what costs were intery to increase in the
3	question again? THE COURT REPORTER: Your Honor?	 ² coming year, and then, for want of a better term, ³ reverse engineer from that back to what that amount
4	THE COURT: Ms. Currier, Mr. Krislov	⁴ would then, taking into consideration the City's
5	is asking for a yes-or-no answer. It didn't ask for	⁵ subsidy, or contribution, or what the City paid, its
6	an explanation as to the process. I took your answer	⁶ percentage, the pension fund subsidy, and the
7	as yes. You pay the claims. You have a third-party	⁷ annuitants would pay the rest, right?
8	administer, but the it's Blue Cross.	⁸ A Correct.
9	But Blue Cross doesn't dip into their	⁹ Q For two thousand and was that done
10	own pocket. You do. The City, does right?	¹⁰ for the rest of 2013, they just continued the
11	THE WITNESS: Correct.	¹¹ rates?
12	THE COURT: Then answer the question.	¹² A Correct. We did not reset the rates for
13	Let's not fence.	¹³ July 1st, 2013.
14	Do you understand me?	¹⁴ We reset the rates January 1st,
15	THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.	¹⁵ 2014; January 1st, 2015; January 1st, 2016.
16	THE COURT: If you can answer the	¹⁶ Q Okay. Were those done with the same by
17	question yes or no, do it.	¹⁷ the same calculation mode, or is it just that you set
18	THE WITNESS: Okay.	¹⁸ the rates?
19	THE COURT: We don't want I don't	¹⁹ A Those were done with the same methodology.
20	want if I asked you what day it is today, you	²⁰ Q Okay. So you did use the Segal methodology
21	wouldn't say, "It's cold outside, it's raining, I	²¹ for each of those years?
22	don't want to be here, and I want to go shopping and	²² A Yes, Segal projects a cost.
23	take care of my family instead of talking to	²³ Q And the same thing for 2016?
24	Mr. Krislov "The answer would be "It's Wednesday"	²⁴ A Correct.
	Mr. Krislov." The answer would be "It's Wednesday,"	A Concet.

21 (Pages 78 to 81)

	Page 82		Page 84
¹ Q Okay. And so th	ere is okav.	1	(Document tendered.)
² You are also av		² BY	MR. KRISLOV:
³ reconciliation process th		3	Q As I understand, this was voted on by the
⁴ settlement period?			nefits committee of the Chicago City Council,
⁵ A Yes, I am.		⁵ rig	
⁶ Q That's where we	met.	6	A It's the benefits committee for the City.
7 A Yes.		7	Q Okay. And you're on it?
⁸ Q And during that t	en years, you would agree,	8	A Yes, I am. The benefits manager is on it,
	y single one of those years,	⁹ yes	-
¹⁰ when audited and recond	ciled, resulted in a refund to		Q Okay. Yeah, you're on it by your office.
¹¹ retirees?		11	This was why did this pop up? Why
¹² A I believe it was e	verv vear.	12 dic	this occur?
	would not dispute that the	13	A Apparently, there was I mean, there's
¹⁴ total was an average of s			en a concern that people that disenrolled for 2016
¹⁵ million a year?			cause of the rates wouldn't be allowed to come back
	went up and down. I		without proving good health.
¹⁷ couldn't		17	So we decided we had a discussion.
	gate you would not	18 W	e decided that we would give them an opportunity to
¹⁹ dispute that the aggregat			enroll in the plan without providing proof of good
²⁰ overcharge or a refund o			alth.
²¹ totaled \$51 million over		21	Q And when was and when was this
²² A That sounds reas		²² co	nsidered and done?
	al disenrollment, re-enroll	23	A It was done on Friday, December
²⁴ ment plan		24	Q This past
	Page 83		Page 85
¹ A Amendment?		1	A December 18th, yes.
² Q The I'm not sur	e you're aware I don't	2	THE COURT: So now folks can opt back
³ know, but I presume you		³ in	without regard to their any subsequent
⁴ The provision u	nder which the City	⁴ he	althcare problems or anything until September '17,
⁵ sorry. This is Exhibit 6 t	o the City's submission.	⁵ tw	o thousand September 2017; is that correct?
⁶ It says, amendment thi		6	THE WITNESS: Right. I believe
⁷ Amendment to the City of	of Chicago Non-Medicare	⁷ it's	;
⁸ Eligible Retiree Healthca	re Plan and Medicare	8	MR. KRISLOV: I believe it's '16.
⁹ Supplement Retiree Heal	thcare Plan special	9	THE COURT: I'm so sorry.
¹⁰ Disenrollment and Reins	tatement Periods.	10	MR. KRISLOV: It's September '16.
¹¹ Are you familia	r with that?	11	THE WITNESS: Through September
¹² A Yes, I am.			th, 2016.
	RGAST: Your Honor, if	13	THE COURT: Okay. It was my
¹⁴ counsel's going to question			derstanding that this has been extended to 2017,
¹⁵ which is attached to our i		¹⁵ no	
5 15	she can see the document?	16	MR. KRISLOV: No.
	If necessary. Are you	17	THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
	irrier about the substance of		MR. KRISLOV:
	0	19	Q This has not been passed by the Chicago
¹⁹ this document, Mr. Krisl			
²⁰ MR. KRISLOV	ov? ': I guess so. I'm glad to		ty Council, has it?
²⁰ MR. KRISLOV ²¹ give her a copy.	': I guess so. I'm glad to	21	A It doesn't need to be. It's been signed by
 ²⁰ MR. KRISLOV ²¹ give her a copy. ²² THE COURT: 	': I guess so. I'm glad to Here. Take mine. I've	²¹ ²² the	A It doesn't need to be. It's been signed by epople that need to sign it.
 ²⁰ MR. KRISLOV ²¹ give her a copy. ²² THE COURT: ²³ read it. I'm aware of the 	': I guess so. I'm glad to Here. Take mine. I've	²¹ ²² the ²³	A It doesn't need to be. It's been signed bye people that need to sign it.Q And it also as I read it, it says that
 ²⁰ MR. KRISLOV ²¹ give her a copy. ²² THE COURT: 	': I guess so. I'm glad to Here. Take mine. I've	²¹ ²² the ²³	A It doesn't need to be. It's been signed by epople that need to sign it.

22 (Pages 82 to 85)

	Page 86	Page 88
1	[AS READ:	¹ United Healthcare has dropped it's PPO individual
2	The annuitant may reinstate coverage	² purchasable plans?
3	for any person who is covered on December 1, 2015,	³ A I heard something about United Healthcare,
4	with the following exceptions: (A) If during the	⁴ not all the specifics.
5	time of absence from the plan the annuitant's	⁵ Q And you heard about Blue Cross dropping its
6	dependent reaches the plan's limiting age, the	⁶ individual purchase PPO plans, right?
7	dependent is not eligible for reinstatement.]	7 A Correct.
8	Right?	⁸ Q And so the fact of the matter is that if
9	A That's correct.	⁹ they drop the City coverage because they can't afford
10	Q So if you drop their coverage, and their	¹⁰ it, they may, indeed, wind up in an inferior plan?
11	child passes the age, they can't come back in for the	¹¹ A I don't think all those I don't agree
12	expenses that the child would have incurred during	¹² that those plans are inferior.
13	that drop period, right?	-
14		Q I ou don't agree that any plans are interior
15	A Well, the child has reached the limiting	01
16	age. They'd no longer be eligible to be covered by	A This sure there are some interior plans, and
17	the plan. Ω	This sure there are some that are superior.
18	Q But they wouldn't be able to come back in for the drop period right?	Q And have you checked that out?
19	for the drop period, right?	A we have done some research on that, my team
20	A No. It's prospective coverage.	and I.
21	Q It's only prospective?A Uhm-hmm.	Q Did you know that
22		A There are some advantage to mose ACA
23	Q Second:	plans. They cover some times that we don't cover m
24	[CONTINUING: If during the time of channes from the	the standard medical plan that we offer.
	If during the time of absence from the	²⁴ They have drug copayments that go into
	Page 87	Page 89
1	plan the annuitant divorces his or her spouse, the	¹ the out-of-pocket limit, for instance. Our drug
2	former spouse is not eligible for reinstatement.]	2 copayments do not.
3	A That's correct. They're divorced. They're	³ Q And some of their copay and some of their
4	not eligible under the plan anyway, a divorced	⁴ out of pockets are generally as much as \$6,000 for an
5	spouse.	⁵ individual; \$12,000 for a family?
6	Q But if they had been on the plan, they	⁶ A It depends on the plan. There's different
7	would remain?	
7 8	would remain? A No You can't cover a divorced spouse	⁷ levels in the ACA.
	A No. You can't cover a divorced spouse.	 ⁷ levels in the ACA. ⁸ Q And you would not dispute that the plan
8	A No. You can't cover a divorced spouse. They're not eligible.	 ⁷ levels in the ACA. ⁸ Q And you would not dispute that the plan that was in effect and you're familiar with the
8 9	A No. You can't cover a divorced spouse.They're not eligible.Q And once again, it would not cover the drop	 levels in the ACA. Q And you would not dispute that the plan that was in effect and you're familiar with the plan that was in effect in 1987, are you not?
8 9 10	A No. You can't cover a divorced spouse.They're not eligible.Q And once again, it would not cover the drop period?	 levels in the ACA. Q And you would not dispute that the plan that was in effect and you're familiar with the plan that was in effect in 1987, are you not? A No, I'm not.
8 9 10 11	 A No. You can't cover a divorced spouse. They're not eligible. Q And once again, it would not cover the drop period? A Correct. Its prospective coverage. They 	 levels in the ACA. Q And you would not dispute that the plan that was in effect and you're familiar with the plan that was in effect in 1987, are you not? A No, I'm not. Q Not at all?
8 9 10 11 12	 A No. You can't cover a divorced spouse. They're not eligible. Q And once again, it would not cover the drop period? A Correct. Its prospective coverage. They can come back prospectively. 	 levels in the ACA. Q And you would not dispute that the plan that was in effect and you're familiar with the plan that was in effect in 1987, are you not? A No, I'm not. Q Not at all? A No.
8 9 10 11 12 13	 A No. You can't cover a divorced spouse. They're not eligible. Q And once again, it would not cover the drop period? A Correct. Its prospective coverage. They can come back prospectively. Q And the other thing is, this doesn't 	 ⁷ levels in the ACA. ⁸ Q And you would not dispute that the plan ⁹ that was in effect and you're familiar with the ¹⁰ plan that was in effect in 1987, are you not? ¹¹ A No, I'm not. ¹² Q Not at all? ¹³ A No. ¹⁴ Q And at least you would concede that if that
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8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 A No. You can't cover a divorced spouse. They're not eligible. Q And once again, it would not cover the drop period? A Correct. Its prospective coverage. They can come back prospectively. Q And the other thing is, this doesn't this doesn't you have no idea whether the people, if they decide to drop the City coverage because they can't afford it, and so they sign up with another plan, you have no control over whether they can drop that plan without penalty? A You can drop an ACA plan without penalty. Q At any time? A Yeah. I believe within 14 days' notice, 	 levels in the ACA. Q And you would not dispute that the plan that was in effect and you're familiar with the plan that was in effect in 1987, are you not? A No, I'm not. Q Not at all? A No. Q And at least you would concede that if that plan has a \$1,000 deductible, that cost of \$55 a month or \$21 a month paid for by whomever, that that is a superior plan to one that you have to pay \$2,200 a month for, would you agree? A Depends what that plan covered. I can't speak to what the plan covered in 1989. Q Okay. But when we talk about saving money by going into the ACA, you're focusing on premium
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 A No. You can't cover a divorced spouse. They're not eligible. Q And once again, it would not cover the drop period? A Correct. Its prospective coverage. They can come back prospectively. Q And the other thing is, this doesn't this doesn't you have no idea whether the people, if they decide to drop the City coverage because they can't afford it, and so they sign up with another plan, you have no control over whether they can drop that plan without penalty? A You can drop an ACA plan without penalty. Q At any time? 	 levels in the ACA. Q And you would not dispute that the plan that was in effect and you're familiar with the plan that was in effect in 1987, are you not? A No, I'm not. Q Not at all? A No. Q And at least you would concede that if that plan has a \$1,000 deductible, that cost of \$55 a month or \$21 a month paid for by whomever, that that is a superior plan to one that you have to pay \$2,200 a month for, would you agree? A Depends what that plan covered. I can't speak to what the plan covered in 1989. Q Okay. But when we talk about saving money by going into the ACA, you're focusing on premium cost, correct?
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A No. You can't cover a divorced spouse. They're not eligible. Q And once again, it would not cover the drop period? A Correct. Its prospective coverage. They can come back prospectively. Q And the other thing is, this doesn't this doesn't you have no idea whether the people, if they decide to drop the City coverage because they can't afford it, and so they sign up with another plan, you have no control over whether they can drop that plan without penalty? A You can drop an ACA plan without penalty. Q At any time? A Yeah. I believe within 14 days' notice, you can drop it. 	 levels in the ACA. Q And you would not dispute that the plan that was in effect and you're familiar with the plan that was in effect in 1987, are you not? A No, I'm not. Q Not at all? A No. Q And at least you would concede that if that plan has a \$1,000 deductible, that cost of \$55 a month or \$21 a month paid for by whomever, that that is a superior plan to one that you have to pay \$2,200 a month for, would you agree? A Depends what that plan covered. I can't speak to what the plan covered in 1989. Q Okay. But when we talk about saving money by going into the ACA, you're focusing on premium cost, correct?

23 (Pages 86 to 89)

Page	90
raye	90

1 2			Page 92
2	in the ACA plans, you can see a doctor and pay a	1	your position is that the City didn't have any
2	copayment. You don't have to meet the deductible.	2	obligation under the explicit terms of the statute to
3	1 2	3	
	So there are some advantage to some of those ACA	4	make a contribution, right?
4	plans, like I said.		A That's what this is saying, yes.
5	Q If you can	5	Q Okay. Are you a lawyer?
6	A So there's always a tradeoff between	6	A No, I'm not lawyer.
7	premium and out-of-pocket deductibles.	7	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. So I would move
8	Q Okay. The let's see.	8	to strike her conclusions as to I think these
9	Now, when you say in your view	9	conclusions require a legal opinion, but Your Honor
10		10	
	you're familiar with your affidavit that was		can deal with that later.
11	submitted as Exhibit 5 to the City's submission?	11	THE COURT: Okay, I will. Motion to
12	THE COURT: Ms. Currier, can I have	12	strike is denied. But I'll certainly take into
13	that back? Do you need to see your affidavit, or	13	account, in terms of the weight of what she's saying,
14	THE WITNESS: Well, it depends what I	14	that which you just elicited from the witness stand.
15	can remember.	15	BY MR. KRISLOV:
16	THE COURT: Well, we'll both look at	16	Q And when you say Exhibit 9 is incomplete,
17		17	
18	it together, unless you have an extra copy.	18	you say that the
19	(Document tendered.)	19	THE COURT: Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9, you
	THE WITNESS: Thank you.		mean?
20	THE COURT: Take a look at that, and	20	MR. KRISLOV: Correct.
21	tell me if that's the affidavit that you signed.	21	BY MR. KRISLOV:
22	THE WITNESS: Yes, it is.	22	Q Sorry. You refer at your paragraph seven
23	THE COURT: Mr. Krislov, you've	23	to Plaintiffs' Exhibit 9, which is our spreadsheet
24	tendered to the witness Plaintiffs' Exhibit D for	24	and the statements of the retirees as to their and
	Page 91		Page 93
	idge 91		rage 55
1	purpose of identification, yeah?	1	I think what you're referring to is a comparison of
2	MR. KRISLOV: No, I think yes.	2	their premium to their annuity, right?
3			then premium to then annuity, fight?
5	It's now our Exhibit D, but it is the City's Exhibit	3	
4	It's now our Exhibit D, but it is the City's Exhibit 5 to its submission	3 4	A Correct.
	5 to its submission.		A Correct. Q Okay. And you're saying that it's
4 5	5 to its submission. Either way, we have the same document.	4 5	A Correct. Q Okay. And you're saying that it's incomplete because it doesn't take into account other
4 5 6	5 to its submission. Either way, we have the same document. THE COURT: It's the Currier affidavit	4 5 6	A Correct. Q Okay. And you're saying that it's incomplete because it doesn't take into account other sources of income that retirees or their spouses may
4 5 6 7	5 to its submission. Either way, we have the same document. THE COURT: It's the Currier affidavit that's part of the City's submission, which you have	4 5 6 7	A Correct. Q Okay. And you're saying that it's incomplete because it doesn't take into account other sources of income that retirees or their spouses may have?
4 5 7 8	5 to its submission. Either way, we have the same document. THE COURT: It's the Currier affidavit that's part of the City's submission, which you have now tendered as your Exhibit D.	4 5 6 7 8	A Correct. Q Okay. And you're saying that it's incomplete because it doesn't take into account other sources of income that retirees or their spouses may have? A Correct.
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4 5 7 8 9 10	5 to its submission. Either way, we have the same document. THE COURT: It's the Currier affidavit that's part of the City's submission, which you have now tendered as your Exhibit D. Proceed. BY MR. KRISLOV:	4 5 7 8 9 10	 A Correct. Q Okay. And you're saying that it's incomplete because it doesn't take into account other sources of income that retirees or their spouses may have? A Correct. Q Okay. Now, it is not your it is not your position that the retirees are entitled to
4 5 7 8 9 10 11	 5 to its submission. Either way, we have the same document. THE COURT: It's the Currier affidavit that's part of the City's submission, which you have now tendered as your Exhibit D. Proceed. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Your comparison of at page I guess it's paragraphs four through six. What I think 	4 5 7 8 9 10 11	 A Correct. Q Okay. And you're saying that it's incomplete because it doesn't take into account other sources of income that retirees or their spouses may have? A Correct. Q Okay. Now, it is not your it is not your position that the retirees are entitled to healthcare only if they have a certain amount of
4 5 7 8 9 10 11 12	 5 to its submission. Either way, we have the same document. THE COURT: It's the Currier affidavit that's part of the City's submission, which you have now tendered as your Exhibit D. Proceed. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Your comparison of at page I guess it's paragraphs four through six. What I think you're saying is that their out-of-pocket costs, if 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	 A Correct. Q Okay. And you're saying that it's incomplete because it doesn't take into account other sources of income that retirees or their spouses may have? A Correct. Q Okay. Now, it is not your it is not your position that the retirees are entitled to healthcare only if they have a certain amount of income or less, is it? A No.
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4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 5 to its submission. Either way, we have the same document. THE COURT: It's the Currier affidavit that's part of the City's submission, which you have now tendered as your Exhibit D. Proceed. BY MR. KRISLOV: Q Your comparison of at page I guess it's paragraphs four through six. What I think you're saying is that their out-of-pocket costs, if all that they get is the subsidy that the Funds provided if the City only provided today the subsidy that the Funds provided under the 1983 and '85 amendments, that the retirees would have to pay more than would have to pay less in 2016 than they would have had to pay if 2016 only had the subsidy obligations of the '83 and '85 amendments? A I believe that's what I'm saying, yes. Q Okay. But for purposes of and you're aren't you comparing apples to oranges there? 	4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A Correct. Q Okay. And you're saying that it's incomplete because it doesn't take into account other sources of income that retirees or their spouses may have? A Correct. Q Okay. Now, it is not your it is not your position that the retirees are entitled to healthcare only if they have a certain amount of income or less, is it? A No. Q Their entitlement if they have an entitlement A I'm not I wouldn't agree with the word "entitlement." They're eligible for coverage under the plan if they're an annuitant of one of the four city pension plans at the current time. Q Okay. And their entitlement to partici sorry. Their right to participate under the plan is not dependent on making more or less income. They

24 (Pages 90 to 93)

	Page 94		Page 96
1	plan	1	What you're saying is, since these
2	Q If they're sorry. If they're an	2	people are on a list, your conclusion is that they
3	annuitant	3	must have other income, otherwise they'd have
4	A Right. If they're receiving an annuity of	4	applied, right?
5	one of the four pension plans	5	A That's the statement, yes.
6	Q Then you're eligible to be a participant in	6	Q And have you reviewed have you done any
7	the annuitant healthcare plan?	7	statistical analysis to determine if people actually
8	A Correct.	8	understand their ability to do this?
9	Q Regardless of your income?	9	A Well, we get a fair number of applications
10	A Correct.	10	every year, so I do believe that and we do tell
11	Q Okay. So their entitlement isn't	11	them in the mailing that we send out in the fall to
12	determined by their income.	12	tell them about what's coming up for the next year,
13	What you're saying is that the in	13	we tell them about the means test, and we also do a
14	evaluating whether they can afford these premiums or	14	means test mailing to a good third of the annuitants,
15	whether they should apply for a means test cap shows	15	I believe.
16	that the that they are not being subjected to an	16	Q And but you say that how do you pick
17	unfair burden, right?	17	that third?
18	A That's right. We don't know the family	18	A I just that was just a pick. We pick
19	income.	19	we base it on everybody's annuity below a certain
20	Q Okay. And you don't have a right to demand	20	amount. I don't know the number off the top of my
21	that, do you?	21	head.
22	A No. People can apply for a means test if	22	Q So you'll know the City knows what each
23	they want to.	23	person's annuity is, right?
24	Q Okay. How many people have applied you	24	A Yes.
	Page 95		Page 97
1	-	1	-
2	would know how many people have applied? A I would have to research that. I don't	2	Q And so the City sends out to one third of
3	know	3	the people
4	Q You have no idea?	4	A I'm just speculating it's about a third. But it's everybody below a certain number.
5	A I think it's around a thousand, but I don't	5	Q Below a certain annuity or
6	know. Over the ten-year period or we've had it in	6	A I know it's we probably go to, like, 300
7	effect longer than that since the settlement plan	7	percent of the federal poverty level, according to
8	we've had a means test. So I don't know the number	8	the annuity, because you can apply if it's
9	of individuals that have applied, no.	9	250 percent or less. I mean, you can apply
10	Q Okay. And you don't know whether any	10	regardless. But it goes up to 250 percent now.
11	you don't know if any of the people have applied for	11	So go over that.
12		12	ę
	2015 or '16?		Q Is it possible you would agree, would
13	A The number? I don't know off the top my	13	Q Is it possible you would agree, would you not, that it's possible that a number of people
13 14		13 14	you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not
14 15	A The number? I don't know off the top my head, no. Q Ballpark?	13 14 15	you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not really aware of it?
14 15 16	A The number? I don't know off the top my head, no.Q Ballpark?A (No response.)	13 14 15 16	you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not
14 15 16 17	 A The number? I don't know off the top my head, no. Q Ballpark? A (No response.) Q No idea? 	13 14 15 16 17	you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not really aware of it? A I don't know. Q Okay.
14 15 16 17 18	 A The number? I don't know off the top my head, no. Q Ballpark? A (No response.) Q No idea? A I'd be guessing. 	13 14 15 16 17 18	 you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not really aware of it? A I don't know. Q Okay. A They've been notified many, many, many
14 15 16 17 18 19	 A The number? I don't know off the top my head, no. Q Ballpark? A (No response.) Q No idea? A I'd be guessing. Q Okay. And you say that the fact that they 	13 14 15 16 17 18 19	 you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not really aware of it? A I don't know. Q Okay. A They've been notified many, many, many times.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 A The number? I don't know off the top my head, no. Q Ballpark? A (No response.) Q No idea? A I'd be guessing. Q Okay. And you say that the fact that they have not received cap premium coverage under the 	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	 you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not really aware of it? A I don't know. Q Okay. A They've been notified many, many, many times. Q Well, if they've gotten a notice, then they
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 A The number? I don't know off the top my head, no. Q Ballpark? A (No response.) Q No idea? A I'd be guessing. Q Okay. And you say that the fact that they have not received cap premium coverage under the City's means test suggests that these retirees have 	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not really aware of it? A I don't know. Q Okay. A They've been notified many, many, many times. Q Well, if they've gotten a notice, then they understand, I mean right?
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 A The number? I don't know off the top my head, no. Q Ballpark? A (No response.) Q No idea? A I'd be guessing. Q Okay. And you say that the fact that they have not received cap premium coverage under the City's means test suggests that these retirees have sources of income beyond their annuities which would 	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not really aware of it? A I don't know. Q Okay. A They've been notified many, many, many times. Q Well, if they've gotten a notice, then they understand, I mean right? A Correct.
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 A The number? I don't know off the top my head, no. Q Ballpark? A (No response.) Q No idea? A I'd be guessing. Q Okay. And you say that the fact that they have not received cap premium coverage under the City's means test suggests that these retirees have sources of income beyond their annuities which would disqualify them from receiving cap premium costs and 	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	 you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not really aware of it? A I don't know. Q Okay. A They've been notified many, many, many times. Q Well, if they've gotten a notice, then they understand, I mean right? A Correct. Q And over the years, there are, currently,
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 A The number? I don't know off the top my head, no. Q Ballpark? A (No response.) Q No idea? A I'd be guessing. Q Okay. And you say that the fact that they have not received cap premium coverage under the City's means test suggests that these retirees have sources of income beyond their annuities which would 	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 you not, that it's possible that a number of people don't apply for the means test because they're not really aware of it? A I don't know. Q Okay. A They've been notified many, many, many times. Q Well, if they've gotten a notice, then they understand, I mean right? A Correct.

25 (Pages 94 to 97)

	Page 98	Page 100
1	A There's about 22,000.	¹ no.
2	Q Retirees on the City's annuitant healthcare	² THE COURT: Ms. Currier
3	plan?	³ THE WITNESS: Sorry. Sorry.
4	A Correct.	⁴ THE COURT: It's called English. Let
5	Q And about a thousand over ten years	⁵ me give you the question.
6	A It's probably more than that individually.	⁶ Has it been audited and reconciled for
7	I'd rather research that number for you than guess.	⁷ the last half of 2013? Yes or no?
8	Q But you don't know that?	⁸ THE WITNESS: Yes.
9	A I don't know that.	⁹ BY MR. KRISLOV:
10	Q So your conclusions as to what's motivating	10 Q Who audited it?
11	them and you're just talking about sorry.	¹¹ A Shurong Tong. She's the manager of audit
12	Your conclusions as to what's	¹² and finance in the benefits office.
13	motivating them, your belief that they have sources	¹³ THE COURT REPORTER: Excuse me, You
14	of income beyond their annuities which would	¹⁴ Honor. I did not hear the answer.
15	disqualify them from receiving cap premium costs and	¹⁵ THE COURT: Ms. Currier, would you
16	other benefits pursuant to the City's means test, you	¹⁶ mind keeping your voice up just a touch more, please.
17	haven't done any study to, you're just saying that	¹⁷ THE WITNESS: Shurong Tong, T-o-n-g.
18	A I don't have access to everybody's family	¹⁸ BY MR. KRISLOV:
19	income, no.	¹⁹ Q Is she a CPA?
20	Q Nor to their you haven't done a study to	20 A Yes, she is.
21	find out their motivation in not applying?	²¹ Q And she provided an audit?
22	A No, I haven't.	²² A Not an official audit. She looked at the
23	Q So you don't know whether they're not	²³ numbers. She reconciled the numbers.
24	applying because they don't really know and	Q Okay. So is there a report to that effect?
	Page 99	Page 101
1	understand	¹ A No, there is not a report.
2	THE COURT: It's been asked and	² Q Did she do a report on that?
3	answered, Clint. That was answered about 90 seconds	³ A No, she did not.
4	ago.	⁴ Q So she just looked at it
5	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. And you believe	⁵ A There's no official report on that, Clint.
6	we've got an affirmative one to that?	⁶ We weren't required to do a reconciliation past June
7	THE COURT: Absolutely.	7 30th.
8	MR. KRISLOV: Okay.	⁸ THE COURT: So the answer is now "no"?
9	THE COURT: I'm sorry you didn't hear	⁹ THE WITNESS: The answer is no.
10	it.	¹⁰ BY MR. KRISLOV:
11	MR. KRISLOV: I try, Your Honor, but	¹¹ Q Right. Okay. So for 2014, same question,
12	thank you.	¹² same answer.
13	BY MR. KRISLOV:	¹³ A No, we did not do a reconciliation for
14	Q You have not audited and reconciled the two	¹⁴ 2014.
15	thousand the actual expenditures versus premium	15 Q Or an audit?
16	charges for the last half of 2013, right?	¹⁶ A Or an audit, no.
17	A We looked at it, yes.	¹⁷ Q And for 2015, we're
18	Q You haven't audited it's not been	¹⁸ A We're not done.
19	audited and reconciled, has it, the last half of	$Q \rightarrow in your view, there won't be one done?$
20	2013?	²⁰ A Correct.
21	A We looked at it, yes.	Q Okay. So the actual and for 2016, you
22 23	THE COURT: You looked at it. The	22 don't anticipate doing that, either?
23	question is has it been audited?	A Collect.
24	THE WITNESS: Not an official audit,	Q And you would agree that you would not
		1

26 (Pages 98 to 101)

Page	1	02
rage.		UΖ

Page 104

	Page 102		Page 104
1	dispute that for every year that has been subjected	1	A We send a package every year that has
2	to an audit, there has been a refund because the	2	charts to show what the benefits are for the next
3	charges were more than would reflect the actual,	3	for the following year, the rates that would apply to
4	right?	4	that individual, a letter from myself that has all
5	6	5	the information about the means test. There's
6	A Correct.	6	
	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. No further	7	usually several pieces of information in there.
7	questions of this witness.		In addition, we do a mailing of means
8	THE COURT: City.	8	test applications.
9	MR. LAYDEN: Yes, Your Honor.	9	Q Can you briefly explain how the City's
10	CROSS-EXAMINATION	10	means test works for retirees.
11	BY MR. LAYDEN:	11	A The person applies. They have to fill out,
12	Q Good morning, Mrs. Currier.	12	I believe it's a 4506T, so we can get a transcript
13	Let's start with the means test.	13	from the IRS.
14	Mr. Krislov asked you some questions about that.	14	So once we get the transcript from the
15	Does your office get inquiries from	15	IRS, we do a calculation to compare the adjusted
16	retirees about the means test?	16	gross income to what the premium would be. And if
17	A Yes.	17	they meet the premium test sometimes they meet the
18	Q And when you get an inquiry from a retiree	18	premium test, and they get a reduction in the
19	about the means test, what does your office do?	19	premium, or and/or they could get premium
20	A We mail out an application.	20	copayments.
21		21	Sometimes people don't get the premium
22	Q And do they sometimes ask you questions on	22	
23	the telephone about the means test?	23	reduction, but they do qualify for copayment
24	A Yes. My assistant is the one who actually	24	reductions at mail order.
21	handles all the means test applications, inquiries.	21	Q At what level of income does a retiree have
	Page 103		Page 105
1	Q And does your office try to work with	1	to have to qualify for the City's means test,
2	retirees to understand the means test?	2	Ms. Currier?
3	A Yes.	3	A Less than 250 percent of an adjusted gross
4	Q And does your office maintain a hotline	4	income.
5	that the retirees can call?	5	Q Is that of the federal poverty level.
6	A We have a benefits	6	A Of the federal poverty level, correct.
7	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, I would	7	Q And does the Affordable Care Act have
8	object to doing this as a leading question.	8	similar provisions for people at certain income
9	THE COURT: It's cross. He may lead.	9	levels?
10	MR. KRISLOV: But it's cross of a	10	A The federal government's means test
11	hostile witness. I don't think he's entitled to do	11	actually goes to 400 percent of the federal poverty
12	it this way.	12	level, and they provide premium assistance, as well
13	THE COURT: You're entitled to your	13	as reductions in plan out of pockets and deductibles.
14	opinion. Mine's the one that counts.	14	Q So with the Affordable Care Act, are more
15	Objection overruled.	15	people able to qualify for these reductions in
16	5	16	premiums?
17	You may go on. BY MR. LAYDEN:	17	1
18		18	A I would think so, based on the fact that it
19	Q Ms. Currier, just so I understand, does	19	goes up to 400 percent of the federal poverty level?
20	your office annually send out information to retirees	20	Q And is the percent of income under the ACA
20	about the City's means test?	20	lower or higher than the City's means test?
<u> </u>	A Yes, we do.		A The percent of income that they can get
2.2		22	capped at?
22	Q And is it a what kind of	22	
23	A We send	23	Q Yes.
		23 24	

27 (Pages 102 to 105)

	D 100	2 100
	Page 106	Page 108
1	government.	¹ retirees can pay lower premiums as compared to the
2	Q So there's more generous subsidies under	² premiums that they currently pay under the City's
3	the ACA?	³ 2015 plan?
4	A Correct.	⁴ A Yes, there are plans out there.
5	Q Do you have, I think it's Exhibit 3, the	⁵ MR. LAYDEN: Your Honor, this is
6	special disenrollment and reinstatement	⁶ Exhibit C to our opposition. Would you like a copy?
7	A I think the judge took it back.	⁷ THE COURT: That's probably a good
8	THE COURT: Exhibit 3 is the Illinois	⁸ idea.
9	Revised Statutes. Is that what you want?	⁹ (Document tendered.)
10	MR. LAYDEN: No, no. I wanted to give	¹⁰ MR. LAYDEN: Your Honor, if it's okay,
11	back the SBDR.	¹¹ we'll mark this as City's Exhibit No. 1.
12	THE COURT: Oh, yes. That is	¹² THE COURT: Sure.
13	Exhibit 6.	¹³ (Marked City Exhibit No. 1 for ID.)
14	(Document tendered.)	¹⁴ BY MR. LAYDEN:
15	BY MR. LAYDEN:	¹⁵ Q Can you identify this exhibit, Ms. Currier?
16	Q Ms. Currier, I wanted to ask you a question	¹⁶ A Yes. This is some research we did on some
17	about something Mr. Krislov raised.	¹⁷ of the plans that are available, or the number of
18	Mr. Krislov asked you about the	¹⁸ plans that are available under Get Covered Illinois.
19 20	conditions set forth in paragraph 3A and 3B.	¹⁹ Q And was this an exhibit that was attached ²⁰ to your affidavit?
20	Do you see that?	
22	A Yes.	A Contect.
23	Q Those conditions there about a divorce from	
24	a spouse and an annuitant's dependent hitting the age limit, are those requirements that already exist in	 ²³ moment. ²⁴ Why is there a vertical column for the
	mint, are those requirements that aready exist in	wity is there a vertical column for the
	Page 107	Page 109
1	the City's current plan?	¹ age of retirees?
2	A Yes, they do.	age of fethees:
3		² A Under the ACA the age factors into the
-		A Older the ACA, the age factors into the
4	Q So this isn't is this a new	³ calculation on the premium.
	Q So this isn't is this a newA No. When you get divorced, you're supposed	 ³ calculation on the premium. ⁴ Q Okay. Now how about the vertical column
4	Q So this isn't is this a new A No. When you get divorced, you're supposed to take your divorced spouse off.	 calculation on the premium. Q Okay. Now how about the vertical column for smoking status?
4 5	Q So this isn't is this a new A No. When you get divorced, you're supposed to take your divorced spouse off. When your child reaches the limiting	 calculation on the premium. Q Okay. Now how about the vertical column for smoking status?
4 5 6	Q So this isn't is this a new A No. When you get divorced, you're supposed to take your divorced spouse off.	 a condet the ACA, the age factors into the calculation on the premium. a Q Okay. Now how about the vertical column for smoking status? b A Smoking status also plays into the premium.
4 5 7 8 9	Q So this isn't is this a new A No. When you get divorced, you're supposed to take your divorced spouse off. When your child reaches the limiting age, they come off the plan. They're no longer	 a Condet the ACA, the age factors into the calculation on the premium. Q Okay. Now how about the vertical column for smoking status? A Smoking status also plays into the premium. Q And can you explain the fourth column that's labeled "Number of Exchange Plans Available." A According to our research, there's 69 plans
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28 (Pages 106 to 109)

	Page 110		Page 112
1	A Get Covered Illinois plan comparison tool.	1	THE COURT: What's your objection,
2	Q So is the lowest cost in premium plan under	2	without telling me a story? Do you have an
3	the ACA less than the lowest cost in premium plan	3	objection?
4	under the City's plan?	4	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
5	A Yes, it is.	5	THE COURT: What is it?
6	Q So if a retiree was concerned about	6	MR. KRISLOV: I have an objection that
7	premiums under the 2016 plan, he or she could seek	7	whether I'd like voir dire to determine who put
8	coverage under the ACA and obtain coverage with lower	8	this together.
9	premiums for 2016?	9	THE COURT: Denied. You may cross.
10	A Correct.	10	MR. KRISLOV: Okay.
11	THE COURT: Is that for every	11	THE COURT: You may redirect.
12	individual retiree's case? Do you have firsthand	12	MR. KRISLOV: As long as I've got
13	knowledge that any one of these people can actually	13	everything on cross, I'll just let them go.
14	do that from any given plan?	14	THE COURT: Well, that's nice of you.
15	Did you audit every retiree to know	15	
16	that that's the case, or is this just a	16	You may redirect. I'm not stopping you from
17	generalization, Ms. Currier?	17	inquiring into anything they elicit, as I didn't last
18	THE WITNESS: This is from some	18	time. Go ahead.
19	research we did on the website, Get Covered Illinois.	19	
20	I can't	20	Your objection's overruled. Proceed.
21	THE COURT: You've answered my	21	
22	question. Thank you.	22	BY MR. LAYDEN:
23	BY MR. LAYDEN:	23	Q So based on that research, you looked at
24	Q Let's talk about the research.	24	the fifth vertical column here that's titled "Lowest
	Q Let's tark about the research.		Available Exchange Plan Premium"?
	Page 111		Page 113
1	So you took somebody who has an age of	1	A Yes.
2	55, correct?	2	Q And are those the premium that you found
3	A (Nodding.)	3	based on the research that you performed.
4	Q And then you took another thing you did	4	A Yes.
5	is you looked at their smoking status, correct?	5	Q And then if you look at the second to last
6	A Correct.	6	vertical column that says "Lowest Available City
7	Q Then you went to an ACA the ACA website,	7	Retiree Plan Premiums," are those the current
8	correct?	8	available plan premiums to retirees under the City
9	A Correct.	9	plan?
10	Q And you put in that data.	10	A For non-Medicare eligible
11	A (Nodding.)	11	THE COURT: One second, please.
12	Q And as a result of that, you got the	12	Whoever's talking, stop. If you can't
13	corresponding premium associated for coverage for	13	be in this courtroom without talking, that's okay.
14	that person under the ACA, correct?	14	Just leave and talk. But I'm trying to listen, read,
15	A Correct.	15	understand. And the constant murmuring in the
16	Q You did that for each age, each smoking	16	background is presenting a problem to me.
17	status identified on this exhibit, correct?	17	So I would really appreciate it if you
18	A Correct.	18	stopped talking, whoever it is whomever it is.
19	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, can I I	19	Okay. Go ahead.
20		20	BY MR. LAYDEN:
-	mean, I'm letting him go on in the		
21	mean, I'm letting him go on in the THE COURT: That's nice of you, but	21	O Besides lower-costing besides the
	THE COURT: That's nice of you, but I'm the one who lets him.	21 22	Q Besides lower-costing besides the availability of lower-costing premiums under the ACA
21	THE COURT: That's nice of you, but		availability of lower-costing premiums under the ACA,
21 22	THE COURT: That's nice of you, but I'm the one who lets him.	22	· · · · ·

29 (Pages 110 to 113)

	Page 114		Page 116
1	A As compared to the City's standard plan,	1	you're no longer eligible for coverage.
2	for example, the ACA plans do have some advantages.	2	Q And does the ACA plan have a lifetime
3	They cover preventive care. They have	3	maximum?
4	office visits. You can go to the doctor's office and	4	A No, it does not.
5	pay a copayment and not have to meet the deductible.	5	Q And in terms of the out-of-pocket expenses
6	The drug copayments go into the out of	6	between the ACA and the City's plan, are there
7	pocket, which they don't do on any of the City plans	7	differences?
8	for retirees.	8	A There are differences, and it really
9	They cover immunizations. There's	9	depends on how a person utilizes or what their
10	well-baby care that they cover.	10	medical needs are in terms of whether or not they'll
11	Q How about for dental services and vision	11	ever meet their deductible or their out-of-pocket
12	services for children under the ACA? Is that	12	expense limit.
13	covered?	13	Q Mr. Krislov asked you some questions about
14	A They cover basic dental and basic vision	14	whether or not some of the ACA plans have higher
15	services under the ACA for children under 19.	15	deductible and out-of-pocket limits, right?
16	THE COURT: One second.	16	A Correct.
17	What is it that you didn't understand	17	Q And just because a plan under the ACA has a
18	about me saying not talking and laughing? You, young	18	higher deductible or out-of-pocket limit, does that
19	lady? You two were just talking.	19	mean that a retiree who has coverage under that plan
20	MR. KUGLER: If that was the	20	will, in fact, pay more in out-of-pocket and
21	THE COURT: I don't care who it was or	21	deductible expenses?
22	what you were saying. It applies to attorneys, it	22	A No, it does not mean that.
23	applies to the folks in this courtroom. Next time,	23	Q Can you explain how that works?
24	you're getting kicked out and be held in contempt of	24	A Well, it depends. If somebody's just going
	you're getting kleked out and be neid in contempt of		A wen, it depends. It someoody's just going
	Page 115		Page 117
1	court. Happy Christmas. CVLS will get a donation	1	to the doctor, and they just go, like, three times a
2	from you, and I mean it.	2	year and they're in the ACA plan, they pay a
3	Do you understand, you, young lady?	3	copayment, then that would be it.
4	UNIDENTIFIED GALLERY MEMBER: Yes.	4	Or if they had prescription drugs,
5	And I apologize.	5	they're getting them generic or something, they'd pay
6	THE COURT: All right. Don't do it	6	those copayments, and that would be it. Copayments
7	again.	7	and the doctors' bills.
8	Proceed.	8	Q Let's talk about the difference of the
9	BY MR. LAYDEN:	9	copayments and the deductibles.
10	Q I was asking you, Ms. Currier about, under	10	Under the ACA, how does a copay work?
11	the ACA, are dental services and vision services for	11	A So if you go to the doctor's office, you
12	children covered?	12	would generally pay a copayment, \$30, \$40, \$50,
13	A Under the age of 19, basic vision and basic	13	whatever they set their copayment at. Depending if
14	dental are covered.	14	it's the primary care doctor or specialist, there
15	Q And are dental services and vision services	15	would be different copayment levels. You would not
16	for children under the City's plan covered?	16	have to meet the deductible.
17	A Dental and vision aren't covered for anyone	17	Q And under the City's standard plan, do you
18	under the City's retirement plan.	18	have to meet the full deductible before the cost of
19	Q And does the City standard plan have a	19	going to the doctor is paid for under the plan?
20	lifetime maximum?	20	A Correct.
21	A Yes, it does. \$1.5 million.	21	Q One of the things that you talked about is
22	Q Could you explain what a lifetime maximum	22	that the ACA plan covers preventive care, right?
23	is.	23	A Correct.
24	A Once the plan has paid out \$1.5 million,	24	Q Can you explain what kind of things are

30 (Pages 114 to 117)

Page	120
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	Page 118	Page 120
1 '	covered under preventive care under the ACA that are	¹ I can't think of any more right off
2	not covered under the City's plan?	2 the top of my head.
3	A Screening for detection of diabetes;	3 Q And are there lower premiums under the
4	cholesterol, your screening for cholesterol; your	⁴ City's Choice network plan as opposed to its PPO
5		City's Choice network plan as opposed to its 110
6	annual exam, a woman's annual gyne exam, those types	network plan?
7	of care are preventive, and they're not covered in	A I CS, It IS.
8	the City's plan; they're covered in the ACA plans.	Q And in addition to differences in networks,
	Q 100 percent under the ACA plan?	you said there are two different plans, I believe a
9	A Yes. I believe there's no copayment in	standard and a value plan.
10	those plans for preventive services.	¹⁰ A Correct.
11	Q Now, does the City also offer different	¹¹ Q Can you briefly describe the difference
12	plan types?	¹² between the City's standard plan and its value plan?
13	A For the non-Medicare people, we have four	¹³ A Sure. The value plan has higher
14	plan types: Two basic plan designs on two different	¹⁴ deductibles, higher out-of-pocket limits. It has
15	networks.	¹⁵ office visit copayment. It covers preventive care.
16	Q And can we talk a little bit about the	¹⁶ There's different copayments based on the service.
17	different networks for a minute.	¹⁷ And all four plans have the same drug coverage.
18	Is one of the networks called your PPO	¹⁸ Q Has the City always had four plan
19	network?	¹⁹ alternatives for non-Medicare eligible retirees?
20	A Correct. One is on a PPO network.	²⁰ A No. Prior to 2015, there were two plan
21	Q Is another network called the Choice	²¹ alternatives. There was the Medicare supplement, and
22	network?	²² there was a non-Medicare a plan for non-Medicare
23	A And we have the Blue Choice network, which	 ²³ eligible retirees.
24	is a select group of hospitals and fewer doctors in	²⁴ Q And, Ms. Currier, why did the City come up
	is a select group of hospitals and lewer doctors in	Q Third, isis. Currier, why are the city come up
	Page 119	Page 121
1	that network.	¹ with four plan alternatives for non-Medicare eligible
2	Q Can you describe the difference between the	² retirees starting in 2015?
3	Q Can you describe the anterence between the	
	breadth of the networks between the PPO plan under	
4	breadth of the networks between the PPO plan under the City and its Choice plan	³ A To provide people with alternatives, and to
	the City and its Choice plan.	³ A To provide people with alternatives, and to ⁴ provide some plans that have lower premiums.
4	the City and its Choice plan. A In terms of the size of the network?	 A To provide people with alternatives, and to provide some plans that have lower premiums. MR. LAYDEN: I think we're done, Your
4 5	the City and its Choice plan.A In terms of the size of the network?Q Yes. How many doctors are under the City's	 A To provide people with alternatives, and to provide some plans that have lower premiums. MR. LAYDEN: I think we're done, Your Honor.
4 5 6 7	the City and its Choice plan.A In terms of the size of the network?Q Yes. How many doctors are under the City's PPO plan?	 A To provide people with alternatives, and to provide some plans that have lower premiums. MR. LAYDEN: I think we're done, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Krislov,
4 5 6 7 8	 the City and its Choice plan. A In terms of the size of the network? Q Yes. How many doctors are under the City's PPO plan? A There's a on the comparison chart that 	 A To provide people with alternatives, and to provide some plans that have lower premiums. MR. LAYDEN: I think we're done, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Krislov, redirect.
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31 (Pages 118 to 121)

	Page 122	Page 124
1	Q Okay. Those five are the premier hospital	¹ Q Your team being?
2	groups in town right now, right?	2 A The people in the benefits office.
3	A Those are some of the premier.	³ Q Okay. But you did not this wasn't
4		
	Q The and for someone who makes the bad	your did you put tins physicany, who put the
	choice to happen to move out of the Chicago area	chart together!
	you can retire anywhere in the country, right?	⁶ A People on my team
7	A Correct.	⁷ Q People representatives
8	Q And you're still free to move from	⁸ A put this chart together.
9	A You can move out of the country, I believe.	⁹ Q You did not
10	Q Even in.	¹⁰ A I reviewed the chart.
11	But let's say they stay in the country	¹¹ Q You reviewed the chart, but have you
12	so we keep this a domestic problem.	¹² compared it to the actual data? I presume you took
13	That Choice network would be utterly	¹³ this as your people do an accurate job, and you
14	worthless to the people, right?	¹⁴ generally rely on them?
15	A Right. It's for the people in I believe	15 A I rely on them, yes.
16		¹⁶ Q Okay. As far as the deductible that will
17	it's a six-county region.	
18	Q Okay.	vary, you aren't saying your locus sorry.
19	A In Illinois.	Surke an mat, start nesh with you.
	Q And only for those hospital groups within	what these figures focus on is the
	that network?	²⁰ premium?
21	A Correct.	²¹ A Correct.
22	Q And oh, also, for the rates with for	²² Q It does not address, for any given policy,
23	the rates for a single person without Medicare, that	²³ or individually, or in the group, what the
24	would not include their children, right?	²⁴ deductibles are for those policies, the chart
	Page 123	Page 125
-	_	
1	A Correct. That's single person.	¹ doesn't?
2	Q Right. So if they wanted to have their	² A The chart does not.
	kids covered for what did you talk about? Dental	³ Q The chart doesn't talk about out of pocket?
	and other preventive care?	⁴ A No, it does not.
5	A Right.	⁵ Q Doesn't talk about networks?
6	Q They would be extra. They'd have to pay	⁶ A No, it does not.
7	extra for that?	⁷ Q So all this chart deals with is just the
8	A Correct.	⁸ premium?
9	Q Yeah. So that's not in the and if they	⁹ A Correct.
10	wanted their spouse in, too, that's not in these	¹⁰ Q And you would agree, as we all in the room
	rates either? This is just	¹¹ would agree, I think, that the evaluation of a
12	A Which chart are you referring to, Mr.	¹² particular policy is not just based on the premium.
13	Krislov?	¹³ It would be based on the premium, of course; the out
14	Q The one that you've been the one that	¹⁴ of pockets; the deductibles; the network is certainly
15	you've testifying for	¹⁵ important as well; the lifetime maximum. All sorts
16	A This one with the	¹⁶ of stuff, right?
17	Q Yes. This is this just	17 A Yes, including your own health status.
18	A This is a single person at age 55.	¹⁸ Q Including your own health status, although
19	Q Right. So if they want dependent or spouse	¹⁹ for these purposes, I guess so why would it matter
	coverage, that's an additional charge?	²⁰ if your health status because you can't be rated
21	A Correct.	²¹ under the Affordable Care Act, right?
22		A Well, you know yourself how many times
	Q Okay. And so we could agree oh, let me	A well, you know yourself now many times
24	ask you. Who put this chart together?	you're fikely to go to the hospital. Tou should have
	A My team.	²⁴ a good idea how many visits to the doctor you're

32 (Pages 122 to 125)

Page 126	Page 128
going to use, whether you're sterry, whether you're	DT MR. EATDEN.
nearthy.	Q Wis. Currer, going back to this exhibit,
Q Fail ellough. Okay.	the one that has the comparison of the ACA premiums
A flow many drugs you use. Tou know now many	and the city premiums.
you're using in the ran that you're probably going	with Kitsiov asked you some questions
to have to use in the following year.	about whether the premium would go up under the ACA
Q Sure. I but health condition factors into	in a particular person apprying had a spouse of
⁸ the equation as well, based on what you need?	dependent.
A Collect.	Do you remember that question?
¹⁰ MR. KRISLOV: I think we're done with	¹⁰ A Correct.
¹¹ Ms oh, sorry. Almost.	¹¹ Q And if they had a spouse or dependent, the
¹² BY MR. KRISLOV:	¹² premium would be greater than what's reflected here?
¹³ Q The in order to get the cap, the means	¹³ A This is just for single coverage.
¹⁴ test cap, you have to I take it from your	¹⁴ Q So the premium could go up under the ACA if
¹⁵ testimony, you have to fill out a form 4506T, which	¹⁵ they added a dependent or a spouse; is that right?
¹⁶ gives the City a transcript of your tax returns.	¹⁶ A Correct.
¹⁷ A Correct.	¹⁷ Q And, similarly, if you were doing an apples
¹⁸ Q You full tax return?	¹⁸ to apples comparison, and you looked under the City
¹⁹ A No, just the transcript. Just a basic	¹⁹ plan, and they're adding a spouse or dependent, do
²⁰ transcript of your tax return. It's not the full	²⁰ their premiums go up?
²¹ thing.	A Correct.
²² Q It's got all of your revenue from all	²² MR. LAYDEN: Nothing further, Your
²³ sources. It must have	²³ Honor.
²⁴ A It's got your adjusted gross income on	²⁴ THE COURT: Ms. Currier, I release
Page 127	Page 129
¹ there, so I know we get that. But it I don't	¹ you.
² believe it's the full thing. It's the transcript of	² THE WITNESS: Thank you.
3 it.	³ THE COURT: Thanks for coming in. I
4 Q Okay. So whatever comes in the transcript,	⁴ appreciate it. Please have a happy holiday. Thank
⁵ whatever data the IRS sends out in respect to the	⁵ you.
⁶ request for a person's transcript, and you're	⁶ (Witness excused.)
 ⁷ essentially looking for you get, whether you're 	⁷ THE COURT: Any other witness you'd
⁸ looking for it or not, you get all that person's a	⁸ like to call?
⁹ summary of all that person's reports to the IRS?	⁹ MR. KRISLOV: No, Your Honor.
10 A Right. But we just look at the AGI. We're	¹⁰ THE COURT: Any witness that the City
¹¹ not examining sources of income.	¹¹ would like to call?
12 Q Well, but it might be a concern for a	would like to call?
¹³ retiree to give you all that information if you	WIR. FRENDEROAST. Four Honor, the City
	doesn't have any writesses.
¹⁴ A If they apply for a means test under the ¹⁵ excuse me. You didn't ask me that question.	I take it that the arreavits that
	have been questioned here are in evidence.
Q That's okay.	THE COURT. They are.
That's the only way they get that is	WIK. I KENDEROASI. Okay. And I take it
if you get a transcript of then	¹⁸ that the Court is looking at the exhibits attached to
A concet.	¹⁹ their
WIR. KRISLOV. Okay. Okay. Then Th	²⁰ THE COURT: I have.
done.	²¹ MR. PRENDERGAST: submissions and
THE COURT. Recloss.	²² ours as in evidence for purposes of this hearing.
WIR. LATDEN. Just a few, Tour Honor.	²³ THE COURT: I'm considering them all
²⁴ RECROSS-EXAMINATION	²⁴ in evidence for purposes of this hearing.

33 (Pages 126 to 129)

1 Any objection to that, Mr. Krislov? 1 the Constitution 2 MR. KRISLOV: No objection. THE COURT: I asid all people who 3 any winesses the Funds would like to call to the stand? MR. KRISLOV: No, you didn't say 4 MR. BURKE: Judge, we have no MR. KRISLOV: Song pight there. 5 MR. KUGLER: No witnesses, Your Honor. THE COURT: Very good. Both sides 6 or all sides rest. MR. KRISLOV: Judge, the Laborers' 7 MR. KRISLOV: Judge, the can have The COURT: No. your cay to argue? 7 MR. KRISLOV: Judge, the can have The COURT: No. your cay to argue? 7 MR. KRISLOV: Judge, the can have The COURT: No. Your Report, how 7 THE COURT: Well see you all at five all vert when the Korstak subclass. 7 THE COURT: Well see you all at five all vert presson 7 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? The court is the stand it would 7 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? The court is the stand it would is a prophysical states a 7 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? The court is state is the court is state and for a state is a to the court is state is		Page 130		Page 132
1 MR. KRISLOV: No objection. 1 3 THE COURT: 1 said all people who 4 my witnesses the Funds would like to call to the 5 any witnesses. 6 MR. RURKE: Judge, we have no 7 Witnesses. 7 MR. KENEDY: Judge, the Laborers' 8 MR. KUSLOV: Yes, good Both sides 9 Fund has no witnesses. 9 MR. KUSLOV: Yey good Both sides 10 THE COURT: Wry good Both sides 11 THE COURT: Wry good Both sides 12 or all side rest. 13 THE COURT: Ms. Court Reporter, how 14 THE COURT: Ms. Court Reporter, how 15 THE COURT: Court REPORTER: Five minutes with 16 Firet outher the parties that it would 17 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Krislov. 18 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Krislov. 19 Therefore, Count I clearly states a 1111E COURT: All right, Mr. Krislov. Therefore, Count I clearly states a 112 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Krislov. 113 THE COURT: So leds put them into two 11111E COURT: All right, Mr. Kr	1	Any objection to that Mr. Krislov?	1 the Cou	nstitution
2 THE COURT: All right. And the Funds, any witnesses the Funds would like to call to the stand? if i	2			
any wincesses the Funds would like to call to the stand? MR. KURSLOV: Judge, we have no MR. KURSLOV: I clearly states in the constraint of the constr	3		³ retired	1 1
 stand? MR. BURKE: Judge, we have no witnesses. MR. KENNEDY: Judge, the Laborers' Fund has no witnesses. MR. KUGLER: No witnesses, you relate the count of the second state of the second sta	4			
MR. BURKE: Judge, we have no Iff: COURT: Let's stop right there. MR. KURSLOY: Judge, the Laborers' MR. KURSLOY: Yes. MR. KURSLOY: Lvery good. Both sides Iff. COURT: Corpage ten of my opinion, and I quote, I said: IAB Samendments were in or all sides rest. IAB KURSLOY: Judge, if we can have fiver minutes before we do the argument. The IPS3 and IPS3 amendments were in the Funds' retirement system. There does not appear to be any Subclass, and subclass 3 entered into the Funds' retirement system. There does not appear to be any Subclass, and subclass 3 entered into the Funds' retirement system. There does not appear to be any Subclass, and subclass 3 entered does not appear to be any firet minutes before we do the argument. The COURT REPORTER: Five minutes will firet courr. Well see you all at five If the COURT: Are we ready to proceed? firet courr. All right, Mr. Krislov. Page 131 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Krislov. Therefore, Court 1 clearly states a firet we had yesterday, who we're asking for it for is a Subclass, and all of those amendments dealt with filte - differs a bit. So let's put them into two Subclass, and lang' firet we had by seterday, who we're asking for it for is a Subclass, and lang' firet minute boffore weath apsetter motion? Subclass, and lang' firet courry is all we're looking for today is	5	5	⁵ either	
7 witnesses. MR. KENEDY: Judge, the Laborers' 8 MR. KENEDY: Judge, the Laborers' THE COURT: Very good. Both sides 9 or all sides rest. MR. KRISLOV: Judge, if we can have 10 Are you ready to argue? 11 MR. KRISLOV: Judge, if we can have 12 or all sides rest. 13 Are you ready to argue? 14 MR. KRISLOV: Judge, if we can have 15 THE COURT: MS. Court Reporter, how 14 THE COURT: Me'l see you all at five 15 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 16 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 17 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 18 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 19 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 20 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 21 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 22 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 23 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 24 THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? 25 THE COURT: Sol trap the more the the stand is not properly 26 THE COURT: Sol trap the minto two 2	6			
* MR. KENNEDY: Judge, the Laborers' * THE COURT: On page ten of my opinion, and I quote, I said: ** MR. KUGLER: No witnesses, Your Honor. ** ** *** or all sides rest. ** ** *** Are you ready to argue? ** ** *** MR. KRISLOV: Judge, if we can have ** ** *** MR KNISLOV: Judge, if we can have ** ** *** ** ** ** ** *** ** ** ** ** *** ** ** ** ** *** ** ** ** ** *** ** ** ** ** *** ** ** ** ** *** ** ** ** ** *** ** ** ** ** ** *** ** ** ** ** ** *** ** ** ** ** ** *** ** ** ** **	7	-	7	
 Fund has no witnesses. MR. KUGLER: No witnesses, Your Honor. THE COURT: Very good. Both sides - or all sides rest. Are you ready to argue? MR. KRISLOV: Judge, if we can have five minutes before we do the argument. THE COURT: MS. Court Reporter, how much time would you need? THE COURT: We'll see you all at five affer 1:00. (Brief recess.) THE COURT: We'll see you all at five affer 1:00. (Brief recess.) THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? THE COURT: Are we ready to proceed? THE COURT: All right, Mr. Krislov. You're the movant. You may argue. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, while I might think that we're entitled to summary judgment, all we're looking for today is a preliminary injunction to block the change in rates from going ind crease and I quote, I said: THE COURT: All right, Mr. Krislov. You're the movant. You may argue. THE COURT: All right Mr. Krislov. Page 131 THE COURT: Me'll reget the movant. You may argue. And if you want I know, because of our conversation with my colleagues on the other side whad yesterday, who we're asting for it for is a little differs a bit. So lefs put them into two categories. THE COURT: Differs from what? from what 1: Field on the motion. MR. KRISLOV: No, no. I mean, I what I filed in the motion. MR. KRISLOV: No, no. I mean, I what I filed in the motion. MR. KRISLOV: No, no. I mean, I what I filed in the motion. MR. KRISLOV: No, no. I mean, I what I filed in the motion. MR. KRISLOV: No, no. I mean, I what I filed in the motion.	8		8	
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²³ decision which holds that their interest is protected ²³ that the City another discussion does not claim	<u> </u>	pre were participants meaning their hire date		= $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$ $=$
	22	was before August 23 of 1989, are covered by your	²² the lifet	time benefits to be supplied by the City;
	22 23	was before August 23 of 1989, are covered by your decision which holds that their interest is protected	 the lifet that the 	time benefits to be supplied by the City; City another discussion does not claim

34 (Pages 130 to 133)

	1090 101		2090 200
1 '	don't have to, but they claim they're going to, so	1	the '89, '97 and 2003 amendment.
2	as I understand their position.	2	You may disagree, and I know you do,
3	But everyone after that date, per my	3	and I know that's going to be subject to review, most
4	ruling, is covered by the 1989, the 1997, and the	4	likely, but that's my ruling, and that's what I held.
5	2003 amendments to the Illinois Pension Code, which I	5	So your objection to the contrary, or
6	said at page 11 were time limited at creation. I	6	your read to the contrary, you're wrong, much to my
7	also added, for good reason. They were enacted	7	regret. But that's the way of the law.
8	solely to codify the time-limited settlement	8	MR. KRISLOV: I don't want interrupt
9	agreements between the parties, to wit, these folks'	9	you, but do I get a chance to talk?
10	unions who bargained in good faith with the City, and	10	THE COURT: Thanks for that. I
11	they bargained for time limitations. They were time	11	appreciate it.
12	limited by their own terms.	12	MR. KRISLOV: I don't want start until
13	Regardless of the basis of it	13	you're done.
14	factually, the only important thing is what the	14	THE COURT: Ball's in your court.
15	legislature did. This Court, I, even though I'd like	15	MR. KRISLOV: Here's where your
16	to be, I am not a super-legislature. I cannot change	16	decision is right, but your interpretation is wrong,
17	the terms of enactments decided by the Illinois House	17	with all due respect. And I do, frankly, enjoy
18	and Senate.	18	practicing before you, because it may be combative,
19	By the express terms of the amendments	19	and I apologize for my seeming or my coming off as
20	in 1989, 1997, and 2003, they were time limited, and	20	combative with you at times.
21	that's at creation, and by their express terms.	21	THE COURT: I don't feel that.
22	Therefore, I said the amendment specifically did not	22	MR. KRISLOV: I enjoy the interplay
23	provide the annuitants with lifetime or permanent	23	with you.
24	healthcare benefits.	24	Here's where your the statement you
	Page 135		Page 137
			-
1	Not my doing, just my read of the	1	just made is right, that the people who can claim
2	statutes, which are clear and don't require any	2	THE COURT: Well, let me ask you a
3	interpretation.	3	question before you opine on whether I'm right or
4	Because they were time limited at	4	wrong.
5	creation, I have to enforce the specific terms of	5	That's my decision.
6	those amendments, which means that they were time	6	MR. KRISLOV: If I can
7	limited, non-permanent, non-lifetime, and they lapsed	7	THE COURT: You have not filed a
8	on their own accord. Therefore, there's nothing to	8	motion for reconsideration let me finish a
9	diminish or impair.	9	motion for clarification. The City has; you could
10	It's true, the pension clause	10	have, you did not.
11	grants guarantees a right to have pension	11	If you think of this as a motion as
12	benefits, but not to be not diminished or	12	we said yesterday in our conversation with all the
13	impaired, but it doesn't as I've said, it doesn't	13	parties, if you think of this as a motion for
14	magically create a right to receive a lifetime	14	reconsideration of my decision, then you should have
15	benefit, a forever friend in healthcare.	15	stylized it that way. I'm not going to review my
16	My politics aside, and what I think	16	decision. I think I'm right for the reasons
17	should be done aside, it doesn't serve to magically	17	enunciated, much to my regret. But I am bound to
18	create a right to receive benefits that have not been	18	follow the law, and that's my decision.
19	specifically granted, and that's what I said.	19	It's not an interpretation of my
20	So that's why I found that although	20	decision, Clint. It's my decision. If you don't
21	Count 1 does state a cause of action for everyone,	21	like it, you know what to do. Not that. You know
22	August 23rd, 1989, and before, who retired that	22 23	what to do. You can appeal me, and you will. But
23			
0.6	date, it does not it does not state a cause of		that's my decision.
24	date, it does not it does not state a cause of action for declaratory relief as to obligations under	23	MR. KRISLOV: On the preliminary

35 (Pages 134 to 137)

	Page 138		Page 140
1	THE COURT: I haven't interpreted	¹ partici	ipated during the '83 and '85 amendment period,
2	anything.	partic	cessarily retired by August 23rd.
3	MR. KRISLOV: Do I get a closing	3	MR. KRISLOV: Right.
4	argument?	4	THE COURT: Then is it your corollary
5	THE COURT: Yeah, sure.	⁵ positio	on that it's the Funds who are responsible for
6	MR. KRISLOV: Okay.		participants' health benefits?
7	Your Honor's decision that people who	7	Because you've already
8	were Your Honor's decision, I believe, and I was	8	MR. KRISLOV: Not only
9	interpreting until maybe yesterday and this morning,	9	THE COURT: Let me finish.
10	was that people who could claim protection because	10	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
11	they were participants under the 1983 and 1985	11	THE COURT: You've already taken the
12	amendments have a protected benefit. That is what	¹² positio	on, you've conceded here in court during our
13	Buddell says. It is participants. It is not that		gument, for one, that you were not going
14	you retired before that date. It's that you were a		st the City on the '83 and '85 amendments; you
15	participant in the Fund on that date.		going against the Funds. So if that's the case,
16	And in that respect, what we're		also true that it's the Funds who are
17	talking about is the people who were participants in		sible for the participants, the folks who
18	the one of the four pension funds, meaning a hire		I to participate during the '83 and '85
19	date before August 23rd of 1989. That's what this		Iment period?
20	battle is about.	20	MR. KRISLOV: Yes, but not solely.
21	If it were just over the retirees, the	²¹ Becau	se if you read Kanerva, Kanerva talks about a
22	people who the Korshak and Window classes who		healthcare plan that the state adopted. It was
23	retired by that date, there would not be a dispute,		pension plan it was not a Pension Code plan.
24	because the City says they're going to honor that.		a group health plan that the state provided to
			- See of a contract of the second s
	Page 139		Page 141
1	And that was the class that I represented then.	¹ its for	mer employees, conditioned on their being
2	But here's what Buddell says and we		ants, or eligible to become annuitants
3	do have that in our motion. Buddell says that you	3	THE COURT: So how does that play here
4	are protected throughout your participation from	⁴ where	the statutes say it's the Funds that shall
5	your participation. And Kanerva basically says that		, and it's the City that shall just finance it
6	as well.		tax levies, but it's the Funds that shall
7	Kanerva says that the benefits flow		/ and you conceded that it was the Funds who
8	from your being a participant in the Funds. They do		I do so and not the City.
9	not they're not limited. The City's whole	9	MR. KRISLOV: No, I didn't say not the
10	argument, really, in response to our motion is that	¹⁰ City.	I conceded
11	all you should enforce is what the four corners of	11	THE COURT: You did, actually.
12	the Pension Code imposes on somebody.	12	MR. KRISLOV: No. I said that the
13	And on the '83 and '85 statutes, I	¹³ statute	e does not require the City to provide the
14	have acknowledged that the Pension Code provisions		care coverage, but Kanerva says where the City
15	say that the Funds are obligated to get coverage for		hat. I mean, the City does this by ordinance.
16	their participants. That was fulfilled by the City		ate does it by state statute. You don't have
17	providing that coverage.		e it in the Pension Code.
18	Now, the other thing that is from	18	But Kanerva is absolutely clear.
19	Kanerva is that Kanerva	¹⁹ That's	where you and I differ. Kanerva says that the
20	THE COURT: So let me stop you there		provided benefit to people who are participants
21	for a second.		Funds, in one of the state retirement funds
22	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.		all that makes you eligible to participate in
23	THE COURT: With regard to your		te group health benefit that that is
24	argument that it's participants who it's folks who		ted as well by Article 13, Section 5.

36 (Pages 138 to 141)

		1	
	Page 142	Page 1	44
1 '	And so the City, having provided the	¹ The 1997 was a different bird because	
2	what it's providing now, the annuitant the City	² we were temporarily out of it because that was dur	ing
3	of Chicago Annuitant Health Benefit plan, that by	³ the period when Judge Green had refused to reinsta	ate
4	doing that, that is a benefit which is limited in its	⁴ the case, but before the appellate court ordered the	
5	eligibility to conditioned on people who are	⁵ case reinstated. So no one knows exactly what the	
6	receiving an annuity or will receive an annuity from	⁶ effect and it wasn't a union-negotiated deal, any	
7	one of the four Funds.	⁷ of these three.	
8	It is the same thing. The City having	⁸ The '89 was imposed over our strenuous	
9	signed onto that deal, the City having created a	⁹ objections. Went up to the Supreme Court. While	we
10	retirement benefit of the annuitant healthcare plan	¹⁰ disagree with the due process of it, I concede we at	re
11	is obligated to continue providing that without	¹¹ bound by it. The pre-'89 class is bound by it.	
12	reduction. That's what Kanerva says Article 13,	¹² THE COURT: So the post-'89 class, you	
13	Section 5 protects.	¹³ agree, then, are subject to the time limitations,	
14	THE COURT: What's the effect	¹⁴ and, therefore, Kanerva does not apply?	
15	taking your position, what is as gospel, excuse	¹⁵ MR. KRISLOV: Here's the with an	
16	me what is your position with regard to the	¹⁶ asterisk.	
17	effect, then, of employees who began after	¹⁷ Somebody who just came into let's	
18	August 23rd, 1989, where their wherein the	¹⁸ say they were hired in 2004. They did not agree to)
19	amendment stated that it was time-limited benefits?	¹⁹ waive their rights. They're sort of stuck with I	
20	Brand new employees. What's your position about	²⁰ understand	
21	that? Once given, they're lifetime, regardless of	²¹ THE COURT: What rights?	
22	time limitations?	²² MR. KRISLOV: Well, whatever rights	
23	MR. KRISLOV: They're a different	they have as a participant	
24	they're in a different category for three reasons.	²⁴ THE COURT: What rights do they have	
	Page 1/3	Page 1	15
-	Page 143	Page 1	
1	THE COURT: Well, first I'm not	¹ in 2004? Every right they have to any healthcare	
2	THE COURT: Well, first I'm not interested in what category. I'm interested in your	 in 2004? Every right they have to any healthcare ² benefits are time limited by the statute. It's not a 	
2 3	THE COURT: Well, first I'm not interested in what category. I'm interested in your conclusion. What's your position?	 in 2004? Every right they have to any healthcare benefits are time limited by the statute. It's not a right. It's not a right. It was given by the City 	
2 3 4	THE COURT: Well, first I'm not interested in what category. I'm interested in your conclusion. What's your position? MR. KRISLOV: We will show in our	 in 2004? Every right they have to any healthcare benefits are time limited by the statute. It's not a right. It's not a right. It was given by the City with a time limitation. 	
2 3 4 5	THE COURT: Well, first I'm not interested in what category. I'm interested in your conclusion. What's your position? MR. KRISLOV: We will show in our amendment that we think the City's	 in 2004? Every right they have to any healthcare benefits are time limited by the statute. It's not a right. It's not a right. It was given by the City with a time limitation. MR. KRISLOV: Sorry. I was referring 	
2 3 4 5 6	THE COURT: Well, first I'm not interested in what category. I'm interested in your conclusion. What's your position? MR. KRISLOV: We will show in our amendment that we think the City's THE COURT: I don't have an amendment	 in 2004? Every right they have to any healthcare benefits are time limited by the statute. It's not a right. It's not a right. It was given by the City with a time limitation. MR. KRISLOV: Sorry. I was referring to whatever benefits they had 	
2 3 4 5	THE COURT: Well, first I'm not interested in what category. I'm interested in your conclusion. What's your position? MR. KRISLOV: We will show in our amendment that we think the City's THE COURT: I don't have an amendment before me.	 in 2004? Every right they have to any healthcare benefits are time limited by the statute. It's not a right. It's not a right. It was given by the City with a time limitation. MR. KRISLOV: Sorry. I was referring to whatever benefits they had THE COURT: Well, you think of thing 	
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	THE COURT: Well, first I'm not interested in what category. I'm interested in your conclusion. What's your position? MR. KRISLOV: We will show in our amendment that we think the City's THE COURT: I don't have an amendment before me. MR. KRISLOV: I know. I know.	 in 2004? Every right they have to any healthcare benefits are time limited by the statute. It's not a right. It's not a right. It was given by the City with a time limitation. MR. KRISLOV: Sorry. I was referring to whatever benefits they had THE COURT: Well, you think of thing in terms of rights and entitlements, and I don't 	
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1	but the bulk of the people who's who are concerned	1	done it, because I don't think we have it I don't
2	today, and the City as well, I think would not	2	think that we were aware of the City's.
3	dispute this	3	THE COURT: Okay, so we're just not
4	THE COURT: Isn't the bulk of the	4	going to play it on the run here. We're going to
5	people those who retired before August 23rd, 1989?	5	deal with what you've raised.
6	MR. KRISLOV: No. Those who retired	6	MR. KRISLOV: So in any event, if you
7	those who started working before August 23 of	7	accept because I think if you read Buddell, you
8	1989.	8	must, that the protections apply for whatever the
9	THE COURT: I see.	9	plan whatever plan the City provided when you were
10	MR. KRISLOV: That's the bulk of the	10	while you were a participant, date of hire to date
11	22,000 people. If you think about it, if they	11	of death. That's what's protected, and that's what
12	started working for the City before August 23rd of	12	Kanerva says is protected.
13	'89, police and fire people could not start retiring	13	Now, what I think you have done in
14	on full benefits until 2009.	14	your decision is satisfy that there is a clearly
15	So the earliest of the subsequent	15	ascertainable right that requires protection.
16	people or the earliest of the hired people	16	Irreparable injury, the forcing them off of their
17	wouldn't have started retiring until six years ago.	17	coverage. It's one thing to say, well, they're going
18	And for municipal and laborers, probably most of them	18	to have to pay more, but we can pay you back. Some
19	are still working for the City.	19	people will forego their coverage because they can't
20	But here's and this is where I	20	afford it, and some people will wind up in lesser
21	think it's fundamental. And I think if you reread	21	plans, and some people will drop coverage altogether,
22	if you read Kanerva, if you read Buddell, the deal is	22	or have to do whatever.
23	your rights are determined from when you became a	23	This is going without your
24	participant to when you die. And so limiting it to	24	healthcare is an irreparable injury. And the City
	participant to when you die. And so mining it to		neutrioure is an integratione injury. And the City
	Page 147		Page 149
1	the retirees would also the City's effort to limit	1	can't always recover. If it turns out that the City
2	it to the pre 8-23-89 retirees would violate the	2	wins in the end, there is no limitation period on the
3	Illinois Constitution's protections of equal	3	City going back after, or the pension funds going
4			
	protection.	4	back after somebody who didn't pay the appropriate
5	The City cannot make a distinction	5	back after somebody who didn't pay the appropriate amount.
5 6	The City cannot make a distinction between who gets protections under Article 13,	5 6	back after somebody who didn't pay the appropriate amount. All it really had and there's
5 6 7	The City cannot make a distinction between who gets protections under Article 13, Section 5.	5 6 7	back after somebody who didn't pay the appropriate amount. All it really had and there's so and giving you back money, and even with
5 6 7 8	The City cannot make a distinction between who gets protections under Article 13, Section 5. THE COURT: Well, that's something you	5 6 7 8	back after somebody who didn't pay the appropriate amount. All it really had and there's so and giving you back money, and even with interest after you lose your healthcare coverage, is
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1	covered by this preliminary injunction. And yet you	1	were giving it for life when they gave it for only
2	seek to have an order which does cover that.	2	six months to 2013, or another two years. You know,
3		3	what's right is right. That's the opposite side of
4	How do you jibe that?	4	the coin.
5	MR. KRISLOV: Because we acknowledge that their entitlement is a little different. You	5	
6		6	And if that's the case, the City, or
7	know, call it scalpel, call it rifle, shotgun, we	7	any municipality, will never give anybody anything
8	acknowledge that their entitlement is a little is	8	for fear of being stuck with an argument that you're
9	different than the pre-8-33-89 hires.	9	giving, that if I give it to them for a limited
	We do think that when it comes down to	10	period of time, that's it. We're stuck forever.
10	it, the City's determination in the 2013 letter,		And that seems to me not to be in the
11	where it says the settlement's over, we're	11	interest of these folks or public policy, because
12	unilaterally going to extend your plan extended	12	it's in these folks' interest to have the City give
13	term and benefits of the settlement through the end	13	them something. But when they say they're giving
14	of the year, once the City unilaterally chose to do	14	them something for a specific period of time, it's
15	that, it was stuck with that permanently, and that it	15	it would be Kafkaesque to have something for a
16	says	16	specific period of time end up being forever.
17	THE COURT: Really?	17	So tell me, what law do you have to
18	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.	18	support the proposition that a time-limited grant is
19	And that it says, but we're going to	19	a forever grant?
20	phase you out between now and 2017	20	MR. KRISLOV: Article 13, Section 5
21	THE COURT: What analogy in life or	21	says
22	law do you have by which you could argue that if I	22	THE COURT: It doesn't grant anything.
23	give you the right to enter into my theater free of	23	It just protects that which is given, and if it was
24	charge until December 31st of this year, I have	24	given in a time-limited way, that's what it protects.
	Page 151		Page 153
1	magically given you the right to enter into my	1	MR. KRISLOV: And we'll find out from
2	theater forever?	2	the appellate court whether giving it in a time
3	MD KDICLOW, ICassa and 11		the appendie court whether giving it in a time
	MR. KRISLOV: If you as a public	3	limited way was effective under that letter.
4	employer gives me a benefit that is	3 4	
4 5	employer gives me a benefit that is		limited way was effective under that letter.
		4	limited way was effective under that letter. Because when the City says, we're
5	employer gives me a benefit that is THE COURT: That's time limited by its own terms.	4 5	limited way was effective under that letter. Because when the City says, we're going to extend things to the end of the year, and
5 6	employer gives me a benefit that is THE COURT: That's time limited by its own terms. MR. KRISLOV: Well, it's not time	4 5 6	limited way was effective under that letter. Because when the City says, we're going to extend things to the end of the year, and then we're going to phase them out and drop you off
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39 (Pages 150 to 153)

	Page 154		Page 156
			-
1	before August 23 of '89.	1	that they were members of on August 23rd, 1989, is
2	THE COURT: I'm going to listen to	2	one the four funds. It is not they don't have to
3	what the City has to say about that, in this, your	3	be a retiree by that date to be protected.
4	motion to reconsider.	4	THE COURT: I understood that. I
5	MR. KRISLOV: It's not a motion to	5	understand your position on that. But now we're
6	reconsider.	6	going to the other question I asked you, the folks
7	THE COURT: It is, because I've	7	who joined afterwards.
8	already excluded those folks, but you think I'm	8	MR. KRISLOV: For the people whose
9	wrong. Now you're arguing they should be included	9	first hire was afterwards, I don't think that they
10	it.	10	can claim if a date limitation is effective
11	MR. KRISLOV: No, with all due	11	THE COURT: Subject to my being right
12	respect, Your Honor, your decision says that people	12	about that.
13	claiming their entitlement under the '83 and '85	13	MR. KRISLOV: Subject to your being
14	amendments. And that means people who were	14	subject to you know, and we'll probably challenge
15	participants during that time.	15	that in the appellate court.
16	THE COURT: Okay.	16	THE COURT: Sure.
17	MR. KRISLOV: Not people who had	17	MR. KRISLOV: If the date limitation
18	retired before that.	18	is effective, their entitlement really stems more
19	THE COURT: All right. Maybe the City	19	from the 2013 extension by the City, and the City
20	will agree. Who knows. But let's hear what they	20	THE COURT: Which you think giving it
21	have to say.	21	for six months meant that, willy-nilly, it magically
22	MR. KRISLOV: In any event, the City's	22	becomes life, yes?
23	argument is basically that all that you can enforce	23	MR. KRISLOV: I would delete the term
24	are what is specified in the Pension Code, and that's	24	"willy-nilly," and "magically." I would say that
	Page 155		Page 157
1	not right. That's not what Kanerva says.	1	when the public employer grants a benefit
1 2	not right. That's not what Kanerva says. Kanerva dealt with a group health	1 2	-
			when the public employer grants a benefit
2 3 4	Kanerva dealt with a group health	2 3 4	when the public employer grants a benefit THE COURT: For a day, it becomes for
2 3	Kanerva dealt with a group health benefit that was outside the Pension Code, and they	2 3	when the public employer grants a benefit THE COURT: For a day, it becomes for life; for six months, it becomes for life.
2 3 4	Kanerva dealt with a group health benefit that was outside the Pension Code, and they acknowledge that in their decision. They say that	2 3 4	when the public employer grants a benefit THE COURT: For a day, it becomes for life; for six months, it becomes for life. MR. KRISLOV: If it is done for
2 3 4 5	Kanerva dealt with a group health benefit that was outside the Pension Code, and they acknowledge that in their decision. They say that THE COURT: Well, we're not talking	2 3 4 5	when the public employer grants a benefit THE COURT: For a day, it becomes for life; for six months, it becomes for life. MR. KRISLOV: If it is done for partici if eligibility is determined solely by
2 3 4 5	Kanerva dealt with a group health benefit that was outside the Pension Code, and they acknowledge that in their decision. They say that THE COURT: Well, we're not talking about what was granted or not granted. We're just	2 3 4 5 6	when the public employer grants a benefit THE COURT: For a day, it becomes for life; for six months, it becomes for life. MR. KRISLOV: If it is done for partici if eligibility is determined solely by their being a participant in one of the Funds, that
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40 (Pages 154 to 157)

1 /			Page 160
1	MR. KRISLOV: All right. We disagree	1	that the rates were higher than were appropriate,
2	about other things, too.	2	every year, the settlement the audit
3	THE COURT: Probably not many, but	3	reconciliation resulted in an average of \$5 million
4	that one we do.	4	being returned to retirees.
5	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. So anyway, if I	5	THE COURT: Sure. But if you have
6	can go back to the pre-August 23, '89, participants.	6	limited benefits, what's there to reconcile?
7	THE COURT: Folks who were	7	MR. KRISLOV: If the benefits of
8		8	
9	participants in the program before that date.	9	the
	MR. KRISLOV: Participants in their	10	THE COURT: If the benefits are time
10	pension fund.		limited, and the City can do if I'm right, and the
11	THE COURT: That's what I meant.	11	City can do whatever they want with regard to that,
12	MR. KRISLOV: They are the ones who	12	including nothing as of December 31st, 2013, and
13	are protected for, and the benefit that's protected	13	give no extensions they did but then what's
14	is the annuitant healthcare plan.	14	there to reconcile after 2013?
15	THE COURT: I understand.	15	MR. KRISLOV: If the rates are not
16	MR. KRISLOV: That's what's protected.	16	reflective what they said is they do a ballpark.
17	And that's why, for those people who are the bulk of	17	They do an estimate based on the same reports the
18	the people if you said we would grant an injun	18	same estimate that they've done in the past. The
19	we can grant a preliminary injunction only for those	19	rates they're charging them are excessive. They're
20	people whose hire date precedes August 23rd of '89,	20	more than would be done if they did the rates in an
21	for preliminary injunction purposes, that's fine.	21	audited, reconciled fashion.
22	And the Funds can't tell you that	22	The rates that they want to impose are
23	that's a prob all that you have to do is tell the	23	suspect as it is. The City says and the City
24	Funds that they are not to withhold at the higher	24	artfully changed things from at least 50 percent
	Funds that they are not to withhold at the higher		artituny changed things nom at least 50 percent
	Page 159		Page 161
1	rates beginning January 1st. That is the sum	1	to or at least 55 percent to as much as 50
1 2	rates beginning January 1st. That is the sum the total sum that you have to do.	1 2	to or at least 55 percent to as much as 50 percent. And it may still be, we don't know the
	the total sum that you have to do.		percent. And it may still be, we don't know the
2	the total sum that you have to do. The other thing is that the City	2	percent. And it may still be, we don't know the legitimacy of the rates, but based on the past, the
2 3	the total sum that you have to do. The other thing is that the City cannot just pick I told you, I argued that the	2 3	percent. And it may still be, we don't know the legitimacy of the rates, but based on the past, the future rates are no more reliable than the past ones.
2 3 4	the total sum that you have to do. The other thing is that the City cannot just pick I told you, I argued that the City cannot just pick which among those people it	2 3 4	percent. And it may still be, we don't know the legitimacy of the rates, but based on the past, the future rates are no more reliable than the past ones. The bottom line to most of this is
2 3 4 5	the total sum that you have to do. The other thing is that the City cannot just pick I told you, I argued that the City cannot just pick which among those people it will honor under Article 13, Section 5 between the	2 3 4 5	percent. And it may still be, we don't know the legitimacy of the rates, but based on the past, the future rates are no more reliable than the past ones. The bottom line to most of this is that for the pre-August 23, '89 hires, they have a
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41 (Pages 158 to 161)

	Page 162		Page 164
1 '	the old expression.	1	appropriate. Whoever can appeal at that time can
2	MR. KRISLOV: I think that that's what	2	appeal. But for the moment, the City can hold off on
3	that guy said.	3	raising the rates, because it can always get the
4	THE COURT: That's what he said.	4	money back from the retirees.
5	MR. KRISLOV: But the bottom line,	5	As I understand it, the Funds assert
6	Your Honor, is that in terms of until this Court	6	there's no limitation period on correcting the amount
7		7	that they withhold from people.
8	decides the merits of the issue, and we have until January to file our amended complaint, which I	8	All that we need to do and some of
9	believe will address everything fine, for the time	9	
10		10	these people have had massive increases some of
11	being, we ask that you hold the City off in	10	the increases are such that their premium is more
12	increasing the rates.	12	than their annuity. And for others, they're paying
	All that we're talking about is		as much as \$26,000 for family coverage. That's a lot
13	delaying the City's imposition of these new rates for	13	of money.
14	a few months until this Court deals with the issue on	14	And having to forego your family
15	the merits. If Your Honor doesn't agree with me on	15	coverage, or having to go with a lesser plan in which
16	everything today, it's not necessary, but we	16	none of your doctors are in I mean, what they've
17	certainly have created a fair question. And there's	17	testified to is the networks you can go in with
18	nothing, really, in the City's equities to say that	18	these the Choice plan you know, everything, if
19	holding them off for a couple of months until you	19	there's a fairness statute, you know who things are
20	decide what the merits are so we can get it teed up	20	being done to. If there's a choice statute, you know
21	for them to appeal or us to appeal, whatever	21	that you're reducing your choices. They have bee
22	THE COURT: Well, if it's only a	22	taken out of the plan. You no longer have a network,
23	couple of months, and if they can be made whole by	23	Northshore, Northwestern, University of Chicago,
24	money with interest, only a couple months, why is	24	Rush, Advocate. If you take those out, you may have
	Page 163		Page 165
1	damages at law not adequate to your clients, and,	1	a few nice hospitals, but you have eliminated the
2	thereby, as a matter of law, say that an injunction	2	bulk of the medical care that is done by the premier
3	should not issue?	3	institutions in the Chicago area.
4	MR. KRISLOV: Because going without	4	And so when you balance the equities,
5	your City coverage and of all the plans that	5	who's undergoing a hardship? Not for the City. The
6	people may prefer to keep their City coverage live,	6	City just has to put off its phaseout for another
7	going without your City coverage, is irreparable	7	couple or three months. For the retirees, for the
8	injury. And it isn't even and for those people	8	participants in the plan, they have real risk. They
9	that go off, they won't be addressed retrospectively.	9	have real life, human experiences that the City
10	They'll only be addressed prospectively if they come	10	doesn't.
11	back.	11	As I've said, Your Honor, the retirees
12	There is no and giving them	12	only have the Illinois Constitution and this Court.
13	refunding them the additional amounts if they're gone	13	And so for the time being, we ask this Court to hold
14	is no replacement. And refunding it with interest	14	the City off in raising its rates January 1st.
15	doesn't replace the risk, the fear of having to go	15	THE COURT: Thanks.
16	without your health insurance that you depend on.	16	MR. KRISLOV: Thank you, Your Honor.
17	These people are, for the most part,	17	THE COURT: Mr. Prendergast, may I
18	we're talking about 22,000, or the bulk of them, who	18	start with a question to you, or you start with a
19	are retirees. Their health is not great. The older	19	question for me.
20	they get, the older they are, the sicker they get in	20	MR. PRENDERGAST: I'm happy to answer
21	numbers. And so between the balance of equities, is	21	any questions.
22	it fairer to say to the City, hold off for a few	22	THE COURT: I'm rereading my opinion
23			
	months. We'll get this worked in whatever way we	23	of December 3rd, and I read that before the federal
24	months. We'll get this worked in whatever way we think whatever way the Court deems to be	23 24	of December 3rd, and I read that before the federal district court, page five, the plaintiffs filed their

42 (Pages 162 to 165)

	Page 166		Page 168
1	amended complaint which identified the four putative	1	centers on the fact that those retirees, you have to
2	subclasses of plaintiffs, the Korshak subclass, those	2	be relying on the '83 and '85 amendments.
3	retiring prior to December 31st, 1987; the Window	3	THE COURT: I'm talking about the
4	subclass, those retiring between January 1st, 1988,	4	hirees, not the retirees.
5	and August 23rd, 1989; and the third subclass was	5	MR. PRENDERGAST: Yeah, they're hired
6	subclass 3. And that was any participant who	6	but, at that point, the '83 and '85 amendments are
7	contributed to any of the four Funds before	7	the amendments in place.
8	August 23rd, 1989's, amendments to the Pension	8	THE COURT: Yes. We are relying on
9	Codes forget the fourth one for a second which	9	those.
10	would encompass the class of folks that Mr. Krislov	10	MR. PRENDERGAST: And for purposes of
11	just referred to as the hirees, anyone who was hired	11	the '83 and '85 amendments, the one thing that
12	before August 23rd, 1989, because they would have	12	counsel has conceded, at least ten times, including
13	been a participant, a participant who contributed	13	this morning, is that they're not relying on the '83
14	before that date.	14	and '89 [SIC] amendments, because for good reason
15	You then go to my opinion at page ten,	15	I'll give two reasons. One is the '83 and '89
16	and I say the 1983 and '85 amendments were in effect	16	amendments don't impose any obligation on the City.
17	when the Korshak subclass, the Window subclass, and	17	We've talked about that.
18	the subclass 3 entered into the Funds' retirement	18	THE COURT: '83 and '85.
19	system. That means the hirees that Mr. Krislov	19	MR. PRENDERGAST: '83 and '85, I'm
20	referred to.	20	sorry, don't impose any obligation on the City.
21	The '83 and '85 amendments were in	21	And, two, because even if they did
22	effect when the hirees entered into the Funds'	22	and this is where I'd kind of like to start. Even if
23	retirement system as participants before August	23	they did, the amount that the City would pay under
24	23rd, 1989, and I wrote:	24	the 2016 plan is greater than the amount that the
	Page 167		Page 169

1	[AS READ:	1	City would pay under either the '83 or '85
2	There does not appear to be any		amendments. The amount is greater.
3	dispute between the parties that the amendments		Now, this case is about the pension
4	from '83 and '85 apply to these subclasses.]	4	clause. It is about whether or not there is a
5	That means the hirees. So doesn't	5	diminution, or a reduction, or whatever word we want
6	the these are lifetime benefits I held, according	6	to use, in a pension benefit. We're accepting the
7	to my opinion, through the '83 and '85 amendment,	7	fact that under Kanerva healthcare costs are pension
8	because they were not time limited. And Kanerva	8	benefits.
9	holds that that which is given cannot be diminished	9	But as you mentioned just now in your
10	or impaired.	10	conversation with Mr. Krislov, rights must using
11	Doesn't that mean that the City cannot	11	your words, rights must be specifically granted in
12	diminish or impair any benefits that enure to the	12	order to be protected.
13	benefit, for lack of another word, of the hirees	13	So if the rights that they were
14	before August 23rd, 1989?	14	granted are the rights under the '83 and '85
15	In other words, doesn't that mean that	15	amendments, in other words, if we lose our motion to
16	Mr. Krislov is absolutely right, that with regard to	16	reconsider, so I'm not going there right now
17	his request for a preliminary injunction, it should	17	THE COURT: But it is inextricably
18	issue with regard to raising the subsidies, the rates	18	bound with his request for the issuance of
19	to be charged these folks, including the folks of the	19	preliminary injunction, so you can go there if you
20	hirees, the people who entered as participants into	20	want.
21	the Funds' retirement system before August 23rd,	21	MR. PRENDERGAST: And I will, with my
22	1989?	22	prepared remarks.
23	That's my question.	23	But to answer your question, and
24	MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, the answer	24	jumping a little bit ahead of them, the '83 and '85

43 (Pages 166 to 169)

	Page 170		Page 172
1 '	amendments require the City to pay less than the	1	to pay, whether it's the City or the Funds, paid \$55
2	2016, okay? Therefore, there is no diminution.	2	for the firemen and police officers who were
3	There is no reduction. You cannot	3	non-Medicare, and \$21 for those that were Medicare.
4	THE COURT: So you're saying that	4	And under the '85 amendment for labor and for
5	assuming Mr. Krislov is right, and all hirees before	5	municipal, it was \$25 a head across the board.
6	August 23rd, 1989, are included as participants,	6	THE COURT: Regardless of Medicare or
7		7	c
8	and their right to receive paid benefits for	8	not.
9	healthcare is immutable, it cannot be diminished or	9	MR. PRENDERGAST: Exactly, right.
10	impaired, you're saying that, nevertheless, it is	10	Okay. That amount is considerably
	subject to the terms of the '83 or '85 amendments, is		less than what the City paid in 2015 and what's
11	that correct?	11	considerably less than what the City will pay in
12	MR. PRENDERGAST: That's correct.	12	2016. Therefore, the City is paying more in 2016
13	THE COURT: In terms of the amount	13	than under the only possible statutory bases that
14	that the City has to pay?	14	they can rely upon for a diminution or reduction in
15	MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes, because that's	15	pension benefits.
16	the statutory basis. And I'm going to jump around	16	If they're paying if the City is
17	here a little bit from my prepared remarks, because I	17	paying more they're paying more than they used to
18	really think it's important to go to this.	18	pay, then that's not a diminishment in what the City
19	We are talking about the diminution or	19	is contributing. It is an enhancement of what the
20	reduction in a pension benefit.	20	City is contributing. There's no way you can do the
21	So you have to look at '83 and '85 and	21	math any other way.
22	say what were they. In '83, the police department	22	THE COURT: Explain that to me again.
23	THE COURT: You mean what was that	23	MR. PRENDERGAST: Sure. I'm a
24	which was granted?	24	fireman. I'm 1986. We're going to use this I got
	Page 171		Page 173
1	-		_
1	MR. PRENDERGAST: What was it that the	1	hired in 1986. We're using "hire." That's what he
2	City was required to do, or what anybody was	2	wants to use. I'm hired in 1986.
3	required. City wasn't required to do anything under	3	I say I've got pension benefits. My
4	the '83 amendment or the '85 amendment.	4	pension benefits include healthcare. I say, what
5	But let's just use the numbers. Let's	5	makes you think so? The answer is 1983. They passed
6	suppose that you hold that the City does have	6	a statute. I'm entitled for the City the argument
7	obligations to do what the '83 and '85 amendments	7	being for the City rather than the Funds, but we'll
8	require. I don't think that is correct, but that's	8	stay with that. I'm entitled for the City to pay \$55
9	okay. Let's assume that.	9	because I'm not on Medicare. The City has to
10	THE COURT: I've already said that.	10	contribute \$55 a month. The City contributes a lot
11	MR. PRENDERGAST: Under the '83	11	more in 2016 than \$55 dollars a month.
12	amendment, the City of Chicago had to contribute \$55	12	So for purposes of a preliminary
13	for police and fire who were not Medicare I'm	13	injunction, that is one that pertains to only 2016,
14	sorry, the Funds. The Funds had to do that. But,	14	the City is now paying more than it would have had to
15	again, I'm only assuming for purposes of argument	15	pay under the 1993 amendment to the Pension Code.
16	THE COURT: Take for the sake of	16	Consequently, there is there cannot be a
17	argument the truth of what I said in my opinion, that	17	diminution in the benefit
18	the Funds are an instrumentality of the City, and	18	THE COURT: So there's no reason for
19	there's really no substantive difference between the	19	the issuance of a preliminary injunction
20	two. So it's the City that had to do it. Take that	20	MR. PRENDERGAST: Absolutely.
21	as granted.	21	THE COURT: with regard to those
22	•		•
	MR. PRENDERGAST: Right So we're	22	now raised rates relative to the '83 or '85 because
23	MR. PRENDERGAST: Right. So we're working in that framework for purposes of my answer.	22 23	now raised rates relative to the '83 or '85, because it's no harm no foul vis a vis the ratirees
23 24	working in that framework for purposes of my answer.		it's no harm, no foul, vis-a-vis the retirees.
		23	

44 (Pages 170 to 173)

	Page 174		Page 176
¹ basis that can be cited, and, obviousl	v. it can't be	¹ reaction is no good act goes unpunished	d.
² the later statutes because it's time lim		² THE COURT: Well, that's ab	
³ only basis, statutory basis, and there		3 true. But here's another one. A deal's a	
⁴ for the healthcare right is the '85 stat		⁴ MR. PRENDERGAST: Okay	y. So let's talk
⁵ '83 statute if you're a fireman or polic		5 about the deal. What was the deal? We	
⁶ getting more now from the City than	you got back	⁶ benefits to a specific date, no magic abo	out it, the
⁷ then. There can be no diminution.		⁷ end of 2013. We will then wean you of	ff this process
⁸ We've covered that as clear	ly as we	⁸ over a period of four years, through 201	16, each year,
⁹ can in our response to his request for	preliminary	⁹ each step down being time limited.	
¹⁰ injunctive relief. He hasn't given us	much of an	¹⁰ Each one, the 2013 limitation	ended in
¹¹ answer. But his answer seems to be,	well, that's not	¹ 2013, next 2014, 2015, 2016. They're a	all time
¹² what Kanerva holds. You don't have	to just look at	² limited. There's absolutely no difference	ce
¹³ Pension Code. Kanerva makes it cle	ar. You don't	³ THE COURT: What about	I'm not
¹⁴ look at just the Pension Code.		⁴ talking about the folks who entered into	the system
¹⁵ That's true. Kanerva wasn't	t based on	⁵ during those time limiteds. I'm talking	about the
¹⁶ the Pension Code. What happened in	n Kanerva was, the	⁶ folks who entered into the system befor	e they went
¹⁷ state argued that if it's not in the Pens	sion Code,	⁷ into effect.	
¹⁸ there's no entitlement. And the court	said, not so.	⁸ MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, y	yeah, and so am
¹⁹ There's another statute. And that oth	er statute was	⁹ I. I'm talking about	
²⁰ the Group Health Insurance Act.		THE COURT: Let's just talk	about
And under the Group Healt	h Insurance	those folks. Everybody in class 1, 2, ar	nd 3 being
²² Act, that's the act under which they w		the miles, mose who participated in the	e system
²³ the state employees, were entitled to		prior to August 2510, 1969, you gave u	iem benefits,
²⁴ benefits. There was a statutory basis	2.	benefits as stated in those statutes. You	1 chose to

	Page 175		Page 177
1	So the Supreme Court said, we don't	1	increase them. And as you said, no good benefit goes
2	care if it's in the Pension Code. There's another	2	unpunished.
3	statute here. Well, here, there isn't another	3	Was that not immutable?
4	statute. The only statute for the people we're	4	MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, no.
5	talking about here is the '83 and the '85 statute.	5	THE COURT: Why not?
6	And it, number one, in our view, doesn't apply to the	6	MR. PRENDERGAST: Because they were
7	City of Chicago. But if it did impose obligations on	7	time limited. In the middle of 2013, the limitation
8	the City of Chicago, those obligations are far less	8	on the extension was the end of 2013.
9	than what the City is doing now. Therefore, there	9	THE COURT: Can you time limit
10	can be no diminution, and, therefore, there cannot be	10	something that's been given for life? Can you just
11	a preliminary injunction.	11	change in midstream I understand why the City
12	THE COURT: Understood, your position.	12	wants to. No one loves the City more than me or any
13	Let me ask you a question, and getting	13	of these folks here, I assume. No one wants the City
14	more to the core and the substance.	14	to be destitute. We all know what's going on. We
15	Mr. Krislov has said that that may be,	15	all know what the cause of it is, and we're all
16	but you've given, and you've given without for	16	looking for an answer. And I do understand that.
17	these '83, '85 participants, including the hirees,	17	But when you've given something for
18	you've given more than those enactments require, and	18	life, as you acknowledge has been given forget the
19	because they're not time limited at creation, it was	19	numbers. This is what Mr. Krislov's point is.
20	something you just gave, and you cannot take away	20	Forget the numbers. You gave the benefits for life.
21	that which you've already given at the levels that	21	Can you now take them away?
22	you've given it.	22	MR. PRENDERGAST: We didn't give them
23	What's your response?	23	benefits for life.
24	MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, my gut	24	THE COURT: There's no time

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1	-	
2	limitations in the '83 and '85 statutes.	THE COOKT. They ie subject to the
	MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, those benefits?	conditions that were stated in the 65 and 65
3	THE COURT: Yes. That's the ones I'm	statute. Everyone agrees about that. There are no
4	talking about.	⁴ time limitations on those benefits. So how can you
5	MR. PRENDERGAST: My point is, if	⁵ start weaning them off something about which there
6	that's the benefits Your Honor, time and again,	⁶ were no time limitations?
7	they've said the '83 and '85 amendments don't apply	⁷ MR. PRENDERGAST: We didn't wean them
8	to them. Do you know why? The '83 and '85	⁸ off of that, Your Honor. We weaned them off of what
9	amendments they don't want the '83 and '85	⁹ they were paid under the settlement statute that
10	amendments.	¹⁰ ended in 2013. We're paying them more than 1983 and
11	THE COURT: Because they don't want to	¹¹ 1985. We don't have to wean them off of that. For
12	be stuck at lower amounts.	¹² 2016, we're paying more than we're required to by
13	MR. PRENDERGAST: Not only do they not	¹³ statute, under the '83 and '85 statutes, if you hold
14	want to be stuck at the lower amount, they know they	¹⁴ us accountable to the '83 and '85 statutes.
15	have no constitutional claim if you're relying on the	¹⁵ THE COURT: Let's assume I hold you
16	'83 and '85, because the City pays less under the '83	¹⁶ accountable for the subclass 1, 2, and 3. That
17	and '85 amendments than it's going to pay for 2015.	¹⁷ means, as I was discussing with Mr. Krislov, the
18	We're now in 2015. They're seeking an injunction for	¹⁸ hirees before August 23rd, 1989. And they're in the
19	2016, where the City's going to pay more than the '83	¹⁹ Korshak class and the Windows class.
20	and '85 amendments would require the City to pay.	²⁰ What do you owe them?
21	That can't be a diminution, period.	²¹ MR. PRENDERGAST: Korshak and Windows
22	THE COURT: Okay. So let's get to the	²² are classes 1 and 2.
23	answer to my question.	²³ THE COURT: Yes. Class 3 is everyone
24	By giving it to them, how can you take	²⁴ who participated before August 23.
	Page 179	Page 181
1	it away?	¹ MR. PRENDERGAST: That's what they
2	MR. PRENDERGAST: Because, for the	² say, so
3	very reason that part of the your question said time	³ THE COURT: Yes, that's what they say.
4	limited, and that's why I said they weren't. They	⁴ But that's what we're dealing with.
5	were not time limited. They had six they were	⁵ MR. PRENDERGAST: Your opinion is
6	extended by six months, and six months only, to the	⁶ still otherwise, but we're not going to get into
7	end of 2013.	⁷ revisiting it. Let's stay with one and two for a
8	And then they announced that they were	⁸ minute.
9	going to go through three years or four years of	⁹ What else has the City done that it's
10	stages of reductions for the very reason that Ms.	¹⁰ now apparently being punished for?
11	Holt testified to, and that is, they wanted to give	¹¹ Korshak and Windows class members,
12	people a time to wean off of this and get into the	¹² have been extended lifetime healthcare by the City.
13	Affordable Care Act and give them an opportunity.	¹³ THE COURT: Yes.
14	THE COURT: How can you wean people	¹⁴ MR. PRENDERGAST: Okay. They're gone.
15	off of something that they've been given for life?	¹⁵ They're taken care of. There's no injunction you
10		1 $1 $ $1 $ $1 $ $1 $ $1 $ $1 $ 1
16		
	MR. PRENDERGAST: It wasn't given for	¹⁶ have to enter for them. They're going to get
16	MR. PRENDERGAST: It wasn't given for life.	 have to enter for them. They're going to get lifetime healthcare for that's what they asked for
16 17	MR. PRENDERGAST: It wasn't given for life. THE COURT: In '83 and '85, those	 have to enter for them. They're going to get lifetime healthcare for that's what they asked for them. They cannot use a settlement statute that was
16 17 18	MR. PRENDERGAST: It wasn't given for life. THE COURT: In '83 and '85, those participants.	 have to enter for them. They're going to get lifetime healthcare for that's what they asked for them. They cannot use a settlement statute that was time limited as a basis for a diminution claim,
16 17 18 19	MR. PRENDERGAST: It wasn't given for life. THE COURT: In '83 and '85, those participants. MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, no.	 have to enter for them. They're going to get lifetime healthcare for that's what they asked for them. They cannot use a settlement statute that was time limited as a basis for a diminution claim, because, as you held, when it was time limited, the
16 17 18 19 20	MR. PRENDERGAST: It wasn't given for life. THE COURT: In '83 and '85, those participants. MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, no. THE COURT: Let's keep our eye on the	 have to enter for them. They're going to get lifetime healthcare for that's what they asked for them. They cannot use a settlement statute that was time limited as a basis for a diminution claim, because, as you held, when it was time limited, the rights under that statute ended, so you have to go
16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. PRENDERGAST: It wasn't given for life. THE COURT: In '83 and '85, those participants. MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, no. THE COURT: Let's keep our eye on the ball. I'm talking about subclass 1, 2, and 3, those	 have to enter for them. They're going to get lifetime healthcare for that's what they asked for them. They cannot use a settlement statute that was time limited as a basis for a diminution claim, because, as you held, when it was time limited, the rights under that statute ended, so you have to go back to '83 and '85.
16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. PRENDERGAST: It wasn't given for life. THE COURT: In '83 and '85, those participants. MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, no. THE COURT: Let's keep our eye on the ball. I'm talking about subclass 1, 2, and 3, those who began as participants before August 23rd, 1989.	 have to enter for them. They're going to get lifetime healthcare for that's what they asked for them. They cannot use a settlement statute that was time limited as a basis for a diminution claim, because, as you held, when it was time limited, the rights under that statute ended, so you have to go back to '83 and '85. When you go back to '83 and '85, you
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. PRENDERGAST: It wasn't given for life. THE COURT: In '83 and '85, those participants. MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, no. THE COURT: Let's keep our eye on the ball. I'm talking about subclass 1, 2, and 3, those	 have to enter for them. They're going to get lifetime healthcare for that's what they asked for them. They cannot use a settlement statute that was time limited as a basis for a diminution claim, because, as you held, when it was time limited, the rights under that statute ended, so you have to go back to '83 and '85.

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	Page 182		Page 184
1 /		1	
1 2	or the Funds were paying less	2	applies to 2016 only. So it's not a question of
3	THE COURT: Than they are now	3	lifetime benefits. It's a question of whether the
4	MR. PRENDERGAST: The numbers are	4	City has to give up \$30 million that is appropriated
5	less.	5	
6	THE COURT: under the time limited	6	THE COURT: I understand.
7	enactments.	7	MR. PRENDERGAST: for 2016. And in
8	MR. PRENDERGAST: So there's no	8	this case, the City's the amount the City would
9	diminution.	9	pay under the '83 and '85 amendments is so much less
10	THE COURT: Does that then, also then	10	than what it's going to pay for 2016, that there's
10	apply to the subclass 3?	11	nothing to enjoin. That's our position with respect
12	MR. PRENDERGAST: It would apply to	12	to that.
12	any retiree that claims a diminution of healthcare	13	So it's really much more, Judge, in my
13	benefits.	14	opinion, a question of put in that context. That
	THE COURT: Well, I'm asking	14	is a question of which class is covered or not.
15	specifically. Is it your position that applies to		We're at a preliminary injunction stage. They have
16	the hirees, people who were hired and participated in	16	to prove everything necessary for preliminary
17	the program, and may still be working, before	17 18	injunction.
18	August 23rd, 1989?		THE COURT: Well, but,
19	MR. PRENDERGAST: A person who, in	19	Mr. Prendergast, Mr. Krislov has just acknowledged,
20	this case, it's brought on behalf of the retirees, so	20	or conceded earlier today, that the post-hirees,
21	let's stay with retirees if I could.	21	post-August 23rd, 1989, hirees would not be included
22	THE COURT: Yes, who was hired before	22	in his request for a preliminary injunction because
23	August 23rd, 1898 and retired thereafter.	23	they're not entitled to anything.
24	MR. PRENDERGAST: Retired thereafter.	24	MR. PRENDERGAST: It doesn't say that
	Page 183		Page 185
1		1	_
2	Okay. What are they entitled to? The only statute	2	in his papers, I must say.
3	that applies to them is the '83 and '85 statute.	3	THE COURT: Well, I understand. But
4	THE COURT: Are those the benefits	4	he argued that today, if we accept my version of what
5	you're giving for the lifetimes of the class 1, class	5	the law is vis-a-vis Kanerva, with that exception,
6	2 folks, those same benefits?	6	which, by the way, I'm accepting, he acknowledged
7	MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, for purposes	7	that if I'm right on that, then the post-August 23rd,
8	of the preliminary injunction, we're only dealing		1989 class has no ascertainable claim of relief.
	with 2016. For the purpose as this case proceeds,	8	They have no standing to complain, because they're
9 10	you're going to hear a lot of evidence going a lot of	9	not covered. So that's done. I accept that.
	different ways. A lot of arguments about whether you	10	MR. PRENDERGAST: Maybe one and two is
11 12	can stop altogether at 2016, or whether you have to $11 + 102 = 105$	11	done.
12	pay the '83 or '85 benefits.	12	THE COURT: So now we're just dealing
	Although I must say to you, Judge, if	13	with the hirees.
14 15	all they're looking for is the '83 and '85 benefits,	14	MR. PRENDERGAST: We're just dealing
15	this case isn't going to last very long.	15	with people who
± 0		16	THE COURT: Who were part of the
17	THE COURT: From your mouth.	1.5	
17	MR. PRENDERGAST: To God's ears. And	17	program, who participated in the program before
18	MR. PRENDERGAST: To God's ears. And they're clearly not. They are running away from '83	18	program, who participated in the program before August 23rd, 1989.
18 19	MR. PRENDERGAST: To God's ears. And they're clearly not. They are running away from '83 and '85 at record speed. They've done everything	18 19	program, who participated in the program before August 23rd, 1989. And it seems to me your argument is
18 19 20	MR. PRENDERGAST: To God's ears. And they're clearly not. They are running away from '83 and '85 at record speed. They've done everything they can to tell you that's not where they're going,	18 19 20	program, who participated in the program before August 23rd, 1989. And it seems to me your argument is that a preliminary injunction should ensue vis-a-vis
18 19 20 21	MR. PRENDERGAST: To God's ears. And they're clearly not. They are running away from '83 and '85 at record speed. They've done everything they can to tell you that's not where they're going, and the reason is because it doesn't get them	18 19 20 21	program, who participated in the program before August 23rd, 1989. And it seems to me your argument is that a preliminary injunction should ensue vis-a-vis those at least so your argument is, it should be
18 19 20 21 22	MR. PRENDERGAST: To God's ears. And they're clearly not. They are running away from '83 and '85 at record speed. They've done everything they can to tell you that's not where they're going, and the reason is because it doesn't get them anywhere.	18 19 20 21 22	program, who participated in the program before August 23rd, 1989. And it seems to me your argument is that a preliminary injunction should ensue vis-a-vis those at least so your argument is, it should be granted in part, denied in part, but it should be
18 19 20 21 22 23	MR. PRENDERGAST: To God's ears. And they're clearly not. They are running away from '83 and '85 at record speed. They've done everything they can to tell you that's not where they're going, and the reason is because it doesn't get them anywhere. And so but for purposes of a	18 19 20 21 22 23	program, who participated in the program before August 23rd, 1989. And it seems to me your argument is that a preliminary injunction should ensue vis-a-vis those at least so your argument is, it should be granted in part, denied in part, but it should be granted vis-a-vis those folks to the extent of the
18 19 20 21 22	MR. PRENDERGAST: To God's ears. And they're clearly not. They are running away from '83 and '85 at record speed. They've done everything they can to tell you that's not where they're going, and the reason is because it doesn't get them anywhere.	18 19 20 21 22	program, who participated in the program before August 23rd, 1989. And it seems to me your argument is that a preliminary injunction should ensue vis-a-vis those at least so your argument is, it should be granted in part, denied in part, but it should be

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1 '	'85 amendments, yes?	1	Judge, I do think that
2	MR. PRENDERGAST: No. The reason is	2	THE COURT: That's why throughout your
3	because this is an injunction for 2016. There's no	3	brief, you argue in the alternative, that even if the
4	need for an injunction because they're going to get	4	City's implicated in this, or part of this and I
5	more	5	understand.
6	THE COURT: Because they're going to	6	MR. PRENDERGAST: And I have to argue
7	get that anyway.	7	in the alternative until we get past that point.
8	MR. PRENDERGAST: That's right.	8	THE COURT: Of course you do.
9	THE COURT: At least at this point.	9	MR. PRENDERGAST: But I have to say
10	MR. PRENDERGAST: At this point,	10	that it's been my experience that parties are held to
11	they're going to get that.	11	their pleadings, and they are held to what they say,
12	THE COURT: But in the end, there's a	12	especially when they say it time and time again.
13	claim that those even those benefits are going to	13	So they have said that the '83 and '85
14	be extinguished.	14	amendments don't apply, and we all know, there has to
15	MR. PRENDERGAST: And in the end, at	15	be a statutory basis. Even under Kanerva, there was
16	the end of 2016, they may be back here, if necessary,	16	a statute that the Supreme Court relied upon, because
17	talking about an injunction if it's needed	17	it's got to come from some basis, either a contract,
18	THE COURT: To prevent that from	18	or it's got to come from a statute.
19	happening.	19	And the contract claim is out on your
20	MR. PRENDERGAST: Yeah, but that's not	20	ruling. And by the way, I know Mr. Krislov has said
21	today. And by the way, Judge, I expect, based upon	21	on several occasions here, something one thing or
22	your remarks the last time we were here, and based	22	another is going to be in his amended complaint.
23	upon my assessment of what's got to be done in this	23	That's not the complaint that's before the Court
24	case, this case is going to be over before 2016.	24	right now. That's the complaint we're dealing with
	Page 187		Page 189
1	THE COURT: Once again, from your	1	for preliminary injunction purposes.
2	mouth.	2	So let me go to some of this has
3	MR. PRENDERGAST: Yeah, right. But, I	3	been covered, but if I could go to what I expected to
4	mean, you know, there will be some discovery, I	4	talk about maybe I'll be redundant, but that's the
5	suppose, and there will be motions and the like.	5	lawyer's prerogative, especially when you give them
6	But we're not talking preliminary	6	unlimited time.
7	injunction motions. Preliminary injunction motions	7	Under the Pension Code, pension
8	are to address an immediate need, and there is no	8	benefits cannot be impaired or diminished. We all
9	immediate need.	9	agree on that. That's understood. Under Kanerva,
10	THE COURT: I understand.	10	retiree healthcare benefits can be pension benefits,
11	MR. PRENDERGAST: Mike points out, I	11	as long as, like any other benefits, they are created
12	think something I thought was implicit in my remarks,	12	by statute or contract. We're good with that. We're
13	and that is, remember, please, this preliminary	13	not trying to revisit you we don't want you to
14 15	injunction that they're seek is against the City, and	14 15	revisit Kanerva on the central issue of Kanerva,
16	they concede that the '83 and '85 amendments don't	16	which is can healthcare benefits be pension benefits.
17	apply to the City.	17	The Supreme Court's answered that question for us.
18	THE COURT: Well, that's true. They	18	The plaintiffs' contract claim, that's
19	concede that. It's really an interesting case. They concede that.	19	been dismissed. It was dismissed by the district court. It's been dismissed by this Court.
20	But, I held that the Funds are an	20	Plaintiffs' have not asked you to reconsider that
21	instrumentality of the City. So from my point of	21	ruling, even in argument today.
22	view, the City's in it. That's my ruling, which you	22	The plaintiffs' reliance on the
23	want me to revisit.	23	McDonough affidavit and deposition and the Kordeck
24	MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, you know,	24	affidavit from back 30 years ago was raised before

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	Tage 190		Tage 192
1 '	you made your ruling, and you still held that doesn't	1	In terms of the likelihood of success
2	establish the basis for a contractual claim. The	2	on the merits, at least for purposes of preliminary
3	materials, of course, were before you when you	3	injunction, since they're getting more on their 2016
4	dismissed the contract.	4	plan, 2016 plans than they would ever get under the
5	Plaintiffs cannot claim a likelihood	5	'83 and '85 amendments, they can't possibly show a
6	of success on the merits, on the limited settlement	6	basis for a success on the merits under the '83 and
7		7	'85 plan.
8	statutes, because you have ruled on that as well and	8	
9	dismissed those counts. So that argument about	9	And, therefore, on that ground alone,
10	success on the merits goes out.	10	and they have to satisfy all the criteria, on that
	I do want to emphasize, by the way,		ground alone, the motion for preliminary injunction
11	that that first requirement is a requirement for them	11	has to be denied.
12	to establish a likelihood of success on the merits.	12	As we pointed out, this is their sixth
13	It is not a requirement just to establish that	13	attempt to get a preliminary injunction with respect
14	they've stated a claim.	14	to this phaseout program.
15	Mr. Krislov has a habit, and I'm not	15	Mr counsel states that, well, the
16	being pejorative, but he does have a habit of	16	previous ones all involved a finding that the pension
17	characterizing every denial of a motion to dismiss as	17	benefits were not I'm sorry healthcare benefits
18	if he's won the case. That's not the case here. He	18	are not pension benefits, and Kanerva reversed all
19	has to establish, for purposes of preliminary	19	that, but that's not correct. There's been all of
20	injunction, a likelihood of success on the merits.	20	the arguments that he's making now were made in all
21	And the contract claim can't do it.	21	of those motions for preliminary injunctive relief.
22	The time limited statutes can't do it. The estoppel	22	And no one parsed out that, well, maybe you'll win on
23	claim can't do it, because since you have dismissed	23	some other ground.
24	them, they can't possibly establish a likelihood of	24	But the point is, we're here today.
	them, they can't possibly establish a fixelihood of		But the point is, we re here today.
	Page 191		Page 193
1	success on the merits. So that leaves the	1	-
1 2	success on the merits. So that leaves the	1 2	We're here on this motion for preliminary injunction.
	success on the merits. So that leaves the constitutional claim, which was Count 1.		We're here on this motion for preliminary injunction. I don't mean to suggest the last five or six times
2	success on the merits. So that leaves the constitutional claim, which was Count 1. And so what he has to establish is if	2	We're here on this motion for preliminary injunction. I don't mean to suggest the last five or six times that he's lost sets precedent, but it is getting to
2 3	success on the merits. So that leaves the constitutional claim, which was Count 1. And so what he has to establish is if there's been a diminution or impairment of pension	2 3	We're here on this motion for preliminary injunction. I don't mean to suggest the last five or six times that he's lost sets precedent, but it is getting to be habit for him.
2 3 4	success on the merits. So that leaves the constitutional claim, which was Count 1. And so what he has to establish is if there's been a diminution or impairment of pension benefits. And if he doesn't have a likelihood of	2 3 4	We're here on this motion for preliminary injunction. I don't mean to suggest the last five or six times that he's lost sets precedent, but it is getting to be habit for him. I've talked about why the '83 and '85
2 3 4 5	success on the merits. So that leaves the constitutional claim, which was Count 1. And so what he has to establish is if there's been a diminution or impairment of pension benefits. And if he doesn't have a likelihood of success on that one, and he talked about summary	2 3 4 5	We're here on this motion for preliminary injunction. I don't mean to suggest the last five or six times that he's lost sets precedent, but it is getting to be habit for him. I've talked about why the '83 and '85 amendments don't apply. Talked about it doesn't make
2 3 4 5 6	success on the merits. So that leaves the constitutional claim, which was Count 1. And so what he has to establish is if there's been a diminution or impairment of pension benefits. And if he doesn't have a likelihood of success on that one, and he talked about summary judgment. But I have to tell you, Judge, if he's not	2 3 4 5 6	We're here on this motion for preliminary injunction. I don't mean to suggest the last five or six times that he's lost sets precedent, but it is getting to be habit for him. I've talked about why the '83 and '85 amendments don't apply. Talked about it doesn't make any difference whether they apply or not. There's no
2 3 4 5 6 7	success on the merits. So that leaves the constitutional claim, which was Count 1. And so what he has to establish is if there's been a diminution or impairment of pension benefits. And if he doesn't have a likelihood of success on that one, and he talked about summary judgment. But I have to tell you, Judge, if he's not relying on the '83 and '85 amendments, that summary	2 3 4 5 6 7	We're here on this motion for preliminary injunction. I don't mean to suggest the last five or six times that he's lost sets precedent, but it is getting to be habit for him. I've talked about why the '83 and '85 amendments don't apply. Talked about it doesn't make any difference whether they apply or not. There's no irreparable harm.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	success on the merits. So that leaves the constitutional claim, which was Count 1. And so what he has to establish is if there's been a diminution or impairment of pension benefits. And if he doesn't have a likelihood of success on that one, and he talked about summary judgment. But I have to tell you, Judge, if he's not relying on the '83 and '85 amendments, that summary judgment motion comes from our side, not his.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	We're here on this motion for preliminary injunction. I don't mean to suggest the last five or six times that he's lost sets precedent, but it is getting to be habit for him. I've talked about why the '83 and '85 amendments don't apply. Talked about it doesn't make any difference whether they apply or not. There's no irreparable harm. And you have raised a very significant
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	5 104	7 100
	Page 194	Page 196
1 '	out. There's 23,000 members of this class. So that	¹ resolved with the cooperation and effort of everyone,
2	concern no longer justifies a preliminary injunction.	² including the Court, and your calendar, to resolve
3	And so now we turn to the one thing	³ this case by September 30th, 2016.
4	that they hammered on in this case, since they filed	⁴ I'm authorized to tell you one other
5	it. They've hammered on the idea that people would	⁵ thing. It's not in that document, but I'm on the
6	have to make choices. That's why this January date	⁶ record as an officer of the court, representing the
7	is critical. People would have to make choices of	 ⁷ City of Chicago.
8	staying in or getting out.	⁸ If at the end of the day they win this
9	But if they get out, and they went to	⁹ case, and then they say but it's January 2017, and
10	one of those lower-priced Affordable Care Act plans,	¹⁰ it's after September, and they say, we won, I want
11	or even one of the premier plans that has all the	¹¹ back in the City plan, they're going to be allowed to
12	bells and whistles you want, they wouldn't be able to	¹² go back in the City plan.
13		go back in the City plan.
14	get back in without an ability to prove insurability.	so this ineparable nami argument they
15	That has been the irreparable harm argument here	have made from the beginning is no longer existent.
	since day one.	All they have to do that gives them all the
16 17	So finally, we decided, you know, that	choices they want. They can stay with the plan, in
	one's got come off the table. We went back to the	the City plan if they want to. They can get but if
18	City, and we said let's revise that. Can you revise	¹⁸ they don't want to. I'm happy you heard the
19	that? Is that impossible? That won't require you to	¹⁹ testimony of witnesses today that Mr. Krislov thought
20	do anything. It won't require the Funds do anything	²⁰ would be helpful to the Court, because I think one
21	in January of 2016 to unscramble the eggs.	thing you should have come away with, I believe, from
22	But it would extend people the	²² that testimony is that the City makes a great deal of
23	opportunity if they become uninsurable because they	²³ effort to deal with its retirees, to put them on
24	have bad health to still come back to the City plan	²⁴ notice of everything from change any changes, any
	Page 195	Page 197
1	if they mented to	¹ options that they have they're fully aware of it
2	if they wanted to.	options that they have, they re fully aware of it.
3	And so the exhibit, which I forget the	They ve got a phone bank feady to answer any
4	number of, and you saw it, which is only dated the	questions that they have.
5	18th of this month. That's when it became official,	And certainly, you know, to the extent
6	but it addresses	that they ask questions of wir. Kristov and he wants
7	THE COURT: It's your Exhibit 6 in	to send mose questions in, the enty is going to
8	your submission.	answer menn.
	MR. PRENDERGAST: That's correct,	⁸ The point is, they have all the basis
9	Judge.	⁹ that they need to make choices. But if they make, in
10	That program now allows people, if	¹⁰ their view, the wrong choice, and they get out of the
11	they leave and they go into an Affordable Care Act	¹¹ City plan, they can get back in. And that has not
12	plan, or any other plan, if for some reason they find	¹² been before you before this. I thought
13	out this wasn't really good for me, this wasn't I	¹³ THE COURT: What limitations are you
14	don't like the deductibles here, I don't like the	¹⁴ putting upon their ability to get back in? You say
15	copay, or whatever their concern is, they can come	¹⁵ you've extended it now, as an officer of the court,
16	back. They can come back anytime between	¹⁶ to at least into 2017. What limitations?
17	September 30th until September 30th of this	¹⁷ MR. PRENDERGAST: The same limitations
18	year, nine months out. And I know you point up when	¹⁸ as are in the plan right now. For example
19	say this.	¹⁹ THE COURT: No, what time limitations?
20	THE COURT: 2016.	²⁰ MR. PRENDERGAST: Oh, I think there
21	MR. PRENDERGAST: 2016.	²¹ will
22	THE COURT: Not this year.	²² THE COURT: Up until the end of this
23	MR. PRENDERGAST: I'm sorry. 2016.	²³ case, whatever that's defined as; isn't that right?
24	-	
	But there's nothing about this case that can't be	²⁴ MR PRENDERGAST: I should clarify
	But there's nothing about this case that can't be	²⁴ MR. PRENDERGAST: I should clarify.

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Page	198
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1	If they win this	¹ that got in. If they want to stand up here when I'm
2	THE COURT: If this goes up the	² through and show it to you, it will surprise both of
3	Supreme Court and takes two or three years, and it	³ us. But that's not there. There has not been a city
4	comes back, and they won, the City is game, yes?	⁴ ordinance that grants healthcare benefits to anyone,
5	MR. PRENDERGAST: The City is game.	⁵ and there's no state statute that does so, with the
6	The City will let them back into the plan, whatever	⁶ possible exception, possible exception, because we
7	the plan is, if there is a plan.	 ⁷ have a motion to reconsider, of the '83 and the '85
8		⁸ amendments to the Pension Code.
9	If they lose the case, they'll say we	amendments to the relision code.
10	have to have a plan. If they win I'm sorry. If	And since the Kanerva case rened upon
10	they win the case, they're going to say, we have to	another statute, there was a statutory basis. The as
12	have a plan, and it's going to be ordered.	this court has said, there has to be. Tou have to
13	If they lose the case, there won't be	have a basis for the claim before the pension clause
	a plan to come back to. Which is one of the reasons	ean protect it. If there's nothing to protect, you
14	that it would be very prudent for those who have a	can't say there's a pension clause, so I get a
15	concern, and I mean the pensioners, to explore, like	¹⁵ pension. That's not how it works. You've got to
16	a lot of people who are in the private sector,	¹⁶ have a basis for doing that.
17	explore the Affordable Care Act.	¹⁷ In terms of the balancing of the
18	Because, as you heard in the testimony	¹⁸ equities, if an injunction is entered requiring the
19	today, there are considerable advantages to the	¹⁹ City to subsidize at the 2015 rates rather than the
20	Affordable Care Act. Counsel points out that there	²⁰ 2016 rates, the cost to the City will be
21	are going to be hospitals that are not covered by the	²¹ approximately \$30 million.
22	Affordable Care Act, and that's true. They can't go	²² That 30 Ms. Holt, I was happy that
23	to Northwestern or Chicago. People in Peoria don't	²³ she was called. I didn't if I had put her on
24	go to Northwestern or Chicago either, generally	²⁴ direct, I would have spent the first five minutes
	Page 199	Page 201
1		
2	speaking. But they have good hospitals in Peoria.	going through her credentials, and they would have
3	Loyola's an excellent hospital. There are a lot of	been impressive. But it's not important, beeause i
4	excellent hospitals that are covered by the	units site s an impressive writess. She knows the
5	Affordable Care Act.	budget. She knows now to balance the budget. She
6	So the idea that they can't get	knows what's happened in the City of Chicago in
7	healthcare I mean, there's a difference between	previous years when they haven't balanced the budget,
8	saying people should be able to get healthcare and	and they ve gone off and sold the Sky way, sold
	saying they should able to get healthcare, forget	parking meters, round other unings to sen in order
9	networks, forgetting limitations on hospitals,	⁹ to raise money.
10	forgetting limitations on doctors that don't want to	¹⁰ The objective now is to get the City
11	provide that healthcare, that's not a constitutional	¹¹ back on a solid footing, fair to the taxpayers, fair
12	claim. That's a beef. That's a political argument.	¹² to the residents of the city in a way that will make
13	That's something they can take to their legislature.	¹³ the city great and keep it from going in the wrong
14	But speaking of the legislature, I do	¹⁴ direction fiscally.
15	want to mention something, because I'll probably	¹⁵ So she explained what goes into the
16	forget to mention it.	¹⁶ budget, and that means we looked at everything. And
17	In their papers, they say that	¹⁷ one of the exhibits they talked about were the cuts
18	Mr. McDonough, in his affidavit or his deposition, I	¹⁸ that they have to make. They aren't only cuts in
19	think it's his deposition, testified that there was a	¹⁹ it isn't just a step down in the amount that they
20	city ordinance that was passed that granted	²⁰ paid to subsidize healthcare. It cuts across the
21	healthcare.	²¹ board. Elimination of positions. Cutting programs.
22	Not only was there no such city	²² I think it's I forget the number
23	ordinance, it's not in his affidavit or in his	²³ \$3- or \$400 million in new real estate taxes were
24	deposition. I don't know where that leaked in, how	²⁴ enacted this year. Other fees were enacted this year
	-	

51 (Pages 198 to 201)

	Page 202	Page 204
1	pursuant to the budget that they passed for 2016 so	¹ income, because if they don't, then they're not going
2	they could balance that budget. \$30 million is an	² to get hit as hard under the Affordable Care Act or
3	imbalance. It's not an imbalance you make up by	³ under the City plan. And, basically, what we were
4	snapping your fingers or flipping a switch. There's	⁴ told is, that's an unreasonable intrusion into their
5	a lot that goes into that, and it may mean cutting	⁵ privacy.
6	300 jobs, or it may mean cutting 150 jobs and \$15	⁶ Well, it's a relevant fact. We'll
7	million worth of programs.	⁷ develop it in the course of discovery in this case to
8	But it is an impact on the taxpayers,	⁸ find out what the real impact is, and we will make
9	on the residents. As she pointed out correctly, when	⁹ our judgments accordingly.
10	you raise taxes, you have to raise taxes across the	¹⁰ But fact of the matter is when you
11	board. There's people up in Lincoln Park that afford	¹¹ balance the availability of lower-priced insurance
12	the tax increase. I can afford a tax increase. I'll	¹² under the Affordable Care Act, the availability of
13	make it. There's lots of people who can't. A lot of	¹³ insurance under the City plans, the lower-level City
14	them are retirees. A lot of people who are going to	¹⁴ plans, against the fiscal hit that the City has for
15	be put to the test of paying the other way in taxes.	¹⁵ the \$30 million adjustment, I think the balance of
16	And so balance that against the	¹⁶ the equities falls in favor of the City.
17	hardship to the retirees. Well, we have before you a	¹⁷ And I know it's more popular to talk
18	fair amount of evidence for a preliminary injunction	¹⁸ about how people on pensions are hurt more, but I'm
19	hearing on the alternatives that the retirees have.	¹⁹ saying to you that when you take \$30 million out,
20	The alternatives would be the Affordable Care Act,	²⁰ everybody gets hurt. Taxpayers get hurt, residents
21	the opportunity to get insurance at lower prices so	²¹ who do not have excess income see their taxes go up
22	they don't have to.	²² even more than the \$347 million, I believe it was, in
23	And in context of the discussion about	²³ new real estate taxes this year, more than the new
24	the breaks you get if you are below the poverty	²⁴ water fees, more than the other new fees that went up
	Page 203	Page 205
1	level, I should say below two and a half times the	¹ this year in order to balance the budget in 2016.
2	poverty level, or on the Affordable Care Act side,	² It's a significant impact.
3	four times the federal poverty level, four times the	³ And, you know, the case law on that,
4	federal poverty level is \$46,500. If you're making	⁴ Your Honor, particularly when you get into the public
5	\$46,500 or less, that's then you get substantial	⁵ sector, is pretty clear that the public harm, the
6	additional breaks under the Affordable Care Act.	⁶ impact of an injunction to the extent that it creates
7	It's only two and a half times, but it	⁷ a public harm, or public burden, has to be considered
8	is two and a half times for the poverty level for the	⁸ by the Court. It's not just a question of, well, why
9	city program, which, you know, if you're making	⁹ don't you write a check for \$30 million.
10	\$30 million, people making less than that.	¹⁰ To a certain extent, in fact, to a
11	One of the things that the witnesses	¹¹ large extent throughout their reply brief, I think
12	were asked here today was, how do you know? You	¹² that's the most important document that they filed,
13	know, how do you know what people are making, you	¹³ they try to as was much the discussion that we had
14	know? Well and the only ones we know are the ones	¹⁴ with counsel, they tried to run away from the ruling
15	that ask for the break, you know, that say, I'm	¹⁵ dismissing most of the case, and now they're down to
16	eligible to pay less.	¹⁶ carving out, trying to carve out some group of class
17	So they send they basically,	¹⁷ members that are maybe part of a class and saying we
18	their entire tax return is not sent to the City. The	¹⁸ should enter an injunction for them.
19	first page, or the summary on the first page gives	¹⁹ But for the same reasons that we've
20	your adjusted gross income is what does it.	²⁰ discussed at length here today, they don't have a
21	So when they provided you with this	²¹ colorable claim under the '83 or '85 statutes.
22	book full of various annuitants' letters and a	²² So they turn to Kanerva, and I just
23	summary they put in the front, we were interested in	²³ discussed Kanerva. Kanerva was based upon the
24	knowing whether or not those annuitants have other	²⁴ statute. There is no statute basis here. It's that

52 (Pages 202 to 205)

1	simple. This is not, as counsel said, a photocopy of	1	We talked about irreparable harm.
2	the Kanerva case. This is a different case. There	2	THE COURT: You have.
3	is no ordinance, there is no statute on which to	3	MR. PRENDERGAST: And I won't go back
4	rely.	4	to it, other than
5	Had there been no statute in Kanerva,	5	THE COURT: Good.
6	the state would have won. Had there been no statute	6	MR. PRENDERGAST: Good. I hope that
7	establishing the state's obligation to pay pension	7	means I've persuaded you.
8	benefits, the state would have won the Kanerva case.	8	THE COURT: It means I've heard it
9	It's absolutely clear from the opinion.	9	all.
10	I don't want to sound patronizing, but	10	MR. PRENDERGAST: You've heard it all,
11	this is a preliminary injunction; it's not the case.	11	yes.
12	THE COURT: I understand.	12	THE COURT: We've been here since
13	MR. PRENDERGAST: Okay. I need to go	13	10:30, it's now quarter to 3:00.
14	no further on that.	14	MR. PRENDERGAST: You have been
15	There is an argument that they make,	15	awfully patient, and I appreciate that.
16	and he alluded to it, because we've decided the	16	THE COURT: I'm sorry? I didn't hear
17	City has decided that the Korshak and the Window	17	that.
18	classes are going to have coverage for life, even if	18	THE COURT REPORTER: Do you want me to
19	the City otherwise gets out of the business.	19	read it back?
20	They've thrown in an argument that	20	(Laughter.)
21	there's a denial of equal protection here. Now, that	21	THE COURT: No, no, no. I want to
22	argument has not previously been made, and I saw it	22	
23		23	give everyone an opportunity to argue. MR. PRENDERGAST: One argument they
24	for first time when we got their papers fairly	24	
21	recently, and so we really haven't had a chance to go		have made is that it and it was rebutted by the
	$\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{a}} = \mathbf{a} + $		$D_{2} \approx 200$
	Page 207		Page 209
1	into it in any depth.	1	sworn testimony today, is that, well, what's going to
1 2	-	1 2	
	into it in any depth.		sworn testimony today, is that, well, what's going to
2	into it in any depth. THE COURT: And there's no need to,	2	sworn testimony today, is that, well, what's going to happen if a retiree goes to an ACA plan and then
2 3	into it in any depth. THE COURT: And there's no need to, because new ideas brought up in a reply brief are not	2 3	sworn testimony today, is that, well, what's going to happen if a retiree goes to an ACA plan and then says, I want to go back to the City, and the ACA
2 3 4	into it in any depth. THE COURT: And there's no need to, because new ideas brought up in a reply brief are not going to be considered by the Court. And I'll just note that the equal protection argument, as I noted	2 3 4	sworn testimony today, is that, well, what's going to happen if a retiree goes to an ACA plan and then says, I want to go back to the City, and the ACA insurer says, well, you have to pay for the next THE COURT: The uncontradicted
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	into it in any depth. THE COURT: And there's no need to, because new ideas brought up in a reply brief are not going to be considered by the Court. And I'll just note that the equal protection argument, as I noted to Mr. Krislov, is not pled. So, as Mr. Krislov says, it may be in the future, but that's not what I'm dealing with now, so no need. MR. PRENDERGAST: They argue with respect to the handbook. Are you familiar with what I'm referring to? THE COURT: I sure am. MR. PRENDERGAST: Plaintiffs incorrectly argue that the City abandoned its argument that under the handbook, the City maintained the right to terminate its retiree healthcare plan. That's just not what we've done. It's not correct. Plaintiffs' opening brief did make claims in support of a likelihood of success on the merits based on the handbook for the straightforward	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	sworn testimony today, is that, well, what's going to happen if a retiree goes to an ACA plan and then says, I want to go back to the City, and the ACA insurer says, well, you have to pay for the next THE COURT: The uncontradicted evidence is there's a 14-day period, notification period, and there can be no at least according to the evidence I hear, no penalty for that. I don't know to the contrary, but that's what the evidence is that was elicited from the stand. See, I remember, Richard. MR. PRENDERGAST: So Mike Layden, my colleague who's one of the best lawyers I know, just handed me a note that said let's end it. THE COURT: He's not only good, he's wise. MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you for your time. THE COURT: You're welcome. Mr. Burke.

53 (Pages 206 to 209)

	Page 210		Page 212
1 '	underlying litigation and the one that we just pled.	1	response.
2	THE COURT: Thank you.	2	THE COURT: What's this?
3	Mr. Kennedy.	3	(Indicating.)
4	MR. KENNEDY: Thank you, Your Honor.	4	MR. KRISLOV: No, no. The City.
5	On behalf of the Laborers' Fund, we join in the	5	THE COURT: That's what I'm talking
6	City's request that you deny the motion for	6	about.
7	preliminary injunction.	7	MR. KRISLOV: I'm talking about the
8	THE COURT: Mr. Kugler.	8	Funds.
9	MR. KUGLER: Yes, Your Honor. Well,	9	THE COURT: Oh, well. Okay. I
10	granting we've been here for four hours or more,	10	thought we were just talking my eye was on the
11	granting your preliminary injunction in full or in	11	City, not the Funds.
12	part is now there's nothing further that the	12	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. As I say, you can
13	Pension Fund can add to it. The Court has heard it.	13	ignore that.
14	It's in your hands.	14	THE COURT: But it does call into
15	The only thing I would say, Your Honor	15	question where your eye is. Mr. Prendergast has
16	is, as I understand it, I believe the timing of this	16	asserted, as I know, and I was here when he did it,
17	month, the deductions have already been made with	17	you conceded the City had no obligation under the '83
18	regard to the City, or are in effect, so whatever the	18	and '85 amendments. That, just so you know, is key
19	Court does, there may have to be some adjustment with	19	to my answer to this problem raised by your motion.
20	the check that's going out currently.	20	And you conceded the City has no obligations under
21	THE COURT: Thank you.	21	that.
22	Mr. Krislov, you've got last ups.	22	Apart from my ruling, what's your
23	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, I mean, we	23 24	response to Mr. Prendergast's argument about that?
24	obviously, as we have said before, object to the	24	MR. KRISLOV: Our position is that
	Page 211		Page 213
1	Funds taking a positions today, especially to say	1	while the specific language of the Pension Code
2	that it's some sort of hardship or difficulty to not	2	while the specific language of the Pension Code provisions do not obligate the City to provide
2 3	that it's some sort of hardship or difficulty to not they've not asserted anything like this before.	2 3	while the specific language of the Pension Code provisions do not obligate the City to provide healthcare, the City has in two ways subjected itself
2 3 4	that it's some sort of hardship or difficulty to not they've not asserted anything like this before. All that they have to do is just not withhold from	2 3 4	while the specific language of the Pension Code provisions do not obligate the City to provide healthcare, the City has in two ways subjected itself to that obligation: Number one, by being the insurer
2 3 4 5	that it's some sort of hardship or difficulty to not they've not asserted anything like this before. All that they have to do is just not withhold from their people the January premiums at the higher	2 3 4 5	while the specific language of the Pension Code provisions do not obligate the City to provide healthcare, the City has in two ways subjected itself to that obligation: Number one, by being the insurer that the Funds have obtained that insurance from;
2 3 4 5 6	that it's some sort of hardship or difficulty to not they've not asserted anything like this before. All that they have to do is just not withhold from their people the January premiums at the higher rates.	2 3 4 5 6	while the specific language of the Pension Code provisions do not obligate the City to provide healthcare, the City has in two ways subjected itself to that obligation: Number one, by being the insurer that the Funds have obtained that insurance from; and, number two, by providing and this is what we
2 3 4 5 6 7	that it's some sort of hardship or difficulty to not they've not asserted anything like this before. All that they have to do is just not withhold from their people the January premiums at the higher rates. If they're now saying that that would	2 3 4 5 6 7	while the specific language of the Pension Code provisions do not obligate the City to provide healthcare, the City has in two ways subjected itself to that obligation: Number one, by being the insurer that the Funds have obtained that insurance from; and, number two, by providing and this is what we seek to enforce the City of Chicago Annuitant
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	that it's some sort of hardship or difficulty to not they've not asserted anything like this before. All that they have to do is just not withhold from their people the January premiums at the higher rates. If they're now saying that that would be difficult, they could have spoken about this	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	while the specific language of the Pension Code provisions do not obligate the City to provide healthcare, the City has in two ways subjected itself to that obligation: Number one, by being the insurer that the Funds have obtained that insurance from; and, number two, by providing and this is what we seek to enforce the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan. That is Exhibit 4 to our
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	Page 214		rage 210
1	are stuck with it for life because Article 13,	1	But I'll tell you, it's just ordinary
2	Section 5 doesn't say we protect benefits of	2	rules of statutory construction. You look at the
3	pension we don't protect benefit excuse me. We	3	four corners of the statute and the contract. You
4	don't protect pension benefits. It says, membership	4	look at the four corners of the contract, and you are
5	in any pension or retirement system of the state or	5	limited by those terms as to what was given. That's
6	any unit of local government, dot, dot, dot.	6	just the ordinary rules of construction, whether it's
7	THE COURT: Shall not be diminished or	7	a constitutional amendment provision, statutory
8	impaired.	8	provision or a contract.
9	•	9	1
10	MR. KRISLOV: The benefits of which	10	You're asking me to read into that
11	shall not be diminished or impaired.	10	that which is not there. You're asking me to do it
12	THE COURT: Sure.	12	because of Kanerva, and I understand that.
	MR. KRISLOV: That's the key language.		But Kanerva didn't just give carte
13	That's why when the City provides the plan, and it's	13	blanche. It doesn't say that which has been given
14	the plan that we're seeking to enforce, it's the plan	14	with limitations is, carte blanche, given for life.
15	that is the benefit.	15	It just said that which is given is guaranteed. It's
16	Once they provide it to people	16	not guaranteed for life. It's guaranteed within the
17	conditioned on their being members of the retirement	17	ambit in which it was given, and that's up to the
18	system	18	legislature. It's not up to you, and it's not up to
19	THE COURT: They don't disagree,	19	me. I wish it were up to me; then we'd have a real
20	really.	20	nice, platonic republic, and lots of things would be
21	MR. KRISLOV: Then they're stuck.	21	changing. But we don't have that, and I'm somewhat
22	THE COURT: They're just saying that	22	limited by that which is the by the separation of
23	they're limited by the amounts that were granted by	23	powers in that regard.
24	the '83 and '85 legislation. They're capped at that	24	MR. KRISLOV: Here's what I don't
	the os and os registration. They te cupped at that		Mile Medice . Here's what I don't
	5 015		
	Page 215		Page 217
1	in terms of what they have to do, even for the	1	understand and maybe missing the point.
2	hirees.	2	Our view of Kanerva is that Kanerva
3	MR. KRISLOV: That's what they have to	3	says where a public employer has granted a benefit
4	do under the Pension Code. That is not what they are	4	that is conditioned on
5	limited in having to do because they are because	5	THE COURT: Participation.
6	they have taken it on.	6	MR. KRISLOV: participation in one
7	That's why in Kanerva, the state, by	7	of the retirement systems, it is a protected benefit
8	enacting a group healthcare plan, that, for these	8	for life. And giving it
9	people was conditioned	9	THE COURT: What if the nature of that
10	THE COURT: But unlike Kanerva, here	10	which has been given is limited? I'm giving you \$5
11	it was time limited. It was not a, here, you're	11	every week for the rest of your life. Somehow,
12	getting it all for life. Apart from all your	12	because you need more money, or because things
13	assertions to the contrary in your briefs, they've	13	change and I'm not trying to insult anybody here,
14	never said you can have it for life. In fact, they	14	believe me, I'm not are you trying to tell me that
15	didn't say it in the '83 and '85 amendments. I found	15	it should be \$10 or \$20 because the value of the
16	it, without it being in there, because it was given	16	dollar has gone down? Does it ipso facto mean that I
17	without any	17	have to give you \$100 a week? Isn't it limited to
18	MR. KRISLOV: Time limit.	18	that which I give?
19		19	
20	THE COURT: limitation, to the	20	MR. KRISLOV: If I'm a public
20	extent that it was given in those statutes.	20	employee, and I say here is a benefit that I will
21	MR. KRISLOV: See, that's where you	21	give to people who are participants in the retirement
	and I differ on this one, because		system, I will provide your healthcare I will
23	THE COURT: There you go, and when you	23	provide the following benefit. I will provide, the
24	wear the robes, I'll listen to you.	24	City of Chicago

55 (Pages 214 to 217)

	Page 218		Page 220
1	THE COURT: I will give you \$55 a	1	balancing. I don't even get to adequate remedy at
2	month.	2	law. I'll let you go on. You've said it before, and
3	MR. KRISLOV: But that's not what I'm	3	I don't want to stop you. But I don't even get to
4	seeking to enforce.	4	that if you don't pass the standing issue, which is
5	THE COURT: I know. But that's what	5	the first prong of the injunctive inquiry.
6	it says. I understand you're trying to go beyond	6	MR. KRISLOV: And our view is if we
7	that.	7	interpret your ruling, people who were participants
8	MR. KRISLOV: That's what the Pension	8	on August 23rd, '89, have enforceable rights to
9	Code wording says. That's what I concede that the	9	enforce a benefit whose parameters you said are to be
10	Pension Code wording says.	10	determined. And that's what you said, that on a
11	What I'm saying is that by	11	2-615
12	providing and Ms. Holt said all they need is an	12	THE COURT: Yes. Oh, yes. That have
13	ordinance, and all they need is the appropriation	13	yet to be determined under 2-615. I did say that.
14	ordinance, and they could be no one said that the	14	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
15	City of Chicago annuitant healthcare plan was being	15	THE COURT: Absolutely.
16	illegally provided. Once it is provided to people	16	MR. KRISLOV: Those the exact
17	based solely on their being annuitants or	17	nature of those obligations, however, is not properly
18	participants in the plan, you're stuck with it for	18	decided on a 2-615 motion to dismiss. That's where
19	life. Yes.	19	we figure that that explaining what we think the
20	THE COURT: Okay. I got it. I got	20	obligations are is for later in the case.
21	your ideas.	21	At this point, the people who were
22	MR. KRISLOV: So what we're trying to	22	participants as of August 23rd, '89, have
23	enforce is not the \$55 subsidy. The subsidy is the	23	enforceable rights. What they are entitled to
24	Funds. Providing the plan is what the City did.	24	protect you left to be determined, and that's what I
	Page 219		Page 221
1	There are differences. The City is saying, look, all	1	interpret your ruling to be.
2	that they provided	2	THE COURT: Then how does that jibe
3	THE COURT: Providing the tax levy is	3	with the likelihood of success and an ascertainable
4	what the City did per the statute, '83 and '85.	4	claim if I haven't yet determined what rights enure
5	MR. KRISLOV: Per the Pension Code	5	to those three classes?
6	statute.	6	MR. KRISLOV: Because at this stage of
7	THE COURT: Yeah, well, isn't that	7	the proceedings, we need we don't have to prove
8	what I'm stuck with?	8	summary judgment. We just have to show that there's
9	MR. KRISLOV: No, you're not stuck	9	a reasonable basis that we might
10	with that. The City is stuck with it when it legally	10	THE COURT: No, that's not true, and
11	provides a benefit to people based on their	11	that's not the law, and you know that.
12	participation in one of the four Funds, it's stuck	12	MR. KRISLOV: Oh, I
13	with that for their life. And that's if we	13	THE COURT: For purposes of injunctive
14	disagree on something, I believe I'm right on that	14	relief, you have to show a likelihood of success.
15	one.	15	Not a reasonable probability that there's a conflict
16	I guess we'll find out.	16	here, or it's been interpreted as being a fair
17	But for these purposes, at least at	17	question, at least.
18	this point, until you decide the merits of it, who's	18	MR. KRISLOV: Fair question, at least.
19	more harmed? They can't say the City's harmed. The	19	We've done that. And I believe that you will say
20	taxpayers, if they have an average of \$30 per	20	that you will agree that at least for these
21	person	21 22	purposes whether you disagree with me ultimately
22 23	THE COURT: But I don't get to harm if	22	or not is for the Court to decide but the fact is,
23	I don't find an ascertainable claim, I mean a right, standing. I don't get to harm. I don't get to	23	I think we have raised an absolutely, at least a fair question. I think we're right. I think we will
	standing. I don't get to nami. I don't get to		question. I unité we le right. I unité we will

56 (Pages 218 to 221)

	Page 222	Page 224
1	ultimately prevail on that. But I think we've shown	¹ off of the Choice.
2	enough to justify hurdle number one.	² So if you want to get lesser
3	And it's not an all and failing	³ coverage and I probably should have asked
4	one. It is an overall we shouldn't fail any of	⁴ Ms. Currier but if she's elected out of the
5	them by a significant amount, but it is a balancing	⁵ coverage and to go in the ACA, everybody who says,
6	test overall, and it is to maintain	⁶ oh, you'll be better off in the ACA is generally not
7	THE COURT: No, it's not. I don't	⁷ in it.
8	even get to the balancing test unless you can prove	⁸ The only ordinance needed is the
9	the first four.	⁹ appropriation ordinance. We're looking to enforce
10	MR. KRISLOV: Well, I think we have	¹⁰ the plan, and at this point, I think we've shown,
11	satisfied	¹¹ certainly for the pre-8-23-89 hires, a sufficient
12		¹² showing of likelihood of harm, balance of equities,
13	THE COURT: And that's the law, too. MR. KRISLOV: Fair enough. But	 ¹³ hardship. I don't think we've missed any of the six
14	we've sat I believe we've satisfied the first	¹⁴ on that.
15		on that.
16	one, at least, sufficient to preserve the status quo,	But I tillik, överall, were not asking
17	until we get to the merits of the case.	for much. Just put on the mercase until we much
18	In terms of the post-'89 hirees, in	out who's entitled to do what. And until then, we
19	our view, is that when you give things to people	an we can fery on, that's an these people have to
20	after that, whatever you give them, again,	Tery on is the constitution and this court, and we
21	conditioned on their being participants, that's a	
22	floor.	THE COURT. Thanks.
23	But we can we may disagree with	First, 1d like to compliment
24	that, and that's why for purposes of this injunction	WIT. KITSIOV and WIT. I Tendergast and the other
24	that we're requesting, it's for the pre-8-23-89	²⁴ attorneys here on their submissions. They were as
	Page 223	Page 225
1		
2	hires.	went witteen as anything i ve ever seen as a judge,
3	THE COURT: You're not asking for it	and certainly better than I ve ever written, and they
4	to be imposed as to the post-August 23rd, 1989, hirees, or participants, correct?	helped hie loeds on what the issues were.
5		The Court is guided by the law with
6	MR. KRISLOV: We concede that that is	 regard to issuance of injunctions. And for the sake of the folks here who do not know the law as well as
7	a weaker claim that you, by your ruling, do not accept. How is that?	of the forks here who do not know the faw as well as
8	1	 the attorneys, let me just spend a few moments explaining to you what it is and what I'm guided by.
9	THE COURT: That means you want me to	⁹ An injunction is called an equitable
10	rule. Okay. I will. Anything else?	¹⁰ remedy. It's an order by which a party is directed
11	MR. KRISLOV: Yes. This whole	¹¹ to perform some act or is ordered to refrain from
12	business of you can't get you know, you can still	to perform some act of is ordered to remain nom
13	get healthcare. Too bad you can't get your doctor,	¹² doing some act, which is what Mr. Krislov is asking ¹³ for here.
14	too bad you can't get any of the hospitals you've	A request for a preliminary injunction
15	been dealing with. These are hardships. These are	¹⁵ is called an interlocutory remedy. That means that
16	unique hardships that everybody has been recognizing	¹⁶ they're intended to provide immediate but durational,
17	is a big problem.	¹⁷ that means not forever, relief prior to the final
18	If you can't deal with the doctor that	¹⁸ adjudication of a controversy on the merits.
19	you have been dealing with for years, if you must go	¹⁹ And by definition, that means I can't,
20	to a lesser, far distant place people in Peoria	²⁰ by the giving of the issuance of a preliminary
21	don't necessarily go to Northwestern, but people in	²¹ by the giving of the issuance of a preliminary ²¹ injunction, make a ruling on the merits. And as
22	the city go overwhelmingly, it may be 80 percent of	²² Mr. Krislov just suggested, I have not with regard
23	the patient treatment or more, I don't know, goes to	²³ to the motion to dismiss, I do not know, have not yet
24	the five or six institutions that I named who are all	²⁴ decided, have not yet discussed with the attorneys
	the five of six institutions that I harried who are all	ucclucu, have not yet discussed with the attolleys

57 (Pages 222 to 225)

1	what the nature and extent of the folks' interest is	1	As I've ruled in my December 3rd
2	under the '83 and '85 amendments to the Pension Code.	2	opinion, I find that the participants, post-August
3	An interlocutory injunction is also	3	23rd, 1989, that means the hirees thereafter, do not
4	called an extraordinary remedy by our Supreme Court.	4	have an ascertainable claim for relief.
5	And that means that I shouldn't grant one unless I've	5	And the reason for that, so you know,
6	taken great care to assure that it is needed under	6	is, as I said before, alluded to, I'm guided by the
7	the circumstances.	7	law. And the law says that, yes, pension benefits
8	What the circumstances are is	8	shall not be diminished or impaired.
9	dependent on every case, and being equitable in	9	But it doesn't grant pension benefits.
10	nature, that means not being guided by law, but being	10	To that, I have to look at the core body, the body
11	guided by aspects of equity. They're addressed to	11	which issued that. In this case, it's the
12	the sound discretion of the trial court. In this	12	legislature. And for the post-August 23rd, 1989
13	case, that's me.	13	hirees, whatever protections they were given,
14	The elements which must be shown by	14	whatever benefits they were given were a matter of
15	the movant for the issuance of a preliminary	15	statute.
16	injunction and calling upon this Court's discretion	16	As I said before, if it were me, it
17	to issue an extraordinary order is, first, there must	17	would be different. But I'm not a super-legislature.
18	be an ascertainable claim for relief by the	18	I've been told, every court has been told, I cannot
19	plaintiffs.	19	impose my will on the legislature. And there's a
20	Secondly, there has to be showing of a	20	reason for that in democratic theory. They're your
21	likelihood of success on the merits, without ruling	21	representatives. They're the ones who decide what
22	on those merits, or, as I said just a few moments	22	the law is going to be; I decide whether they did it
23	ago, at least a fair question that the plaintiff will	23	right or not, and I look at it. As I said before, I
24	succeed.	24	use statutory construction, if needed. But the first
	Page 227		Page 229
1	Third, there has to be irreparable	1	rule is, I just look at the ordinary words that are
2	harm to the plaintiff if or in this case, a class	2	in the statute.
3	of plaintiffs if the injunction is not given.	3	And in the statutes in '89 and
4	Fourth, there has to be an inadequate	4	thereafter, it was clearly limited, the benefits that
5	remedy at law. And that means, according to the law,	5	were given to the folks post who were hired
6	as our Supreme Court has said, that means that money	6	post-August 23rd, 1989. So that's the core grant.
7	damages will not suffice if it's not given.	7	And Mr. Krislov's argument
0		0	

Page 226

damages will not suffice if it's not given. 8 Lastly, or -- not lastly, but the 9 courts say that if it comes down to it, I should 10 balance the equities, the hardships to both sides. I 11 should consider that in terms of giving or not giving 12 the injunctive relief.

And, also, some cases have said that I should consider the public interest, and the harm to the public, and public policy.

13

14

15

16 As you've heard, and I compliment you 17 all for, (a), being here. Obviously, you're 18 concerned, and it's a concerning matter. I've 19 noticed your attention to it. 20 With regard to the first element, the 21 ascertainable claim for relief, the plaintiffs must

- 22 clearly establish an ascertainable right and need of 23
- protection, and the failure to do so obviates the 24 need to go further.

58 (Pages 226 to 229)

notwithstanding, the Constitution protects that which

problem therein lies with the legislature if you have

a beef, not with anybody else. And that was a long

So, clearly, as to the -- it seems to

With regard to the prior groups, the

Although Mr. Krislov and I argued

about the issue, I do find, of course, that those who

me, as to the post-August 23rd, 1989 group, the

claim for relief, and I need go no further.

fourth subclass, they do not have an ascertainable

1983 and '85 amendments were in effect when the

Korshak subclass and the Windows subclass and

subclass 3 entered into the Funds' retirement

was granted. It doesn't add to it. It doesn't

magically create a right that was not given. The

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time ago.

systems, as I stated.

Page 228

Page	230
raye	230

	rage 250	raye 232
1 '	were participants prior to August 23rd, 1989, do	¹ evidence, based on myself, that the older you get,
2	have an ascertainable claim for relief. And that's	² the less you like change. And as my father used to
3	what I said earlier in my December 3rd opinion.	³ say, "these newfangled ways, I just don't understand
4	What that claim for relief is, as I	⁴ them, and they're confusing." And I find that there
5	mentioned earlier, and Mr. Krislov mentioned, is	⁵ is a hardship to retirees, the elderly folks, to
6	going to be subject to further discussion between the	⁶ change the way things are, and to go out and look at
7	parties, arguments, etcetera. But as I have alluded	⁷ this mysterious ACA, and have to go into the
8	to, I use rules of statutory construction, and I	uns mysterious ACA, and nave to go into the
9	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	marketplace when it's already and always been give
10	cannot write into a statute that which is not there,	to you. That's the problem with our paternal
11	even if I want to.	structure of government as it's been in the past.
12	And I look at the 1983 and the 1985	i understand timgs have changed for
	statutes, and much as Mr. Prendergast has as argued,	all sorts of reasons, a lot of which have been
13	they are limited. They are limited by their terms.	¹³ alluded to today. And I just wanted to say that I'm
14	And the ascertainable claim for relief for those	¹⁴ sensitive to that, and I do understand that it's a
15	three subclasses is, thus, limited thereby.	¹⁵ problem for folks to go out into the marketplace and
16	Therefore, they do have an	¹⁶ start looking and thinking, instead of just taking it
17	ascertainable claim for relief, but I have to go on	¹⁷ as it's been given to them all these years. I
18	to see their likelihood of success on the merits as	¹⁸ understand that, and I've taken that into
19	to that which is being asked of me today and is being	¹⁹ consideration.
20	asked of me in the complaint. That's the second	²⁰ But it doesn't throw the balance off
21	element, as you may recall I said to you.	²¹ or replace the lack of a factor, in this case, the
22	Much as Mr. Prendergast has argued,	²² claim for relief, which is limited by that which was
23	and I accept his argument, those retirees are subject	²³ granted by the legislature, and the lack of a
24	to the limitations of the statute that gave them the	²⁴ likelihood of success on the merits for that reason.
	-	
	Page 231	Page 233
1	Page 231	Page 233
1	benefit, the '83 and the '85 statute, which is	¹ The fourth element is the inadequate
2	benefit, the '83 and the '85 statute, which is clearly less than that which is being given by the	¹ The fourth element is the inadequate ² remedy at law. There is case law that's been cited
2 3	benefit, the '83 and the '85 statute, which is clearly less than that which is being given by the 2016 enactment, or appropriation.	 The fourth element is the inadequate remedy at law. There is case law that's been cited to me that Illinois law is clear that a preliminary
2 3 4	benefit, the '83 and the '85 statute, which is clearly less than that which is being given by the 2016 enactment, or appropriation. Therefore, I do not find that there	 The fourth element is the inadequate remedy at law. There is case law that's been cited to me that Illinois law is clear that a preliminary injunction, which is being requested here, cannot be
2 3 4 5	benefit, the '83 and the '85 statute, which is clearly less than that which is being given by the 2016 enactment, or appropriation. Therefore, I do not find that there would be a likelihood of success on the merits with	 The fourth element is the inadequate remedy at law. There is case law that's been cited to me that Illinois law is clear that a preliminary injunction, which is being requested here, cannot be premised upon a temporary loss of benefits or income
2 3 4 5 6	benefit, the '83 and the '85 statute, which is clearly less than that which is being given by the 2016 enactment, or appropriation. Therefore, I do not find that there would be a likelihood of success on the merits with regard to that which is before me today.	 The fourth element is the inadequate remedy at law. There is case law that's been cited to me that Illinois law is clear that a preliminary injunction, which is being requested here, cannot be premised upon a temporary loss of benefits or income The case law is cited in the parties'
2 3 4 5 6 7	benefit, the '83 and the '85 statute, which is clearly less than that which is being given by the 2016 enactment, or appropriation. Therefore, I do not find that there would be a likelihood of success on the merits with regard to that which is before me today. I might say to you all who are	 The fourth element is the inadequate remedy at law. There is case law that's been cited to me that Illinois law is clear that a preliminary injunction, which is being requested here, cannot be premised upon a temporary loss of benefits or income The case law is cited in the parties' submissions to me, especially the City's, and I have
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	benefit, the '83 and the '85 statute, which is clearly less than that which is being given by the 2016 enactment, or appropriation. Therefore, I do not find that there would be a likelihood of success on the merits with regard to that which is before me today. I might say to you all who are seriously interested in this, my ruling today is not	 The fourth element is the inadequate remedy at law. There is case law that's been cited to me that Illinois law is clear that a preliminary injunction, which is being requested here, cannot be premised upon a temporary loss of benefits or income The case law is cited in the parties' submissions to me, especially the City's, and I have read it, and it's actually true, wherein Knott versus
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	benefit, the '83 and the '85 statute, which is clearly less than that which is being given by the 2016 enactment, or appropriation. Therefore, I do not find that there would be a likelihood of success on the merits with regard to that which is before me today. I might say to you all who are seriously interested in this, my ruling today is not with prejudice. If there is some other evidence that	 The fourth element is the inadequate remedy at law. There is case law that's been cited to me that Illinois law is clear that a preliminary injunction, which is being requested here, cannot be premised upon a temporary loss of benefits or income The case law is cited in the parties' submissions to me, especially the City's, and I have read it, and it's actually true, wherein Knott versus Illinois Racing Board, the court said the loss of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	benefit, the '83 and the '85 statute, which is clearly less than that which is being given by the 2016 enactment, or appropriation. Therefore, I do not find that there would be a likelihood of success on the merits with regard to that which is before me today. I might say to you all who are seriously interested in this, my ruling today is not with prejudice. If there is some other evidence that comes before me, I'm open to that. But I'm trying to	 The fourth element is the inadequate remedy at law. There is case law that's been cited to me that Illinois law is clear that a preliminary injunction, which is being requested here, cannot be premised upon a temporary loss of benefits or income The case law is cited in the parties' submissions to me, especially the City's, and I have read it, and it's actually true, wherein Knott versus Illinois Racing Board, the court said the loss of income for a brief period does not constitute
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	benefit, the '83 and the '85 statute, which is clearly less than that which is being given by the 2016 enactment, or appropriation. Therefore, I do not find that there would be a likelihood of success on the merits with regard to that which is before me today. I might say to you all who are seriously interested in this, my ruling today is not with prejudice. If there is some other evidence that comes before me, I'm open to that. But I'm trying to give you the analysis that I have gone through and my	 The fourth element is the inadequate remedy at law. There is case law that's been cited to me that Illinois law is clear that a preliminary injunction, which is being requested here, cannot be premised upon a temporary loss of benefits or income The case law is cited in the parties' submissions to me, especially the City's, and I have read it, and it's actually true, wherein Knott versus Illinois Racing Board, the court said the loss of income for a brief period does not constitute irreparable harm.
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59 (Pages 230 to 233)

	Page 234		Page 236
1	accurate, that there's a chance that this is going to	1	right, or wrong but I truly believe the City is
2	be resolved without going much further and causing	2	implicated in this, and so that they are a proper
3	more heartache to the retirees.	3	party with regard to the '83 and '85. That's
4	But I have to follow the law,	4	something that will be subject to review by the
5	regardless of my heart, which I've been accused of	5	City's motion to reconsider, which I will review and
6	leading with too much. But I have to follow the law.	6	keep an open mind on.
7	And when there's a remedy at law, as a matter of law,	7	But that's my ruling as of today. So
8	an adequate remedy at law will prevent me from	8	for all those reasons, and with great respect for the
9	issuing an injunction. In fact, injunctive relief is	9	job that's been done by Mr. Krislov and
10	proper when money damages are adequate to remedy the	10	Mr. Prendergast and the attorneys for the Funds, the
11	wrong, absent a showing that it would be impossible.	11	motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction
12	And there has been no showing here. There hasn't	12	is denied.
13	even been an argument about that here.	13	What's next?
14	So three of the elements have not been	14	MR. KRISLOV: We need to do some
15	proven to me by a satisfactory burden by the	15	scheduling. And one of them at the moment, our
16	plaintiffs, the ascertainable claim of relief, past	16	response to their to motion to clarify is due
17	that which was given by the '83 and '85 statutes.	17	tomorrow
18	Therefore, the likelihood of success on the merits	18	THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, I
19	and the inadequate remedy at law, that's enough for	19	know that you're done and you want to go. But I need
20	me to deny this, with my sorrow, especially on	20	for you to still be quiet so that I can listen to
21	Christmas, as we're approaching that.	21	Mr. Krislov, your attorney, about what it is he wants
22	I have considered the balance of the	22	to do to help protect your rights. I promise it's
23	equities. I have considered the barance of the	23	going to be over in no more than three minutes. Just
24	mentioned, I'm aware of the hardships that befall the	24	give me the three minutes, please.
	mentioned, i'm aware of the nardsmps that befan me		give me the three minutes, please.
	Page 235		Page 237
1		1	-
1 2	elderly. And by the elderly, I mean anyone over 30.	1 2	Go ahead.
	elderly. And by the elderly, I mean anyone over 30. (Laughter.)		Go ahead. MR. KRISLOV: We're due tomorrow to
2	elderly. And by the elderly, I mean anyone over 30.	2	Go ahead. MR. KRISLOV: We're due tomorrow to respond to their motion to clarify.
2 3	elderly. And by the elderly, I mean anyone over 30. (Laughter.) THE COURT: But I am duty-bound by my oath to follow the law, and that's the way I see it.	2 3	Go ahead. MR. KRISLOV: We're due tomorrow to
2 3 4	elderly. And by the elderly, I mean anyone over 30. (Laughter.) THE COURT: But I am duty-bound by my	2 3 4	Go ahead. MR. KRISLOV: We're due tomorrow to respond to their motion to clarify. I would like, and I don't think
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60 (Pages 234 to 237)

	Page 238	Page	240
1	that, and that's my ruling. Just tell me when you	¹ next. If we're going to	
2	would like to file your response.	2 THE COURT: Well, that's with the	
3	MR. KRISLOV: I guess on the motion to	³ motion for clarification. So I'll throw it in the	
4	clarify, we'd probably like to file on the same day	⁴ book on then, and show up so that Deborah can a	isk vou
5	as we file the amended complaint.	⁵ about your schedules, and choose a ruling date th	•
6	THE COURT: Have I given you leave to	⁶ commensurate with your personal and profession	
7	file the amended complaint?	 ⁷ schedule with regard to your motion to amend. 	
8	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.	⁸ said it would be due by 1-11.	
9	THE COURT: What is that date? What	⁹ Do you wish to change that?	
10	day is that?	¹⁰ MR. KRISLOV: No. We would still f	le
11	MR. KRISLOV: January 11th.	¹¹ that on January 11th.	
12	THE COURT: Any objection to the	¹² THE COURT: Okay. And they're to	
13	motion to extend time to file the response to	¹³ answer or otherwise plead by 2-16, which is the	date
14	January 11th?	¹⁴ I gave you. Is that still all right?	
15	MR. PRENDERGAST: No objection.	¹⁵ MR. KRISLOV: Could they answer th	e
16	THE COURT: When would you like to	¹⁶ Count 1 that's been upheld?	
17	file your reply?	¹⁷ THE COURT: No. No, they can't. No.	
18	MR. PRENDERGAST: 14 days thereafter.	¹⁸ Let me explain to you why.	
19	MR. KRISLOV: I think that's already	¹⁹ No. They're going to answer or	
20	set, actually.	²⁰ otherwise respond, per our schedule, by 2-16. T	nat's
21	THE COURT: But aren't we pushing	²¹ what I gave the last time. That was without	
22	things forward? I don't have the briefing schedule.	²² objection then. And then we have a clerk's a	
23	MR. KRISLOV: Their response was	²³ status date before me of 2-24, and that still sound	ls
24	THE COURT: Oh, I do have	²⁴ good to me. Is that okay for you?	
	Page 239	Page	0.44
	Page 239	Idye	241
1		¹ MR. KRISLOV: What I don't under	
1 2	MR. KRISLOV: February 16th, I think.		stand,
	MR. KRISLOV: February 16th, I	 MR. KRISLOV: What I don't under Your Honor, is why they don't have to answer count that's been upheld. 	stand,
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61 (Pages 238 to 241)

	Page 242		Page 244
1	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. So we file our	1	everything that's occurred today, and you can go
2	amended complaint and our response to their motion to	2	home, and all these people can go home. And we have
3	clarify on January 11th.	3	a transcript anyway.
4	THE COURT: Yes, sir.	4	MR. PRENDERGAST: That will be fine,
5	MR. KRISLOV: They then file their	5	Judge.
6	response to the reply on the clarification on	6	THE COURT: I will not be here next
7	January 29th.	7	week, so I can't sign off on anything, but Judge
8	THE COURT: Correct.	8	Allen will be around. And I wish you well.
9	MR. KRISLOV: And they have until	9	Happy holidays to everybody.
10	February 16th in which to answer or otherwise plead	10	(Proceedings adjourned at 3:25 p.m.,
11	with respect to the amended complaint.	11	December 23, 2015.)
12	THE COURT: Correct.	12	
13	MR. KRISLOV: There is a clerk status,	13	
14	I guess, on February 1, with respect to the clarify?	14	
15	THE COURT: Correct. And there is a	15	
16	and if you tell Deborah when you come on	16	
17	February 1st, tell her there's a status date on the	17	
18	new, amended complaint of 2-24-16 at 9:30.	18	
19	Are we all on the same page,	19	
20	schedule-wise?	20	
21	MR. KRISLOV: We are.	21	
22	MR. KENNEDY: The 2-24 had been on our	22	
23	schedule as a ruling date on the reconsideration, but	23	
24	now it's just	24	
	now it's just		
	Page 243		Page 245
1	THE COUDT: Wall it's not now	1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	THE COURT: Well, it's not now. MR. KENNEDY: I understand.	2	REPORTER 5 CERTIFICATE
3	THE COURT: Things have been pushed	3	I, JERRI ESTELLE, CSR, RPR, doing
4	up. Who knows? If I can get to it, believe me, I	4	business in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois,
5	will. But I can't guarantee that, so I don't want to	5	do hereby certify that I reported in computerized
6	lie to you about anything.	6	shorthand the foregoing proceedings as appears from
7	MR. PRENDERGAST: Should we put that	7	my stenographic notes.
8	in the order, Your Honor?	8	I further certify that the foregoing
9	THE COURT: Put in the "I don't want	9	is a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand
10	to lie to you about anything" in the order.	10	notes and contains all the testimony had at said
11	MR. KENNEDY: Strike the	11	proceedings.
12	THE COURT: Yes, please strike the	12	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my
13	which date are we striking?	13	hand as Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the
14	MR. KENNEDY: The ruling date, which	14	State of Illinois on January 6, 2016.
15	is not	15	Janni Katella V
16	THE COURT: Yeah, 2-24 is not a ruling	16	Jerri Estelle Sund
17	date. You're going to have to fill out another	17	
18	briefing schedule, a modified briefing schedule as to	18	Jerri Estelle, CSR, RPR
19	the motions to clarify.	19	License Number: 084-003284
20	Is anyone going to be around tomorrow?	20	
21	I will. Is anyone going to be around?	21	
22	MR. KRISLOV: I will.	22	
23	THE COURT: So maybe you can put all	23	
24	of these get a confirming order in writing for	24	
		l	
			62 (Pages 242 to 245)

1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT - CHANCERY DIVISION 2 3 MICHAEL W. UNDERWOOD, et al.,)) Plaintiffs,) 4) 5 vs.) No. 13 CH 17450 Calendar 13) б CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal) Corporation,) 7) Defendant,) 8) and) 9 Trustees of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of 10 Chicago; Trustees of the 11 Firemen's Annuity and Benefit) Fund of Chicago; Trustees of) the Municipal Employees' 12) Annuity and Benefit Fund of) 13 Chicago; and Trustees of the) Laborers' & Retirement Board) 14 Employees' Annuity and Benefit) Fund of Chicago, et al.,) 15) Defendants.) 16 17 Record of proceedings had at the 18 hearing of the above-entitled cause, before the Honorable NEIL H. COHEN, one of the Judges of said 19 20 Court, on March 18, 2016, in Room 2308, Richard J. 21 Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois, commencing at 9:45 22 a.m. 23 24

1	A P P E A R A N C E S
2	
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	for the plaintiffs;
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16	for the City;
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18	DAVID R. KUGLER & ASSOCIATES, LTD.
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20	Suite 308
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22	(312) 263-3020
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24	for the Trustees of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund
25	of Chicago; Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago;

1	A P P E A R A N C E S (Continued)
2	
3	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD.
4	Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300
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	sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com
8	for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity
	and Benefit Fund of Chicago;
9	
10	TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP
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14	BY: Mr. Cary E. Donham
	cdonham@taftlaw.com,
15	
	for the Trustees of the Laborers' &
16	Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and
	Benefit Fund of Chicago.
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	

1	MR. PRENDERGAST: Good morning, Your
2	Honor. Richard Prendergast on behalf of the City.
3	THE COURT: Richard.
4	MR. KRISLOV: Good morning, Your
5	Honor. Clint Krislov with Ken Goldstein on behalf of
б	Mr. Underwood and the other 300 employees.
7	THE COURT: Clint.
8	MS. BOECKMAN: Good morning, Your
9	Honor. Sarah Boeckman on behalf of Defendants Fire
10	Fund and Municipal Fund.
11	MR. DONHAM: Good morning, Your Honor.
12	Cary Donham on behalf of the Laborer's Fund.
13	THE COURT: Cary.
14	MR. KUGLER: David Kugler on behalf of
15	Policemen's Fund.
16	THE COURT: David. Hello, everybody.
17	First I have a motion to dismiss
18	that's been filed by you, Cary.
19	MR. DONHAM: Yes, sir. Yes, Your
20	Honor.
21	MS. BOECKMAN: And, Your Honor,
22	Fireman's Fund and Municipal Fund also filed a motion
23	to dismiss yesterday.
24	THE COURT: I don't have a copy of it.

1 MS. BOECKMAN: I have a copy for you 2 right here. 3 (Document tendered.) 4 MR. KUGLER: The Policemen's Fund also 5 filed a motion. I filed it back on March 8th. б THE COURT: How would I know? How 7 would I know, David? You never gave me a copy of it. 8 MR. KUGLER: Your Honor --9 THE COURT: You never gave me a copy of it. 10 11 MR. KUGLER: I apologize for that, 12 Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: It's okay. 14 All right. So I have three motions to 15 dismiss by the Funds. 16 MR. KRISLOV: You're supposed to have 17 another one from the City today. 18 MR. PRENDERGAST: Our motion to 19 dismiss is due today. I've spent the last three days 20 in Los Angeles in a mediation. We figured we'd finally get it together on the laptops. The laptops 21 weren't working. 22 23 Here's my point. If can file it 24 Monday, I'd appreciate it.

1 THE COURT: Of course you can. 2 MR. KRISLOV: We would object, Your 3 Honor. And I'll tell you why. 4 THE COURT: Your objection is noted 5 and overruled. б MR. KRISLOV: Can I explain why? 7 THE COURT: Do I have the discretion 8 to allow them to file a motion to dismiss in an 9 untimely fashion when I set the time to begin with? You know the law. 10 11 MR. KRISLOV: This wasn't set to begin 12 with this way. 13 Mr. Prendergast asked me a week ago, 14 maybe two weeks ago, for an extension because he had 15 a --16 THE COURT: Well, he asked the wrong 17 person since you don't have control over it. I do. 18 MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we agreed to 19 -- we wanted to have their motion before we were here. Regardless, I think we can address the whole 20 thing today, and I --21 THE COURT: Well, regardless of your 22 23 position, whatever it is, because I don't understand what your objection is --24

1 MR. KRISLOV: I'm on vacation all next 2 week. Mr. Prendergast --3 THE COURT: He's just filing it, 4 Clint. I'm just giving him leave to file it. 5 Today's Friday. I'm going to give him leave to file 6 it Monday, over your objection, the basis of which I 7 still don't understand. And I guess it's that you 8 gave him an extension until today, and he didn't meet it because he was working. 9 10 MR. KRISLOV: We wanted to be in a 11 position to address the Court on -- to be able to 12 address the court on all the motions before we came 13 here. But we'll deal with that. 14 MR. PRENDERGAST: Let's be clear on 15 one thing, Judge. 16 THE COURT: We don't have to be clear 17 on anything. The motion is directed towards me. 18 It's nice that he asked you for it. It's the 19 appropriate thing. It's nice that you gave it to 20 him, and that's great. But in the end, I have the final say, 21 even when I'm wrong, as pointed out to me, which I 22 23 have, you know, the ability to be. But in this case, he's asking for two 24

1	days. He's asking for the weekend to file it. I
2	don't see any prejudice to you, other than your
3	vacation. And we'll survive that.
4	So your request is granted, Richard.
5	You'll file it on Monday.
6	Would you like to engage in a briefing
7	schedule on this and set it now, assuming his word
8	can be trusted, which I think it can, so that we can
9	deal with all of these?
10	Do you want to do that?
11	MR. KRISLOV: Is it my turn yet?
12	THE COURT: Let me tell you something.
13	MR. KRISLOV: I don't want to deal
14	with just
15	THE COURT: I don't like being talked
16	to that way. I don't like facetiousness.
17	MR. KRISLOV: I'm not being facetious.
18	THE COURT: I don't like it. I don't
19	deserve it. The court doesn't deserve it.
20	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, I have the
21	greatest respect for this Court, but
22	THE COURT: Well, I think you were
23	being facetious, and I don't like it.
24	MR. KRISLOV: The defendants have

1 THE COURT: It's your turn when it's 2 your turn. 3 MR. KRISLOV: I'll wait for my turn. 4 THE COURT: I asked you a question. 5 Do you want to enter into a briefing 6 schedule today? Yes or no? 7 MR. KRISLOV: I would like to propose a manner of dealing with this that is 8 all-encompassing. There are five pending motions. 9 THE COURT: What are the other 10 11 motions? 12 MR. KRISLOV: One motion is our motion to vacate your clarification --13 THE COURT: It's denied. 14 15 MR. KRISLOV: We filed it. We filed 16 it. 17 THE COURT: It's denied. I read it. 18 You said I'm wrong. You disagree with me. 19 The gist of it is that you think I flipped my original opinion. I say I didn't. I said 20 21 it was pretty clear. The motion for clarification was not made by you. It was made by the City. I 22 23 made it pretty clear. I did read what you had to say in the 24

1 I disagreed with you when you said it. I press. 2 thought you got it wrong. But then it was an 3 interesting situation. Does the court have the 4 obligation to let someone who's talking to the press 5 about a case to tell him he's gotten it wrong or not. б I came down on the side of you're 7 entitled to say anything you want to anyone about the 8 case, at any time you want, for whatever purpose you 9 want, and it's not my obligation to tell you you're wrong when you talk to the press about what you're 10 11 saying. So you think I'm wrong, that's fine. 12 13 I disagree with you. 14 MR. KRISLOV: Okay. That's the 15 current motion. That's the recent --16 THE COURT: Your motion to --MR. KRISLOV: Vacate clarification --17 18 THE COURT: Yes. MR. KRISLOV: -- and to certify the 19 20 question. THE COURT: Yes, it's denied. 21 I'm sorry? 22 23 MR. KRISLOV: The motion has --THE COURT: The other part of it about 24

1 the certification?

2	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.						
3	THE COURT: It's denied too.						
4	MR. KRISLOV: Okay.						
5	THE COURT: Now what else is there?						
б	MR. KRISLOV: Our motion for summary						
7	judgment.						
8	THE COURT: Yes, that's fine.						
9	MR. KRISLOV: That's fine. We'd like						
10	them to respond. If we do a briefing schedule on the						
11	motion to dismiss						
12	THE COURT: No, I'm not going to do a						
13	motion for summary judgment until I'm done with the						
14	motions to dismiss, because it may not be necessary.						
15	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, you have						
16	already upheld Count 1.						
17	THE COURT: It may not be necessary.						
18	I'm going to deal the with motions to dismiss. I'm						
19	going to deal with that.						
20	MR. KRISLOV: You're holding the						
21	THE COURT: It's entered and						
22	continued.						
23	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Our renewed						
24	motion for class certification.						

1THE COURT: Yes. That's something --2MR. KRISLOV: That's been pending for3a long time.

4 THE COURT: So the question again is, 5 do I deal with the motion to dismiss first, or -б which is my inclination, for the same reason, just in 7 terms of efficiency. If it's unnecessary, then I 8 don't have to deal with the motion for class 9 certification. Based upon the recent case with the 10 11 Supreme Court, which upheld me, you have your motion for certification in. No one can claim otherwise. 12 No one can undercut about that in terms of procedure. 13 14 So my question to you, Clint, is why 15 deal with the motion for certification, class certification, before it's necessary, as long as 16 17 you're not prejudiced thereby? MR. KRISLOV: Well, the question is 18 19 who we're representing, and, you know, it's been pending for a long time, and --20 21 THE COURT: I know it has, but we've been dealing with other things for a long time, and 22 23 we've probably got those to the side of us. MR. KRISLOV: Well, it may never get 24

there, it seems like.

2	Here's what I would propose. I would						
3	propose that and I've read the Funds' motions to						
4	dismiss, read all of them.						
5	THE COURT: I haven't because I didn't						
6	get them.						
7	MR. KRISLOV: I read all of them, and						
8	I got them yesterday, as the agreement was.						
9	MR. PRENDERGAST: All but one.						
10	MR. KRISLOV: Pardon?						
11	MR. PRENDERGAST: All but one.						
12	MR. KRISLOV: No.						
13	THE COURT: You didn't get the City's.						
14	MR. KRISLOV: I said all the Funds'						
15	motions were filed yesterday, and I reviewed those.						
16	They're different. And we'll see though we had						
17	hoped to see the City's motion today so that we could						
18	figure out how long it will take to deal with it.						
19	Here's what I suggest is the most						
20	efficient way to deal with this is that when the						
21	City's motion comes in, we think, because most of the						
22	Funds are rehashing arguments that they made to you						
23	before, most of which were rejected, I suspect the						
24	City's motion is not going to differ substantially						

1 from what it did the first time.

2	What I would suggest is that, barring				
3	some I guess we wait until we see the City's				
4	motion, but presuming it's going to be essentially				
5	what it was before				
6	THE COURT: What's your suggestion?				
7	MR. KRISLOV: My suggestion is that				
8	you, over our disagreement I know we disagree				
9	fundamentally on this case but that after				
10	reviewing their motion, you would rule, likely, that				
11	you would still dismiss the third amended complaint,				
12	the Counts 2 and 3 now with prejudice, and you would				
13	uphold Count 1 the way that you had ruled and made				
14	findings there was no just cause to delay enforcement				
15	or appeal. Because at that point, the most efficient				
16	way to deal with it is to get that case up on appeal.				
17	THE COURT: Before we deal with				
18	summary judgment?				
19	MR. KRISLOV: Yes. You can I mean,				
20	otherwise, we're going to spend another three to four				
21	months				
22	THE COURT: And before we deal with				
23	class certification?				
24	MR. KRISLOV: You know, it's				

getting the legal question decided is the most
 important thing. And people -- because there's no
 injunction --

4 THE COURT: I understand what you're 5 saying. And I wanted to -- what is the Funds' and б the City's point of view on 308 certification? I'm 7 not sure what the certified question would be as to 8 how you would like to phrase it or I would like to 9 phrase it. 10 MR. KRISLOV: So you don't have to 11 certify the question for this purpose. All you have 12 to do -- because you'd be dismissing --13 THE COURT: 304 language. 14 MR. KRISLOV: Yes. 15 THE COURT: So Clint would like to, as good trial lawyers do, look ahead three steps, figure 16 17 out what's probable and what's going to happen, and 18 we don't know what's going to happen. And I'm not 19 going to make any ruling today until I've already ruled on the motions to dismiss. 20 21 But assuming your motions to dismiss are handled in the way that Mr. Krislov suggests is 22 23 likely, I guess the question is, you don't have to make a decision today, are you all going to be 24

agreeing to 304(a) language or not? That's something
 for you to think about.

3 And I do take your point that on the 4 legal issue, it would be nice to have that subject to 5 review as soon as possible for obvious reasons. б It does seem to be the most efficient 7 way. I agree with you on that. Prior to dealing 8 with class certification, prior to dealing with 9 summary judgment, it would be nice to get a somewhat definitive ruling from whichever higher court it's 10 11 going to go to. 12 MR. KRISLOV: You and I will probably 13 get along probably lots better after we know where 14 we're going. 15 THE COURT: Mr. Krislov, you keep saying that, you know. I guess you like to think of 16 17 yourself as being a person who's a target. But I 18 told you this on the record. It's the way I feel 19 about you off the record and on the record. I'll say 20 it again. 21 I don't have any problem with you personally or professionally. In fact, I have said 22 23 on the record how much I admire what you do and who you do it for and the people you do it for, which is 24

the people from whence I came. And the motivation
 and the intent, it's something I admire and always
 have.

4 So I wish you'd stop telling me, or at 5 least give me a basis for why you think that you and б I have problems, because I don't see them. 7 MR. KRISLOV: We just fundamentally 8 disagree on the law governing this case. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's going to happen, and that's going to happen in life. But 10 it's not personal. It's just a disagreement on 11 12 that --13 MR. KRISLOV: Agreed. 14 THE COURT: -- at this point, so --15 regardless of what I want. So I don't -- I can't lead with my heart. I have to lead with my mind, 16 17 such it is. So there you are. So my suggestion is, in response to 18 19 what you say, Clint, is that we do deal would the motions to dismiss. I can't deal with it any other 20 21 way. We have to deal with it in a linear fashion. And assuming it ends up that way, 22 23 we'll take it up, and I will entertain 304(a) language, and I'll listen to objections from others. 24

1	Why don't you all talk about it at the					
2	appropriate time. If you're all behind it, it's					
3	even this is much stronger than this, as every					
4	good union person knows.					
5	MR. KRISLOV: Here's why I raise it					
6	this way, because what's going to happen otherwise,					
7	I'd like to see the City's motion to dismiss, and					
8	then I think we will all probably agree that you're					
9	going to come out the same way that you did					
10	THE COURT: But one still has to fight					
11	the fight before you know.					
12	MR. KRISLOV: Except that if we have					
13	to do full briefing on both sides on this issue, it's					
14	going to consume huge resources					
15	THE COURT: Oh, that's where you're					
16	coming from.					
17	MR. KRISLOV: And the other part is					
18	that it takes we're looking at three to five					
19	months of doing this before we get to the point that					
20	we put it up on appeal.					
21	And during that time, the healthcare					
22	premiums are still at that much higher level.					
23	THE COURT: Sure. I understand.					
24	MR. KRISLOV: And so the people are					

1	THE COURT: So what's the way around					
2	this? You're trying to cut out the middleman, to					
3	wit, an opinion, on the motion to dismiss that I'm					
4	sure the Funds and the City feels does avoid 137					
5	ramifications because it's legitimate, and it has to					
6	be heard, and it has to be ruled upon, and there has					
7	to be a definitive ruling from me without cutting out					
8	the middleman.					
9	How does one do that?					
10	MR. KRISLOV: We do that by when we					
11	see the City's motion, we would say, based on your					
12	most recent rulings, the March 4th and the					
13	December					
14	THE COURT: Both of them.					
15	MR. KRISLOV: And the November 3rd					
16	ruling, three of them, based on those, you would hold					
17	the first the third amended complaint, that you					
18	would uphold the Count 1, as you've described, the					
19	rights; that you would dismiss Counts 2 and 3, now					
20	with prejudice.					
21	And I've learned from Mr. Prendergast					
22	that you have to do at least one cause of action					
23	has to be denied with prejudice in order to support					
24	304 findings, but then you do that in a very summary					

fashion, and then we have an appealable order.

2 THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you what. 3 My inclination, my strong inclination, 4 is to not do it that way. However, I will listen to 5 what the other side has to do. I don't want to -the reason for it is because, (a) I think there has 6 7 to be a definitive ruling from me on their definitive motions. I think they're entitled to my 8 consideration of it in the same way you were, and I'd 9 like to give them that, and I'd like the record to 10 11 reflect that. 12 However, if the parties agree, I will certainly consider a shortcut that meets everyone's 13 14 agenda, legal agenda. 15 MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, I would like to point out, just for the record, that the 16 17 third amended complaint is almost 50 pages long. Ιt 18 adds three new causes of action. You haven't yet 19 ruled on that, and we don't have a briefing schedule 20 on it, which I think is the point that you made 21 starting out, that that's where we ought to start. That's what we ought to get done today. 22 23 The motion for reconsideration of your second order has been denied. Your motion -- I 24

assume the motion for class certification is entered
 and continued.

3	THE COURT: Yes.
4	MR. PRENDERGAST: And so we don't
5	really know where we're going to be until we get
6	there. If you deny if you granted our motion with
7	respect to all of the counts that we filed, and
8	that's the reason they're running late, because we
9	are not just rehashing old arguments. We have new
10	arguments because they have new claims, if you were
11	to grant our motion completely, he wouldn't need
12	304(a). His case would be dismissed. It's an
13	appeal.
14	So I think we're a little bit ahead of
15	ourselves. I think your inclination is correct. We
16	need a briefing schedule on the only motion that's
17	now before you, which is the motions are all
18	before you, which are the motions to dismiss. I
19	assure you I will not be asking for any more time. I
20	appreciate the extension.
21	And we can work out Monday's date for
22	a briefing schedule. All Mr. Krislov has to tell us
23	is how long he'll need to respond.
24	THE COUDT: Mr. Donbom?

24 THE COURT: Mr. Donham?

22

2 said. 3 MS. BOECKMAN: The Funds would like 4 the benefit of the Court's ruling on our motion to 5 dismiss. We definitely wouldn't be opposed to an 6 expedited briefing schedule, but I think it is 7 important. Like Rich points out, there are new 8 counts on the third amended complaint. We'd like the benefit of the Court's ruling on those. 9 10 MR. KUGLER: Likewise, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: All right. I think that's 12 the appropriate way to go, Clint. I do understand 13 your urgency and your desire to not expend resources, precious resources, financial resources and time 14 15 because of the premiums. I understand that. 16 But other than -- I will take up your 17 offer. I'm sure Mr. Krislov would like this to be 18 expedited, if possible, which I'll grant. 19 Other than that, they're entitled to have their day and to have the Court consider their 20 21 motions on their own, especially in light of the three additional counts, something I haven't thought 22 23 of but makes sense. So your motion to -- your suggestion 24

is it takes two to tango -- it's denied because they 1 2 don't want to and because I don't really want to do 3 it that way. I'm going to do it the right way, in a 4 linear way, and give them a ruling. I think they're 5 entitled to that. б So can we enter a briefing schedule 7 today so we don't have to wait until Monday? I won't 8 be here next week. 9 MR. KRISLOV: I won't be here next week either, but I'm not -- sorry. I won't 10 11 voluntarily do it in the blind. I would like to see 12 that --13 THE COURT: Great. I'll be gone. I'm 14 going with my wife. She's telling me I'm going out 15 of town next week. 16 MR. KRISLOV: We're both going out of 17 town next week. THE COURT: And if you don't want to 18 19 enter into a briefing schedule, that's fine. 20 When are you back from your trip? MR. KRISLOV: I'll be back the 21 following week. So if we're in the following Monday 22 23 or Tuesday, that should be fine. THE COURT: Let me check. The week 24

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1
      after Easter. I will not -- I have to go to EdCon
 2
      for teaching and to be taught the week of
 3
      April 4th.
 4
                      Is April 8th filled?
 5
                      THE CLERK: Yeah. But you're also --
 6
      the week of the 28th -- you're gone next week, but
 7
      you're back --
 8
                      THE COURT: Oh, very good. How about
      any day the week of the 28th, including April 1st?
9
10
                      What day is best for you, Clint?
11
                      MR. KRISLOV: Why don't we do it
12
      March 29th?
13
                      THE COURT: Mr. Goldstein, is that a
      good day for you? Mr. Prendergast?
14
15
                      MR. PRENDERGAST: March 29th.
16
                      THE COURT: Mr. Donham?
17
                      MR. DONHAM: Works, Your Honor.
18
                      THE COURT: I don't remember your
19
      name.
20
                      MS. BOECKMAN: Sarah.
21
                      THE COURT: What's your last name?
                      MS. BOECKMAN: Boeckman.
22
23
                      MR. PRENDERGAST: She takes Ed Burke's
24
      place.
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THE COURT: Well, thank you. You're
 doing the Court a great favor.

3 David, is that all right with you? 4 MR. KRISLOV: Can we do it the 5 28th instead -- we'll do it the 29th. б THE COURT: It's just to set a 7 briefing schedule. I'll get you in and out of here, 8 I promise. And you if you all e-mail each other and 9 talk, you can agree upon a briefing schedule and give me an agreed-upon order. As long as you set the 10 clerk's status date for a Monday, you can do that. 11 12 So, Mr. Goldstein, will you be out of 13 town? 14 MR. GOLDSTEIN: No, I'm around. 15 THE COURT: Did he give you the right to agree upon a briefing schedule? 16 17 MR. GOLDSTEIN: Maybe. 18 THE COURT: Okay. I know. So if you 19 all want to do that and bring it in, it will be signed by me or Judge Allen in my absence, and we can 20 21 get that done. Otherwise, we'll put it for the 29th 22 23 until we hear otherwise, at 9:30, get you in and out of here. 24

1		MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you very much.
2		THE COURT: You're welcome. Wish you
3	all well.	
4		(Proceedings adjourned at 9:58 a.m.,
5		March 18, 2016.)
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

2						
3	I, JERRI ESTELLE, CSR, RPR, doing					
4	business in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois,					
5	do hereby certify that I reported in computerized					
6	shorthand the foregoing proceedings as appears from					
7	my stenographic notes.					
8	I further certify that the foregoing					
9	is a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand					
10	notes and contains all the testimony had at said					
11	proceedings.					
12	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my					
13	hand as Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the					
14	State of Illinois on March 18, 2016.					
15						
16						
	Jerri Estelle, CSR, RPR					
17	License Number: 084-003284					
18						
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT - CHANCERY DIVISION						
MICHAEL W. UNDERWOOD, et al.,)						
Plaintiffs,)						
vs.) No. 13 CH 17450) Calendar 13						
CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal) Corporation,)						
Defendant,)						
and))						
Trustees of the Policemen's) Annuity and Benefit Fund of) Chicago; Trustees of the) Firemen's Annuity and Benefit) Fund of Chicago; Trustees of) the Municipal Employees') Annuity and Benefit Fund of) Chicago; and Trustees of the) Laborers' & Retirement Board) Employees' Annuity and Benefit) Fund of Chicago, et al.,) Defendants.)						
Decord of progoodings had at the						
Record of proceedings had at the						

hearing of the above-entitled cause, before the Honorable NEIL H. COHEN, one of the Judges of said Court, on May 12, 2016, in Room 2308, Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois, commencing at 9:30 a.m.

	Page	2	Page 4
1 APPEARANCES		1	MR. DONHAM: Good morning Cary Donham
 2 KRISLOV & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 3 20 North Wacker Drive, Suite 1300 		2	on behalf of the Laborers' Fund.
3 20 North Wacker Drive, Suite 13004 Chicago, Illinois 60606		3	THE COURT: All right.
5 (312) 606-0500		4	MS. BOECKMAN: Good morning, Your
6 BY: Mr. Clinton A. Krislov clint@krislovlaw.com,		5	Honor. Sarah Boeckman on behalf of the Fire and
7		6	Municipal Fund.
Mr. Kenneth T. Goldstein 8 ken@krislovlaw.com		7	MR. PRENDERGAST: Richard Prendergast
for the plaintiffs;		8	for the City.
9 RICHARD J. PRENDERGAST, LTD.		9	MR. LAYDEN: Mike Layden on behalf of
10		10	the City.
111 West Washington Street, Suite 1100		11	MR. KUGLER: David Kugler, Police
11 Chicago, Illinois 60602		12	Fund.
12		13	MR. KRISLOV: Good morning, Your
(312) 641-0881 13		14	Honor. Clint Krislov.
BY: Mr. Richard J. Prendergast		15	MR. GOLDSTEIN: Ken Goldstein.
 14 rprendergast@rjpltd.com, 15 Mr. Michael Layden 		16	MR. KRISLOV: On behalf of the
mlayden@rjpltd.com		17	plaintiffs.
16 for the City;		18	THE COURT: Welcome, everybody.
 DAVID R. KUGLER & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 6160 North Cicero Avenue 		19	Clint, did Mr. Prendergast keep his
19 Suite 308		20	word to you and file his response in time?
20 Chicago, Illinois 60646 21 (312) 263-3020		20	
22 BY: Mr. David R. Kugler		22	MR. KRISLOV: He filed it, I believe,
davidkugler@comcast.net 23 for the Trustees of the Policemen's			Tuesday late. And we've gone through it.
Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago;		23	The Matthews decision, which came down
24		24	from the Illinois Supreme Court, they have addressed
	Page	3	Page 5
1 A P P E A R A N C E S (Continued)		1	extensively in their briefs. We would like a short
2 3 BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD.		2	time for surreply on just that issue.
3 BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD.4 Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300		3	And I would be able to do it sooner,
5 Chicago, Illinois 60602		4	but we also have the direct appeal motion that we
6 (312) 541-8600		5	have to the City had things on the 9th and the
7 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman		6	10th, so we have time to respond to those, and
sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com		7	we're going to address the Supreme Court on the
8 for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago;		8	Matthews effect on this case as well.
9		9	So if we could have until the
10 TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP		10	23rd to file our surreply, and then we would like
11 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800		11	
12 Chicago, Illinois 60601		12	
13 (312) 836-4038 14 BY: Mr. Cary E. Donham		13	Susan's taking me to Rome between the 26th and
cdonham@taftlaw.com,		14	
15		15	period of time.
for the Trustees of the Laborers' & 16 Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and		16	8
16 Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago.		17	first opportunity that you might have in June if
17		18	
18		19	
19		20	what it is you have to say, but how about the
20 21		21	following week sometime, the week of June 13th.
22		22	\mathcal{O}
23		23	
24		24	that the decision was filed on the 5th. The other

2 (Pages 2 to 5)

Page	6	
2030	~	

Page	8	
rage	0	

	Page б		Page 8
1	parties	1	THE COURT: It was today, but it's not
2	THE COURT: The Matthews decision?	2	going to happen because
3	MR. DONHAM: The Matthews decision.	3	MR. KRISLOV: Right. Well, we can do
4	THE COURT: Yes, I've read it.	4	it for everything but the surreply, or we can just
5	MR. DONHAM: And we all had to respond	5	THE COURT: Nah that's right. We
6	to it in three days by the	6	put it on today's date to accommodate Richard.
7	THE COURT: What's your point?	7	That's fine. Let's have another clerk
8	MR. DONHAM: Well, it seems like two	8	status date set. 5-23 is when you want your surreply
9	extra weeks, but if Mr. Krislov needs that courtesy,	9	done. That's a Monday. Our clerk status dates are
10	I don't object.	10	on Mondays. Is the 31st available, the day after
11	THE COURT: Then why even say it?	11	Memorial Day?
12	You've wasted my time for nothing. Sorry. I'm on	12	THE CLERK: Yes.
13	prednisone. It's the prednisone talking.	13	THE COURT: Let's set a clerk status
14^{13}	But, I mean, if you're going to give	14	date, the new clerk status date on this issue, this
15	it to him, then why what are you objecting for?	15	briefing, to 5-31 at 9:00 a.m. If someone can't make
16	And it's not based on his schedule, it's based on	16	it because they're out of town with their family,
17	mine.	17	it's understandable. Someone else can cover for you,
18	You want to talk to my wife?	18	or give it to your honorable opponent, and he or she
19	MR. DONHAM: Oh, I'm not complaining	19	can do that for you.
20	about I wish you the best for your vacation.	20	5
20	THE COURT: Thank you. It's not a	21	And Deborah will give you a ruling
22	•	22	date. But right now, we're talking about an oral
22	vacation. But, of course, it's granted.	22	argument date essentially, yes, Clint? MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
	MR. KRISLOV: Oh, Your Honor, anytime	23	
24	you get a week in Rome, it's a vacation.	24	THE COURT: And how about June 15th or
	Page 7		Page 9
1	THE COURT: I've never been.	1	16th at what's the schedule look like on that day?
2	MR. KRISLOV: It's a great	2	Do I have any motions or hearings set?
3	THE COURT: She's a member of the	3	I heard that. We'll accommodate you.
4	board of trustees of Loyola, and it's the annual	4	THE CLERK: June 15th is good.
5	meeting this time, so things are changing with	5	Deborah set it for ruling date not before
6	Loyola.	6	June 22nd, but this is just
7	So they're going to Rome, I guess	7	THE COURT: Well, that's fine, because
8	maybe to speak to somebody.	8	we'll have oral argument anyway before that.
9	MR. KRISLOV: It's all roads lead	9	So someone's on trial the 15th or
10	there, and actually, it's a we were just there	10	16th, is that what I heard?
11	last summer.	11	MR. PRENDERGAST: We're starting a
12	THE COURT: Did you enjoy it?	12	trial, but we have a break, so we're available those
13	MR. KRISLOV: Yes, and getting to I	13	days.
14	mean, I'll be glad to go ex parte and limit our	14	THE COURT: I'm suggesting 1:30 or so.
15	discussion to Rome.	15	It will take all hopefully, it won't be four hours
16	THE COURT: No, I can't do that.	16	this time. But we'll talk. And I'm suggesting 1:30
17	But what does the week of	17	on, we'll say, June 15th? Is that a good date?
18	June 13th look like for us?	18	MR. PRENDERGAST: That will be great.
19	THE CLERK: It's good.	19	Can I speak to counsel's request?
20	THE COURT: All right. I would like	20	THE COURT: Give me one second. 6-15
21	to take a look at what everyone has to say.	21	at 1:30 for oral argument, and I set the new clerk
22	Do we have a clerk status date on	22	status date of 5-31, is that right, Richard?
23		23	MR. PRENDERGAST: That's what I have.
23 24	these already set? MR. KRISLOV: It was today.	23 24	MR. PRENDERGAST: That's what I have. THE COURT: At 9:00 a.m.

3 (Pages 6 to 9)

4	Page 10		Page 12
1	Yes, what.	1	how long it's going to take for him to reply to the
2	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, I'm not	2	issues that you raise with regard to Matthews. But I
3	objecting to the surreply, but I would like some	3	want the record to be clear that I'm giving him every
4	limitations. Number one, I'd like to see a five-page	4	opportunity to do so in the way he chooses, not you.
5	limitation on it, the surreply.	5	He's the master of his fate, and
6	And number two, I would like to limit	6	you're the master of yours, and I'm the master of all
7	it to reply to what we have to say about Matthews,	7	of yours. And I'm giving him every right and every
8	because it's a reply.	8	opportunity to fully discuss it.
9	THE COURT: Well, let me talk to you	9	That being said, Clint, you are to
10	about it so I can understand it and make a decision.	10	restrict yourself to the Matthews issue and nothing
11	Matthews just came down, and it, of	11	more.
12	course, may or may not have any impact on this, and I	12	Of course, you can explain how it
13	want to hear what the parties have to say.	13	impacts all the other issues that you raised before,
14	But who raised it first in which	14	but without rearguing those.
15	brief?	15	MR. KRISLOV: Oh, no.
16	MR. PRENDERGAST: We raised it in our	16	THE COURT: And I'll just trust you to
17	reply, because it came down between their response	17	do that. And if you stray, I won't consider it.
18	and their reply.	18	MR. KRISLOV: I think the Laborers and
19	THE COURT: Sure.	19	the Municipal and Fire also mention Matthews, so, you
20	MR. PRENDERGAST: Which is the	20	know, we'll deal with it succinctly. I don't think
21	reason	21	that the length
22	THE COURT: And how much how long	22	THE COURT: Sure. So again, using the
23	was your reply brief? I think I extended page	23	ruling of reason, you are to restrict yourself to
24	limitations anyway.	24	that rule.
	Page 11		Page 13
1	MR. PRENDERGAST: Our reply we	1	MR. KRISLOV: Will do.
2	didn't our reply was 20 I think 19 or 20 pages.	2	THE COURT: Restrict yourself to
3	THE COURT: My feeling is the	3	Matthews, what issues it raises, how it impacts on
4	following: Your request with regard to page	4	your case, and that's that, in responding to the
5	limitations is denied. That's a limitation I put on	5	City.
6	as a matter of convenience to the Court in order to	6	That's all I can do, Richard. I have
7	have the parties use a rifle, not a shotgun, and	7	to be fair.
8	merely reply to that which has been raised.	8	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, you're
9	Now, Matthews came down. We have a	9	always very fair. The last time, you were very fair,
10	body of law that is now being before this Court, and	10	because the last time we were here, you said the rule
11	the parties want me to consider one way or another,	11	of reason. Okay, they filed a 56-page brief.
12	and I will. You have the right to make a record on	12	Now, when I see that, I don't want to
13	that, both sides, and I will.	13	see another 56-page brief. I don't think you do. We
14	And you spent 20 pages in your reply.	14	took 19 pages to respond to 56.
15	I extended the page limitation for that, and I said,	15	My concern is you've answered it.
	using the rule of reason, so that no party, in this	16	You've answered it. He's restricting it to Matthews.
16	using the rule of reason, so that no purty, in this		
	case you, would be prevented from saying whatever it	17	THE COURT: Just to Matthews.
16	case you, would be prevented from saying whatever it	17 18	THE COURT: Just to Matthews. If you need to spend more than that
16 17			
16 17 18	case you, would be prevented from saying whatever it is you need to say in order to effectively represent	18	If you need to spend more than that
16 17 18 19	case you, would be prevented from saying whatever it is you need to say in order to effectively represent your counsel your client but more importantly,	18 19	If you need to spend more than that which the City has spent, you may not do so without
16 17 18 19 20	case you, would be prevented from saying whatever it is you need to say in order to effectively represent your counsel your client but more importantly, put before me, this Court and future courts, the	18 19 20	If you need to spend more than that which the City has spent, you may not do so without leave of Court.
16 17 18 19 20 21	case you, would be prevented from saying whatever it is you need to say in order to effectively represent your counsel your client but more importantly, put before me, this Court and future courts, the issues you think you need to raise and the points you	18 19 20 21	If you need to spend more than that which the City has spent, you may not do so without leave of Court. So in a sense, you have a 20-page

4 (Pages 10 to 13)

	Page 14		Page 16
-			
1	THE COURT: And I don't think it will	1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
2	be either. So let's just agree that anything beyond	2	
3	that defies the rule of reason.	3	I, JERRI ESTELLE, CSR, RPR, doing
4	MR. KRISLOV: The only	4	business in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois,
5	THE COURT: We're not including	5 6	do hereby certify that I reported in computerized
6	exhibits.	7	shorthand the foregoing proceedings as appears from my stenographic notes.
7	MR. KRISLOV: If I added up all the	8	I further certify that the foregoing
8	pages that they all the City and the funds dealt	9	is a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand
9	with, I'm sure we would get to more than that. But I	10	notes and contains all the testimony had at said
10	don't think that's the problem.	11	proceedings.
11	THE COURT: Maybe so, but my guess is,	12	
12	and I haven't read it, and I don't know, that most	13	hand as Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the
13	likely no new issues or points were made by the other	14	State of Illinois on May 20, 2016.
14	parties that were not enunciated by the City.	15	SI QA GUN
15	So if you find it's a problem, please	16	Serre Estelle
16	ask me first. You all know how to reach me. You may		Jerr Estelle, CSR, RPR
17	do so through a phone call, as long as everyone's on	17	License Number: 084-003284
18	the line, or at least Richard and you are on the	18	QUI DIA NA
19	line. Richard can speak for everyone else if that's	19	
20	what you all agree to.	20	
21	But you have a limitation of 20 pages	21	
22	unless for some reason you think that 20 pages is not	22	
23	enough for you to enunciate your position.	23	
24	MR. KRISLOV: Shouldn't be a problem.	24	
	Page 15		hand as Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Illinois on May 20, 2016.
1	THE COURT: I don't think it would be.		0
2	So that's that. Anything else?		Y.
3	MR. PRENDERGAST: That's all.		•
4	THE COURT: Anything from anybody		
5	else?		
6	MR. PRENDERGAST: Nothing, Your Honor.		
7	MR. KRISLOV: Since we can't go off		
8	the record on stuff		
9	THE COURT: There are other people		
10	waiting, Clint.		
11	MR. KRISLOV: Okay.		
12	THE COURT: You know, I'll rely on the		
13	universe to teach me about Rome, and I'm sure it		
14	will.		
15	MR. KRISLOV: You can do the it's a		
16	small town. You can walk around, and the subway		
17	system is understandable. And I found that doing		
18	that immeasurably adds to the enjoyment anyway.		
19	THE COURT: Thank you very much.		
20	MR. KRISLOV: Bon voyage.		
21	(Proceedings adjourned at 9:48 a.m.,		
22	May 12, 2016.)		
23			
24			

5 (Pages 14 to 16)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT - CHANCERY DIVISION
MICHAEL W. UNDERWOOD, et al.,)
Plaintiffs,)
vs.) No. 13 CH 17450) Calendar 13
CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal) Corporation,))
Defendant,)
and)
Trustees of the Policemen's) Annuity and Benefit Fund of) Chicago; Trustees of the) Firemen's Annuity and Benefit) Fund of Chicago; Trustees of) the Municipal Employees') Annuity and Benefit Fund of) Chicago; and Trustees of the) Laborers' & Retirement Board) Employees' Annuity and Benefit) Fund of Chicago, et al.,)
Defendants.)
Record of proceedings had at the
hearing of the above-entitled cause, before the

Honorable NEIL H. COHEN, one of the Judges of said Court, on July 6, 2016, in Room 2308, Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois, commencing at 1:30 p.m.

	Page 2	Page 4
1	A P P E A R A N C E S	¹ THE COURT: Once again, good
2		² afternoon, everyone. Underwood versus City of
3 4	KRISLOV & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 20 North Wacker Drive, Suite 1300	³ Chicago.
5	Chicago, Illinois 60606	⁴ For Michael Underwood, et al.
6	(312) 606-0500	⁵ MR. KRISLOV: Clint Krislov. With me
7	BY: Mr. Clinton A. Krislov	⁶ is Ken Goldstein, Your Honor, and many members of the
8	clint@krislovlaw.com,	 ⁷ participant class to be are with us today as well.
	Mr. Kenneth T. Goldstein	⁸ THE COURT: Thank you. You're all
9	ken@krislovlaw.com	⁹ welcome to be here.
10	for the plaintiffs;	¹⁰ And for the City of Chicago and the
11	RICHARD J. PRENDERGAST, LTD.	¹¹ pension funds.
12 13	111 West Washington Street, Suite 1100	¹² MR. PRENDERGAST: For the City of
14	Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 641-0881	¹³ Chicago, Corporation Counsel, Steve Patton and
15	BY: Mr. Richard J. Prendergast,	¹⁴ Richard Prendergast.
16	rprendergast@rjpltd.com,	¹⁵ THE COURT: Mr. Patton.
16	Mr. Stephen Patton,	
17	for the City;	 MR. PATTON: Good morning, Your Honor. MS. BOECKMAN: For the Municipal
18	DAVID R. KUGLER & ASSOCIATES, LTD.	¹⁸ Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund, and also the
19 20	6160 North Cicero Avenue Suite 308	¹⁹ Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund, Sarah Boeckman
21	Chicago, Illinois 60646	Themen's Annuty and Denemi Fund, Sarah Doeckman
22	(312) 263-3020	and Ed Burke.
23	BY: Mr. David R. Kugler	THE COOKT. All fight. WI. Burke,
24	davidkugler@comcast.net for the Trustees of the Policemen's	you're going to let ner speak for you.
	Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago;	WIR. BURKE. Tes.
	Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago;	²⁴ THE COURT: It shows your wisdom, sir.
	Page 3	Page 5
1		
	A P P E A R A N C E S (Continued)	¹ MR. BURKE: Oh. ves. She's a lot
2	A P P E A R A N C E S (Continued)	WIK. BUKKE. OII, yes. She's a lot
3	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD.	² easier to look at, too.
	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300	² easier to look at, too.
3 4	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD.	 ² easier to look at, too. ³ MR. PRENDERGAST: You're on the
3 4 5	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman	 a control of the second second
3 4 5 6 7	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600	 a control of the second second
3 4 5 6	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com	 a control of the second second
3 4 5 6 7	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke	 a control of the second second
3 4 5 7 8 9	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity	 a control of the second second
3 4 5 6 7 8	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees	 a control of the second second
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago	 a construction of the second second
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and	 a construction of the second second
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60601	 a lot and the second second
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 836-4038	 a lot and the second second
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 836-4038 BY: Mr. Cary E. Donham	 a construction of the properties of the
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 836-4038	 a lot and the proponents of the motion will a lot argument for previously filed motions to dismiss the a lot argument for the proponents of the motion will b going first. And who is speaking for the
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 836-4038 BY: Mr. Cary E. Donham cdonham@taftlaw.com, for the Trustees of the Laborers' & Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and	 and the proponents of the motion will and the proponents of the motion will be going first. And who is speaking for the and the proponents of the motion will be going first. And who is speaking for the and the proponents of the motion will be going first. And who is speaking for the
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	 BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 836-4038 BY: Mr. Cary E. Donham cdonham@taftlaw.com, for the Trustees of the Laborers' & 	 and the propenties of the properties of the propenties of
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 836-4038 BY: Mr. Cary E. Donham cdonham@taftlaw.com, for the Trustees of the Laborers' & Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and	 and the proponents of the motion will be going first. And who is speaking for the MR. PRENDERGAST: I am, Your Honor. MR. KUGLER: For the Policemen's MR. KUGLER: For the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund, David Kugler. THE COURT: David. MR. DONHAM: Good afternoon, Your Honor. For the Laborers' and Retirement Board, Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, Cary Donham. THE COURT: Hi, Cary. All right. We're here on oral argument for previously filed motions to dismiss the third amended complaint in this matter. And the proponents of the motion will be going first. And who is speaking for the defendants? MR. PRENDERGAST: I am, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Prendergast, is anyone else speaking on behalf of the City of Chicago.
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 836-4038 BY: Mr. Cary E. Donham cdonham@taftlaw.com, for the Trustees of the Laborers' & Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and	 and the propenets of the motion will and the propenets of the motion will MR. PRENDERGAST: You're on the annuity and Benefit Fund, David Kugler. THE COURT: David. MR. DONHAM: Good afternoon, Your Honor. For the Laborers' and Retirement Board, Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, Cary Donham. THE COURT: Hi, Cary. All right. We're here on oral argument for previously filed motions to dismiss the third amended complaint in this matter. And the proponents of the motion will be going first. And who is speaking for the defendants? MR. PRENDERGAST: I am, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Prendergast, is anyone else speaking on behalf of the City of Chicago. MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes, the City of
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD. Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300 Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600 BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com Mr. Edmund Burke eburke@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago and Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP 111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800 Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 836-4038 BY: Mr. Cary E. Donham cdonham@taftlaw.com, for the Trustees of the Laborers' & Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and	 and the propenets of the motion will and the propenets of the motion will MR. PRENDERGAST: You're on the annuity and Benefit Fund, David Kugler. THE COURT: David. MR. DONHAM: Good afternoon, Your Honor. For the Laborers' and Retirement Board, Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, Cary Donham. THE COURT: Hi, Cary. All right. We're here on oral argument for previously filed motions to dismiss the third amended complaint in this matter. And the proponents of the motion will be going first. And who is speaking for the defendants? MR. PRENDERGAST: I am, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Prendergast, is anyone else speaking on behalf of the City of Chicago. MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes, the City of

2 (Pages 2 to 5)

	Page 6	Page 8
1	THE COURT: What about the Pension	¹ Court's fully acquainted with the issues.
2	funds?	² So I may prolong maybe the half an
3	MS. BOECKMAN: Yes, I'll be speaking	³ hour is longer than I should take, but I'll try to
4	on behalf of the Municipal Fund and also the	⁴ get it done in that amount of time.
5	Fireman's Annuity and Benefit Fund.	⁵ THE COURT: The court reporter would
6	THE COURT: Does anyone else wish to	⁶ like all counsel to speak up loudly and clearly so
7	be heard?	⁷ she can hear, make sure I can hear.
8	MR. KUGLER: Your Honor, the	⁸ But, also, there are a number of
9	Policemen's Annuity, we're going to rest on the	⁹ citizens here. It's important that they have every
10	memorandums that we filed in the case, and if the	¹⁰ opportunity to be heard, although you're not
11	Court has any questions, we're happy to respond.	¹¹ addressing them specifically, you're addressing me.
12	THE COURT: Very good.	¹² But if you could keep your voice up,
13	MR. DONHAM: Your Honor, I'm going to	¹³ everybody, it would be good for everybody.
14	speak on behalf of the Laborers' Fund, briefly.	¹⁴ MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you, Your
15	THE COURT: All right. And,	¹⁵ Honor.
16	Mr. Krislov, you're speaking on behalf of the	¹⁶ On December 3, 2015, Your Honor
17	plaintiffs in this case; is that correct?	¹⁷ entered a memorandum of opinion and order addressing
18	MR. KRISLOV: Yes, Your Honor.	¹⁸ the plaintiffs' second amended complaint.
19	THE COURT: How much time do the	¹⁹ You dismissed Count 2 for failure to
20	parties wish to discuss the matter with me?	²⁰ state a claim for breach of a written contract, as
21	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, I hope	²¹ well as Count 3, the common-law equitable estoppel
22	to be finished within a half hour or less with	²² claim.
23	opening remarks.	²³ Count 1 was dismissed as to both the
24	THE COURT: Very good. We'll give you	²⁴ City and the Funds' obligations under the 1989, 1997
	Page 7	Page 9
1	a half hour at most. We'll give Mr. Burke's better	¹ and 2003 settlement amendments to the Pension Code.
2	half another 15 minutes if you need it. And, also,	² The only part of the amended complaint that was not
3	Cary, you'll need five minutes or so; is that right?	³ dismissed at that time was the declaratory relief
4	MR. DONHAM: That's about right, Your	⁴ claimed as to the City and the Funds' obligations
5	Honor.	⁵ under the '83 and '85 statutes.
6	THE COURT: All right. And,	⁶ On March 3, in response to the City's
7	Mr. Krislov, you'll have a combination of all that	
0	WIT. NUSIOV, VOU IT HAVE A COMDINATION OF AN UNAL	
8		⁷ motion for clarification and reconsideration, this
8 9	put together, and then I'll give you a few minutes	 ⁷ motion for clarification and reconsideration, this ⁸ Court issued a memorandum opinion and order that
		 ⁷ motion for clarification and reconsideration, this ⁸ Court issued a memorandum opinion and order that
9	put together, and then I'll give you a few minutes for rebuttal if necessary, all right?	 motion for clarification and reconsideration, this Court issued a memorandum opinion and order that addressed the City's and the Funds' obligations under
9 10	put together, and then I'll give you a few minutes for rebuttal if necessary, all right? MR. KRISLOV: That's fine.	 motion for clarification and reconsideration, this Court issued a memorandum opinion and order that addressed the City's and the Funds' obligations under the '83 and '85 amendments.
9 10 11	put together, and then I'll give you a few minutes for rebuttal if necessary, all right? MR. KRISLOV: That's fine. THE COURT: Mr. Prendergast, you have	 motion for clarification and reconsideration, this Court issued a memorandum opinion and order that addressed the City's and the Funds' obligations under the '83 and '85 amendments. You held on that occasion that and
9 10 11 12	put together, and then I'll give you a few minutes for rebuttal if necessary, all right? MR. KRISLOV: That's fine. THE COURT: Mr. Prendergast, you have the floor.	 motion for clarification and reconsideration, this Court issued a memorandum opinion and order that addressed the City's and the Funds' obligations under the '83 and '85 amendments. You held on that occasion that and I want to stress something. When I say "you held," I
9 10 11 12 13 14 15	put together, and then I'll give you a few minutes for rebuttal if necessary, all right? MR. KRISLOV: That's fine. THE COURT: Mr. Prendergast, you have the floor. MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you, Your	 motion for clarification and reconsideration, this Court issued a memorandum opinion and order that addressed the City's and the Funds' obligations under the '83 and '85 amendments. You held on that occasion that and I want to stress something. When I say "you held," I don't mean that something wasn't pleaded
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	put together, and then I'll give you a few minutes for rebuttal if necessary, all right? MR. KRISLOV: That's fine. THE COURT: Mr. Prendergast, you have the floor. MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you, Your Honor. Good afternoon.	 motion for clarification and reconsideration, this Court issued a memorandum opinion and order that addressed the City's and the Funds' obligations under the '83 and '85 amendments. You held on that occasion that and I want to stress something. When I say "you held," I don't mean that something wasn't pleaded sufficiently. I mean you made rulings as a matter of law, and after all these briefings and all these arguments, I think that's an important thing to keep
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17	put together, and then I'll give you a few minutes for rebuttal if necessary, all right? MR. KRISLOV: That's fine. THE COURT: Mr. Prendergast, you have the floor. MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you, Your Honor. Good afternoon. Your Honor, I'm going to try to hit on some points a little more than others and some not at all. And I don't want you to think that if I leave	 motion for clarification and reconsideration, this Court issued a memorandum opinion and order that addressed the City's and the Funds' obligations under the '83 and '85 amendments. You held on that occasion that and I want to stress something. When I say "you held," I don't mean that something wasn't pleaded sufficiently. I mean you made rulings as a matter of law, and after all these briefings and all these arguments, I think that's an important thing to keep in mind when that's the case.
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	put together, and then I'll give you a few minutes for rebuttal if necessary, all right? MR. KRISLOV: That's fine. THE COURT: Mr. Prendergast, you have the floor. MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you, Your Honor. Good afternoon. Your Honor, I'm going to try to hit on some points a little more than others and some not at all. And I don't want you to think that if I leave out something I don't think it's important.	 motion for clarification and reconsideration, this Court issued a memorandum opinion and order that addressed the City's and the Funds' obligations under the '83 and '85 amendments. You held on that occasion that and I want to stress something. When I say "you held," I don't mean that something wasn't pleaded sufficiently. I mean you made rulings as a matter of law, and after all these briefings and all these arguments, I think that's an important thing to keep in mind when that's the case. You held on that occasion that the
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3 (Pages 6 to 9)

	idge iv		
1	obligation, you held that the City does have an	1	City.
2	obligation to contribute through the collection of	2	Your Honor also found that apparent
3	the special tax levy. The money is used by the Funds	3	authority is not a basis for equitable estoppel
4	to subsidize and provide healthcare to the Funds'	4	against a public body.
5	annuitants, close quote.	5	Once again, the Supreme Court's
6	After your December 15, 2015, and	6	decision in Matthews absolutely confirms the
7	March 2016 decisions, the Illinois Supreme Court	7	correctness of that decision. The Supreme Court
8	issued a decision in Matthews. We've referred to it	8	rejected the contention that apparent authority can
9	in our reply briefs. Mr. Krislov was given leave to	9	be used to sustain an estoppel claim against a public
10	file an additional brief on Matthews.	10	body and reiterated that, and I quote, statements of
11	In Matthews, the Supreme Court	11	an unauthorized official where that official lacked
12	confirmed the correctness of your earlier decisions	12	the power to bind the municipality cannot work in
13	in a number of key respects, which I'll touch on here	13	estoppel.
14	as we go along.	14	The Supreme Court in Matthews likewise
15	First, as to the time-limited benefits	15	rejected the argument that allegations that the
16	provided under the 1989, 1997 and 2003 Pension Code	16	defendant acted consistent and this is a quote
17	amendments, your Honor found that those statutes	17	"acted consistent with the well-established
18	could not be used to premise a claim to lifetime	18	understanding that it had an obligation to provide
19	healthcare benefits.	19	retiree healthcare benefits by paying those benefits
20	In that regard, Your Honor held that	20	are insufficient as a matter of law to support an
21	the pension clause protects only benefits that have	21	estoppel claim."
22	actually been granted. It does not serve to	22	In short, the Matthews court totally
23	magically create, to use your words, a right to	23	vindicated Your Honor's decision on the estoppel
24	receive benefits not specifically granted.	24	claim as well.
	Page 11		Page 13
1	The Supreme Court in Matthews held the	1	And, in fact, in the Matthews case,
2	same thing. At paragraphs 59 and 63 of the Matthews	2	the court went further.
3	decision, the Supreme Court held, as you did, that	3	The court said that the premises for
4	the pension clause does not change the terms of the	4	the equitable estoppel claim, when you're dealing
5	contract or the essential nature of the rights	5	with a public body, in that case the CTA, has to be
6	conferred. Rather, the Supreme Court found the	6	an action authorized by the legislative branch of
7	pension clause simply protects the actual contract	7	that public body; in that case the board, in this
8	that governs the retirement system membership.	8	case, the City Council.
9	There is certainly no basis for	9	There's no allegation or no proof at
10	revisiting Your Honor's prior ruling on this point,	10	all that the City Council ever passed any ordinance
11	particularly after Matthews, and plaintiffs have	11	or passed a resolution consistent with claims that
12	certainly offered you no basis to do so.	12	are set forth in this complaint.

certainly offered you no basis to do so. are set forth in this complaint. 13 Second, Your Honor previously found At the end of the day, plaintiffs' 14 that plaintiffs had not stated a claim for estoppel opposition brief simply rehashes arguments that this 15 because plaintiffs failed to allege, first, an Court squarely rejected. 16 affirmative act by a City official with express For example, they once again argue 17 authority to bind the City. that Judge Green's prior ruling on motions to dismiss 18 THE COURT: On the contract issue. in Korshak is binding on this Court here. That 19 MR. PRENDERGAST: This is on the argument was without merit the last time, and this 20 Court rejected that argument in its prior ruling. equitable estoppel issue. 21 THE COURT: Oh, okay. Plaintiffs similarly suggest that the 22 MR. PRENDERGAST: And that the Supreme Court's decision in Heaton prevents the 23 plaintiffs undertook no inquiry into the unidentified General Assembly from providing time-limited 24 official's supposed actual authority to bind the benefits. But that simply ignores, as this Court

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4 (Pages 10 to 13)

	Page 14	Page 16
1	previously held, that Heaton did not address the	¹ a claim that they need a judgment on.
2	question of whether the general assembly can enact	² THE COURT: One second, please.
3	pension statutes with time limits. Plaintiffs, of	³ (Brief interruption.)
4	course, offered no reason why any of those arguments	⁴ THE COURT: Go ahead, Richard.
5	worked this time around any more than they worked	⁵ MR. PRENDERGAST: This Court has found
6	last time.	⁶ that the City has no direct obligation to provide or
7	What plaintiffs do not do, frankly,	 ⁷ subsidize retiree healthcare under the '83 and '85
8	because they can't, is explain how any of the	⁸ amendments, as I just mentioned.
9	allegations in the third amended complaint fixes the	⁹ Rather, this Court has found that the
10	defects that this Court previously found.	¹⁰ City's only obligation is to impose a tax levy to
11	And aside from as we'll discuss,	¹¹ support the Funds' obligations under the '83 and '85
12	hopefully briefly aside from the argument on	¹² amendments. That's your ruling on that motion to
13	Heaton, on Matthews, Matthews clearly stands for the	¹³ reconsider.
14	proposition that the contract that underlies a	¹⁴ The plaintiffs' claims under the '83
15	pension claim, whether it's a contract through the	¹⁵ and '85 amendments are barred by the ten-year statute
16	by virtue of the Pension Code or a written contract,	¹⁶ of limitations that applies to those claims.
17	collective bargaining agreement, it clearly does make	¹⁷ Plaintiffs did not bring any claim
18	clear that whatever is granted can be granted	¹⁸ against the Funds until the present litigation, even
19	conditionally. And conditionally could be a time	¹⁹ though those claims accrued almost 30 years ago, when
20	limit, as was the case in the various time-limited	²⁰ the Funds disclaimed an obligation to provide
21	statutes that Your Honor referenced in your previous	 ²¹ healthcare coverage for retirees, nor did the
22	decision.	²² plaintiffs preserve those claims in connection with
23	Now, I would like to address an issue	²³ the Korshak litigation.
24	that I think pertains particularly to the '83 and '85	²⁴ In October of 1987, the City brought
	Page 15	Page 17
1	Pension Code amendments.	¹ the Korshak litigation seeking to, among other
2	We've been in and out a little bit by	² things, obtain restitution of the amounts that the
3	the statute of limitations argument. I'd like to	³ City had previously paid for retiree healthcare. And
4	take this opportunity to address that in a thorough	⁴ the Funds moved to dismiss, and they filed
5	way. I think we tried do that in our briefs, but it	⁵ counterclaims, and that litigation proceeded.
6	is a significant issue here.	⁶ In the course of that litigation, the
7	THE COURT: And I'm interested most	⁷ Funds argued that they had no monetary obligation
8	with regard to that, and I am keen on that issue as	⁸ whatsoever for annuitants' healthcare obligations.
9	well. It's interesting you should raise that and	⁹ They had no obligation to provide healthcare.
10	decide to talk about it.	¹⁰ They drove a stake in the ground as to
11	I'm interested in knowing what	¹¹ what the Funds' position was with respect to their
12	allegations of fact I can rely upon to find any	¹² obligations. And at the same time, a class action
13	statute of limitations to the to groups three and	¹³ was filed and intervened in the case. That's the
14	four, for instance.	¹⁴ Korshak class action. Mr. Krislov represented the
15	MR. PRENDERGAST: Okay.	¹⁵ intervenors there.
16	THE COURT: As you discuss the matter.	¹⁶ In that case, they never asserted
17	MR. PRENDERGAST: I'll cover all four	¹⁷ against the Funds any claim that the Funds were
18	classes eventually.	¹⁸ liable for healthcare. They didn't make that claim
19	But, of course, one and two, even if	¹⁹ against the Funds. I think that in retrospect I
20	we didn't have a statute of limitations argument,	²⁰ wasn't there, Mr. Krislov was, he can speak to it
21	that's Korshak and Windows, we've already committed	²¹ but I think that in all likelihood, what was going on
22	to them.	²² is that when they came in to intervene, they had to
23	THE COURT: That's right.	²³ pick one side or the other. They chose to go after
23 24	THE COURT: That's right. MR. PRENDERGAST: And that's no longer	 pick one side or the other. They chose to go after the City. They didn't go after the Funds.

5 (Pages 14 to 17)

Page 18 1 The plaintiffs' complaint in this case Class 1 and 2, as I just indicated, is moot. 2 is the first time that the intervenors, the class Class four, those are people who were 3 members, have ever raised a claim that the Funds were hired after 1989. And all of those plaintiffs took 4 liable under the 1983 and 1985 amendments. That's 26 or obtained their pension rights under the 5 years after. They were put on notice of the Funds' time-limited statutes. The only statutes that apply 6 position, as stated by the Funds, in 1987. to class four are the time-limited statutes, and --7 because they're all hired before '89, and so they're

The Illinois ten-year statute of 8 8 limitations here bars the plaintiffs' claims. That's finished as far as a claim under the pension clause, 9 9 Illinois Appellate Court. That's Seventh Circuit because they're suing under a Pension Code that has 10 10 law. It's not disputed by the plaintiffs that if time limitations. 11 11 there's a limitation period, it's a ten-year Unless you change your view, and I 12 12 limitation period. would suggest you should not, particularly in light 13 13 of Matthews, class four is out. So when you're But plaintiffs' failure to bring a 14 14 claim against the Funds within that ten years, by looking at the accrual date, it's the date on which 15 15 December of 1997, renders those claims time barred they received notice of the position that the Funds 16 16 under the applicable statute of limitations. were taking and continue to take, that the Funds have 17 17 Now, in your December 3, 2015, no obligation. 18 18 opinion, you used the City's May 2013 notice They should have sued the Funds then, 19 19 regarding the three-year phaseout as sort of an or within ten years of when they got notice, or their 20 20 accrual date. And when you -- and I think that case is barred. That's what the statute of 21 21 determination was due as much to a lack of clear limitations claim is all about. 22 22 briefing on our part than anything else. Now, the plaintiffs claim that they 23 23 THE COURT: You're about to tell me preserved their claims by virtue of the Korshak 24 24 settlement agreement. I'm wrong.

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	Page 19		Page 21
1	MR. PRENDERGAST: I'm about to tell	1	The December 15, 1989, settlement
2	you that I disagree with you, Judge.	2	order in Korshak provides that the Funds' intervenors
3	THE COURT: Okay.	3	and annuitants may contend that the City is obligated
4	MR. PRENDERGAST: But, you know, I'm	4	to provide and pay for healthcare benefits of its
5	hoping to persuade you	5	retired employees. Doesn't say anything about the
6	THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead.	6	Funds. It does not
7	MR. PRENDERGAST: that you didn't	7	THE COURT: So the part of the Korshak
8	have the facts that you indicated a few minutes ago	8	agreement which talks about, and agrees, that the
9	you want to have, and that is that the proper accrual	9	parties would be restored to the same legal status
10	date for a claim is when you know you've got a claim.	10	that existed on October 31st, 1997, only applies to
11	That's basic.	11	the City, not the Funds? Is that your position?
12	And in 1987, everybody knew that the	12	MR. PRENDERGAST: It's yes. The
13	Funds were asserting that they had no obligation.	13	carve-out language does not mention any claim against
14	THE COURT: How did they know	14	the Funds, for a very good reason. It was basically
15	factually? What notice was given to, for instance,	15	an agreement between the City and the Funds. The
16	class three, class four, who at that time were not	16	intervenors went along with it. The intervenors had
17	even in existence and did not even have an attorney,	17	already chosen to go after the City.
18	let alone Mr. Krislov, who knew? Another question	18	They haven't made a claim against the
19	about that later.	19	Funds. The Funds, obviously, haven't made a claim
20	But how could people who were not yet	20	against the Funds. No annuitants have made a claim
21	a class be given notice of anything?	21	against the Funds. So the only claims that were
22	MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, in 1987, class	22	preserved were those that were in existence at the
23	three were people who were hired before 1987, or	23	time of the first agreement. It doesn't change
24	retired after 1987, and so class three falls in.	24	anything with respect to the 2003 agreement or

6 (Pages 18 to 21)

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Page 20

1Plaintiffs raise other issues and try1claims to be brought by subclass three. But no clair2to deflect the statute of limitations claim. We2was brought on behalf of subclass three until more3briefed those. I don't think there's anything3than ten years later, after the cause of action had4substantive that I need to respond to other than4accrued.5perhaps in my reply, so I'll wait on that.5Indeed, the Korshak litigation was6There's another statute of limitations6brought only on behalf of subclasses one and two. I7argument, though. The City's argument is if the7think Mr. Krislov even acknowledged that the City8Funds aren't liable, then if the statute has run on8could change the plan for future annuitants. It was9the Funds, the City's only liability, under your9not until 1998, which is beyond the ten-year statute10ruling, is derivative. And, therefore, if the10of limitations, 1998 being more than ten years since11derivative liability the primary liability doesn't11the City filed that '87 complaint, that Mr. Krislov12exist, there is no derivative liability. That's12even began to allude to claims of subclass three, and13precisely the reason we make this argument.141983 and 1985 statutes.	2	Page 22	Page 24
a The 2003 Korshak settlement likewise a Subclass four has no claim under the a did not preserve any claims against the Funds. That a a agreement only preserved claims against the formed barred since 1987 no longer Sta and '85 amendments for the reasons I just existed. There were no prior claims against the Funds to preserve. So the preservation argument fails. a Plaintiffs point to a November 27, That is their pension rights. Their 1980 stipulation between the City and the Funds, but fails. Code + that's what 1 - it's very clear from 10 Plaintiffs never preserved the claims against the Funds. 11 plaintiffs never preserved the claims against the Funds. 12 That sitpulation, consistent with Judge Green's statements in the December 1989 13 annuitants will be permitted to reargue the claims file 14 for the intervenor's initial pleading, which is only against the City. As I mentioned earlier in my argument, the City. As I mentioned carlier in my argument, the citie against the City. Page 23 14 Plaintiffs raise other issues and try Code with a the cause of action had accrued. 15 That situate of limitations argument that the City. Statelast the city on that. <t< th=""><th></th><th>settlement either to the extent of 2013</th><th>¹ prior to that date, so that retired afterwards</th></t<>		settlement either to the extent of 2013	¹ prior to that date, so that retired afterwards
3 did not preserve any claims against the Funds. That 3 *83 and *85 amendments for the reasons I just 4 agreement only preserved claims that anyone currently 5 5 that at the time of the settlement, because any claims of the settlement amendments twase anacted and each the settlement amendments wase anacted and the the first of the settlement amendments wase anacted and the the first of the settlement amendments wase anacted and of the settlement amendments wase anacted and of the settlement amendments wase anacted wase for settlement amendments wase anacted the claims wase anacted and of the settlement amendments wase anactement. 12 Mathews: You table premining in at a time when the	2		-
4 agreement only preserved claims that anyone currently 4 mentioned. That is, they were hired after the first 5 that had been time of the settlement amendments was enacted and each of 6 that had been time of the settlement amendments thereafter were enacted. 7 existed. There were no prior claims against the 8 Funds to preserve. So the preservation argument 11 1989 stipulation between the City and the Funds, but 12 1989 stipulation between the City and the Funds, but 13 That stipulation, consistent with 14 Judge Green's statements in the December 1989 27 settlement agreement, expressly provides that 30 minitants will be permitted to reargue the claims 44 the City. As I mentioned earlier in my argument, the 21 Plaintiffs raise other issues and try 22 Plaintiffs raise other issues and try 23 Plaintiffs raise other issues any tright 24 Plaintiffs raise other issues any try 25 Plaintiffs raise other issues and try 26 Plaintiffs raise other issues any try 27 Plaintiffs raise other issues any try 28 Plaintiffs raise other issues a	ځ		
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aFunds to preserve. So the preservation argument fails.apension rights, if I came in as a class four claimant, Thr coming in at a time when the Pension claimant, Thr coming in at a time when the Pension claimant, Thr coming in at a time when the Pension claimant, Thr coming in at a time when the Pension Code says my rights are time limited. And that's the Code that's what I it's very clear from Matthews: You take the contract that exists at the time you're hired. And Matthews couldn't be clearer on that.10Plaintiff's never preserve the claims against the Funds.11Code that's what I it's very clear from Matthews: You take the contract that exists at the time you're hired. And Matthews couldn't be clearer on that.16Judge Green's statements in the December 1989 settlement agreement, expressly provides that annuitants will be permitted to reargue the claims which were asserted in the Funds' counterclaims, that's only against the City, as well as the initial pleading, which is only against the City field a complaint seeking a declaration that it had no obligation to provide or subsidize retiree healthcare. Thus, the ten-year statute of limitations claim. We substantive that I need to respond to other than perhaps in my reply, so I'l wait on that.Page 2312Page 23Page 213Plaintiffs raise other issues and try to deflect the statute of limitations argument, though. The City's argument is if the Funds aren't liable, then if the statute has run on the Funds, the City's only liability, under your ruling, is derivative. And, therefore, if the erive is no derivative liability. That's argument, the gis another statute of limitations argument, though. The City's argument is if the Funds aren't l	7	•	
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¹⁴ But there is another class action ¹⁴ 1983 and 1985 statutes.	12		even began to and to chains of subclass three, and
But there is another class action 1965 and 1965 statutes.			even then never faised any of the claims under the
15 argument I'm commy There's enother statute of 15 Completing simulations are the second	13		1965 and 1965 statutes.
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argument that I ve just made for why then elam	13 14 15	•	argument that I ve just made for why then claim
Even if the plainting claims under under the 1985 and 1985 amendments is time barred	13 14 15 16		under the 1965 and 1965 amendments is time barred,
	13 14 15 16 17	une of and of amenuments were not otherwise barred	and for good reason. I think because they can't
by the statute of minitations, those claims would dispute what these facts are.	13 14 15 16 17 18		
still be time barred as to the only subclass that the row, you asked in the beginning, what	13 14 15 16 17 18 19	by the statute of limitations, those claims would	· · ·
	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	by the statute of limitations, those claims would still be time barred as to the only subclass that	²⁰ Now, you asked in the beginning, what
	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	by the statute of limitations, those claims would still be time barred as to the only subclass that could even potentially have a claim under the 1983	 Now, you asked in the beginning, what are the facts? The facts are all date related, and
	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	by the statute of limitations, those claims would still be time barred as to the only subclass that could even potentially have a claim under the 1983 and 1985 amendments, which is subclass three,	 Now, you asked in the beginning, what are the facts? The facts are all date related, and it's simply a matter of math. You just add ten years
	13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	by the statute of limitations, those claims would still be time barred as to the only subclass that could even potentially have a claim under the 1983	 Now, you asked in the beginning, what are the facts? The facts are all date related, and it's simply a matter of math. You just add ten years to the triggering dates.

7 (Pages 22 to 25)

	Page 26		Page 28
1	learn, as it does, and you don't anything for ten	1	They do raise in this particular
2	years, you can't come in 20 years later, 30 years	2	complaint another claim called the impairment of
3	later and assert that claim. It's pretty basic	3	contract claim.
4	statute of limitations.	4	Their impairment of contract claim
5	THE COURT: So, Richard, tell me again	5	fails for two pretty straightforward reasons. First,
6	when class three learned of it from your point of	6	it fails to identify what the contract is. They
7	view, and how they learned it.	7	didn't have a written contract here, and the contract
8	MR. PRENDERGAST: Class three would	8	clause covers legislative action. It has to be a
9	have known by the time they came into existence that	9	legislative impairment, and so there's no impairment
10	the on the first argument that the Funds had	10	of contract claim here.
11	taken the position that there was no liability on the	11	Plaintiffs, frankly, have offered no
12	part of the Funds. They took that position back as	12	response to either defect in their impairment in
13	far as, I think, 1987.	13	trying to defend their impairment of contract claim.
14	They would have known in the second	14	They raise an equal protection claim.
15	argument, after when they filed when the	15	You know, as you're probably familiar, there are two
16	plaintiffs filed their complaint. They already know	16	different standards for equal protection claims. If
17	what the City's position is. And they don't file	17	you're dealing with a suspect class, then you have a
18	their claim on behalf of that class, subclass, until	18	more significant burden to defend the classification.
19	years later. More than exactly 11 years later	19	But there is no suspect class here.
20	and, therefore, they can't make that claim. '87	20	We're not talking race, gender,
21	to '98 is 11 years.	21	nationality, etcetera, and they don't suggest
22 23	THE COURT: Uhm-hmm. Okay.	22	otherwise. So they're limited to the rational reason
23	MR. PRENDERGAST: Now, we've talked	23 24	test for the classification.
24	about I'll depart from that, unless you have other	24	And there is a certain irony, because
	Page 27		Page 29
1		1	
1 2	questions.	1 2	this class action is brought on behalf of four
	questions. THE COURT: No, thank you.		this class action is brought on behalf of four subclasses. And, basically, what they're arguing is
2	questions. THE COURT: No, thank you. MR. KRISLOV: And I don't know how	2	this class action is brought on behalf of four subclasses. And, basically, what they're arguing is that because the City has acceded to the wishes of
2 3	questions. THE COURT: No, thank you. MR. KRISLOV: And I don't know how much time I have left.	2 3	this class action is brought on behalf of four subclasses. And, basically, what they're arguing is that because the City has acceded to the wishes of two of those subclasses in continuing to provide
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8 (Pages 26 to 29)

	Page 30	Page 32
1	said they're not rational, and they haven't offered	¹ handbook, or the agendas of the preretirement
2	an argument why this is an irrational classification.	 ² seminars, or the City's appropriation ordinances,
3	And so given that, the equal protection claim has no	³ which were argued last time and rejected last time,
4	grounds. There's no grounds for that.	⁴ or Dell versus Streeter, which is the only case they
5	They also add a special legislation	⁵ rely on, which we've also briefed, and which doesn't
6	claim, which fails, basically, for the same reason of	⁶ even mention the statute of frauds, it's hardly a
7	the equal protection claim. They're very similar	⁷ case that they can rely on, applicably.
8	claims.	⁸ Unless you have specific questions on
9	The third amended complaint does not	⁹ those, I'm not going to go through the five pages of
10	allege that the classification at issue in the '89,	¹⁰ notes that I have, and I've covered the equitable
11	'97 and 2003 amendments is arbitrary. They do not	¹¹ estoppel claim.
12	allege that it excludes others who are similarly	¹² I wonder, Judge, if you have any
13	situated. They don't identify anybody who's	¹³ questions at this point. If not, I will be back and
14		¹⁴ answer any questions you may have.
15	similarly situated.	¹⁵ THE COURT: Looking forward to it.
16	All of those things are requirements	l l
17	for even getting the door open to the special	MR. FRENDEROAST. Thank you, Tour
18	legislation claim, and there is no basis for	Honor.
19	plaintiffs to contend that the amendments in question	
20	are arbitrary.	MS. BOECKMAN. Thank you, You Honor.
21	As this Court previously found, the	Thank you for the opportunity to speak on behan of
22	amendments were enacted to codify settlement	the Municipal Fund and also the Frienen's Annuty and
23	agreements that apply only to participants in City	Benefit Fund.
24	pension funds, so of course you're going to limit	There to them conectively
24	them to city employees. They're a codification of a	throughout my remarks as the Funds, but I do
	Page 31	Page 33
1		
1 2	settlement agreement. That's a perfectly rational	¹ represent both. And if I do mention any
	settlement agreement. That's a perfectly rational basis for them.	 represent both. And if I do mention any specifically, I'll be sure to indicate so.
2	settlement agreement. That's a perfectly rational basis for them. Your Honor, I'm going to spare you the	 represent both. And if I do mention any specifically, I'll be sure to indicate so. And I also just at this point, for the
2 3	settlement agreement. That's a perfectly rational basis for them. Your Honor, I'm going to spare you the reiteration of the arguments that we've made so often	 represent both. And if I do mention any specifically, I'll be sure to indicate so. And I also just at this point, for the record, want to note that all of our arguments set
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2 3 4 5 6	settlement agreement. That's a perfectly rational basis for them. Your Honor, I'm going to spare you the reiteration of the arguments that we've made so often on other matters. Obviously, they haven't done anything to improve their position with respect to the contract claim itself.	 represent both. And if I do mention any specifically, I'll be sure to indicate so. And I also just at this point, for the record, want to note that all of our arguments set out in our motion to dismiss and our reply are incorporated here in our oral argument. Mr. Prendergast stole a few of my
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1 MS. BOECKMAN: No, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: Because I won't do that. 3 MS. BOECKMAN: No, Your Honor. And I 4 appreciate that. No, I'm not asking you to 5 reconsider your prior rulings. I'm just sort of 7 important to consider that the Funds are separate and distinct entities from the City of Chicago, because I 5 1 think that 2 THE COURT: I think the City agrees with you, which is why if's their position that they something is a lifetime benefit. 3 So on that note, we are not an 1 instrumentality of the City. We have the sole authoriz, the Pension Funds in accordance with Article 6 and 2 And in this case, Your Honor, the 2 Page 35 2 Funds are taking the position that they would 2 Page 35 3 amedment, the '85 and all subsequent amendments. 4 THE COURT: - that when the legislature intends - if 4 the ancelevent and in this case. 4 THE COURT: - and give to the folks. 5 Your Honor, the 2 They have no powers or authorities		Page 34		Page 36
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⁴ amendment, the '85 and all subsequent amendments. ⁴ THE COURT: What's the part you	3		3	e 1
	4		4	•
	5	-	5	

amendment, the '85 and all subsequent amendme	ents. ⁴	THE COURT: What's the part you
Your Honor has previously ruled that	5	disagree with?
the '89, '97, and 2003 amendments were time lin	nited. ⁶	MS. BOECKMAN: Well, Your Honor, I
So I'll focus my remarks on the '83 and '85	7	would say that if they intended the Funds to provide
amendments.	8	a lifetime healthcare benefit, they would have
It is our opinion that the '83 and '85	9	expressly put that in the '83 and '85 amendments, and
amendments are also time limited. We believe -	10	they did not do so.
THE COURT: Where in the legislatio	n, ¹¹	So right off the bat, I think the fact
in the ordinance, or anything from the legislatur	re ¹²	that they did not provide specific language saying
does it say "time limits"	13	that it's a lifetime
MS. BOECKMAN: Right.	14	THE COURT: What's the old Latin
THE COURT: like it does in the '89) 15	phrase when you want to do something, you say it
and the other statutes?	16	specifically, and your failure to say it means that
MS. BOECKMAN: Right.	17	you're not limited?
THE COURT: Like it did in Matthews	s. 18	That's an old rule of statutory
MS. BOECKMAN: Right.	19	construction. You know the one I'm talking about?
THE COURT: Show me the language		MS. BOECKMAN: I believe I I don't
it's time limited.	21	know the Latin phrase for it.
MS. BOECKMAN: Understood, Your	r Honor. ²²	THE COURT: Me neither. I didn't go

MS. BOECKMAN: Understood, Your Honor. Well, we think it's time limited for three reasons: One, because there isn't language in

10 (Pages 34 to 37)

THE COURT: Me neither. I didn't go

But there's no time limitation

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to Ignatius.

	Page 38	Page 4	10
1	language at all. And so, somehow, you're now arguing	¹ opinion that the '83 and '85 retirees	
2	because there is no time limitation, because there's	² THE COURT: Okay, so what I'd like you	
3	no specific statement as for the life of the	³ to do is don't waste your time	
4	annuitant, by definition, it's time limited.	⁴ (Inaudible colloquy from the gallery.)	
5	Okay. Let's take your argument to its	⁵ MS. BOECKMAN: Okay.	
6	natural logical extent.	⁶ THE COURT: Your limited time stop	
7	MS. BOECKMAN: Okay.	⁷ it everybody rearguing that which I've already	
8	THE COURT: How is it time limited?	⁸ denied.	
9	In what fashion is it time limited? When does the	⁹ MS. BOECKMAN: Okay.	
10	limit end? When does it start? Does it create	¹⁰ THE COURT: You have a new third	
11	classes that are not mentioned but that's okay with	¹¹ amended complaint. You have some time now to talk	to
12	you because they don't have to? And when they don't	¹² me about what you think is important besides	
13	have to, by definition, everybody's time limited?	¹³ positions that I've ruled, in all intellectual	
14	Isn't that just so ambiguous and	¹⁴ honesty, against you on. And let's not rehash old	
15	against the rules of construction that we never, ever	¹⁵ stuff.	
16	go there?	¹⁶ MS. BOECKMAN: Okay.	
17	Because people have an opportunity to	¹⁷ THE COURT: I know it's important to	
18	know, especially when it's retirement, what they're	¹⁸ you. I know it's important to the Funds, just as	
19	getting into, what they're bargaining for and what	¹⁹ it's important to the annuitants. But, you know, my	
20	they're not, like they did in the '89 statute, like	²⁰ ruling is my ruling. I think it's backed up by	
21	they did in the ones that followed.	²¹ Matthews, and that's that.	
22	I've ruled, and Matthews has been	²² So what's next?	
23	it's been argued, says that if they mean to put time	²³ MS. BOECKMAN: Fair enough, Your	
24	limits in, they do, and you give them the effect of	²⁴ Honor. And on that note, I would argue that you have	
	Page 39	Page 4	1 1
1	that contract, because it is a contract.	¹ ruled on many of the counts that plaintiffs have	
1 2	that contract, because it is a contract. MS. BOECKMAN: Right.	fulled on many of the counts that planting have	
	MS. BOECKMAN: Right.	² presented in their third amended complaint.	
2	MS. BOECKMAN: Right. THE COURT: Now, they didn't put it in	 ² presented in their third amended complaint. ³ In your December 3rd, 2015, order, 	
2 3	MS. BOECKMAN: Right. THE COURT: Now, they didn't put it in yours. Somehow, you're telling me it's limited.	 ² presented in their third amended complaint. ³ In your December 3rd, 2015, order, ⁴ you specifically cited their failure to allege any 	
2 3 4	MS. BOECKMAN: Right. THE COURT: Now, they didn't put it in yours. Somehow, you're telling me it's limited. MS. BOECKMAN: Well, I would state,	 ² presented in their third amended complaint. ³ In your December 3rd, 2015, order, ⁴ you specifically cited their failure to allege any ⁵ breach of contract against the Funds. I would say 	
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11 (Pages 38 to 41)

	Page 42	Page 44
1	Funds.	¹ can't estop a fund based on its complying with a
2	So I would reiterate what we've said	 ² statutory mandate, which is all it's done is provided
3	from day one, in both Korshak and this Underwood	³ the subsidies that the statute has called for, going
4	litigation, that the Funds are not nowhere in the	⁴ back to 1985.
5	Pension Code are the Funds mandated or authorized to	⁵ And there's also no allegation of any
6	provide a lifetime benefit to their annuitants.	⁶ breach of any contract to the extent that the
7	•	breach of any contract to the extent that the
8	The Funds are governed by a board of trustees. They have a fiduciary responsibility to	contract claim is brought against the Fund. It's not
9	carry out the duties and obligations of the Pension	 ⁸ clear that it is. There's no allegation of a breach, ⁹ that it failed to pay the subsidies. There's no
10	Code in the best interest of the participants. They	¹⁰ allegation that the Fund ever accepted the employee
11	have always faithfully done so.	¹¹ handbook that they posit is the contract. There's no
12	It's our opinion, and I know Mr.	¹² discussion of what the terms of the contract are.
13	Kugler has mentioned this in other arguments, we're	¹³ So even if that contract claim is
14	really just an interested party here. The Funds do	¹⁴ aimed at the Fund, it should be dismissed with
15	exactly what they're mandated to do by that Pension	anned at the Fund, it should be distillissed with
16	Code. They always have.	prejudice, as should the equitable estopper of
17		promissory estopper claim should be.
18	And we believe that plaintiffs have	I do want to bring up one uning with
19	failed to allege sufficient facts otherwise.	legard to the 1985 amendment.
20	THE COURT: Thank you very much.	Number one, courser is a fittle stoppy
21	MS. BOECKMAN: Thank you.	In now he describes it, because he says he miks
22	THE COURT: Appreciate it.	the 85 and the 85 amendments together and says that
23	David, you're resting on your many	these amendments require the Funds to provide
24	laurels. MR. KUGLER: Yes, Your Honor. We'd	 healthcare coverage. Well, they don't. The 1985 amendment
	MR. ROOLER. Tes, Tour Honor. we'd	wen, mey don t. The 1983 amendment
	Page 43	Page 45
1	Page 43 like to hold some time so we can respond to	
1 2	-	
	like to hold some time so we can respond to	 simply requires well, it allows the Fund to approve a healthcare and surgical care plan. And if
2	like to hold some time so we can respond to Mr. Krislov.	 simply requires well, it allows the Fund to approve a healthcare and surgical care plan. And if
2 3	like to hold some time so we can respond to Mr. Krislov. THE COURT: You'll be given that	 simply requires well, it allows the Fund to approve a healthcare and surgical care plan. And if it does, it requires it to provide a maximum of \$25 a
2 3 4	like to hold some time so we can respond to Mr. Krislov. THE COURT: You'll be given that opportunity.	 simply requires well, it allows the Fund to approve a healthcare and surgical care plan. And if it does, it requires it to provide a maximum of \$25 a month subsidy.
2 3 4 5	like to hold some time so we can respond to Mr. Krislov. THE COURT: You'll be given that opportunity. Please.	 simply requires well, it allows the Fund to approve a healthcare and surgical care plan. And if it does, it requires it to provide a maximum of \$25 a month subsidy. Now, rather than going into I heard
2 3 4 5 6	like to hold some time so we can respond to Mr. Krislov. THE COURT: You'll be given that opportunity. Please. MR. DONHAM: May it please the Court.	 simply requires well, it allows the Fund to approve a healthcare and surgical care plan. And if it does, it requires it to provide a maximum of \$25 a month subsidy. Now, rather than going into I heard Your Honor's discussion about the time limitation on
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	Page 40		rage to
1	retired did not have vested benefits in a lifetime	1	After the termination of the
2	\$25 a month subsidy. Rather, at that point, they	2	settlement period, class members retain any right
3	were subject to the legislature amendment, which is	3	they currently have to assert any claims with
4	essentially the amendment to the contract that	4	regard to the provision of annuitant healthcare
5	provides the benefit that is protected by the Pension	5	benefits other than claims arising under the prior
6	Code.	6	
7		7	settlement of this action or under the 1989, 1997
8	THE COURT: What year was that	8	or 2002 amendments to the Pension Code.]
9	amendment?	9	What I would suggest is that given
	MR. DONHAM: The first amendment was		that I believe the parties are in privity. You
10	pretty much coextensive with the Korshak settlement	10	have a final judgment on the merits. That regardless
11	agreement, 1989.	11	of, you know, while I agree with Your Honor's ruling
12	THE COURT: After they were hired?	12	and encourage you to uphold it, I think that the
13	MR. DONHAM: After they were hired.	13	settlement agreement is res judicata as to any claims
14	THE COURT: So isn't it fair to assume	14	the plaintiffs might make in this lawsuit regarding
15	that under Matthews, if they were hired during the	15	the 1989, 1997, or 2003 amendments.
16	term of the '85 amendment, as you talked about, but	16	And, again, I'm not raising this here
17	before it was itself amended, they are subject to the	17	for the first time. It was in the 2-619 portion of
18	terms of that amendment, and it's not limited?	18	our memorandum, and plaintiffs did not respond to it.
19	MR. DONHAM: I don't think that's I	19	Unless you have any questions, I'm
20	believe the distinction I'm trying to make, and	20	done, Your Honor.
21	perhaps not artfully Your Honor, is between a vested	21	THE COURT: I don't. Thanks, Cary.
22	benefit, which would have vested at the time someone	22	Any other of the other defendants wish
23	hired prior to 1989 had retired and the class three	23	to be heard from at this point?
24	who had not retired	24	(No response.)
	who had not remod		(rio response.)
			- 10
	Page 47		Page 49
1	-	1	Page 49 THE COURT: Mr. Krislov.
1 2	THE COURT: When is it vested? Upon retirement?	1 2	THE COURT: Mr. Krislov.
	THE COURT: When is it vested? Upon retirement?		THE COURT: Mr. Krislov. MR. KRISLOV: Thank you, Your Honor.
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13 (Pages 46 to 49)

1	Page 50	Page 52
	protected by the Constitution against being	¹ City, under Kanerva, and Kanerva is the case we think
2	diminished or impaired. Can't reduce it.	² controls, under Kanerva, the City adopted the City of
3	And so you don't have to say the word	³ Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefit Plan. It was
4	lifetime. It may be	⁴ conditioned on being explicit, conditioned on being
5	THE COURT: But the obverse is also	⁵ an annuitant, and, hence, it achieved the protection
6	true, which is to say if it is limited by the	⁶ of Article 13, Section 5.
7	legislation, it's limited. It can't be expanded,	⁷ Now, that one we disagreed on
8	which is one of your arguments.	⁸ THE COURT: You and I you mean.
9	So how could you distinguish between	⁹ MR. KRISLOV: You and I. Because your
10	I'm with you on the first one, as I've said. What	¹⁰ view was that the Pension Code controls, and it's
11	about the second one?	¹¹ just the Pension Code.
12	MR. KRISLOV: Here's where we are on	¹² And the answer to that is that Kanerva
13	the second one. Our view of the 1989, '97 and 2003	¹³ makes it clear it's not just the Pension Code.
14	statutes is, we're not basing a claim on those	¹⁴ Because there, the state had provided a benefit to
15	statutes.	¹⁵ former employees, and it wasn't under the Pension
16	Yes, we don't think you can reduce	¹⁶ Code.
17	things below what you agree to provide. But the	¹⁷ It was under the Employment act, the
18	fundamental base of our claim, certainly for the	¹⁸ state employees act, whatever it's called. It wasn't
19	people who began their participation before August 23	¹⁹ Pension Code. And the Supreme Court said it doesn't
20	of 1989, is that the statutes in effect and the	²⁰ matter as long as it is conditioned on, flows
21	benefits that were in effect then are enforced.	²¹ directly from, limited to, it's protected.
22	The City and this is where it	²² The other part of that is under
23	becomes important to have the two aspects of our	²³ contract. And this is where the Funds come in. And
24	claim under contract. And the reason you dismissed	²⁴ Mr. Kugler, bless his heart, comes the closest to our
	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
	Page 51	Page 53
1		
2	another contract the first time was because we submitted all of these attachments in response to	argument on that, because if we accept your
3	submitted all of these affactments in response to	
		² limitation and say, well, the Pension Code provisions
	their motion to dismiss rather than as part of the	³ govern, the Pension Code statutes require the Funds
4	their motion to dismiss rather than as part of the complaint.	 ³ govern, the Pension Code statutes require the Funds ⁴ to administer or approve a health plan for their
4 5	their motion to dismiss rather than as part of the complaint. And if you walk through the two	 ³ govern, the Pension Code statutes require the Funds ⁴ to administer or approve a health plan for their ⁵ retirees. It was not a permissive, as the Municipal
4 5 6	their motion to dismiss rather than as part of the complaint. And if you walk through the two claims that we make under contract are that, number	 ³ govern, the Pension Code statutes require the Funds ⁴ to administer or approve a health plan for their ⁵ retirees. It was not a permissive, as the Municipal ⁶ and Firemen's Fund attorneys says it was an
4 5 6 7	their motion to dismiss rather than as part of the complaint. And if you walk through the two claims that we make under contract are that, number one, the City obligated itself as the provider of a	 ³ govern, the Pension Code statutes require the Funds ⁴ to administer or approve a health plan for their ⁵ retirees. It was not a permissive, as the Municipal ⁶ and Firemen's Fund attorneys says it was an ⁷ obligation. Mr. Burke said it was permissive in the
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14 (Pages 50 to 53)

	Page 54	Page 56
1	this all started, which was in the Ryan case, we had	
2	discovered that the City was using pension fund	 judgment. That's for that ten years, which Judge Green chided me and said, you're not losing anything
3	moneys to earn interest for itself, and we forced the	³ by this, because you'll be restored back to where you
4	City to repay about \$35 million to the pension funds,	⁴ were when this case started.
5	which even in those days were severely underfunded.	⁵ And that is, indeed, what the
6	The City, then under the new	⁶ settlement agreement says, that the parties are
7	Washington administration, concocted an offset plan	 restored to the situation they were in on
8	where they came up with this argument that maybe	⁸ October 19th, 1985. And that is the day that the
9	we've been paying for healthcare we've been paying	⁹ City filed the complaint.
10	for healthcare coverage illegally. We know we're	¹⁰ And on that day, our claims against
11	going to owe you this \$35 million, but we came up	¹¹ the City, the Funds, whoever, were viable, and they
12	with this argument that we've been paying for	¹² were continued both in that settlement and in all the
13	healthcare illegally, and so we have to get that	¹³ subsequent settlements. So the assertion of a
14	back.	¹⁴ statute of limitations that we should have sued them
15	But if you forget about the 35 million	¹⁵ at some time during the settlement ignores also that
16	we're going to owe you in the Ryan case, we'll forget	¹⁶ the settlement agreement said we couldn't sue anybody
17	about suing you on healthcare.	¹⁷ during the settlement period. It's all being carried
18	And the trustees, in those days	¹⁸ until the end. And if we don't get to a resolution
19	adverse to the City somewhat, said no. If we did	¹⁹ before the end, you'll be back to you can assert
20	that, we'd be breaching our fiduciary duty. And so	²⁰ any claims that you have then.
21	the City launched the Korshak complaint, saying that	²¹ And so the whole business I
22	it didn't have an obligation but that the Funds did.	²² understand some of the argument, but the statute of
23	The Funds sued back, saying the City had this	 ²³ limitations claim you rejected the first time. You
24	obligation to continue healthcare coverage and	²⁴ rejected it correctly. It's baseless.
	Page 55	Page 57
1	couldn't terminate it.	¹ Matthews is a unique situation,
2	And though they did not assert the	² because Matthews deals with where there is a
3	constitutional protection, they did assert everything	³ collective bargaining agreement. And that is a
4	else on behalf of the retirees, that the retirees had	⁴ different
5	been promised this as a term of employment.	⁵ THE COURT: Doesn't Matthews just say
6	And the fact is, all these people in	⁶ a deal's a deal, and you can't change the deal, when
7	the courtroom and the 22,000 rest of them out there	⁷ the contract you contracted for has terms, and terms
8	spent their whole careers working for the City in the	⁸ in that case and in this case are term limitations.
9	reasonable expectation that they would have retiree	⁹ I didn't write the contract. I don't
10	healthcare for life.	¹⁰ necessarily like it, but the law is the law, and a
11	I'll get to that part in a second.	¹¹ deal's a deal. Isn't that what Matthews holds? And
12	But the reason, when we intervened, we	¹² isn't that what's here?
13	intervened because all we knew was that between the	¹³ MR. KRISLOV: It's not what's here.
14	City and the Funds, they both owed the retirees this	¹⁴ THE COURT: Why is it not here?
15	fixed rate, subsidized plan that they'd been	¹⁵ MR. KRISLOV: Because Matthews was a
16	promised, and we expected them both to fulfill that,	¹⁶ collective bargaining agreement. And the collective
17	and we frankly didn't care who.	¹⁷ bargaining agreement, that agreement, when that
18	When they settled around when we	¹⁸ agreement is entered into, that controls, and it
19	went to trial, and then before Judge Green could	¹⁹ controls over, including the authorized
20	decided the merits of the case, the City and the	²⁰ Mr. Donham's argument about the way that the two
21	trustees cut a deal that all of the participants	²¹ collective bargaining agreements operated there.
22	objected to but was, you know, we while we may not	²² The fact was that four active
23	like it, it was it's res judicata, and it was	²³ employees, they are represented by their authorized
23	ince it, it was it is res judicata, and it was	
23	forced down our throats, and it was in the final	²⁴ union agent, and Matthews holds for the class two

15 (Pages 54 to 57)

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	Page 58		Page 60
1	there that if your authorized agent or you, if you	1	but Matthews does not say that. Matthews says that
2	agree to it, agree to change your contract rights,	2	either I or my authorized bargaining agent can agree
3	you can do that. And your authorized agent has the	3	to almost anything
4	power to do that.	4	THE COURT: Sure.
5	The reason that the class one people	5	MR. KRISLOV: and that would be
6	had standing to enforce their agreement was that they	6	binding.
7	retired during the course of that agreement, and they	7	What we're talking about on this
8	were no long and once you retire, you're no	8	group, what we're talking about now, I think, are
9	longer represented by the union. You are outside the	9	people who were hired after August 23 of '89.
10	bargaining unit. And so the union cannot agree to	10	Okay. Here's where we are now. And
11	amend your rights thereafter without your consent.	11	they're a little different, because and they're
12	And so for the class one people who	12	squarely under this issue about are those statutes
13	retired during a certain state of facts, during a	13	legal. Because if those status are illegal or
14	certain collective bargaining agreement, they the	14	invalid
15	court then said, well, does this agreement provide	15	THE COURT: Tell me when that was
16	for is it permanent to age 65, or can it be	16	raised at the time that they were passed. Tell me
17	amended by the subsequent agreement? They said it	17	when that's been raised at all, the legality vel non
18	can't.	18	of those statutes. How's never?
19	But that has nothing to do with what's	19	MR. KRISLOV: It hasn't been raised
20	happening here.	20	before.
21	THE COURT: Someone who got hired	21	THE COURT: Okay. So that's it.
22	after legislation went into effect that the	22	That's the law.
23	annuitants' benefits were time limited, isn't that	23	MR. KRISLOV: Well, no. But it
24	the deal? Isn't that what they signed on for? Isn't	24	doesn't mean that the law what you're saying is
	Page 59		Page 61
			idge of
1		1	
1 2	that what they had knowledge of, at least	1 2	that the law that was in effect on the day that you
	that what they had knowledge of, at least constructive what the law is? You want to go against		that the law that was in effect on the day that you were hired is what governs. And the answer to that
2	that what they had knowledge of, at least constructive what the law is? You want to go against the law? Change the law in the future.	2	that the law that was in effect on the day that you were hired is what governs. And the answer to that is, well, that's just
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16 (Pages 58 to 61)

	Page 62	Page 64
1	MR. KRISLOV: They have a tougher road	¹ promissory estoppel. The label of what we're saying,
2	on this, and they must depend on the law being	² that the City and the Funds can't assert would be
3	invalid in order to get around it.	³ equitable estoppel.
4	THE COURT: Which is why you raised	⁴ On the other hand, when you get
5	the special legislation argument.	⁵ through Matthews, you sort of come to the conclusion
6	MR. KRISLOV: True.	⁶ that it's a label, but the standard is probably the
7	THE COURT: Okay.	 ⁷ same, which gets us to one of the most important
8	•	⁸ aspects of people who began working for the City
9	MR. KRISLOV: And, you know, we said	 ⁹ before August 23 of '89. The overwhelming number of
10	it's invalid for because of the purporting not to be a protected benefit because it's special	¹⁰ them began working for the City before April 1 of
11	1 1	¹¹ 1986.
12	legislation, and the third reason oh, is	1960.
13	permanence versus time limited.	reopie who began working for the City
14	You know, if you say that those laws	phot to April 1 of 1980 do not accrue, did not
15	are legal and apply to those people who were hired	accide, cannot accide from their City employment
16	after that date, then the question is can the City	qualitying orders for the Wedleare program. They are
17	reduce it below that or just take it down to nothing.	out of fuck. They are on their own. They are
18	We're sort of in limbo at that point,	totally at lisk.
19	whether the City for those post 8-23-89 hires,	And the City doesn't appreciate that,
20	whether the City has any obligation.	and if there's a damage in the world, that's one of
20	What you're saying is that	them. And those people went to they have a
22	THE COURT: Or the Funds.	handbook issued by the City. It's an action by the
23	MR. KRISLOV: Or the Funds.	City. The City doesn't need If I understand
24	The Funds do have they still have	THE COOKT. Where in the handbook, in
24	an obligation to provide well, it gets this	²⁴ the police handbook, or in any other handbook?
	Page 63	Page 65
1	part's messy, because well, it is, because the	¹ MR. KRISLOV: No, no. The handbook,
2	statutes are not are not well crafted for what	² the City of Chicago Exhibit 6 is the City of
3	happens after.	³ Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan handbook
4	They were explicitly intended just to	⁴ issued by the City.
5	cover the period of those settlements. And that's	⁵ THE COURT: I see. Where in the City
6	really all those statutes were ever intended to do.	⁶ handbook is there a promise for lifetime subsidized
7	To apply them outside that, I think, is looking for a	⁷ premiums?
8	challenge to the statute.	⁸ MR. KRISLOV: Doesn't have to be. But
9	But let's go back to our core people,	⁹ that isn't
10	most of them are here or not most of the people	¹⁰ THE COURT: Please answer my question.
11	who are here.	¹¹ Your argument is that it doesn't have
12	THE COURT: What do you mean, "the	¹² to be. But where is it in it? It's not, right?
13	core people"? Which group? Your '83 and '85 folks.	¹³ MR. KRISLOV: It is not
14	MR. KRISLOV: People who began working	¹⁴ THE COURT: It's a contract that you
15	for the City before August 23, 1989.	¹⁵ want me to find without a specific term that you want
16	And they are additionally and this	¹⁶ me that you want to rely on.
17	is also where we get to the equitable and God	¹⁷ MR. KRISLOV: Once the City made the
18	bless the Court, because it resolved that it's not	¹⁸ qualification for that plan, limited to, flows
19	equitable estoppel that we're asserting.	¹⁹ directly from being an annuitant, eligibility
20	THE COURT: It's promissory.	²⁰ required to be an annuitant. They could say if
21	MR. KRISLOV: It's promissory except	²¹ you're a former employee. They used the term
22	if there's one thing that Matthews did do that's	²² "annuitant." You've got to be an annuitant of one of
23	applicable here, I think they fixed the label.	the City's four plans. Once the City did that, it
24	The label of what we're asserting is	²⁴ didn't need to call it lifetime. Article 13, Section

17 (Pages 62 to 65)

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	Page 66		Page 68
1	5 steps in.	1	see it before I go out there."
2	But back to the contract. The	2	The fact is, the City was sufficiently
3	contract terms can be made up of lots of things. You	3	involved in this that it was entirely reasonable and
4	don't need to have one document signed by Mr.	4	enforceable as a contract, and it was also
5	Emanuel, Mr. Washington, Mr. Daley, Ms. Byrne. You	5	enforceable under promissory estoppel.
6	don't need the contract signed by that person any	6	I think, unless can I have one
7	more than you need everybody to sign off on the city	7	second, Your Honor?
8	Council.	8	THE COURT: Of course.
9	What we're saying is, there is	9	MR. KRISLOV: As far as the post-'89
10	sufficient City action to show that there was a	10	people, I think you had asked me how I got them
11	contract. That's all you need. And the elements	11	the post-'89 hires, how I get them in.
12	that we show it by are the handbook, the	12	They have if those statutes are not
13	preretirement seminars, and we it's not an	13	valid or if they're not valid, it's uncertain what
14	unidentified person speaking, Kordek and McDonough,	14	the effect is then.
15	who are the exhibits in our I believe they're 18	15	If they are valid, our argument, I
16		16	think, would be that those provide a floor from which
17	and 19. Those are the guys who said it. They told people it was lifetime, and	17	things can be improved. But the statutes are a
18	they told and it occurred often enough. There	18	problem if only because they were only intended to
19	•	19	cover the settlement period.
20	were at least 50 preretirement seminars authorized	20	If those statutes are invalid, then
21	and conducted by the City. And even Judge Green said that it is inconceivable that all this was done	21	the pre-'89 statutes go into effect because they
22		22	reinstate the old statutes, which were not time
23	without anybody knowing about it, that it just fell	23	limited. And so everybody would be packed in. It's
24	through the cracks. All you need to show and that's for	24	not a neat process by any means. I agree.
	All you need to show and that's for		not a near process by any means. Tagree.
	David (7		
	Page 67		Page 69
1	the contract. You need to show City action. You	1	But for the core people, especially
2	don't know need to show the stamp in the sealing wax.	2	the core people not just the 8-23-89 hires, but
3	You need to show that the City was so involved in it	3	the people who began working for the City before
4	that it regarded it as an enforceable contract.	4	April 1 of '86, which are most of those, they have an
5	And that's what they did. They've got	5	enforceable contract. They have an enforceable
6	a whole benefits department that is not there because	6	constitutional right.
7	they just happened to stop by on their way to some	7	I guess, in sum, our belief is that
8	other job.	8	the City having provided the benefit limited to,
9	And the appropriations explicitly	9	flows from, exclusively to annuitants, it's protected
10	referred to annuitant help. And the people who were	10	by the Constitution. That under contract, whether
11	speaking at the preretirement seminars, you know,	11	the City agreed to provide it as a term of
12	don't believe them. You can say that Matthews was	12	employment, as the Funds said back when they were
13	very nonspecific. Matthews said, well, there were	13	opposing the City, and said, you know, don't believe
14	some statements made, and they were definitive, but	14	us, but take their word for it, they were that the
15	there was no identification.	15	City provided that by contract, either as a contract
16	We have more than 50 preretirement	16	provider or because that was how the Funds fulfilled
17	We have more than 50 preretirement	17	
	seminars authorized and conducted by the City and the	17	their obligation, by hiring in the City. That's what
18	seminars authorized and conducted by the City and the people who actually spoke, and they thought that they	18	all four of them said in 1987, which all but
18 19	seminars authorized and conducted by the City and the people who actually spoke, and they thought that they were authorized.	18 19	all four of them said in 1987, which all but Mr. Kugler are backtracking now, and on estoppel,
18 19 20	seminars authorized and conducted by the City and the people who actually spoke, and they thought that they were authorized. Otherwise, every cop, when the radio	18 19 20	all four of them said in 1987, which all but Mr. Kugler are backtracking now, and on estoppel, which I guess is promissory rather than equitable.
18 19 20 21	seminars authorized and conducted by the City and the people who actually spoke, and they thought that they were authorized. Otherwise, every cop, when the radio says "Go to 421 North Hudson," is supposed to say	18 19 20 21	all four of them said in 1987, which all but Mr. Kugler are backtracking now, and on estoppel, which I guess is promissory rather than equitable. People were led to believe that they
18 19 20 21 22	seminars authorized and conducted by the City and the people who actually spoke, and they thought that they were authorized. Otherwise, every cop, when the radio says "Go to 421 North Hudson," is supposed to say "From what authority do you speak?" and "How long	18 19 20 21 22	all four of them said in 1987, which all but Mr. Kugler are backtracking now, and on estoppel, which I guess is promissory rather than equitable. People were led to believe that they would have lifetime healthcare coverage in their
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18 (Pages 66 to 69)

	Page 70	Page 72
1	involvement of the City sufficient to enforce it, and	¹ doubt about that.
2	that they suffer great detriment if the City is	² I didn't take detailed notes of
3	allowed to dump them, as it's done, and as it's	³ everything counsel said about the promissory estoppel
4	doing, because they have nowhere else to go.	⁴ issue. But the sense of it was that people went to
5	With that, Your Honor, I would ask	⁵ seminars. The City must have known what was in the
6	that you uphold the complaint, and we'll ask you	⁶ materials that were handed out, what was said, and,
7	we'll restate our request to reinstate the	 ⁷ therefore, there's a contract.
8	preliminary or to primarily enjoin the City from	⁸ And as he put it, it's both the
9		⁹ contract and it's promissory estoppel, or equitable
10	the 2013 and post changes, until the matter gets	contract and it's promissory estopper, or equitable
11	finally resolved by or Supreme Court, which I think	estopper. There's rearry no distilletion between the
12	is where it will eventually wind up.	two in terms of ciements.
	THE COURT: Absolutely. It will end	First of an, one of the things that
13	up there.	¹³ Matthews says is you can't have both. You have a
14	Thank you, Mr. Krislov.	¹⁴ contract claim or you have a contracted debt claim, a
15	MR. KRISLOV: Thank you, Your Honor.	¹⁵ so-called contracted debt, it is promissory estoppel.
16	THE COURT: Rebuttal.	¹⁶ But you can't have both. They're mutually exclusive.
17	MR. PRENDERGAST: Mr. Krislov says	¹⁷ THE COURT: What about the reliance
18	that Matthews has nothing to do with the Pension	¹⁸ factor that Mr. Krislov raised, Mr. Prendergast, in
19	Code. It's really all about collective bargaining	¹⁹ Section 90 of the restated second? It talks about
20	agreements.	²⁰ reliance, and the right to reliance, and reliance to
21	Paragraph 59 paragraph 60 of the	²¹ the detriment and damage therefrom? And didn't all
22	Matthews opinion reads: With regard to the issue of	²² those folks have a right to rely upon someone from
23	vesting, Delegate Kinney, who sponsored the	the City coming out and saying, this is the story,
24	provision, stated that if a public employee begins	these are the terms, this is what you're going to be
	F	
	Page 71	Page 73
	Page /1	rage / s
1	employment under a pension statute that permits the	¹ given? Or not?
1 2		
	employment under a pension statute that permits the	¹ given? Or not?
2	employment under a pension statute that permits the lowering of benefits in the future, that contingency would be constitutionally permissible because it was	¹ given? Or not? ² MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, I'm going to
2 3	employment under a pension statute that permits the lowering of benefits in the future, that contingency would be constitutionally permissible because it was a condition of the contract that the employee	 given? Or not? MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, I'm going to answer that question, and then I'm going to answer
2 3 4	employment under a pension statute that permits the lowering of benefits in the future, that contingency would be constitutionally permissible because it was	 given? Or not? MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, I'm going to answer that question, and then I'm going to answer the beginning of that question, the part that's missing from it, which is perfectly okay when you
2 3 4 5	employment under a pension statute that permits the lowering of benefits in the future, that contingency would be constitutionally permissible because it was a condition of the contract that the employee accepted. Citation 2, the Sixth Illinois	 given? Or not? MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, I'm going to answer that question, and then I'm going to answer the beginning of that question, the part that's missing from it, which is perfectly okay when you break it up. But there are different elements to
2 3 4 5 6	employment under a pension statute that permits the lowering of benefits in the future, that contingency would be constitutionally permissible because it was a condition of the contract that the employee accepted. Citation 2, the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, page 2934.	 given? Or not? MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, I'm going to answer that question, and then I'm going to answer the beginning of that question, the part that's missing from it, which is perfectly okay when you break it up. But there are different elements to promissory estoppel.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	employment under a pension statute that permits the lowering of benefits in the future, that contingency would be constitutionally permissible because it was a condition of the contract that the employee accepted. Citation 2, the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention, page 2934. The court went on to say in paragraph 61: [AS READ: This court approved and adopted that analysis more than 30 years ago, citing Kerner. In Kerner, we held that where a public employee becomes a member of a retirement system under a statute that includes a provision which may operate to deny him benefits in the future, that provision does not become an unconstitutional impairment of his retirement benefits because he has agreed to it as a condition of membership. Citing Kerner and citing Krause versus Board of Trustees.] Clearly, the Supreme Court in Matthews	1given? Or not?2MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, I'm going to3answer that question, and then I'm going to answer4the beginning of that question, the part that's5missing from it, which is perfectly okay when you6break it up. But there are different elements to7promissory estoppel.8THE COURT: Of course.9MR. PRENDERGAST: But take paragraph1097 of the Matthews opinion. In support of the11promissory estoppel claim, Williams does not point to12any specific statement, either written or verbal, in13which the CTA promised to continue to provide14healthcare benefits to retirees.15Rather, the factual support for16Williams' claim is premised on the assertion that the17CTA began providing full paid retirement healthcare18benefits in 1980 and continued to provide those19benefits until 2009, precisely the argument we just10heard, which is that the City was a provider of14heard, which is that the City was a leged

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	Page 74		Page 76
1	an obligation under the collective bargaining	1	have Social Security, and a variety of others.
2	agreement to pay for and provide retiree healthcare	2	When he talks about the people who
3	benefits.	3	are most of the them are 1986 or before, he's
4	The court's holding: These	4	actually talking about people who are similar to the
5	allegations are insufficient as a matter of law to	5	Korshak people and Windows people. They have needs.
6	support a claim of promissory estoppel against the	6	The City has tried to address that.
7	CTA, the fact that the City did it or the CTA did it,	7	So it isn't I know this is a court
8	and people were operating under it and relying upon	8	of equity, but this is a case this is a
9	it. So that it doesn't make any difference.	9	constitutional case based upon the Constitution, the
10	As a matter of law	10	statutes involved, and most importantly, the
11	THE COURT: Why?	11	controlling Supreme Court cases.
12	MR. PRENDERGAST: Because the court	12	And the ones that Mr. Krislov doesn't
13	says the allegations are insufficient as a matter of	13	like, he doesn't cite, he doesn't go into. And
14	law to support a claim for promissory estoppel.	14	that's the real failing of that argument.
15	That's the Supreme Court of Illinois. That's why.	15	And I think that in your previous
16	Because that's the law, once they say it.	16	decision, you thoroughly took that apart, except you
17	Now, I know there are people here who	17	didn't go as far as the Supreme Court went in
18	disagree with that and think that that's inequitable	18	Matthews by going to the legislative requirement.
19	and unfair, but we're confined to the law, as you	19	But even as far as you went, and I
20	know. And that's what the that's a portion of	20	know when you rendered your decision, and I was here
21	this opinion, one of several portions of this opinion	21	for it, I remember when you read rendered your
22	that counsel just ignores, just ignores.	22	decision, you looked out in the courtroom, and you
23	Now, I said the first part. The first	23	said, I am not unsympathetic to the plight of the
24	part of a promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel	24	people who are here and other people and the impact
		1	
	Page 75		Page 77
1		1	
1 2	claim is that the person making the representation	1	that this may or may not have on them. But you put
2	claim is that the person making the representation has to have the authority to do so. You have to	1 2 3	that this may or may not have on them. But you put sympathies aside, and you apply the law.
2 3	claim is that the person making the representation has to have the authority to do so. You have to allege who that person is, where they got their	2 3	that this may or may not have on them. But you put sympathies aside, and you apply the law. And Mr. Krislov makes eloquent
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2 3 4	claim is that the person making the representation has to have the authority to do so. You have to allege who that person is, where they got their authority, what their authority is, and you have to have followed up to determine whether they have that	2 3 4	that this may or may not have on them. But you put sympathies aside, and you apply the law. And Mr. Krislov makes eloquent arguments on behalf of the people that he represents, but they don't carry the day as a matter of law, and
2 3 4 5	claim is that the person making the representation has to have the authority to do so. You have to allege who that person is, where they got their authority, what their authority is, and you have to have followed up to determine whether they have that authority.	2 3 4 5	that this may or may not have on them. But you put sympathies aside, and you apply the law. And Mr. Krislov makes eloquent arguments on behalf of the people that he represents, but they don't carry the day as a matter of law, and they have to. Otherwise, we can just ignore all the
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20 (Pages 74 to 77)

	Page 78		Page 80
1	conditioned right, not unlike the time limited	1	Your Honor, that's what the statute
2	statutes.	2	says. It may be a floor, but it's also a ceiling.
3	And even if you were to look at that	3	If they go back to what's in place at the time the
4	as a contract, which you can't because it doesn't	4	lawsuit was filed, all that was in place at that time
5	satisfy the statute of frauds, it's not signed,	5	for Laborors' Fund retirees is a \$25 a month subsidy,
6	doesn't have all the terms that a contract has to	6	period. So I want to make that point.
7	have. Just because you have a document they	7	And I also want to point out that by
8	really know that's not a contract. They're still	8	focusing on the City plan that they attach, the
9	back on promissory estoppel. But they fall off the	9	plaintiffs, in a sense, have contradicted the idea
10	edge on authority on promissory estoppel.	10	that those 1985 amendments provided for lifetime
11	Your Honor, we have addressed I	11	coverage.
12	should reiterate one thing. Counsel says that they	12	I agree. There's no language in the
13	were they preserved all rights that they had,	13	statute that says "lifetime coverage." No question
14	again going back to 1985 when they entered into	14	about that. What they say is you had to approve a
15	settlements.	15	plan. And plaintiffs allege in the complaint that
16	I read you, and I'm not going to do it	16	the City approved I mean, that the Fund approved
17	again, the very language from those agreements. They	17	the City plan.
18	preserved rights against the City, not against the	18	And, as Your Honor pointed out, that
19	Funds. They preserved only those rights that they	19	City plan is not lifetime. It says right in it that
20	asserted. They didn't assert these rights. You	20	the City has the right to terminate the plan.
21	can't say, I'm going to enter into a ten-year	21	So if the City had the right to
22	agreement, and if I come up with another theory or	22	terminate that plan, and that's the plan the
23	another claim, I'll plug that in too.	23	Laborers' Fund approved pursuant to the 1985
24	You can if it's allowed in the	24	amendment, I think that totally undercuts the idea
	Page 79		Page 81
1	Page 79	1	Page 81
1 2	agreement. But it isn't in the agreement, and it	1 2	that there were lifetime benefits there.
	agreement. But it isn't in the agreement, and it wasn't allowed, and that's the conundrum that they		that there were lifetime benefits there. Thank you, Your Honor.
2	agreement. But it isn't in the agreement, and it wasn't allowed, and that's the conundrum that they are faced with.	2	that there were lifetime benefits there. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you.
2 3	agreement. But it isn't in the agreement, and it wasn't allowed, and that's the conundrum that they are faced with. Your Honor, we have argued this a	2 3	that there were lifetime benefits there. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. KRISLOV: I promise no more than
2 3 4	agreement. But it isn't in the agreement, and it wasn't allowed, and that's the conundrum that they are faced with. Your Honor, we have argued this a number of times. You have been exceedingly patient	2 3 4	that there were lifetime benefits there. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. KRISLOV: I promise no more than two minutes.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	agreement. But it isn't in the agreement, and it wasn't allowed, and that's the conundrum that they are faced with. Your Honor, we have argued this a number of times. You have been exceedingly patient and thorough with us. Unless you have a question, I have nothing further. THE COURT: I have none. Do any of the other parties wish to be heard? MR. DONHAM: I have a very brief comment, Your Honor. THE COURT: Sure. Thank you, Mr. Prendergast. MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. DONHAM: Your Honor, if it please the Court, I'd like to address a point that Mr. Krislov made when he was commenting that under the 1985 amendment as to the and I'm only going to talk about the Laborors' Fund, which required the Fund to approve a \$25 a month subsidy, that if the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	 that there were lifetime benefits there. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. KRISLOV: I promise no more than two minutes. THE COURT: What are you going to give me when you break your promise? Go ahead, Mr. Krislov. MR. KRISLOV: Number one, Mr. Prendergast's argument, the fact of providing in Matthews, the reason that it could change in Matthews was because a collective bargaining agreement is the act of the authorized representative who can agree to the change. That's why, although they provided it, they provided it before, the fact that their collective bargaining agent agreed to the change which was in the first collective bargaining agreement meant that the rights that they had beforehand could be compromised. That's what Matthews is about. That's why it's not here. Judge Green's citation in the handbook, I don't think he cited to it, but the

21 (Pages 78 to 81)

	Page 82	
1	minutes, but I will make it quick.	
2	THE COURT: You're done.	
3	MR. KRISLOV: Last one.	
4	THE COURT: How much time for this	
5	one, Clint?	
6	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
7	MR. KRISLOV: Judge Green the	
8	decision that Mr. Prendergast refers to is the one	
9	that the appellate court reversed. THE COURT: Okay.	
10		
11	MR. KRISLOV: Number three, Mr. Donham	
12	says, if that's the plan, then it's terminable.	
13	Well, if that's the if the City	
	could get out of that, then it's the Funds who have	
14 15	to come up with a new plan to replace that plan,	
15 16	because they have the continuing obligation to	
16 17	provide a plan for their retirees.	
17	THE COURT: I understand your	
18	argument. Thank you. Thanks to everybody. Thanks	
19	to the annuitants who are here. I will be giving a	
20	written ruling, once again, in this case forthwith.	
21	It will be within two weeks or so, and you'll see	
22	what I have to say about it. I wish you all well,	
23	and good-bye.	
24	(Proceedings adjourned at 3:05 p.m,	
	July 7, 2016.)	
	July 7, 2016.)	
	Page 83	
1		
2	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE	
3		
4	I, JERRI ESTELLE, CSR, RPR, doing	
4 5	business in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois,	
	do hereby certify that I reported in computerized	
6	shorthand the foregoing proceedings as appears from	
7	my stenographic notes.	
8	I further certify that the foregoing	
9	is a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand	
10	notes and contains all the testimony had at said	
11	proceedings.	
12	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my	
13	hand as Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the	
14	State of Illinois on July 20, 2016.	
15		
16	Serri Estelle	
	Jerri Estelle, CSR, RPR	
17	License Number: 084-003284	
18	LICENSE INUMOEI. 004-003204	
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		

22 (Pages 82 to 83)

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY DEPARTMENT - CHANC	•
MICHAEL W. UNDERWOOD, et al.,)
Plaintiffs,)
vs.) No. 13 CH 17450 Calendar 13
CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal) Corporation,)
Defendant,)
and)
Trustees of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago; Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago; Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago; and Trustees of the Laborers' & Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, et al.,)))))))
) Defendants.))

Record of proceedings had at the hearing of the above-entitled cause, before the Honorable NEIL H. COHEN, one of the Judges of said Court, on August 9, 2016, in Room 2308, Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois, commencing at 10:30 a.m.

	Pa	ge 2		Page 4
1	A P P E A R A N C E S		1	THE COURT: Underwood versus City of
	KRISLOV & ASSOCIATES, LTD.		2	Chicago.
3 4	20 North Wacker Drive, Suite 1300 Chicago, Illinois 60606		3	On behalf of Underwood.
5	(312) 606-0500		4	MR. KRISLOV: Good morning, Your
6	BY: Mr. Clinton A. Krislov		5	Honor. Clint Krislov and with me, Ken Goldstein, on
7	clint@krislovlaw.com,		6	behalf of the plaintiffs.
	Mr. Kenneth T. Goldstein		7	THE COURT: Hi, welcome. On behalf of
8	ken@krislovlaw.com		8	the City of Chicago and the four funds.
9	for the plaintiffs;		9	MR. KENNEDY: Good morning, Your
	RICHARD J. PRENDERGAST, LTD.		10	Honor. John Kennedy with Cary Donham on behalf of
	111 West Washington Street, Suite 1100		11	the Laborers' Fund.
	Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 641-0881		12	THE COURT: Hi.
	BY: Mr. Richard J. Prendergast		13	MR. KUGLER: David Kugler, Your Honor,
	rprendergast@rjpltd.com,		14	on behalf of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit
15 16	Mr. Michael Layden		15	Fund.
10	mlayden@rjpltd.com,		16	THE COURT: Welcome.
17	for the City;		17	MS. BOECKMAN: Good morning, Your
	DAVID R. KUGLER & ASSOCIATES, LTD.		18	Honor. Sarah Boeckman on behalf of the Municipal
	6160 North Cicero Avenue Suite 308		19	Fund and the Firemen's Fund.
21	Chicago, Illinois 60646		20	THE COURT: Welcome.
	(312) 263-3020		21	
23	BY: Mr. David R. Kugler davidkugler@comcast.net		22	MR. DONHAM: Cary Donham on behalf of the Laborers' Fund.
24	for the Trustees of the Policemen's		22	
	Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago;		24	THE COURT: Very good.
	Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago;		24	MR. PRENDERGAST: Good morning, Your
		ge 3		Page 5
1	A P P E A R A N C E S (Continued)		1	Honor. Richard Prendergast and Michael Layden on
2 3	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD.		2	behalf of the City.
4	Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300		3	THE COURT: Hi. Welcome. So I have
5	Chicago, Illinois 60602		4	before me today for consideration, which I've already
6	(312) 541-8600		5	considered, but I'll listen to what folks have to
7	BY: Ms. Sarah Boeckman		6	say: Underwood's emergency motion, for one, a
8	sboeckman@bbp-chicago.com for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity		7	reconsideration/correction/clarification of my July
0	and Benefit Fund of Chicago;		8	21st order; a request for 304(a) findings so that Mr.
9			9	Krislov can appeal; and, three, a renewed motion for
10	TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP		10	the issuance of a preliminary injunction with regard
11	111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800		11	to the pre-1989 claims and to enjoin the City and the
12 13	Chicago, Illinois 60601 (312) 836 4038		12	Funds from implementing a reduction or a change of
	(312) 836-4038 BY: Mr. Cary E. Donham		13	the change of terms or a change of terms as of
	cdonham@taftlaw.com,		14	June 30th, 2013.
15			15	I've received nothing from the Funds.
16	for the Trustees of the Laborers' & Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and		16	I've received nothing from the City in response.
10	Benefit Fund of Chicago.		17	Did you file something that I just
17	Zenom i una or omougo.		18	never got?
18			19	MR. PRENDERGAST: No, Your Honor, we
19			20	haven't filed it yet when we received it for a
20 21			21	presentment.
21			22	THE COURT: All right. And what is it
23			23	you wish to do, Richard, on behalf of the City?
24			24	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, it's a

2 (Pages 2 to 5)

	Page 6		Page 8
1	little more complicated because the motion is really	1	THE COURT: But it's your feeling that
2	three motions, and they involve different rulings by	2	they're so inextricably intertwined that you can't
3	the Court.	3	rule on one without the other?
4	So, for example, on the motion for	4	MR. PRENDERGAST: That's right. That
5	injunctive relief, we believe that we would be	5	is our view.
6	happy to brief it if the Court wants us to brief it,	6	And it is also our view that based
7	but	7	upon the language of appellate court cases that deal
8	THE COURT: Well, I'll tell you, I'm	8	with 304(a), one of the things that the Court is
9	ready to rule on that today, but you do what you want		admonished to avoid is piecemeal litigation.
10	to do. I'm going to rule on that one way or the	10	So we're staying down here on some
11	other.	11	subclasses, going up on another subclass, but not all
12	And however I rule, I will expect	12	the issues on that subclass, Your Honor. That is the
13	you know, we'll see what happens.	13	heighth of piecemeal litigation.
14	Go ahead. How about the motion for	14	THE COURT: Well, the Court's July
15	reconsideration/correction/clarification of my June	15	21st order ruled specifically and narrowly, but I
16	21st order?	16	think clearly, regardless of Clint's position
17	MR. PRENDERGAST: I'm prepared to	17	otherwise, with regard to the merits, with regard to
18	argue that today.	18	the 1983 and 1985 changes and who's entitled or not
19	THE COURT: All right. So you don't	19	to receive the benefit of those; did it not?
20	wish to submit anything on that in writing?	20	MR. PRENDERGAST: It did. But it's
21	MR. PRENDERGAST: I don't think we	21	not clear to me at all that his 304(a) motion is
22	have to. It's just a fairly narrow	22	designed to address that issue.
23	THE COURT: And what is your position	23	THE COURT: Okay.
24	about the request for the 304(a) findings so that Mr.	24	MR. PRENDERGAST: The 304(a) motion,
	Page 7		Page 9
1	Krislov can appeal?	1	it seems to me, is designed to address that issue
2	MR. PRENDERGAST: Our position is that	2	regarding the post the subclass four that deals
3	the Court should deny the motion.	3	with those who were
4	THE COURT: And the reason?	4	THE COURT: I ruled clearly on that
5	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, I think	5	one as well, did I not?
6	it's not an appropriate 304 finding because it	6	MR. PRENDERGAST: You did. You did
7	certainly	7	rule clearly on that one.
8	THE COURT: Because it's a motion to	8	But Mr. Krislov has brought this case
9	dismiss?	9	on behalf of four subclasses, all involving the same
10	MR. PRENDERGAST: In part because it's	10	clause of the constitution, all involving the same
11	a motion to dismiss and in part because there's a	11	history.
12	great deal of overlap between the disposition of that	12	And the appellate court, in dealing
13	motion and the matter that remained before the Court.	13	with those kind of issues, has spoken to that kind of
14	It's not a clear, distinct issue that	14	piecemeal litigation.
15	should go up on appeal. In fact	15	I can just give you a quote here.
16	THE COURT: Because it doesn't wish to	16	THE COURT: Well, let me talk to you
17	appeal all of the claims that are	17	about piecemeal litigation, and I'll listen to what
18		18	you have to say, Mr. Krislov, but, of course and
	MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, no. It's not		
19	a 304(a) finding anticipates that all of the	19	the funds, of course.
			the funds, of course. But in a very this is a class
19	a 304(a) finding anticipates that all of the	19	
19 20 21 22	a 304(a) finding anticipates that all of the claims are not going to be appealed, but there has to	19 20 21 22	But in a very this is a class
19 20 21	a 304(a) finding anticipates that all of the claims are not going to be appealed, but there has to be a clear distinction between the claims that are	19 20 21	But in a very this is a class action. And in a very true sense, there are four

3 (Pages 6 to 9)

1	Page 10		Page 12
1	If I've already ruled with regard to	1	So I don't see why there's any reason
2	three of them, as I have, Korshak, Windows and	2	to prevent them from going on and issuing 304(a)
3	subclass four, there's nothing left, really. I	3	language as to that group.
4	think, as Mr. Krislov suggested, even though he	4	Tell me why I'm wrong about that, from
5	disagrees with my ruling in some cases, there's	5	the City's point of view.
6	really nothing left to do with regard to those, and	6	MR. PRENDERGAST: I'm looking at this
7	there's nothing piecemeal about an appeal of those	7	in terms of
8	four three out of four distinct groups.	8	THE COURT: And, by the way, let me
9	And it seems to me, Richard, that it's	9	I'm sorry to interrupt you, hopefully, for the last
10	important for the we're talking about people. And	10	time, but I wouldn't bet on it.
11	it's important for those people to know where they	11	It's important for the City to know
12	stand so that they can make accommodations if	12	this too and to get final resolution just for that
13	necessary.	13	subclass four so they know whether to raise my
14	Not so much with regard to the Korshak	14	property taxes some more or not. This is important
15	and Windows class, because the City has agreed to	15	for everybody to know as soon as possible.
16	cover them, and I'm sure they've agreed to accept	16	We're not talking about piecemeal
17	that. But certainly with regard to subclass four,	17	litigation in an amorphous way. We're talking about
18	which the City says it has no obligation to cover in	18	dollars and cents and people's lives so they know
19	terms of healthcare benefits. And I've agreed with	19	what they've got to do.
20	you.	20	And so the City knows what it has to
21	But in the meantime, it's nice that	21	do, even though I'm sure it loathes to raise any more
22	I've agreed from Mr. Krislov's point of view, it's	22	taxes here or there. Who wants to? But they're
23	nice that I've made that decision, even though he	23	going to have to if I'm wrong.
24	disagrees with me, but it doesn't help those folks.	24	Wouldn't the City want to know that
	Page 11		Page 13
1	And as soon as it gets reviewed with a	1	sooner rather than later?
2	final review, the better it is from those human	2	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, I think
3	beings' point of view so that they can make those	3	that we're past the motions to dismiss in this case.
4	accommodations or not. That's not piecemeal.	4	There's not a whole lot of discovery to be done in
5	And maybe even if you were to think of	5	this case. We're going to have if we can get this
6	it as piecemeal, this Court's position at least	6	case moving throughout this year.
7	I'm waiting to hear from you again with regard to	7	When we talk about piecemeal
8	what I say, it's only fair is that even though it	8	litigation in the context of this case, we're talking
9	may be piecemeal as to those, they're a little	9	about an appeal that is currently pending on the
10	universe unto themselves, or a big universe unto	10	injunction the denial for a preliminary injunction
11	themselves. They have a right to know. You've won	11	for injunctive relief. Now, we're going to have
12	on that, but they have a right to know whether I'm	12	another appeal that pertains to one piece of this
13	right or not.	13	litigation, pertaining to one portion of the
14	And extending the timeline during	14	plaintiffs.
15	which they're in limbo, so to speak, since I'm only	15	And what the appellate court has said
16	one guy, and I'm at the trial court level, it's	16	under those circumstances is that permitting separate
1 ~ 1	harmful and doesn't do what I want to be done and I	17	appeals in such a case would require the appellate
17		18	court to relearn, inefficiently, the same set of
18	think what the law requires, which is to have some		
18 19	finality over an important group of people who	19	facts when the case returns for a second appeal
18 19 20	finality over an important group of people who deserve to know whether I'm right or I'm wrong.	19 20	facts when the case returns for a second appeal following the final judgment on all of the claims.
18 19 20 21	finality over an important group of people who deserve to know whether I'm right or I'm wrong. I do believe I'm right. I think	19 20 21	facts when the case returns for a second appeal following the final judgment on all of the claims. That's a quote from Walters versus
18 19 20 21 22	finality over an important group of people who deserve to know whether I'm right or I'm wrong. I do believe I'm right. I think Matthew says I'm right, and I said that before.	19 20 21 22	facts when the case returns for a second appeal following the final judgment on all of the claims. That's a quote from Walters versus Morton. I'd be happy to brief this issue, and I
18 19 20 21	finality over an important group of people who deserve to know whether I'm right or I'm wrong. I do believe I'm right. I think	19 20 21	facts when the case returns for a second appeal following the final judgment on all of the claims. That's a quote from Walters versus

4 (Pages 10 to 13)

	Page 14		Page 16
1	I don't need the law. I know the law and you know	1	MS. BOECKMAN: Sarah Boeckman for the
2	the law. And piecemeal litigation is not something I	2	Municipal and the Firemen's Fund.
3	haven't heard before.	3	We adopt Mr. Prendergast and the
4	MR. PRENDERGAST: Sure.	4	City's position on both the 304, the motion to
5	THE COURT: And you haven't uttered	5	reconsider, and the motion the injunction motion
6	before. So I'm aware of that.	6	the motion for injunctive relief.
7	But I it's factually intensive, and	7	THE COURT: Okay.
8	that's the important thing here. And I don't want to	8	MR. KENNEDY: Good morning, Your
9	cut you off, so you may continue.	9	Honor. John Kennedy on behalf of the Laborer's Fund.
10	MR. PRENDERGAST: But you didn't cut	10	The Laborer's Fund also endorses Mr.
11	me off, Your Honor.	11	Prendergast's comments with respect to all three
12	This is obviously an issue that falls	12	motions.
13	within the discretion of the Court. I respect the	13	THE COURT: Okay. Well, interesting.
14	Court's discretion. I think all the lawyers here do.	14	Curious.
15	But I do believe that litigation that	15	I'm going to hold my ruling on that in
16	constantly resurrects itself in an appeal on an	16	abeyance, pending our discussion of other matters
17	interlocutory basis, we have an interlocutory appeal	17	today, and I'll give you my final ruling on that.
18	there now, and	18	And, Clint, I would love to hear what
19	THE COURT: I want to talk to you	19	you have to say, but when I was a young prosecutor,
20	about that in a second, but go ahead.	20	and when I was a defense counsel thereafter, both
21	MR. PRENDERGAST: We have an	21	civil and criminal, I learned one rule, which is when
22 23	interlocutory appeal there now. We're going to have	22 23	you're winning, say nothing.
23 24	another one. We've had multiple motions for	24	Are you with me on that? MR. KRISLOV: I'm with you, Your
24	injunctive relief in this case from the beginning,	21	
	Page 15		Page 17
1	both in federal court and state court.	1	Honor.
2	Every time Mr. Krislov experiences an	2	THE COURT: Is there anything you'd
3	adverse ruling, we have an amended complaint or	3	like to say with regard to 304(a) only with regard
4	appeal.	4	right now to subclass four?
5	The piecemeal nature of this case has	5	MR. KRISLOV: Well, 304(a) is with
6 7	really, I think, gotten out of hand. I think this is	6	regard to everybody because your ruling is definitive
8	the classic case in which the Court says, I'm going forward with this case. We're going to proceed with	7	on the law with respect to everybody and subclass THE COURT: But it's not with regard
9	it, and the motions to dismiss are behind us. Let's	9	to subclass three, wouldn't you agree?
10	go.	10	MR. KRISLOV: Oh, no. It is
11	THE COURT: Okay.	11	definitive with respect to
12	MR. PRENDERGAST: And that's my view.	12	THE COURT: Well, then you do need a
13	THE COURT: What about the Funds?	13	clarification. It's not.
14	Would the Funds like to chip in on this? I assume	14	MR. KRISLOV: Okay.
15	you all endorsed Mr. Prendergast's point of view, and	15	THE COURT: Tell me how is it
16	if not, I would love to hear from you.	16	definitive with regard to subclass three.
17	David, would you please state your	17	MR. KRISLOV: If your March
18	name, please.	18	THE COURT: It is not with regard to
19	MR. KUGLER: David Kugler for the	19	the statute of limitations aspect.
20	Policemen's Annuity Fund.	20	MR. KRISLOV: Well, that's I
21	Your Honor, the Fund would abide by	21	understand that part.
100	Your Honor's ruling. On the 304 we don't see any	22	THE COURT: All right. Just so we
22			
22 23 24	we have no objection to it going forward on the 304	23 24	understand. MR. KRISLOV: Yes. But with respect

5 (Pages 14 to 17)

	Page 18		Page 20
1	for their entitlement, which you ruled in your I	1	of this since you have refused at this point to
2	believe it's the March clarification, you ruled that	2	certify the case as a class action, but the case
3	the subclass three is entitled to just what the	3	definitively, and everybody agrees, should be is
4	statute provides. No more, no less. And that's a	4	treated for each class differently.
5	matter of law, and that they're not entitled under	5	I think it's we would think it's
6	contract	6	time to certify the class, but whatever.
7	THE COURT: That's before Matthews	7	The 304(a) findings are really to get
8	came down, and then when I said that it's time	8	your clear decision to the appellate court. I'll
9	limited. Yes?	9	make Mr. Prendergast a deal, and I'll let the thing
10	MR. KRISLOV: Well, in that you said	10	take as long as it wants to get resolved at the trial
11	that well, that was I guess that was before	11	level as long as we reinstate the 2013 status quo,
12	Matthews came down.	12	because then the participants
13	But if your clarification in March was	13	THE COURT: Well, you make any deal
14	that what they're entitled to is just what the	14	you want outside the auspices of this Court. That's
15	statute provides	15	not before me. We're not at marketplace here. So do
16	THE COURT: Yes.	16	it on your own time, not mine.
17	MR. KRISLOV: that's a clear ruling	17	MR. KRISLOV: I'm just saying,
18	on the law, which, obviously, we disagree with.	18	procedurally, I would be willing to forego 304(a) and
19	THE COURT: Sure.	19	let the whole thing play out, as long as the City was
20	MR. KRISLOV: Your rulings on the law	20	willing to reinstate the 2013 status quo so that the
21	were very clear. And while I disagree with you, I	21	retirees can have their benefits continue while the
22	you know, I appreciate clear and definitive rulings.	22	matter is being litigated.
23	And on the law, your rulings I think	23	THE COURT: Okay.
24	are leave no there's no fuzzy area. I think	24	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor.
	Page 19		Page 21
1	the statute of limitations issue will we think	1	THE COURT: Yes, please.
2	will blow away clearly, but whatever.	2	MR. PRENDERGAST: I beg your pardon.
3	THE COURT: Why?	3	First of all, I'm not making any deals
4	MR. KRISLOV: Oh, because the clear	4	today.
5	intent of the preservation of the reservation of	5	Secondly, I think it's going to be
6	rights, which was in all the settlements, including	6	very interesting to see what this 304 language looks
7	the one that expired in 2013, was everybody's rights	7	like.
8	get reserved to revive the case if at the conclusion	8	THE COURT: Yes, and I don't have
9	of the settlement there has been no permanent	9	MR. PRENDERGAST: Based upon what
10	resolution.	10	and he hasn't submitted anything.
11	That was in the '87 and codified in	11	THE COURT: I would need the 304
12	the '89 agreement. That was in the '97 agreement,	12	language that you suggest. Although, I do have the
		13	normal language; is that what you meant?
13	which we were not parties to. That was in the 2003		
13 14	agreement.	14	MR. KRISLOV: That's all you want.
13 14 15	agreement. I think your first ruling rejecting	14 15	MR. KRISLOV: That's all you want. That's all we're asking for is that there's no just
13 14 15 16	agreement. I think your first ruling rejecting the statute of limitations, you know, I think that	14 15 16	MR. KRISLOV: That's all you want. That's all we're asking for is that there's no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of the
13 14 15 16 17	agreement. I think your first ruling rejecting the statute of limitations, you know, I think that will hold. But that sort of call that a side	14 15 16 17	MR. KRISLOV: That's all you want. That's all we're asking for is that there's no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of the decisions.
13 14 15 16 17 18	agreement. I think your first ruling rejecting the statute of limitations, you know, I think that will hold. But that sort of call that a side issue, but on everything else, and even on that, I	14 15 16 17 18	MR. KRISLOV: That's all you want. That's all we're asking for is that there's no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of the decisions. MR. PRENDERGAST: Decisions. You see,
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	agreement. I think your first ruling rejecting the statute of limitations, you know, I think that will hold. But that sort of call that a side issue, but on everything else, and even on that, I think we will we will prevail in the appellate	14 15 16 17 18 19	MR. KRISLOV: That's all you want. That's all we're asking for is that there's no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of the decisions. MR. PRENDERGAST: Decisions. You see, the plural pops up.
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	agreement. I think your first ruling rejecting the statute of limitations, you know, I think that will hold. But that sort of call that a side issue, but on everything else, and even on that, I think we will we will prevail in the appellate court.	14 15 16 17 18 19 20	MR. KRISLOV: That's all you want. That's all we're asking for is that there's no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of the decisions. MR. PRENDERGAST: Decisions. You see, the plural pops up. Counsel forgets that the motion to
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	agreement. I think your first ruling rejecting the statute of limitations, you know, I think that will hold. But that sort of call that a side issue, but on everything else, and even on that, I think we will we will prevail in the appellate court. And it's time to get a second opinion,	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. KRISLOV: That's all you want. That's all we're asking for is that there's no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of the decisions. MR. PRENDERGAST: Decisions. You see, the plural pops up. Counsel forgets that the motion to reconsider being ruled on had to do with your
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	agreement. I think your first ruling rejecting the statute of limitations, you know, I think that will hold. But that sort of call that a side issue, but on everything else, and even on that, I think we will we will prevail in the appellate court. And it's time to get a second opinion, if you will, on all these issues.	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	MR. KRISLOV: That's all you want. That's all we're asking for is that there's no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of the decisions. MR. PRENDERGAST: Decisions. You see, the plural pops up. Counsel forgets that the motion to reconsider being ruled on had to do with your interpretation of the '83 and '85 amendments.
13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	agreement. I think your first ruling rejecting the statute of limitations, you know, I think that will hold. But that sort of call that a side issue, but on everything else, and even on that, I think we will we will prevail in the appellate court. And it's time to get a second opinion,	14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. KRISLOV: That's all you want. That's all we're asking for is that there's no just cause to delay enforcement or appeal of the decisions. MR. PRENDERGAST: Decisions. You see, the plural pops up. Counsel forgets that the motion to reconsider being ruled on had to do with your

6 (Pages 18 to 21)

	Page 22		Page 24
1	to do.	1	THE COURT: Tell me what you're
2	THE COURT: Yeah.	2	missing, what they're not doing that you want.
3	MR. PRENDERGAST: What his motion for	3	They're giving all the benefits they
4	a 304(a) is predicated on this. There is as you	4	would have otherwise gotten.
5	have just addressed in your remarks, is addressed in	5	MR. KRISLOV: No, no. What they are
6	one group of people, particularly, the fourth	6	doing is instead of at least 50 percent, they are
7	subclass, because they, as you put it, they don't	7	saying they will do up to 50 percent. That's what
8	know what the future bodes for them.	8	they said they would do.
9	What counsel really wants to do here	9	They have made minor changes in the
10	is off of a motion to dismiss, he wants to take a	10	amounts. It less impacts them than the group three
11	full appeal of every issue in this case. That's what	11	and four, but those people are not moot.
12	he wants.	12	MR. PRENDERGAST: You see, that's the
13	THE COURT: Yes.	13	whole point, Judge.
14	MR. PRENDERGAST: And he's going to	14	THE COURT: Well, if that's the case,
15	call it a 304(a).	15	then isn't that something that I have to deal with on
16	Your Honor, that's not what 304 is	16	summary judgment or trial? It's never going to get
17	there for. 304(a) is, for example, if there's one	17	to summary judgment I mean, to trial on that.
18	party that has a complete adjudication of that	18	But summary judgment I just dealt
19	party's rights but the other but not an	19	with a motion to dismiss, and I just ruled that
20	adjudication of the other party's rights, then that	20	because they because they have offered to do that
21	one party comes in and asks for a 304(a) finding so	21	which they are obligated to do obligated to do
22	they can get out of the litigation.	22	MR. KRISLOV: No. I disagree with you
23	What we're trying to do here this	23	on that.
24	reminds me of the effort to go back a sentence or	24	THE COURT: Well, let me finish the
	Page 23		Page 25
1	two, is that Judge Green commented at one time or	1	sentence before you disagree with me
2	another in the litigation. It always pops up in the	2	MR. KRISLOV: Sorry.
3	briefs. He wants to take an appeal of the entire	3	THE COURT: Just because it's
4	matter.	4	courteous.
5	That's not appropriate in this case.	5	MR. KRISLOV: I apologize. I
6	There are issues, as you pointed out, with respect to	6	apologize.
7	subclass three that have yet to be adjudicated.	7	THE COURT: That it's all mooted out.
8	And subclass one and two, you're	8	If you feel it's not, then maybe 304(a) language is
9	right, the City has indicated that it's going to meet	9	not appropriate because there's other issues to be
10	its obligations and has met its obligations. It's	10	resolved.
11	going to gratuitously extend the rights to them.	11	I thought it was. I thought they
12	But he's going to be up there arguing	12	acknowledged everything that they should be doing and
13	every one of the issues that we've spent all this	13	that they're doing it for the benefit of those folks.
14	time arguing on the motion to dismiss. He wants to	14	And you think not, okay.
15	take the shortcut, and that's not what 304(a) is for.	15	Then there's some factual issues to be
16	That's there for a very specific	16	decided within those two subgroups that make 304(a)
17	THE COURT: I understand. So let me	17	language inappropriate because they're not done. I
18	ask you this: I would like each party's point of	18	thought they were.
19	view on this, if I were to I feel as though I've	19	And I would have given you 304(a),
20	already denied the the motion to dismiss with	20	just so the record is clear, because I thought they
21	regard to the Korshak and Windows class is really	21	were down. You say they're not. I'm surprised to
122	moot, is it not, Clint, because the City is doing	22	hear that. Okay. You got it. It's denied as to one
22		00	1.
22 23 24	exactly what you want? MR. KRISLOV: No, not exactly.	23 24	and two. Would you agree I'm not done.

7 (Pages 22 to 25)

	Page 26		Page 28
1	Would you agree with regard to subclass four where I	1	litigation because they weren't even in existence
2	said that it is time well, it's time it was	2	then.
3	time limited by its own terms, and I denied and I	3	So the only issue with regard to
4	granted the motion to dismiss? Would you agree that		it's a separate and discrete group. And I can't say
5	that is done and subject to appeal, even though	5	whether the statute of limitations applies or not.
6	Richard has said it would be a piecemeal appeal?	6	That's good for you.
7	MR. KRISLOV: You've dismissed their	7	If it couldn't have, then they're in.
8	claim, the class four claim subclass four claim	8	If it does, if they did know what they could have
9	entirely, yes.	9	done in order to assert their claims, they're out.
10	THE COURT: Okay. I will grant 304(a)	10	But I don't know I don't have any facts that would
11	language as to subclass four so those folks can know	11	let me finish speaking, Clint.
12	one way or the other and have resolved as an	12	MR. KRISLOV: I haven't said anything
13	independent group of folk, although, under the	13	yet.
14	umbrella of the purported class, they can know what	14	THE COURT: I have received no facts
15	they're supposed to do one way or another as soon as	15	upon which I can make a judgment as to whether this
16	possible in terms of modifying where they're going to	16	statute of limitations applies or not. So that was
17	allocate their income or whatever funds they already	17	my ruling with regard with regard to them.
18	have.	18	Now, I also ruled about the time
19	So they should know, and the City	19	limitation aspect that is time limited in the
20	should know as well. Everybody should know.	20	amendment. It's true that I did make a ruling with
21	I'll grant you 304(a) language as to	21	regard to that per Matthews, but there's another part
22	subclass four pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule	22	to that, and that's the statute of limitations.
23	304(a), I feel, as to that subclass. There's no just	23	And so subclass three is in a position
24	reason to delay enforcement or appeal of my order	24	where it may be time limited, but there's no way they
	Page 27		Page 29
1	Page 27 with regard to them.	1	Page 29 ever could have asserted a claim, and I don't want to
1 2	with regard to them.	1 2	
			ever could have asserted a claim, and I don't want to
2	with regard to them. Okay. What's your position with	2	ever could have asserted a claim, and I don't want to kick them out of court. I don't want to limit their
2 3	with regard to them. Okay. What's your position with regard to subclass three? MR. KRISLOV: Your ruling was as a matter of law, the governing law of the case. That	2 3	ever could have asserted a claim, and I don't want to kick them out of court. I don't want to limit their ability to assert their claim if the statute of
2 3 4	with regard to them. Okay. What's your position with regard to subclass three? MR. KRISLOV: Your ruling was as a matter of law, the governing law of the case. That ruling governs how it plays out for everybody.	2 3 4	ever could have asserted a claim, and I don't want to kick them out of court. I don't want to limit their ability to assert their claim if the statute of limitations hasn't run.
2 3 4 5 6 7	with regard to them. Okay. What's your position with regard to subclass three? MR. KRISLOV: Your ruling was as a matter of law, the governing law of the case. That ruling governs how it plays out for everybody. THE COURT: You're wrong, because you	2 3 4 5 6 7	ever could have asserted a claim, and I don't want to kick them out of court. I don't want to limit their ability to assert their claim if the statute of limitations hasn't run. I don't know. We'll see. But that's not final yet. I just can't know. MR. KRISLOV: But
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8 (Pages 26 to 29)

	Page 30		Page 32
1	MR. KRISLOV: No. They're not time	1	THE COURT: What's your position about
2	limited. You held they're not time limited, but I	2	that?
3	don't agree that they are entitled to no more, no	3	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, you
4	less than what just the Pension Code provides.	4	denied the motion to dismiss without prejudice on the
5	That's an issue of law. The whole	5	statute of limitations because you found that it was
6	thing is an issue of law, and that's an issue which	6	a factual issue that needed to be developed here.
7	the appellate court can and should rule on.	7	THE COURT: Yeah.
8	THE COURT: Okay.	8	MR. PRENDERGAST: You denied the
9	MR. KRISLOV: And which the core	9	motion to dismiss as to subclass three. How can
10	the core people in category three, subclass three,	10	counsel talk about taking an appeal from the denial
11	those are people who are, for the most part, not	11	of our motion to dismiss?
12	covered.	12	What he wants to do is to take every
13	Their city employment doesn't qualify	13	issue in this case that is of interest to him and get
14	them for Medicare coverage no matter how old they	14	a whole fresh look from the appellate court on that.
15	get. They are, for the most part, retired, although	15	But that's not what $304(a)$ is. $304(a)$
16	there are some people who still haven't retired	16	deals with dispositive rulings because you cannot
17	because they started working before August 23 of	17	have a 304(a) finding unless you have a final
18	1989. They are in a very precarious situation.	18	judgment a final judgment within the case.
19	THE COURT: I hear you. That's	19	That's why a motion to dismiss with
20	another subject.	20	prejudice, as you did with respect to class four, is
21	MR. KRISLOV: Well, but no, because	21	a final judgment, which meets one of the two prongs
22	that's why granting the 304(a) language, just the	22	for a 304(a) finding. And then we go on to the
23	plain 304(a) language, to be able to take your	23	discretionary issues of whether it is in the best
24	rulings on the law up and get it decided in a timely	24	interest to allow appeal.
	Page 31		Page 33
1	fashion so these people can make their decisions	1	They're not past prong one because
2	knowing what their rights actually are.	2	they're what he wants to do is send up to the
3	And it can't go to December 31st	3	appellate court a lot of interesting issues.
4	because the sign-up date for Obamacare, they're going	4	What he really ought to do, I suppose,
5	to have see if they can buy Medicare. They have all	5	is file a 308 motion and ask you to certify 15
6 7	sorts of things.	6	questions, because that's the only way you can get up
	The City loves this delay. They have	7	the appellate court on the specific issues where you
8	asked for and they have gotten the they love the piecemeal. We're trying to get this all wrapped up	8	do not have a final judgment.
9		-	You didn't dismiss count three I
10 11	in a package. And if it gets up and if you'll	10 11	mean class three, so you can't make a three you can't make a finding on 304(a) as to that.
12^{11}	give us the 304(a) findings, we will get it up	12	THE COURT: Okay. And you get last
13	immediately to the appellate court, and we will get	13	ups on that, Clint.
14	the appellate court to deal with these questions of	14	MR. KRISLOV: This is exactly what
15	law because if I'm right	15	304(a) is for. You have made rulings on controlling
16	THE COURT: Well, before you get to	16	issues of law that govern the rights of all four
17	you being right, tell me, because I'm I may have	17	classes. And that is, do I want a fresh look at the
18	missed something. And I would like to hear what both		appellate court? Absolutely. That is what 304(a) is
19	of you have to say about subclass three and where the	19	for.
20	statute of limitations argument fits in.	20	And it is not it is not where you
21	And I'd like to start with you,	21	get if you want to dismiss the whole case at this
22	Richard.	22	point so we can get an appeal so we can get a fresh
23	We'll get back to you.	23	look, I mean, I don't think you want to do it.
24	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor	24	THE COURT: I understand why you want

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	Page 34		Page 36
1	a fresh look. And, by the way, I'm not against that,	1	was not finalized, and it was eventually
2	but I have to follow procedure and the right	2	THE COURT: What's the date of the
3	procedure.	3	settlement agreement?
4	MR. KRISLOV: And this qualifies	4	MR. KRISLOV: The settlement agreement
5	I'm sorry. I didn't mean it. I'm not trying to	5	started in 1987.
6	interrupt.	6	THE COURT: I know.
7	THE COURT: It's okay.	7	MR. KRISLOV: Sorry. In eighty
8	MR. KRISLOV: This is what 304(a) is	8	THE COURT: Ken, do you know the date?
9	there for.	9	MR. GOLDSTEIN: I don't know the date.
10	And the cases the AT&T case, I	10	MR. KRISLOV: It would have been,
11	guess, is the governing the issue, is there	11	like, fall of '88.
12	controlling law? The answer is, there is, your	12	THE COURT: Okay. So some people were
13	determinations of law.	13	in existence. Remember, we're talking that's the
14^{13}	In fact, the statute of limitations is	14	problem with subclass three. It's really two
15		15	separate subclasses within it. There are some who
16	not a factual issue, if you think about it. THE COURT: Tell me.	16	were in existence before the settlement agreement was
17		17	finalized, and there were some, i.e., participants,
18	MR. KRISLOV: Because we know exactly	18	
10 19	what the situation was.		people who were hired after the settlement agreement
19 20	These people were participants by	19 20	was finalized, but before August 23rd, 1989, who were
	definition on August 23 of 1989. And so the	20	not.
21	reservation of rights protects them as well as people		That's the problem with knowledge that
22	who were retirees. They were participants	22	I talked about in the statute of limitations.
23	THE COURT: The reservation of rights	23	So there you go.
24	in the settlement?	24	MR. KRISLOV: My turn?
	Page 35		Page 37
1	MR. KRISLOV: No. The reservation of	1	THE COURT: Please.
2	the rights in the entitled, yes.	2	MR. KRISLOV: Those people existed at
3	THE COURT: They weren't parties to	3	that time.
4	the settlement. There's no way they could have been	4	THE COURT: Not all of them.
5	covered by that settlement. They were not a party to	5	MR. KRISLOV: Oh, no. They existed.
6	it.	6	THE COURT: Okay. We have a
7	The reservation of rights, therefore,	7	disagreement
8	as a matter of fact and law does not protect them.	8	MR. KRISLOV: Whatever.
9	It doesn't cover them. It can't. They no one	9	THE COURT: that I just outlined.
10	negotiated on their behalf. You didn't. They didn't	10	MR. KRISLOV: Fine.
11	exist at the time.	11	THE COURT: How about someone who came
12	So there's no way that their rights	12	to work for the City as a cop or as a fireman or
13	are reserved by an agreement to which they were no	13	whomever after this final settlement was reached, but
14	party. That's just, you know, logic.	14	before August 23rd, 1989? They didn't exist.
15	Yes, the man in the striped tie.	15	MR. KRISLOV: They get the benefit of
16	MR. KRISLOV: They were they	16	the settlement. Yes, they do, Your Honor.
17	existed then. The restoration	17	And the reason why is because the
18		18	settlement restores gives the participants the
T 9	THE COURT: Some of them did: some of		
18 19	THE COURT: Some of them did; some of them didn't.	19	right to restore the litigation to
	them didn't.		right to restore the litigation to THE COURT: Gives the party to the
19	them didn't. MR. KRISLOV: No. All of them	19	THE COURT: Gives the party to the
19 20	them didn't. MR. KRISLOV: No. All of them existed.	19 20	
19 20 21 22	them didn't. MR. KRISLOV: No. All of them existed. THE COURT: What was the date of the	19 20 21	THE COURT: Gives the party to the agreement. MR. KRISLOV: No.
19 20 21	them didn't. MR. KRISLOV: No. All of them existed.	19 20 21 22 23	THE COURT: Gives the party to the agreement.

10 (Pages 34 to 37)

	Page 38		Page 40
1	MR. KRISLOV: Yes, it does.	1	MR. KRISLOV: Well, then
2	THE COURT: Excuse me. Not people who	2	THE COURT: Move on.
3	don't exist yet. It's impossible.	3	MR. KRISLOV: Make them bound. Then
4	MR. KRISLOV: It's not. I disagree,	4	give me
5	Your Honor. And it's a matter of law.	5	THE COURT: Clint, this is not take
6	THE COURT: What a surprise.	6	your ball and go home. You lost on that one.
7	MR. KRISLOV: Rule against me	7	There's a factual issue. You didn't really lose
8	rule	8	yet
9	THE COURT: I did.	9	MR. KRISLOV: I didn't lose.
10	MR. KRISLOV: against me on that.	10	THE COURT: You didn't really lose.
11	THE COURT: I did.	11	It's a factual issue to be fleshed out.
12	MR. KRISLOV: And we'll take that	12	MR. PRENDERGAST: Which is exactly,
13	is one of the issues we'll include.	13	Your Honor
14	THE COURT: No.	14	THE COURT: So that's why you're not
15	MR. KRISLOV: But it's a matter of law	15	going to get 304(a) language with regard to subclass
16	as to whether they're	16	three.
17	THE COURT: No. There's a question of	17	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, 304(a)
18	fact as to the statute of limitations issue.	18	language is not issue limited. 308 language is.
19	MR. KRISLOV: What is it that we could	19	THE COURT: You and I disagree about
20	possibly show you that would they were on notice	20	that as well.
21	that the settlement existed?	21	Your motion for 304(a) language with
22	THE COURT: I don't know that. I	22	regard to subclass three is denied.
23	don't know that. I don't even know that they knew	23	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, then may we
24	anything before how would they know something	24	proceed to the preliminary injunction
	Page 39		D 41
	rage 55		Page 41
1		1	THE COURT: We will. Sure.
1 2	before they existed?	1 2	
	before they existed? And if they did know something, what		THE COURT: We will. Sure. Absolutely.
2	before they existed?	2	THE COURT: We will. Sure.
2 3	before they existed? And if they did know something, what did you do? Did you send them letters? That's	2 3	THE COURT: We will. Sure. Absolutely. But I just want to make sure your
2 3 4	before they existed? And if they did know something, what did you do? Did you send them letters? That's interesting, Clint. Why don't you give us the	2 3 4	THE COURT: We will. Sure. Absolutely. But I just want to make sure your position with regard to the Korshak class and the
2 3 4 5	before they existed? And if they did know something, what did you do? Did you send them letters? That's interesting, Clint. Why don't you give us the evidence. Give it to them so we know.	2 3 4 5	THE COURT: We will. Sure. Absolutely. But I just want to make sure your position with regard to the Korshak class and the Windows class is that there is a disagreement of
2 3 4 5 6	before they existed? And if they did know something, what did you do? Did you send them letters? That's interesting, Clint. Why don't you give us the evidence. Give it to them so we know. MR. KRISLOV: The City sent the	2 3 4 5 6	THE COURT: We will. Sure. Absolutely. But I just want to make sure your position with regard to the Korshak class and the Windows class is that there is a disagreement of facts with regard to those two classes and that which
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	before they existed? And if they did know something, what did you do? Did you send them letters? That's interesting, Clint. Why don't you give us the evidence. Give it to them so we know. MR. KRISLOV: The City sent the notices. THE COURT: Okay. MR. KRISLOV: But the they get the benefit of restoring the litigation to what it was on October 19th, 1987. Yes, they do, Your Honor. And there isn't a fact that you need to decide that they were THE COURT: Someone who doesn't exist gets the benefit of an agreement to which they were not a party. That's an interesting concept. I disagree with you, but we're not yet there because there's other factual issues to decide with regard to subclass three. MR. KRISLOV: Then, Your Honor, I want	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	THE COURT: We will. Sure. Absolutely. But I just want to make sure your position with regard to the Korshak class and the Windows class is that there is a disagreement of facts with regard to those two classes and that which you believe they're the benefits they're entitled to. MR. KRISLOV: No. There is a disagreement of law. What they're entitled to Police, for one, were entitled to a premium and an amount and the police fund paying it. Firemen, same thing. THE COURT: Sure. MR. KRISLOV: Municipal and Laborers, different. THE COURT: The City has agreed to cover them, have they not? MR. KRISLOV: No, not in that fashion. THE COURT: Richard, tell me how it differs, just so everything is fair. I don't want to

11 (Pages 38 to 41)

	Page 42		Page 44
1	THE COURT: This is for me to	1	years, so
2	determine whether I should give 304(a) language with	2	THE COURT: Well, here's what I would
3	regard to the Korshak and Windows class. And I've	3	like to do. I will reserve my ruling on 304(a)
4	dismissed those classes.	4	language with regard to Korshak and Windows class for
5	MR. PRENDERGAST: You dismissed those	5	you all to discuss the matter and see whether you
б	claims.	6	have an agreement as to what the issue is on it or
7	THE COURT: Those claims. But Clint	7	not.
8	now says he didn't get you told me you were the	8	I have as I've told you, Clint, I
9	reason I did is not because of the statute of	9	believe, the City has agreed to cover them entirely
10	limitations. I felt I didn't have to do that because	10	pursuant to the agreement pursuant to the
11	you I didn't even have to deal with it because you	11	settlement agreement. And you tell me that that's
12	told me the City was going to cover them.	12	not the case.
13	I accepted that as to completely cover	13	I'm going to ask you, please, to have
14	them pursuant to the settlement agreement. Am I	14	a conversation. Call it a 201(k) conversation, as
15	wrong?	15	you wish, to see if they're to see what your
16	MR. PRENDERGAST: No, you're not	16	positions are.
17	wrong, Your Honor.	17	If you're asking for something more
18	THE COURT: Clint says I am.	18	than that which was settled, what the agreement was,
19	MR. PRENDERGAST: I know Clint says	19	you're not going to get that. If your position is
20	you are. And I can guarantee you whenever an issue	20	that regardless of the settlement, anything that was
21	arises between the regarding the eighty	21	given thereafter should enure to their benefit, which
22	regarding the Korshak or Windows classes with respect	22	may be your position, as I understand it now, then
23	to what they're getting, Clint will be back here to	23	you should we should know that and Richard should
24	tell you that we're not doing what he thinks we're	24	know that, because, actually, I thought I granted you
	Page 43		Page 45
1	supposed to do.	1	everything you wanted with regard to Korshak and
2	But this is not the place to deal with	2	Windows.
3	that negotiation. This is the place to deal with the	3	Now I'm not so sure because of what
4	fact that you've dismissed that claim because we've	4	you said, and I'd like you to make it clear to me.
5	told you we're going to take care of the '83 and '85	5	So I will hold the 304(a) issue open with regard to
6	classes.	6	class I call them class one and class two in my
7	THE COURT: Is there any reason to not	7	mind, but it's the Korshak and Windows class pending
8	give 304(a) language as to that, if Clint wants to	8	your discussion. Fair?
9	disagree with you?	9	MR. PRENDERGAST: Fair.
10	MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, that those	10	THE COURT: Fair?
11	claims were dismissed on that basis. I don't see any	11	MR. KRISLOV: Fair.
12	reason that I don't know what issues he thinks	12	THE COURT: All right. Let me hold
13	he's going to raise on '83 and '85.	13	on a second. You can't
14	Does he think he's going to get for	14	Yes, Clint, go ahead.
15	'83 and '85 the rates that would apply to nineteen	15	MR. PRENDERGAST: When I did you
16	to 2016?	16	want to go?
17	THE COURT: I don't know.	17	MR. KRISLOV: Yes, please. Your
18	MR. PRENDERGAST: Because he wants to	18	ruling that I mean, this is when we get to the
19	go back to settlements? I mean, I don't know what	19	equal protection.
20	Mr. Krislov thinks that what he thinks he should	20	This is the class three. The class
21	be entitled to.	21	three has the same rights that class one and
22	We will work through with him. If	22	THE COURT: Yes. I disagreed with
23	that's not the case, he'll be back in court on it. I	23	you. I ruled against you. That was your motion to
24	mean, we haven't agreed on anything in four or five		reconsider.

12 (Pages 42 to 45)

	Page 46		Page 48
1	I think you're totally wrong. I think	1	for the City to make a distinction between them in
2	class three is in a distinctive group where from	2	which it will grant permanent healthcare protection
3	class one and class two.	3	is a denial of equal protection
4	Further, I think there's a rationale	4	THE COURT: Yes.
5	basis for the City based upon its economic straits,	5	MR. KRISLOV: of the people who
6	et cetera, to have distinguished between class one	6	have the same benefit.
7	and two on the one hand, class three on the other,	7	THE COURT: I understand.
8	class four on the other. All you need is a rationale	8	MR. KRISLOV: The same rights.
9	basis when it comes to this. There is one.	9	THE COURT: I disagree.
10	You can't for the sake of you've	10	MR. KRISLOV: Okay.
11	lumped them together for the purposes of a class	11	THE COURT: And I've said that.
12	action, and I understand that. You're allowed to and	12	MR. KRISLOV: Given that and
13	you should. I think they're in a distinctive	13	everything else that
14	position, separate from that of class one and class	14	THE COURT: I'm not done. We're not
15	two and separate from that of class four as a matter	15	there yet.
16	of fact and as a matter of law.	16	MR. KRISLOV: Okay.
17	And I think the equal protection	17	THE COURT: I know where you're going,
18	argument fails. You disagree. I disagree with you,	18	so
19	and that's the way it is. But it's not yet ripe for	19	MR. KRISLOV: Okay.
20	304(a) language.	20	THE COURT: And we'll get there.
21	MR. KRISLOV: Let me know if I	21	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor.
22	understand you.	22	THE COURT: What? Yes.
23	Our argument for the equal protection	23	MR. PRENDERGAST: In re Starke is a
	is not that class four is being discriminated against	24	classic case for purposes of this motion.
	Page 47		Page 49
1	_	1	
1	vis-a-vis class three. Our argument is that you're	1	THE COURT: Which motion?
2	vis-a-vis class three. Our argument is that you're holding that people who were participants on August	2	THE COURT: Which motion? MR. PRENDERGAST: The
2 3	vis-a-vis class three. Our argument is that you're holding that people who were participants on August 23 of 1989 have permanent protected rights under the	2 3	THE COURT: Which motion? MR. PRENDERGAST: The THE COURT: Equal protection?
2 3 4	vis-a-vis class three. Our argument is that you're holding that people who were participants on August 23 of 1989 have permanent protected rights under the constitution.	2 3 4	THE COURT: Which motion? MR. PRENDERGAST: The THE COURT: Equal protection? MR. PRENDERGAST: The 304(a) part. It
2 3 4 5	vis-a-vis class three. Our argument is that you're holding that people who were participants on August 23 of 1989 have permanent protected rights under the constitution. That applies identically to class one,	2 3 4 5	THE COURT: Which motion? MR. PRENDERGAST: The THE COURT: Equal protection? MR. PRENDERGAST: The 304(a) part. It is one of the lead cases, Starke and Geier versus
2 3 4 5 6	vis-a-vis class three. Our argument is that you're holding that people who were participants on August 23 of 1989 have permanent protected rights under the constitution. That applies identically to class one, two and three, because they all were participants	2 3 4 5 6	THE COURT: Which motion? MR. PRENDERGAST: The THE COURT: Equal protection? MR. PRENDERGAST: The 304(a) part. It is one of the lead cases, Starke and Geier versus Hamer. And the requirement of those cases is
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	vis-a-vis class three. Our argument is that you're holding that people who were participants on August 23 of 1989 have permanent protected rights under the constitution. That applies identically to class one, two and three, because they all were participants prior to on or before August 23 or 1989. THE COURT: Yes. MR. KRISLOV: And so treating them differently THE COURT: Who is "them"? MR. KRISLOV: Them, treating the people who retired THE COURT: Who is them? Class three	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14	THE COURT: Which motion? MR. PRENDERGAST: The THE COURT: Equal protection? MR. PRENDERGAST: The 304(a) part. It is one of the lead cases, Starke and Geier versus Hamer. And the requirement of those cases is twofold. For a 304(a) finding there must be a final judgment. And then there must be a there must be no just reason for delaying the appeal. As to count three, you denied our motion. That's the end of the discussion. And you granted the motion as to count as to class four, and you granted it with prejudice.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	vis-a-vis class three. Our argument is that you're holding that people who were participants on August 23 of 1989 have permanent protected rights under the constitution. That applies identically to class one, two and three, because they all were participants prior to on or before August 23 or 1989. THE COURT: Yes. MR. KRISLOV: And so treating them differently THE COURT: Who is "them"? MR. KRISLOV: Them, treating the people who retired THE COURT: Who is them? Class three or MR. KRISLOV: Class one and class two. THE COURT: Differently from class three. MR. KRISLOV: Differently from class three. THE COURT: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20	THE COURT: Which motion? MR. PRENDERGAST: The THE COURT: Equal protection? MR. PRENDERGAST: The 304(a) part. It is one of the lead cases, Starke and Geier versus Hamer. And the requirement of those cases is twofold. For a 304(a) finding there must be a final judgment. And then there must be a there must be no just reason for delaying the appeal. As to count three, you denied our motion. That's the end of the discussion. And you granted the motion as to count as to class four, and you granted it with prejudice. Now, you have a final judgment there for purposes of THE COURT: When you said count three just a moment ago, you meant class three? MR. PRENDERGAST: I meant class three. Thank you. And so there is a distinction between
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	vis-a-vis class three. Our argument is that you're holding that people who were participants on August 23 of 1989 have permanent protected rights under the constitution. That applies identically to class one, two and three, because they all were participants prior to on or before August 23 or 1989. THE COURT: Yes. MR. KRISLOV: And so treating them differently THE COURT: Who is "them"? MR. KRISLOV: Them, treating the people who retired THE COURT: Who is them? Class three or MR. KRISLOV: Class one and class two. THE COURT: Differently from class three. MR. KRISLOV: Differently from class three. THE COURT: Yes. MR. KRISLOV: Is a denial of equal	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	THE COURT: Which motion? MR. PRENDERGAST: The THE COURT: Equal protection? MR. PRENDERGAST: The 304(a) part. It is one of the lead cases, Starke and Geier versus Hamer. And the requirement of those cases is twofold. For a 304(a) finding there must be a final judgment. And then there must be a there must be no just reason for delaying the appeal. As to count three, you denied our motion. That's the end of the discussion. And you granted the motion as to count as to class four, and you granted it with prejudice. Now, you have a final judgment there for purposes of THE COURT: When you said count three just a moment ago, you meant class three? MR. PRENDERGAST: I meant class three. Thank you. And so there is a distinction between four and three that is not grounded in fact. It is
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	vis-a-vis class three. Our argument is that you're holding that people who were participants on August 23 of 1989 have permanent protected rights under the constitution. That applies identically to class one, two and three, because they all were participants prior to on or before August 23 or 1989. THE COURT: Yes. MR. KRISLOV: And so treating them differently THE COURT: Who is "them"? MR. KRISLOV: Them, treating the people who retired THE COURT: Who is them? Class three or MR. KRISLOV: Class one and class two. THE COURT: Differently from class three. MR. KRISLOV: Differently from class three. THE COURT: Yes.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	THE COURT: Which motion? MR. PRENDERGAST: The THE COURT: Equal protection? MR. PRENDERGAST: The 304(a) part. It is one of the lead cases, Starke and Geier versus Hamer. And the requirement of those cases is twofold. For a 304(a) finding there must be a final judgment. And then there must be a there must be no just reason for delaying the appeal. As to count three, you denied our motion. That's the end of the discussion. And you granted the motion as to count as to class four, and you granted it with prejudice. Now, you have a final judgment there for purposes of THE COURT: When you said count three just a moment ago, you meant class three? MR. PRENDERGAST: I meant class three. Thank you. And so there is a distinction between

13 (Pages 46 to 49)

	Page 50		Page 52
1	I believe that if you made a 304(a)	1	relying upon what I relied upon earlier and what I
2	finding on three, we would have that dismissed in the	2	told you.
3	appellate court.	3	MR. KRISLOV: Could I just take a
4	THE COURT: I agree.	4	minute of
5	MR. PRENDERGAST: And so I agree with	5	THE COURT: Yes, you can, of course.
6	your exercising your judgment your discretion with	6	MR. KRISLOV: 304 does not require a
7	respect to count four. I don't agree with it, but	7	final dismissal of all claims. That's 301. Mr.
8	I'm not going to argue with you on it. It's your	8	Prendergast in the pension reform case and I
9	ruling.	9	learned something from that. At least one count must
10	But class three, no 304(a) finding.	10	be dismissed with finality in the case wholly, and
11	Class one and two, no 304(a) finding. The City has	11	you have done that. It only has to be
12	laid out in writing what they're going to do for the	12	THE COURT: Which count is that that I
13	Korshak and Windows classes. He's got everything	13	dismissed?
14	that's	14	MR. KRISLOV: You dismissed the claims
15	THE COURT: Well, Clint came up today	15	four class four entirely.
16	with a disagreement about class one and class two and	16	THE COURT: Which is a separate
17	how the City's what he thinks what benefits he	17	universe from class three. You and I disagree about
18	thinks they're entitled to that he doesn't think the	18	that
19	City is going to give.	19	MR. KRISLOV: This is a sorry.
20	You'll have a conversation. You'll	20	THE COURT: You and I disagree about
21	see whether you agree or not, and you'll put it	21	that. You can't say I've rendered a final decision
22	before me, and we'll discuss it.	22	as to one subclass, therefore, it overlaps as to all
23	MR. PRENDERGAST: All right.	23	of them. That's not right. It's wrong. Otherwise
24	THE COURT: And that's the best I can	24	there wouldn't be subclasses.
21		21	
	Page 51		Page 53
1	do with regard to that. I don't want to foreclose	1	Everything I ruled with regard to
2	access to the Court for Clint on that issue. If he	2	subclass four has absolutely no bearing on my rulings
3	thinks that they're entitled to a benefit that's not	3	with regard to subclass three, subclass one, subclass
4	going to be given pursuant to the settlement	4	two.
5	agreement, I want to hear about it.	5	MR. KRISLOV: Then certify the case
6	So that's that. I'm holding that in	6	now because
7	abeyance.	7	THE COURT: No.
8	Subclass three, I agree with you, and	8	MR. KRISLOV: Well, you can't pull
9	it hasn't been dismissed, and that's by definition,	9	THE COURT: I did because I disagree
10	from my understanding and my ruling today is that	10	with you. I think you're absolutely miserably,
11	304(a) does not apply to that. And, you know, a	11	utterly wrong on that. And what else can I tell you?
12	ruling is a ruling.	12	So that's that. You made your record.
13	MR. KRISLOV: But	13	Let's go to the issues raised by Clint
14	THE COURT: No, not a but. That's it.	14	with regard to the issuance of a preliminary
15	MR. KRISLOV: No, I would like	15	injunction.
16	THE COURT: Stop.	16	What is the nature of the
17	MR. KRISLOV: I would like to make a	17	interlocutory appeal pending? I I don't know what
18	record. He cited Starke, and I can explain why that	18	that is. Is it on my failure to grant an injunction
19	is wrong.	19	in the past?
20	THE COURT: My ruling was the same	20	MR. KRISLOV: It's on your failure to
21	before he cited Starke as it would be after. You may	21	grant the preliminary injunction based on the second
22	argue about that later in another forum if you want	22	amended complaint, yes.
23	to, but not in front of me.	23	THE COURT: And is it let me ask a
24	I'm not relying on Starke. I'm	~ 4	question.

14 (Pages 50 to 53)

	Page 54		Page 56
1	Since the second amended complaint is	1	because the City is giving Korshak and Window class
2	no longer viable, why is that appeal viable? It's	2	everything they're entitled to, every benefit they're
3	been superseded by a third amended complaint. Why		entitled to in healthcare. That was my feeling.
4	would that be even a viable appeal at this point?	4	So with regard to that, I would not
5	Can you tell me?	5	have granted a preliminary injunction, and I'll wait
6	MR. KRISLOV: Yes, because the claims	6	to see. I still may not. We'll hold that in
7	that were made in that, the assertions that were made	7	abeyance pending your discussion with regard to what
8	would support having a preliminary injunction.	8	benefits you think they're entitled to as a matter of
9	THE COURT: But that complaint is	9	law, whether there's an agreement upon that.
10	dead.	10	I'll push that to the side for another
11	MR. KRISLOV: That's your ruling, Your	11	day.
12	Honor.	12	With regard to the injunction with
13	THE COURT: Well, it is dead. It was	13	regard to subclass four, injunctions are given when
14	superseded. You filed an amended complaint to that.	14	you have at the least a fair question as to your
15	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we did. And		right to receive those benefits in this case.
16	that's why we have not pushed that one for a time,	16	Clearly, there's no adequate remedy at law. That's
17	because the City has maintained that all that could	17	why we're here. You're arguing there's irreparable
18	be done on that appeal was with respect to what was	18	harm.
19	in the second amended complaint.	19	I understand your argument about that,
20	THE COURT: I agree.	20	but I am as convinced as I can be, as I was before
21	MR. KRISLOV: So we played out the	21	Matthews and certainly since Matthews, that there is
22	third amended complaint with all of the submissions	22	no likelihood a fair question as to your success on
23	that	23	the merits with regard to subclass four.
24	THE COURT: So let me ask you a	24	So your request for an injunction with
	Page 55		Page 57
1	question.	1	regard to them is denied.
2	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.	2	I feel much differently, as you've
3	THE COURT: What is the nature of the	3	enunciated, Clint, and as I have enunciated, with
4	subject matter of the interlocutory appeal about my	4	regard to subclass three. I think there are factual
5	refusal to grant an injunction with regard to which	5	issues that have to be fleshed out and fleshed
6	classes? All of them?	б	out, as I say.
7	MR. KRISLOV: All of them.	7	So I'm concerned about them. I'm
8	THE COURT: All right. Okay. So	8	concerned about them having to, as I said before, be
9	thank you.	9	in limbo and not know whether they have to pay for
10	Now, we're left with your renewed	10	this these healthcare benefits or not. I didn't
11	motion for a preliminary injunction for pre-1989	11	dismiss the count. It's viable.
12	claims to enjoin the City and the Funds from	12	And so I would like to hear from you,
13	implementing a reduction of the change of terms as of	13	Richard, why I should not give a preliminary
14	June 2013.	14	injunction with regard to the pre-1989 claims as to
15	My feeling is and I will hold in	15	subclass three alone, which is, as I have suggested,
16	abeyance relative to your discussion, but prior to	16	my predisposition.
17	hearing what you had to say that somehow there's	17	MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, first of all,
	another benefit you should be getting for the Korshak and Windows class that the City hasn't agreed to pay.	18	Your Honor, there was a denial on the preliminary
18	and windows class that the City hasn't agreed to hav	19	injunction motion. It really does not have anything
19			
19 20	I don't know that to be the case. You two are going	20	to do with whether or not it was the first amended or
19 20 21	I don't know that to be the case. You two are going to have to flesh that out to me so I understand it.	21	second amended or third amended complaint.
19 20 21 22	I don't know that to be the case. You two are going to have to flesh that out to me so I understand it. But before I heard you say that, I	21 22	second amended or third amended complaint. THE COURT: I know. But I'm
19 20 21	I don't know that to be the case. You two are going to have to flesh that out to me so I understand it.	21	second amended or third amended complaint.

15 (Pages 54 to 57)

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1	it could have and the likelihood or fair question as	1	MR. PRENDERGAST: But I'm going to ask
2	to subclass three's success on the merits. I can't	2	the Court because of what's been said here to allow
3	say, as I said in my July 21st, 2016, opinion what	3	us to brief that subject. We won't take a lot of
4	you're going to be able to show about their ability	4	time.
5	to have discovered or known or make a claim when they	5	THE COURT: Sure.
6	could have.	6	MR. PRENDERGAST: But I think you have
7	This all evolves around the statute of	7	to start with this.
8	limitations issue as well. So I'm concerned about	8	First of all, Your Honor, this was
9	that.	9	your finding previously when you're talking about the
10	So tell me why is it I shouldn't give	10	four elements. One of the elements had to do with
11	an injunction and require the City to cover those	11	the adequacy of a remedy law.
12	folks?	12	THE COURT: Yes.
13	How many people are in this subclass,	13	MR. PRENDERGAST: And you said the
14	do you know?	14	case law as cited in the party's submissions to me,
15	MR. PRENDERGAST: I do not.	15	especially the City's. And I have read it, and it's
16	THE COURT: Anybody? Mr. Goldstein,	16	actually true in Knott versus Illinois Racing Board,
17	do you know?	17	the Court said the loss of income for a brief period
18	MR. GOLDSTEIN: I	18	does not constitute irreparable harm.
19	THE COURT: Clint?	19	We cited the Kurle case versus
20	MR. KRISLOV: It's probably about	20	Evangelical. And the bottom line is you found that
21	10,000. It could be more. It could be fifteen. It	21	there was no there was inadequate remedy at law.
22	could be less. But it is the largest number, I	22	THE COURT: Okay.
23	think, of people.	23	MR. PRENDERGAST: And they had not met
24	THE COURT: It is?	24	that criteria.
	Page 59		Page 61
1	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.	1	THE COURT: Okay. So let me talk to
2	THE COURT: The folks who are	2	you about that. I'm aware I said that, but and
3	participants not retirees, but participants in the	3	here's what I would like you to talk to me about in
4	healthcare program as of August 23	4	your brief and your response in reply, which we will
5	MR. KRISLOV: No.	5	do in short order because folks have to know.
6	THE COURT: 1989.	6	It's not just a matter of money. If
7	MR. KRISLOV: The participants in the	7	it were just a matter of money, how much you owe, it
8	Funds, in one of the four funds.	8	would be one thing. That's a one-dimensional view.
9	THE COURT: Yes.	9	In this case we're talking about more
10	MR. KRISLOV: Right.	10	than just money. We're talking about everything that
11	THE COURT: For healthcare benefits?	11	is implied by the need to have the money to spend on
12	MR. KRISLOV: No. Well, that they're	12	healthcare.
13	they for the people that you need an injunction	13	I note, for instance, that Land of
14	for, they must have retired now, because for the	14	Lincoln just went under. I note that under the ACA,
15	people who are working now, they're still covered by	15	affordable costs may not be that affordable, I'm
16	the City's employee plan.	16	sorry to say, because everybody knows how I feel
17	TT71 '1 ' 11 ' 1 ' 1	17	about the ACA. I think it's a wonderful thing, but
	While you're talking about people	1 /	about the riert. I think it's a wonderful thing, but
18	THE COURT: Okay.	18	they may be going up 45 percent.
19			they may be going up 45 percent. Folks need to know how much they need
19 20	THE COURT: Okay.	18 19 20	they may be going up 45 percent.
19 20 21	THE COURT: Okay. MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor	18 19 20 21	they may be going up 45 percent. Folks need to know how much they need
19 20 21 22	THE COURT: Okay. MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor THE COURT: So tell me, Richard, why I	18 19 20 21 22	they may be going up 45 percent. Folks need to know how much they need to put aside. It's not just a matter of money. It's a matter of how they're going to live, and standard of living, and where they're going to find their
19 20 21	THE COURT: Okay. MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor THE COURT: So tell me, Richard, why I shouldn't grant an injunction.	18 19 20 21	they may be going up 45 percent. Folks need to know how much they need to put aside. It's not just a matter of money. It's a matter of how they're going to live, and standard

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	Page 62		Page 64
1	money. It's a matter of everything, because as the	1	of the reason that we haven't pushed it was because
2	old expression goes, if you don't have your health,	2	of the second complaint versus third complaint issue
3	you got nothing.	3	and whether there was the submissions were part of
4	I don't mean to make light of it, but	4	as you said, if they're not part of the complaint,
5	it's true. And we all know this from our own family	5	you're not going to rule anyway. That's why we went
6	experience. There isn't a person who hasn't been	6	through the third amended complaint.
7	touched by death or misery or illness. And it has an	7	THE COURT: Right. So let me ask you
8	impact on everything. So it's not just a matter of	8	another question before I let Richard go on. Forget
9	money.	9	my discussion about the third amended complaint
10	And that's why I said just a few	10	versus second, since you have an appeal pending.
11	moments ago that I felt that money damages are not	11	Doesn't that rob me of jurisdiction to
12	adequate.	12	decide the issue?
13	I'm going let you tell me why I'm	13	MR. KRISLOV: No.
14	wrong, but I have reconsidered that because that's	14	MR. PRENDERGAST: The answer is yes.
15	what I'm supposed to do. And I've considered it in	15	THE COURT: I think it does. If
16	terms of much broader terms than just the money.	16	you've appealed my refusal to grant injunctive
17	But everything that that the need for money to be	17	relief, I think I'm robbed of jurisdiction because
18	spent implies.	18	you've chosen to say, as is your want, Neil, you're
19	So if you want to keep talking to me,	19	wrong. I'm right. And I'm going to take it to a
20	that's fine. I'd love to hear what you have to say,	20	higher court, which is great. But you've done that.
21	but I also will, of course, give you an opportunity	21	So I'm wondering why I'm not robbed of
22	to write.	22	jurisdiction on that matter.
23	MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, I'll give you		MR. KRISLOV: Because what was
24	one point that I think needs to be considered here.	24	appealed was that order based on that complaint.
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1	THE COURT: Yes.	1	THE COURT: Then why didn't you
2	MR. PRENDERGAST: The plaintiffs filed	2	withdraw the appeal if you don't want it to go?
3	a notice of appeal from your prior ruling.	3	MR. KRISLOV: That's not that's not
4	THE COURT: Yes.	4	before you, Your Honor. That's not one of your
5	MR. PRENDERGAST: They briefed it.	5	issues.
6	THE COURT: Yes.	6	THE COURT: That may be so, but I'm
7	MR. PRENDERGAST: We briefed it. It's	7	asking you
8	fully briefed. It's pending in the appellate court.	8	
9			MR. KRISLOV: Because we think that
10		9	MR. KRISLOV: Because we think that based on what we show
	The appellate court is going to		based on what we show
11		9	based on what we show THE COURT: If you think it's a good
	The appellate court is going to consider the very issue you just addressed. The	9 10 11	based on what we show THE COURT: If you think it's a good appeal, then I'm going to let them decide it. If you
11	The appellate court is going to consider the very issue you just addressed. The appellate court is going to address the likelihood of success on the merits because that was another reason	9 10 11	based on what we show THE COURT: If you think it's a good appeal, then I'm going to let them decide it. If you think it's bad because that complaint has been
11 12	The appellate court is going to consider the very issue you just addressed. The appellate court is going to address the likelihood of	9 10 11 12	based on what we show THE COURT: If you think it's a good appeal, then I'm going to let them decide it. If you
11 12 13	The appellate court is going to consider the very issue you just addressed. The appellate court is going to address the likelihood of success on the merits because that was another reason why you determined that injunctive relief is not	9 10 11 12 13	based on what we show THE COURT: If you think it's a good appeal, then I'm going to let them decide it. If you think it's bad because that complaint has been superseded, then I'll consider it.
11 12 13 14	The appellate court is going to consider the very issue you just addressed. The appellate court is going to address the likelihood of success on the merits because that was another reason why you determined that injunctive relief is not appropriate.	9 10 11 12 13 14	based on what we show THE COURT: If you think it's a good appeal, then I'm going to let them decide it. If you think it's bad because that complaint has been superseded, then I'll consider it. Your call. What is it? Make a
11 12 13 14 15	The appellate court is going to consider the very issue you just addressed. The appellate court is going to address the likelihood of success on the merits because that was another reason why you determined that injunctive relief is not appropriate. THE COURT: Has the Court set it down	9 10 11 12 13 14 15	based on what we show THE COURT: If you think it's a good appeal, then I'm going to let them decide it. If you think it's bad because that complaint has been superseded, then I'll consider it. Your call. What is it? Make a decision.
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	The appellate court is going to consider the very issue you just addressed. The appellate court is going to address the likelihood of success on the merits because that was another reason why you determined that injunctive relief is not appropriate. THE COURT: Has the Court set it down has anyone requested oral argument? MR. KRISLOV: We have not. We requested yes, we requested THE COURT: Has it been granted? MR. KRISLOV: Not yet. THE COURT: Has it been set for decision, or do you know where it is?	9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	based on what we show THE COURT: If you think it's a good appeal, then I'm going to let them decide it. If you think it's bad because that complaint has been superseded, then I'll consider it. Your call. What is it? Make a decision. MR. KRISLOV: We'll do it on this complaint. THE COURT: You're going to withdraw that appeal?
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17 (Pages 62 to 65)

	Page 66		Page 68
1	abeyance pending the resolution of that appeal	1	MR. PRENDERGAST: I'll have to check
2	therefore.	2	with the Corporation Counsel's office.
3	What's the next date you want to come	3	THE COURT: Well, give me a date.
4	in for?	4	MR. PRENDERGAST: That's going to be a
5	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, why don't	5	meeting.
6	they brief it, and we can address that issue? I	6	THE COURT: Sure.
7	don't think you're being fair with us on this one.	7	MR. PRENDERGAST: I'll try to set
8	THE COURT: I know.	8	something up.
9	MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, I think		THE COURT: Sure. Okay. How much
10	you're being abundantly fair.	10	time do you want?
11	THE COURT: I know.	11	MR. PRENDERGAST: I will set it up
12	MR. PRENDERGAST: We've already had	12	within the next two weeks.
13	six preliminary	13	MR. KRISLOV: No, Your Honor. We
14	THE COURT: I know. It's on appeal	14	object to more than a week. The people need
15	and my if you think that it's a viable appeal,	15	THE COURT: Your objection is
16	great. I'll go along with your judgment on that and	16	overruled. He wants to set up a meeting. In about
17	say that if you've appealed my refusal to grant an	17	two or three weeks it's Labor Day.
18	injunction, it robs me of jurisdiction on that issue.	18	When do you want to come back on that
19	Therefore, your motion for your	19	issue to tell me that you've agreed or you haven't
20	renewed motion is wrong.	20	agreed and tell me what benefits that you think you
21	MR. KRISLOV: I'll offer this, Your	21	are entitled to under the settlement that the City is
22	Honor.	22	not going to give? That's all I want to know.
23	THE COURT: No offer. We're not in	23	MR. KRISLOV: They're entitled to at
24	the marketplace.	24	least
	Page 67		Page 69
1	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, you are	1	THE COURT: Not me. Talk to them
2	requiring a marketplace thing where	2	first, and tell me after your discussion.
3	THE COURT: I know, but I'm not.	3	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor
4	MR. KRISLOV: You are.	4	THE COURT: When do you want to come
5 6	THE COURT: Okay. Again, we disagree.	5	back?
о 7	MR. KRISLOV: You're saying we'll		MR. KRISLOV: I want to come back
8	withdraw our other appeal if you if we do if we wish you to go forward, if we wish if you'll grant	7	tomorrow. THE COURT: That's not going to
0 9	the motions	9	happen, Clint.
10	THE COURT: If you think that you have	10	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, they know
11	a good appeal on the issue that you've just renewed,	11	exactly what they're doing. They know exactly what
12^{11}	then I'm robbed of jurisdiction on that.	12	my position is. This doesn't take two or three weeks
13	MR. KRISLOV: We'll brief that.	13	to negotiate. This is a what they're willing to do
14	THE COURT: No, we won't brief it.	14	is up to 50 percent.
15	•	15	THE COURT: Sir
16	That's my ruling.		
17	That's my ruling. MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Fine.		
1	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Fine.	16 17	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
18	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Fine. THE COURT: The next thing for you to	16	MR. KRISLOV: Yes. THE COURT: this is a 2013 case.
18 19	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Fine. THE COURT: The next thing for you to do is to have a discussion about 304(a) language, vel	16 17	MR. KRISLOV: Yes. THE COURT: this is a 2013 case. Whether they come back in three weeks or not is not
	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Fine. THE COURT: The next thing for you to do is to have a discussion about 304(a) language, vel non, with regard to the Korshak and Windows class	16 17 18	MR. KRISLOV: Yes. THE COURT: this is a 2013 case.
19	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Fine. THE COURT: The next thing for you to do is to have a discussion about 304(a) language, vel non, with regard to the Korshak and Windows class based upon the benefits you think you're entitled to	16 17 18 19	MR. KRISLOV: Yes. THE COURT: this is a 2013 case. Whether they come back in three weeks or not is not going to make or break this issue or your client's
19 20	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Fine. THE COURT: The next thing for you to do is to have a discussion about 304(a) language, vel non, with regard to the Korshak and Windows class	16 17 18 19 20	MR. KRISLOV: Yes. THE COURT: this is a 2013 case. Whether they come back in three weeks or not is not going to make or break this issue or your client's interest.
19 20 21	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Fine. THE COURT: The next thing for you to do is to have a discussion about 304(a) language, vel non, with regard to the Korshak and Windows class based upon the benefits you think you're entitled to that you think the City is not going to give, or to	16 17 18 19 20 21	MR. KRISLOV: Yes. THE COURT: this is a 2013 case. Whether they come back in three weeks or not is not going to make or break this issue or your client's interest. MR. KRISLOV: It does, Your Honor.

18 (Pages 66 to 69)

	Page 70		Page 72
1	regarding	1	submission, which I'd like to have, and I think the
2	THE COURT: Yes, I know. And three	2	appellate court would like to have.
3	weeks is not going to make or break that.	3	The City disagrees with my with my
4	MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, we've been	4	ruling that on that they're that you're
5	down this road it's their doing. They removed it.	5	entitled to that, but they understand it based upon
6	They got it piecemeal. They love to have it	6	my ruling, and so it's over objection of the City,
7	piecemeal, and our client is	7	your 304(a) language is granted.
8	MR. PRENDERGAST: I'm getting tired of		MR. KRISLOV: With respect to four
9	being called names.	9	THE COURT: Subclass four.
10	THE COURT: It's okay. Please let Mr.	10	MR. KRISLOV: Three is held in
11	Krislov speak.	11	three is denied or held in abeyance?
12^{-1}	You're not going to get it tomorrow.	12	MR. PRENDERGAST: How did that get
13	That's just the way it is. And I'm going to give	13	held in abeyance?
14	them three weeks.	14	THE COURT: 304(a) language as to
15	So I'll make the decision if you guys	15	three is denied.
16	can't agree. You'll come back in approximately three	16	MR. KRISLOV: Okay.
17	weeks. Let me take a look and see what date that is.	17	THE COURT: 304(a) language as to one
18	That's right before Labor Day. Today	18	and two is held in abeyance.
19	is that's about the 30th.	19	MR. KRISLOV: Gotcha. I just want to
20	MR. PRENDERGAST: 31st.	20	make sure we're drawing up the order that matches
21	THE COURT: All right. 31st is good.	20	01
22	Is that good for you, Mr. Krislov?	22	what you did. THE COURT: Sure.
22		22	
23 24	MR. KRISLOV: What day? THE COURT: Wednesday, August 31st.	24	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. MR. PRENDERGAST: Your Honor, I
24	· · ·	24	MR. PRENDERGAST. TOULHOUOL, I
	D_{2} T_{1}		Dago 73
1	Page 71	1	Page 73
1	MR. KRISLOV: Yeah, I think so.	1	understand
2	MR. KRISLOV: Yeah, I think so. THE COURT: Okay. Let's do it at	2	understand THE COURT: What else?
2 3	MR. KRISLOV: Yeah, I think so. THE COURT: Okay. Let's do it at 10:30.	2 3	understand THE COURT: What else? MR. PRENDERGAST: that the
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2 3 4 5	MR. KRISLOV: Yeah, I think so. THE COURT: Okay. Let's do it at 10:30. MR. KRISLOV: Okay. THE COURT: Although I have 10:00	2 3 4 5	understand THE COURT: What else? MR. PRENDERGAST: that the preliminary injunction motion has been denied? THE COURT: It's denied.
2 3 4 5 6	MR. KRISLOV: Yeah, I think so. THE COURT: Okay. Let's do it at 10:30. MR. KRISLOV: Okay. THE COURT: Although I have 10:00 o'clock open if you like.	2 3 4 5 6	understand THE COURT: What else? MR. PRENDERGAST: that the preliminary injunction motion has been denied? THE COURT: It's denied. MR. KRISLOV: Your Honor, can they
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19 (Pages 70 to 73)

	Page 74		Page 76
1	THE COURT: On subclass four? That's	1	THE COURT: Count one is the dec
2	not going to hold up this case moving forward as to	2	action. Count two is the breach of contract that's
3	the other	3	been dismissed. Count three is the equitable.
4	MR. PRENDERGAST: I didn't mean on the	4	MR. KRISLOV: Count four they don't
5	interlocutory appeal.	5	have to respond. That's the federal
6	THE COURT: What do you mean?	6	THE COURT: Yes.
7	MR. PRENDERGAST: On the denial of the	7	MR. KRISLOV: 1983 action.
8	preliminary injunction request.	8	THE COURT: Just to go through them
9	THE COURT: Yes.	9	again.
10	MR. PRENDERGAST: One alternative	10	Count one is the dec action. Count
11	would be for you to enter and continue their motion	11	two is the breach of contract that's been dismissed.
12	until the appellate court rules. That gives them	12	Count three is the equitable estoppel turned into a
13	that keeps their motion alive.	13	promissory estoppel in oral argument, which has been
14	He's got his motion on file, and we'll	14	denied dismissed. Count five is the impairment of
15	find out what happens with the appellate court.	15	contract count, which has been dismissed. Count six
16	THE COURT: I'm sure Mr. Krislov	16	is the equal protection count, which has been
17	appreciates you taking his point of view.	17	dismissed. Count seven is the special legislation
18	I will be happy to keep it alive until	18	count, which has been dismissed.
19	the appeal is decided, if that's what you'd like.	19	The only viable count now is the dec
20	MR. KRISLOV: No. We want it denied	20	action count, count one. And all the defendants are
21	then, Your Honor.	21	to answer that count in 28 days, by September 8th.
22	THE COURT: Done.	22	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. We'll try to
23	MR. KRISLOV: Finally, since we're at	23	oh, can we have at least everybody's agreement that
24	the point the City should answer the City and the	24	we can certify the case as a class case since we're
21	Page 75	21	Page 77
1		-	
1	Funds should answer the complaint, the complaint has been upheld for at least one count. They can respond	1	doing this by classes, and we're dealing
2	peen lippeld for at least one count Lipev can respond	<u> </u>	
	· · ·	2	THE COURT: You know, you can talk to
3	to it.	3	them without bouncing it off me. Just have a
3 4	to it. THE COURT: Any objection?	3 4	them without bouncing it off me. Just have a conversation.
3 4 5	to it. THE COURT: Any objection? MR. PRENDERGAST: No objection to	3 4 5	them without bouncing it off me. Just have a conversation. MR. KRISLOV: We've filed the motion.
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3 4 5 6 7	to it. THE COURT: Any objection? MR. PRENDERGAST: No objection to answering what has not been dismissed. We'll do that within 30 days.	3 4 5 6 7	them without bouncing it off me. Just have a conversation. MR. KRISLOV: We've filed the motion. If they want to oppose it, they should file THE COURT: All right. Well, then all
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3 4 5 6 7 8 9	to it. THE COURT: Any objection? MR. PRENDERGAST: No objection to answering what has not been dismissed. We'll do that within 30 days. MR. DONHAM: Yes, Your Honor. I mean, obviously, we don't have to answer counts two through	3 4 5 6 7 8 9	them without bouncing it off me. Just have a conversation. MR. KRISLOV: We've filed the motion. If they want to oppose it, they should file THE COURT: All right. Well, then all the defendants are to answer the motion for class certification.
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20 (Pages 74 to 77)

	Page 78	
1	for me to deal with the answers for the class	
2	certification motion and to make sure that everyone	
3	has answered the complaint.	
4	MR. KRISLOV: Could I ask that they	
5	file their answers by the 31st, because	
6	THE COURT: You can, but it's denied.	
7	MR. KRISLOV: We'd be in a position to	
8	the handle things, and they've only had 30 years	
9	to	
10	THE COURT: Yes. It's denied. Okay.	
11	Give me an order reflecting today's orders.	
12	(Proceedings adjourned at 11:55 a.m.,	
13	August 9, 2016.)	
14	<i>G</i> , <i>L</i> ,	
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19		
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21		
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	Page 79	
-		
1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE.	
2	I, GAY DALL, CSR and RPR, doing	
3 4	Business in the City of Chicago, County of Cook and State of Illinois, do hereby certify that I reported	
т 5	in computerized shorthand the foregoing proceedings	
6	as appears from my stenographic notes.	
7	I further certify that the foregoing	
8	is a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand	
9	notes and contains all the testimony had at said	
10	proceedings.	
11	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my	
12	hand as Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the	
13	State of Illinois on August 17, 2016.	
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	Gay Dall CSR RPR	
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24	Gay Dall CSR RPR License Number: 084-001169	
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		21 (Pages 78 to 79)
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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT - CHANCERY DIVISION
MICHAEL W. UNDERWOOD, et al.,)
Plaintiffs,)
vs.) No. 13 CH 17450) Calendar 13
CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal) Corporation,)
) Defendant,)
and
Trustees of the Policemen's) Annuity and Benefit Fund of) Chicago; Trustees of the) Firemen's Annuity and Benefit) Fund of Chicago; Trustees of) the Municipal Employees') Annuity and Benefit Fund of) Chicago; and Trustees of the) Laborers' & Retirement Board) Employees' Annuity and Benefit) Fund of Chicago, et al.,) Defendants.)
Record of proceedings had at the

hearing of the above-entitled cause, before the Honorable NEIL H. COHEN, one of the Judges of said Court, on August 31, 2016, in Room 2308, Richard J. Daley Center, Chicago, Illinois, commencing at 10:30 a.m.

	Pag	re 2		Page 4
1	A P P E A R A N C E S		1	THE COURT: Underwood versus the City
2 3			2	of Chicago. For Michael Underwood.
4	KRISLOV & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 20 North Wacker Drive, Suite 1300		3	MR. KRISLOV: Clint Krislov and, with
5	Chicago, Illinois 60606		4	me, Ken Goldstein for the Plaintiffs.
6 7	(312) 606-0500 BY: Mr. Clinton A. Krislov		5	THE COURT: For the City of Chicago.
/	clint@krislovlaw.com,		6	MR. PRENDERGAST: Richard Prendergast,
8			7	Your Honor.
9	Mr. Kenneth T. Goldstein ken@krislovlaw.com		8	THE COURT: For the Funds of the City
	for the plaintiffs;		9	of Chicago, Police and Firemen and Municipal
10			10	Employees.
	RICHARD J. PRENDERGAST, LTD. 111 West Washington Street, Suite 1100		11	MR. BURKE: Ed Burke for the Fireman's
	Chicago, Illinois 60602		12	Fund and Municipal Fund, and Dave Kugler for the
14	(312) 641-0881		13	Policeman's Annuity and Benefit Fund.
15	BY: Mr. Richard J. Prendergast rprendergast@rjpltd.com,		14	THE COURT: Good morning.
16			15	MR. KENNEDY: Good morning. John
17			16 17	Kennedy with Cary Donham for the Laborer's Fund.
18 19	DAVID R. KUGLER & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 6160 North Cicero Avenue		1	If I may be excused, I have a 10:30
	Suite 308		18 19	matter. I don't think it's been called yet. THE COURT: You may do anything you
	Chicago, Illinois 60646		20	want, Mr. Kennedy.
	(312) 263-3020 BY: Mr. David R. Kugler		20	All right. Well, on the last date
23	davidkugler@comcast.net		22	there was an issue as to Mr. Krislov asked for 304(a)
24	for the Trustees of the Policemen's		23	language as to, I believe, everything.
	Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago; Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago;		24	I was at a quandary because I thought
		re 3		Page 5
1	A P P E A R A N C E S (Continued)		1	
2	ATTEARANCES (continued)		$\begin{vmatrix} 1\\2 \end{vmatrix}$	that Mr. Krislov's clients with regard to the first two classes, the Korshak and Windows retirees, had
3	BURKE, BURNS & PINELLI, LTD.		3	already been given everything he wanted, and
4	Three First National Plaza, Suite 4300		4	Mr. Krislov told me that's not true.
5 6	Chicago, Illinois 60602 (312) 541-8600		5	And I asked the parties to talk and
7	BY: Mr. Edward J. Burke		6	figure this out, and they can report back to me, and
	eburke@bbp-chicago.com		7	they did at least as to subclass one and two.
8	for the Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity		8	And you also asked for 304(a) language
9	and Benefit Fund of Chicago;		9	with regard to subclass four, correct?
	TAFT, STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER, LLP		10	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.
11	111 East Wacker Drive, Suite 2800		11	THE COURT: And there's that still
12			12	pending.
13 14	(312) 836-4038 BY: Mr. Cary E. Donham		13	MR. KRISLOV: Actually, I think you
1	cdonham@taftlaw.com,		14	ruled on that one.
15			15	THE COURT: Did I give it to you?
16	for the Trustees of the Laborers' & Retirement Board Employees' Annuity and		16	MR. PRENDERGAST: It was denied as to
10	Benefit Fund of Chicago.		17	subclass three.
17	-		18	THE COURT: It was denied as to
18			19	subclass three because there were some issues of
19 20			20	fact, as I said, that I couldn't discern. I just
			1 2 1	didn't have anough ovidence, while I've received a
21			21	didn't have enough evidence, while I've received a
21 22			22	status report and I've received a letter from
21				

2 (Pages 2 to 5)

	Page 6		Page 8
1	And I think I understand that there's	1	THE COURT: You're not going to get it
2	a distinction in points of view, both practically and	2	as to subclass three.
3	legally, from both sides.	3	MR. KRISLOV: You may not grant it. I
4	What is it you want me to do today?	4	think that your granting it with respect to a part of
5	MR. KRISLOV: Grant us 304(a) language	5	your order may make it effective if the order is
6	with respect to the claims of class one and two.	6	ever
7	THE COURT: Based on what?	7	THE COURT: You can argue anything you
8	MR. KRISLOV: Based on your having	8	want before the appellate court
9	already held that they have a that all three	9	MR. KRISLOV: I will.
10	August 23, 1989, hires, which would include all of	10	THE COURT: I can't stop you from
11	the classes: One, Korshak; two, Windows; and, three,	11	doing that, nor do I want to. You're entitled to.
12	the rest of the pre-8-23-89 hires have a state	12	But it's this Court's ruling you're
13	constitutional protection of benefits that you have	13	not entitled to 304 language with regard to subclass
14	outlined in your you have described in your	14	three because I don't know whether the statute of
15	previous decision.	15	limitations applies to subclass three or not.
16	THE COURT: Well, I didn't rule I	16	I don't have enough facts before me.
17	didn't rule specifically as to what rights as to	17	There's no way I can make an opinion about that, or a
18	subclass three. Everything is still up in the air.	18	ruling about that as a matter of law because I don't
19	MR. KRISLOV: Well, as I understand	19	what the facts are yet. I do not know what they knew
20	your rulings, the way that you ruled was and in	20	or what they didn't know with regard to their
21	your clarification ruling in March, your position is	21	abilities to with regard to their rights their
22	that what they are protected in is just what the	22	ability to assert their rights, whether they knew
23	statute required, what the pension amendment in	23	they should have or not.
24	effect on their during their participation	24	I think I made that clear in my
	Page 7		Page 9
1	requires. No more, no less.	1	opinion, and there's just nothing I can say about
2	We obviously disagree on that point,	2	that. If that's not resolved, then it's been my
3	but that is a decision of law, which it is an	3	understanding of 304(a) that you're not entitled to
4	appropriate time for the appellate court to weigh in,	4	appeal something that's not been decided by me.
5	or, as I say at my checkup, I'd sort of like to get a		
		5	But you do what you want to do. You
6	second opinion. And I think I	6	will anyway, and that's what you wanted. You're not
6 7	second opinion. And I think I THE COURT: Yeah, I know. I know you	6 7	will anyway, and that's what you wanted. You're not getting 304 language with regard to subclass three.
6 7 8	second opinion. And I think I THE COURT: Yeah, I know. I know you do.	6 7 8	will anyway, and that's what you wanted. You're not getting 304 language with regard to subclass three. I gave it to you with regard to subclass four.
6 7 8 9	second opinion. And I think I THE COURT: Yeah, I know. I know you do. MR. KRISLOV: And I think it's an	6 7 8 9	will anyway, and that's what you wanted. You're not getting 304 language with regard to subclass three. I gave it to you with regard to subclass four. Now let's deal with subclass one and
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6 7 8 9 10 11	second opinion. And I think I THE COURT: Yeah, I know. I know you do. MR. KRISLOV: And I think it's an appropriate time THE COURT: But with regard to	6 7 8 9 10 11	will anyway, and that's what you wanted. You're not getting 304 language with regard to subclass three. I gave it to you with regard to subclass four. Now let's deal with subclass one and two. MR. KRISLOV: Okay.
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6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	second opinion. And I think I THE COURT: Yeah, I know. I know you do. MR. KRISLOV: And I think it's an appropriate time THE COURT: But with regard to subclass three, there are issues of fact yet to be determined. MR. KRISLOV: Maybe so, but THE COURT: So it's not ripe for review. MR. KRISLOV: It is ripe for review because, number one, 304(a) requires that there be a claim that has been dismissed completely, with prejudice. You have done that, certainly THE COURT: Not with regard to subclass three. MR. KRISLOV: It is the judgment that	6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21	 will anyway, and that's what you wanted. You're not getting 304 language with regard to subclass three. I gave it to you with regard to subclass four. Now let's deal with subclass one and two. MR. KRISLOV: Okay. THE COURT: I dismissed them. MR. KRISLOV: You dismissed them as moot because you said that had City was giving them all the relief that they had wanted. It is clear, if you take what Mr. Prendergast told you the last time, they're not. What Mr. Prendergast told you the last time THE COURT: They're giving them 55 percent increase, right? MR. KRISLOV: No.

3 (Pages 6 to 9)

	Page 10		Page 12
1	a plan of some sort with the City obligating	1	THE COURT: One second. Let me get
2	itself no, sorry gratuitously giving up to 55	2	there, because I was reading.
3	percent of projected expenses sorry of	3	MR. KRISLOV: Page three of our file.
4	projected costs.	4	THE COURT: Yes, page three.
5	What he told you the last time was	5	MR. KRISLOV: You said, "Clint, as I
6	that they're getting the 2003 to '13 settlement.	6	told you, Clint, I believe"
7	That is not what they are getting.	7	THE COURT: Which line number, please?
8	MR. PRENDERGAST: That's not what I	8	MR. KRISLOV: It is on page 44, line
9	told him.	9	nine line eight.
10	MR. KRISLOV: Yes. I have quotes in	10	THE COURT: Got it.
11	the filings.	11	MR. KRISLOV: "I believe the City has
12	THE COURT: I read what you said.	12	agreed to cover them entirely pursuant to the
13	MR. KRISLOV: The difference between	13	agreement, pursuant to the settlement agreement. And
14	the 2003 settlement and what they are getting are the	14	you tell me that's not the case."
15	following: Number one, the premiums to retirees were	15	The difference between the settlement
16	calculated based on projections and reconciled so	16	agreement terms and what they're providing is about
17	that because the projections have always, in every	17	\$5 million dollars a year in overcharges to
18	single year, turned out to be millions of dollars	18	participants. And that's because Segal makes his
19	above what the actual costs were.	19	projections. He's always projected them high, and so
20	THE COURT: Let me ask you a question,	20	they run the calculation, and they charge the
21	Mr. Krislov.	21	annuitants 45 percent of what the overall costs are.
22	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.	22	That 45 and that's what we're
23	THE COURT: My opinion of July 1st,	23	really looking at. And so if the City's if the
24	2015, which Mr. Prendergast attached to his letter,	24	overall projections are high, the 45 percent of the
	Page 11		Page 13
1	indicates and holds that you missed the boat in terms	1	overall projections will be high as well, as they
2	of trying to enforce the settlement agreement and	2	have been in every single one of the ten years of the
3	or at least that I wasn't going to do that, so	3	settlement.
4	especially with regard to the audit that you're	4	The audit and reconciliation are
5	talking about now.	5	critical to making sure that if retirees have a
6	So what is Mr. Prendergast is	6	package of have a plan with cost sharing, which
7	arguing that you're not entitled to that audit	7	they're saying, that they get an accurate count.
8	because the time for you to have requested that was	8	And it's not just our speculation. It
9	before the case was dismissed with prejudice in 2003,	9	is in every single year. And it is not just in the
10	and the settlement agreement terminated on June 30th,	10	beginning. In the last year and a half, it totaled
11	2013, right?	11	\$8.5 million in overcharges which had to be refunded.
12	MR. KRISLOV: We did request that. We	12	THE COURT: Okay. So you're bringing
13	were denied that, and that is on appeal. That's not	13	to the Court's attention and making of record that
14	what we're talking about.	14	what the City is offering now is not to completely
15	What we're talking about is what the	15	cover them pursuant to the settlement agreement.
16	City is presently committed to providing. And	16	MR. KRISLOV: Right.
17	Mr. Prendergast said at our last hearing because	17	THE COURT: All right. Even though
18	you said, "Because the City has agreed to cover them,	18	Mr. Prendergast said it. When I said, as you
1	you said, because the City has agreed to cover them,		
19	I accepted that as to completely cover them pursuant	19	excerpted in your position, that Mr. Prendergast told
19 20		19 20	excerpted in your position, that Mr. Prendergast told me the City was going to cover them, and I accepted
	I accepted that as to completely cover them pursuant		
20	I accepted that as to completely cover them pursuant to the settlement agreement. Am I wrong?	20	me the City was going to cover them, and I accepted
20 21	I accepted that as to completely cover them pursuant to the settlement agreement. Am I wrong? "Mr. Prendergast: No, you're not	20 21	me the City was going to cover them, and I accepted that as to completely cover them pursuant to the

4 (Pages 10 to 13)

1	Page 14		Page 16
	So you're just holding Mr. Prendergast	1	to me, doesn't apply at this point.
2	to what he said. Is that it?	2	Tell me why I'm wrong.
3	MR. KRISLOV: I am in that respect,	3	MR. KRISLOV: Three reasons.
4	yes.	4	First is with respect to the pre-19
5	THE COURT: So let me ask you another	5	the pre-August 23, 1989, hires, their statute did not
6	question.	6	have a time limit.
7	MR. KRISLOV: There's more reason, but	7	THE COURT: Well, that's to be argued.
8	I'm glad to answer your question.	8	I understand that. I'm not arguing the substance of
9	THE COURT: Oh, thank you.	9	the case right now.
10	One of the things I did not deal with	10	MR. KRISLOV: Fair enough.
11	with regard to the motion to dismiss based on the	11	THE COURT: I'm saying I haven't dealt
12	statute of limitations argument is class one and	12	with it, and I haven't written on it because I
13	class two, the Korshak and Windows class. I haven't	13	thought there was an agreement, or at least I thought
14	even dealt with that.	14	the City was, you know, saying, okay, we're covering
15	And the reason I didn't do that is	15	class one and class two, despite their statute of
16	because it was moot, I felt.	16	limitations argument.
17	You're now telling me it's not moot	17	But what you're getting to is the
18	because your clients in those two classes are not	18	substance of whether the statute of limitations
19	getting that which they feel they're entitled to	19	applies or not, which is fine. And I want you to get
20	under the settlement agreement, correct?	20	to it, but it's premature. I still have to write
21	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.	21	about it and maybe even invite another briefing only
22	THE COURT: So what I'm telling you,	22	on that one issue.
23	Clint, is that before you get 304(a) language on	23	Go ahead. What's the other issue?
24	that, don't you think I should or I think I should	24	What's the other argument?
	Page 15		Page 17
1	deal with the statute of limitations argument.	1	MR. KRISLOV: With respect to class
2	MR. KRISLOV: No. And I'll tell you	2	one and class two, I don't believe they're making
3	why.	3	Mr. Prendergast may correct me, but I don't think
4	THE COURT: Well, sure. Tell me why I	4	they're making a statute of limitations argument with
	about doubt dool with a defense to the City paving your		
5	shouldn't deal with a defense to the City paying your	5	respect to the Korshak and Windows classes.
5 6	clients anything because the statute of limitations	6	
			respect to the Korshak and Windows classes.
6	clients anything because the statute of limitations has run. And I didn't deal with it pending because of what I considered to be the City's position that	6	respect to the Korshak and Windows classes. THE COURT: That may be, but I'll get
6 7 8 9	clients anything because the statute of limitations has run. And I didn't deal with it pending because	6 7 8 9	respect to the Korshak and Windows classes. THE COURT: That may be, but I'll get to that in the MR. KRISLOV: Well, it isn't your entertaining it, your inviting it isn't appropriate.
6 7 8 9 10	clients anything because the statute of limitations has run. And I didn't deal with it pending because of what I considered to be the City's position that they're going to give your client a 55 percent increase.	6 7 8 9 10	respect to the Korshak and Windows classes. THE COURT: That may be, but I'll get to that in the MR. KRISLOV: Well, it isn't your entertaining it, your inviting it isn't appropriate. No offense.
6 7 8 9 10 11	clients anything because the statute of limitations has run. And I didn't deal with it pending because of what I considered to be the City's position that they're going to give your client a 55 percent increase. Okay. If that's the case, I feel, and	6 7 8 9 10 11	respect to the Korshak and Windows classes. THE COURT: That may be, but I'll get to that in the MR. KRISLOV: Well, it isn't your entertaining it, your inviting it isn't appropriate. No offense. THE COURT: No offense taken. None at
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	Page 18		Page 20
1	a question of law, not a question of fact. I think	1	Corporation Counsel.
2	you have ruled that your view is that this is a	2	And I asked you if you wanted me to
3	question of fact to be determined, right?	3	recuse myself, and you said that's not necessary, I
4	THE COURT: What are you talking	4	believe. And I believe the record shows that.
5	about?	5	And believe me so that's what I
6	MR. KRISLOV: I believe it is a	6	first heard, and I believe you've waived that for
7	question of law that has been addressed, and you	7	that reason.
8	have you rejected it the first time around. They	8	And, secondly, I can tell you, it will
9	tried to reraise it not as a reconsideration, but	9	not be the first time that I disagree with my now
10	whatever. You had, in your last decision in July	10	wife as to her position back then. And it's largely
	I think it was July 9th	11	irrelevant.
12	THE COURT: Yes.	12	But if you think I'm prejudiced
13	MR. KRISLOV: July 21st.	13	because of that, then you can file the right motion,
14	THE COURT: The July decision.	14	and I invite you to do so. I don't take it
15	MR. KRISLOV: In the July decision you	15	personally, however personally it's meant. And you
16	indicate that it's a question of fact as to intent,	16	got do what you got to do. That's fine.
17	what the parties intended, and that you view it as a	17	But with regard to your belief that I
18	fact question rather than a law question.	18	have to recuse myself, for the reasons enunciated,
19	And I	19	it's denied, subject to you filing a written motion,
20	THE COURT: No. I talked about	20	and I'll reconsider it.
21	whether there was a contract or not.	21	MR. KRISLOV: I will. I will.
22	MR. KRISLOV: No, I think you talked	22	Can I make one correction to what I
23	about I think what you said is that	23	believe you stated is my position?
24	THE COURT: Let's assume go on with	24	THE COURT: Sure.
	Page 19		Page 21
1	your argument. Go ahead.	1	MR. KRISLOV: My position is not
2	MR. KRISLOV: Number three is if it is	2	because just because she was then and I frankly
	a fact question, I believe you must recuse yourself	3	don't know whether she was married to you then or
	then.	4	not.
5	THE COURT: Why?	5	THE COURT: She wasn't.
6	MR. KRISLOV: Because the City's	6	MR. KRISLOV: The issue is there may
7	intent in that agreement at the time it was entered,	7	be there may have to be testimony as to what the
	that's the time during which the Court's spouse was	8	parties' intention was at the time of the first
	either the Corporation Counsel or the assistant	9	Korshak settlement.
	Corporation Counsel and made public statements to the	10	That would involve me, possibly
	press	11	Mr. Ford, who's represented the Police Fund, Judson
12	THE COURT: Did she?	12	Miner.
13	MR. KRISLOV: Yes.	13	THE COURT: Susan didn't work for
14	THE COURT: Well, I have no idea. I	14	Judson Miner.
15	wasn't married to the woman at the time.	15	MR. KRISLOV: Well, Susan was there at
16	MR. KRISLOV: It doesn't matter.	16	the time
17	THE COURT: Well, it does matter. You	17	THE COURT: She wasn't there while
18	can make your argument. You can make your motion in	18	Judson Miner was there
		19	MR. KRISLOV: She made statements
	writing.		
	But you may recall, because I	20	regarding the settlement
19 20	0		regarding the settlement THE COURT: You can file your motion,
19 20 21	But you may recall, because I	20	0 0
19 20 21 22	But you may recall, because I certainly do, that at the beginning of this case when	20 21	THE COURT: You can file your motion,

6 (Pages 18 to 21)

	Page 22		Page 24
1	your supposition and speculation that Susan might be	1	I have criticisms of the so-called status report.
2	a witness in this case, which I don't see, to be	2	I'm not going to get into this back-and-forth stuff.
3	quite honest, but assuming that your speculation is	3	But I do want to comment on the
4	worrisome to you, the case law, as I understand it,	4	suggestion that when you asked "Was I wrong about the
5	is that I do not have to recuse myself based on	5	Korshak and Windows classes?" I said, "No, you're
6	speculation.	6	right." So let me address that.
7	When the time comes, and if the time	7	THE COURT: Yes.
8	comes that there's got to be a hearing and I think I	8	MR. PRENDERGAST: Frankly, I believe
9	need to recuse myself based on that rather than	9	that's somewhat although he's going beyond the
10	ruling on the credibility of my wife, I will. But I	10	ability to shock me with this motion to recuse, but
11	think it's premature, so it's denied for those	11	I'll stick with this one, because I see it directly
12	reasons.	12	as being a motion, not anything else.
13	But subject to again, without	13	When I said no, I said I wasn't
14	prejudice, subject to you raising it should the	14	saying that the 2003 agreement continued on as their
15	time the moment arise for the need to do so, and	15	settlement. I don't think that the Court ever
16	I'll certainly reconsider it.	16	interpreted that.
17	MR. KRISLOV: So I understand that you	17	The question was are they getting
18	are denying are you denying 304(a) language with	18	THE COURT: The benefits.
19	respect to count one for classes one and two?	19	MR. PRENDERGAST: The benefits, right.
20	THE COURT: I'm denying it you've	20	And the benefits, by the way, are not procedural.
21	got it as to subclass four. It's denied as to	21	They're 55 percent
22	subclass three because there's issues of fact to be	22	THE COURT: Well, Mr. Krislov says no.
23	determined, like who are these people and whether	23	He says that the benefits of the settlement agreement
24	they received notice or not, or whether they should	24	include a reconciliation, and he took you to say that
	Page 23		Page 25
1	affirm something or not to assert their rights, and	1	you were agreeing to give them all the benefits of
2	about that I haven't opined on it.	2	
			the settlement agreement. That's what he said.
3	And with regard to class one and two,	3	MR. PRENDERGAST: But what I'm saying
4	And with regard to class one and two, the Korshak and Windows class, I will wait to hear	3 4	MR. PRENDERGAST: But what I'm saying is that what I was referring to was what is
4 5	And with regard to class one and two, the Korshak and Windows class, I will wait to hear from Mr. Prendergast. I think that's only fair.	3 4 5	MR. PRENDERGAST: But what I'm saying is that what I was referring to was what is protecting the pension clause, which is the benefit
4 5 6	And with regard to class one and two, the Korshak and Windows class, I will wait to hear from Mr. Prendergast. I think that's only fair. I've read what he has to say. And	3 4 5 6	MR. PRENDERGAST: But what I'm saying is that what I was referring to was what is protecting the pension clause, which is the benefit of pension moneys, meaning the contribution from the
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7 (Pages 22 to 25)

1	Page 26		Page 28
–	language for	1	you didn't raise it. But we'll see, and we'll let
2	THE COURT: Subclass four.	2	things lie.
3	MR. PRENDERGAST: subclass four.	3	So did you want to say anything else
4	So he's going to go up.	4	for the record, Richard?
5	THE COURT: Yeah, and he's going to go	5	MR. PRENDERGAST: No, Your Honor. I
6	up anyway, and he's entitled to do that. And so why	6	don't think I have anything that has to be added. I
7	not have subclass one, subclass two up there as well?	7	did have some prepared remarks, but I think the Court
8	MR. PRENDERGAST: And I'll tell you	8	is very close to granting 304 language on one and
9	why. And I certainly haven't conferred with the	9	two
10	client, but I think our position on that is clear.	10	THE COURT: And four.
11	Since it's going up anyway, and since	11	MR. PRENDERGAST: and four, and the
12	I know from past dealings that regardless of whether	12	dismissal stands, and we'll proceed with the case on
13	you give 304(a) language on one and two, he's going	13	subclass three.
14	to argue one and two anyway, and we're going to have	14	THE COURT: That's going to be my
15	to respond.	15	order. And that's just what you asked for. And you
16	THE COURT: That's respect, I think.	16	can that gives you leave to do all sorts of things
17	MR. KRISLOV: It may be backhanded,	17	that you want to do before the appellate court with
18	but I'll take it as a compliment.	18	regard to subclass one, two, and four.
19	MR. PRENDERGAST: I really mean that	19	What do you want to do with regard to
20	based upon what we the history and history of	20	subclass three, Clint?
21	protocol, we know what is going to happen.	21	MR. KRISLOV: I would like 304(a)
22	So the Court has dismissed the claims	22	language with regard to subclass three as well,
23	with respect to Count 1 and 2, and properly so. And	23	because bringing this is up as a whole package is the
24		24	best way to deal it in a timely fashion.
	Page 27		Page 29
-	briefly.		ruge 27
		1	Subalage three is at the they are
1	-	1	Subclass three is at the they are
2	But putting in 304 language on a	2	the most precarious group, I guess, at the moment
2 3	But putting in 304 language on a dismissal is not going to change the composition of	2 3	the most precarious group, I guess, at the moment than subclass four, obviously.
2 3 4	But putting in 304 language on a dismissal is not going to change the composition of the appeal we take. And so it's simply a procedural	2 3 4	the most precarious group, I guess, at the moment than subclass four, obviously. But subclass three, the City has made
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8 (Pages 26 to 29)

	Page 30		Page 32
1	subclass three.	1	THE COURT: Well, now, Richard, I
2	MR. PRENDERGAST: Going back to the	2	agree with you, and I've think I made that record all
3	days of Judge Green, Mr. Krislov has a tendency to	3	along. There is nothing to appeal. I haven't made
4	use dispositions on motions to dismiss as if they are	4	any findings of fact, and I haven't made any findings
5	issued on the merits of the case, and I just want to	5	of law, and no judgments have been entered with
6	state for the record, we've never gone into that	6	regard to subclass three.
7	THE COURT: Well, that's because	7	But I don't see how it is subject to
8	that's what the law says	8	appeal, and the appellate court will note that on
9	MR. PRENDERGAST: That's right.	9	their own, and they'll either agree with me or not.
10	(Simultaneous colloquy.)	10	And then they can take me to task, as they will, for
11	THE COURT: a motion to dismiss	11	granting this language that you just a few seconds
12	isn't a judgment on the merits of the case, so I	12	ago agreed to.
13	don't know how you can appeal it.	13	So I'm going to grant it, and then
14	But go ahead.	14	everything's before them, and they're going to send
15	MR. PRENDERGAST: And to the point on		things back anyway. And it gives Mr. Krislov the
16	subclass four no, I mean subclass three we're	16	opportunity to do that which he wants for his
17	going to be up there on everything else, Judge. I	17	clients.
18	don't care.	18	I think sometimes the parties forget
19	THE COURT: He doesn't care.	19	to remember that we're dealing with human beings, and
20	MR. PRENDERGAST: I do care, but	20	it's important for them to know what they're going to
21	THE COURT: Granted.	21	do.
22	MR. PRENDERGAST: Fine.	22	And by the way, these are not young
23	THE COURT: All right. I will,	23	human beings. These are people who are about to
24	however, say it was a motion to dismiss, and it	24	enter into retirement in terms of subclass three, and
	Page 31		Page 33
1	was there are factual situations that it was	1	they need to know what it is they have to do, and
2	not well, my ruling on subclass three is my ruling	2	they need to know what it is they have to do, and they need to know their rights.
3	on subclass three. I don't think it's right, but you	3	So if the appellate court can do that,
4	want it. He doesn't care. You got it.	4	great. I don't think they can. But Mr. Krislov
5	MR. KRISLOV: Thank you.	5	wants it before them, and you didn't object until you
6	THE COURT: You're welcome.	6	started to backtrack. In fact, you agreed to it.
7	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. Just so we've got	7	So I'm going to stick with your
8	the clear outline of the scorecard on everything so	8	original position. And I assume that the appellate
9	we don't have any disagreements	9	court's going to knock it back to me.
10	MR. BURKE: Well, I'd like to	10	But nothing I would have entered a
11	address	11	stay anyway, Richard, with regard to subclass three,
12	MR. PRENDERGAST: If I can just say	12	because I expect something to come back maybe with
13	Judge, let me back off a little bit on what I said.	13	regard to well, anyway, and if they only knock
14	Subclass three is denied? The motion	14	back subclass three, great. If they knock back
15	to dismiss was denied?	15	subclass one and two, fine. We'll see.
16	THE COURT: Yes, it was.	16	MR. PRENDERGAST: Judge, may I just,
17	MR. PRENDERGAST: So I don't know how	17	for my own benefit?
18	he can appeal it, so	18	THE COURT: Of course you may.
19	THE COURT: And you can make that	19	MR. PRENDERGAST: When I said I don't
20	argument on appeal, and I guess you will. You just	20	care about 304, what I meant to convey was it doesn't
21	told me you have no objection.	21	make any difference to me whether we're arguing on
22	MR. PRENDERGAST: Well, I don't know	22	three classes or four because we're going to be
23	how it can be as a matter of law, I don't know	23	arguing. But I do not want this record to reflect a
24	that the Court can enter 304(a)	24	waiver.

9 (Pages 30 to 33)

	Page 34		Page 36
1	And if there is a waiver, or a notion	1	letter?
2	of a waiver, I want to clarify I'm not waiving	2	So that on appeal, for the record, on
3	anything. All I'm saying is this, and I'm saying	3	appeal, I would like the Court to clarify.
4	this for the record: The reason that I believe you	4	MR. KRISLOV: Can I weigh in on that?
5	cannot no matter whether I like it or not enter	5	I think I can give some clarity to what I think the
6	a 304(a) finding is because	6	Court either would rule or may rule.
7	THE COURT: That's the subclass.	7	MR. BURKE: Not would rule, Judge.
8	MR. PRENDERGAST: Yes is because	8	THE COURT: Well, I ruled under the
9	you denied the motion to dismiss, and he has nothing	9	1983 and 1985 statutes. I didn't rule based on that
10	to appeal.	10	May 2013 letter.
11	THE COURT: Sure. I agree with you.	11	And you don't need to speculate,
12	MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you.	12	Mr. Krislov, or be a mind reader with regard to me.
13	THE COURT: And I did not take your	13	That's what I said in my opinions over and over
14^{13}	•	14	
14	statement as being a waiver. I took it as being,	15	again, and I'm saying it again now. It's your position, based upon your
	actually, a as you said before, you're	16	
16	modifying the preface was he's going to do it anyway. And so that's how I took it.	17	consultation with the City, as I understand it, that
17 18		18	you consider that letter to be somehow a binding
$10 \\ 19$	MR. PRENDERGAST: Thank you. THE COURT: And that's how I still		contract that changed the terms that the City is
20		19 20	has voluntarily agreed to accept. That's not before me. That wasn't
20	take it.		
	I do not consider it to be a waiver.	21	raised before me. That's just statements that have
22	I still consider you to have objected with regard to	22 23	been made in your submissions to me, and I understand
23	that; is that correct?		what you're saying. And it's not important for me to
24	MR. PRENDERGAST: That's correct, Your	24	agree or disagree about that since no one has ever
	Page 35		Page 37
1	Honor.	1	filed anything in front of me with regard to that.
2	THE COURT: And Mr. Krislov can argue	2	What was filed was whether there
3	anything he wants, and he's going to, and that's	3	was what the parties' obligations were under the
4	fine, as it should be.	4	'83 and '85 amendments to the Pension Code and the
5	But I'm going to grant 304(a) language	5	agreements and the ones thereafter.
б	as to all the classes, there being no just reason to	6	And I made that clear over and over
7	delay enforcement of an appeal of all of these	7	and over again in many written opinions. And there's
8	orders, and we'll see what happens. And I wish you	8	no reason for me to say otherwise now. There's
9	well.	9	nothing that you said that changes my opinion.
10	Yes, Mr. Burke.	10	But you want to talk. Go ahead.
11	MR. BURKE: Judge, I have my	11	MR. KRISLOV: Here's what Mr. Burke's
12	understanding of your rulings on 1983, 1985 statutes		point raises.
13	is that was a lifetime benefit.	13	You ruled that class one and class two
14	What that benefit is is altogether	14	have a permanent benefit, and it protects them
15	different from the benefits that are set out in this	15	from the benefit
16	letter of May 13, 2013, to which the funds had no	16	THE COURT: Because there's was no
17	business agreeing or being part of.	17	time limitation.
18	And the reason I raise that, Your	18	MR. KRISLOV: Correct. At least, no
19	Honor, is that there is a subsidy under the old	19	more, no less. We have a difference of opinion on
20	agreement. That subsidy is gone, and, therefore,	20	that. But Mr. Burke is saying they're stopping that
21	that is an enormous expense to the funds.	21	subsidy at the end of the year, even for the class
22	And I think that it's not clear that	22	one and class two people.
23	what this Court is ruling. Is it the 2000 1983,	23	We don't think that they have a right
24	1985 statutes, or is it some interpretation of this		to do that, and we this business about

10 (Pages 34 to 37)

	Page 38		Page 40
1	THE COURT: Well, my ruling was that	1	2013?
2	it is and I was clear on this, and the City agrees	2	THE COURT: I don't find the City's
3	with me, and the Funds disagree with me maybe they	3	letter I'm not making any ruling upon the legal
4	should ask me to recuse myself but was that it is	4	obligation the legal affect of that letter because
5	the Funds' obligation under the '83 and '85 statute	5	no one has asked me
б	that the City has to levy taxes to support that I	6	MR. BURKE: That's what I want.
7	just looked at this at the language of the	7	That's all I asked.
8	amendments and enforce it.	8	THE COURT: and the record is
9	So that hasn't changed. And if the	9	clear.
10	Funds are going to do something, then the funds are	10	There you go, Mr. Krislov, are you
11	going to do something, and I'll await any motions	11	pleased?
12	with regard to that.	12	MR. KRISLOV: I'm happy.
13	But my order was clear with regard to	13	THE COURT: He's happy. Okay. What
14	that.	14	else do you want from me?
15	MR. KRISLOV: And I think Mr. Burke's	15	MR. DONHAM: I just want to say that
16	statement is this they're not going to comply with	16	I'd like to be on the record that we object to the
17	that order.	17	304(a) finding. We understand that you've Your
18	THE COURT: I don't know that he said	18	Honor's ruling, but I don't want there to be any
19	that. I didn't hear him saying that. I didn't hear	19	doubt that we object to the Rule 304(a) finding with
20	him say that he was about to violate my order.	20	regard to subclass three for a number of reasons.
21	I do understand his disagreement with	21	THE COURT: Yes. And your objection
22	my order, and I can understand why he does. I don't	22	is noted, and I agree with your objection. But your
23	agree that he's right, but there you go.	23	objection is not good enough to counteract what I
24	MR. KRISLOV: I'd like to know. If	24	read the City as saying.
	Page 39		Page 41
1	they're going to end the subsidy at the end of the	1	They have without waiving their
2	year, then this makes it acute that we do need a	2	same position, that it's going to be before the court
3	preliminary injunction.	3	anyway, I believe the court is going to bring
4	We restate our request previously in	4	throw that back to me. I also believe they should.
5	order to protect the participants while these matters	5	And so if anyone's at fault, it's me for granting
6	are being sorted out.	6	304(a) language as to subclass three.
7	THE COURT: Mr. Burke?	7	But as Mr. Prendergast alluded to,
8 9	MR. BURKE: Judge, again, I just want	8	it's going to be argued by Mr. Krislov anyway. And let the court do what the court's going to do. I
10	to make it clear on the record, what is this Court's ruling if it's going to go up? What's the Court's	10	think Mr. Krislov, it's clear, needs a statement from
11	ruling on 1983 and '85?		a higher court before he will as to subclass three
12	THE COURT: I told you	12	before he gives up, because he's tenacious, and
13	MR. BURKE: It's	13	that's who he is, and that's why they've hired him,
14	THE COURT: Mr. Burke, it's in my	14	and that's why people like him.
15	opinion not once, not twice, but at least three	15	And I told you before, Mr. Krislov,
16	times, you got to do it.	16	don't, please, take any statement I make in terms of
17	MR. BURKE: I agree.	17	this case as anything less than respect for you and
18	THE COURT: All right. He agrees.	18	the job that you do.
19	MR. BURKE: We have no problem with	19	So I'm going to let him to do that,
20	it.	20	and your objection is noted with all the statements I
21	THE COURT: He's got no problem.	21	made, all the statements Mr. Prendergast has made,
22	MR. BURKE: My problem is how does	22	and I don't want to review this anymore.
23	that make sense in connection with the letter, the	23	So go ahead. What?
24	City's letter, not the Funds', the City's letter in	24	MR. PRENDERGAST: Just when you read

11 (Pages 38 to 41)

	Page 42		Page 44
1	the transcript to hear what you just said now about	1	anything until I find out that either I'm right or
2	the City's position. And I believe you indicated	2	you're right with regard to classes one through four.
3	earlier you regard the City's position to be an	3	If I have to go on with those matters,
4	objection.	4	then I will require them to answer forthwith. But
5	THE COURT: I do.	5	it's silly to do so before they need to.
6	MR. PRENDERGAST: Not a waiver.	6	MR. KRISLOV: No, because and
7	THE COURT: There's no waiver.	7	here's why I disagree. If you're right on the law,
8	There's an objection by the City or by the Funds.	8	they still have to respond to what the facts are. If
9	MR. PRENDERGAST: Secondly, Your	9	they admit most of the facts in the complaint that
10	Honor, earlier you talked about whether we thought	10	give rise to it, I mean, it's only been 30 years.
11	there was going to be no 304(a) finding on the class.	11	They can they filed an answer in Korshak. They
12	THE COURT: Which class?	12	can file an answer here. There's nothing
13	MR. PRENDERGAST: Subclass three, that		THE COURT: Well, but that's not true
14	as we go forward with the appeal, you were going to	14	in total. If my dismissal of class one and class two
15	stay proceedings on that.	15	is right, then they don't have to respond to the
16	THE COURT: Yes.	16	complaint with regard to class one and class two.
17	MR. PRENDERGAST: Now we're going	17	If I'm wrong with regard to subclass
18	forward with the appeal, and I believe the	18	four and it is out for some reason, then they don't
19	proceedings should be stayed until such time as the	19	have to respond to that.
20	court of appeals has the chance to give	20	You know, we're not I'd like to not
21	THE COURT: Sure. Don't you agree?	21	deal with Plato's cave here and go with shadows until
22	MR. KRISLOV: No.	22	I know exactly what is and what is not. I'm not
23	THE COURT: Let ask you a question,	23	going to require them to respond. That would be
24	Mr. Krislov, since you think I'm wrong about	24	silly.
	Page 43		Page 45
1	everything excuse me, and since you want review of	1	MR. KRISLOV: Then you should enjoin
2	everything I've ruled on, how is it efficient? How	2	them as well from changing the terms of the
3	is use of our resources, yours, theirs, but most	3	healthcare, you should then it's very important to
4	importantly, since I am the center of the universe,	4	put in a preliminary injunction to preserve the
5	mine, to go forward with anything that may not we	5	status quo from being basically
б	may not go forward and on?	б	THE COURT: But you've raised that
7	MR. KRISLOV: It's time to have them	7	thought four times now, and it's denied again.
8	answer the complaint.	8	MR. KRISLOV: Okay. I hear you. I
9	THE COURT: He's not. It's stayed.	9	understand your ruling. Respectfully, I disagree
10	It's stayed pending an appeal.	10	with you.
11	MR. KRISLOV: They didn't make a	11	THE COURT: That's nothing new.
12	motion before on the 304(a). Why does it I don't	12	MR. KRISLOV: We have a history
13	understand. Under 304 it doesn't stop proceedings.	13	together.
14	You have ordered them to	14	THE COURT: We have no history
15	THE COURT: Do I have the discretion	15	together.
16	to run discovery?	16	MR. KRISLOV: I mean in this case.
17	MR. KRISLOV: You obviously do.	17	THE COURT: Believe me, we have no
18	THE COURT: Thank you. I'm exercising	18	history together.
19	my discretion	19	So everything is given, and I look
20	MR. KRISLOV: All I	20	forward to seeing you on the flip side of the appeal.
21	THE COURT: Excuse me, Clint.	21	MR. KRISLOV: Can we ask you one other
22	for the efficient use of resources,	22	thing?
23	mine, as well as yours, as well as theirs, to stay	23 24	THE COURT: Sure.
24	all the proceedings and the need for them to answer	24	MR. KRISLOV: Since we're dealing with

12 (Pages 42 to 45)

	Page 46	
1 2 3	everything on a class basis, can you certify it as a class case on behalf of the four classes? THE COURT: Not until I have it.	
4 5 6	We'll see you on the flip side of the appeal. MR. KRISLOV: Thank you, Judge. Proceedings adjourned at 11:30 a.m.,	
7 8	August 31, 2016.)	
9 10 11		
12 13 14		
15 16		
17 18 19		
20 21 22		
23 24		
	Page 47	
1 2	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE	
3	I, JERRI ESTELLE, CSR, RPR, doing	
4 5	business in the City of Chicago, State of Illinois, do hereby certify that I reported in computerized	
6 7	shorthand the foregoing proceedings as appears from	
8	my stenographic notes. I further certify that the foregoing	
9	is a true and accurate transcription of my shorthand	
10 11	notes and contains all the testimony had at said proceedings.	
12	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I hereunto set my	
13 14	hand as Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of Illinois on September 6, 2016.	
15	Janie Estellis	
16	Jerri Estelle, CSR, RPR	
17	License Number: 084-003284	
18 19		
20	Co dll do	
21 22	S. S.	
23		
24		
	ADCOLUTE DEPODETEI	13 (Pages 46 to 47)
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September 23, 2016

VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL

Clinton A. Krislov KRISLOV & ASSOCIATES, LTD. 20 N. Wacker Drive, Suite 1300 Chicago, Illinois 60606

Dear Clint:

This letter responds to the issues raised by your letter dated September 19, 2016.

We respectfully disagree with your position that the Funds are obligated to provide retirees with a health care plan or that they have any obligation to subsidize retiree health care. Judge Cohen has dismissed all of the plaintiffs' claims with the limited exception that he denied the motion to dismiss as to plaintiffs' Pension Clause claim based upon the 1983 and 1985 amendments. But to be clear, no relief has been awarded on that sole remaining claim; rather, that claim will be the subject of further litigation before Judge Cohen after your Rule 304(a) appeal is resolved, including without limitation defendants' statute of limitations defense, which Judge Cohen indicated could not be resolved at the motion to dismiss stage.

On a related subject, in order to provide City retirees with additional options beyond what is available in the marketplace (*i.e.*, the Affordable Care Act or otherwise) for their 2017 coverage, the City, on its own initiative, has coordinated with Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to offer a number of group insurance plans. On September 20, representatives of the City met with union representatives to outline these group insurance plans that will be available for retirees for the 2017 year. (Please find enclosed information distributed during the union meetings). As Jennifer Naber advised you on September 19, the City has also met with the Funds' Clinton A. Krislov September 23, 2016 Page 2

Executive Directors to request that retirees will have the option, if they select coverage under one of these plans, to pay the premiums by deducting such amounts from their monthly pension payments. The Funds' trustees need to vote to approve that process. We understand that the Laborers' Fund Trustees voted to do so on Tuesday and that the other Funds have met or will be meeting in the near future to consider this request.

As to your request for information relating to the rates for members of the Korshak and Window sub-classes, the City expects to provide that information by no later than early October 2016. Consistent with past practice, these rates will be determined by Segal's projections of health care costs for 2017. When available, the City will share Segal's basis for the projections.

Sincerel Richard J. Prendergast

RJP/jls

Enclosures

Summary of Blue Cross Blue Shield Non-Medicare Insured Plans for 2017

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	Option A	Option B;
	Blue Cross Blue Shield Illinois PPO	Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois Options
Provider Network	Network	Network
Metro Chicago	10,358 Primary Care Doctors	10,358 Primary Care Doctors combined in Tiers 1 and 2
Militati Panitanten	10,550 Finitely Care Coctors	16,023 Specialist Octors combined in Tiers
Metro Chicazo	16,023 Specialist Doctors	1 and 2
State of filingis	225 Hospitals	226 Hospitals combined in Tiers 1 and 2
Single Premium	\$1,466	\$1,295
Couple Premium	\$2,610	\$2,305
Family Premium	\$3,622	\$3,188
Lifetime Maximum Amount	Unlimited	Unlimited
in-Natwork Individual Deductible	\$427	Tier 1 is \$1545; Tier 2 is \$2545
Individual Out of Pocket Unit	52,497	Tier I: \$6180; Tier 2; \$7,180
marriant out of forer and		
	100% diagnostic tests at independent	100% diagnostic tests at independent
In-Network Colosorance	labs/90% physician services/80% other	labs/Tier 1: 90% all other services: Tier 2:
	services/BO% out of area services	75% all other services
Preventive Services covered at \$0 in		
network	Yes	Yes
In Network Primary Care/Specialist	Not AppTcable; Office visits subject to	Tler 1:\$20 primary care/\$45 specialist; Tier
Office Visit ca-pay	co-insurance and deductible,	2: \$30/\$55
In and Out of Notwork Emergency Roon	2 C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	2-3 2-4
Co-pay	\$0	\$258
Emergency Room Co-Insurance	90% after deductible is met	90% after deductible is met
in antipation actuards for Paul	50 50	Tiers 1 and 2; \$250 per admit
in patient in-network Co-Pay In-network out-patient surgical co-pay	20	KA HEIST AND Z, SZSU PER ADIDIK
for facility charges	50	\$200
Out of Network Individual Deductible	5998	\$3,545
Out of Network Individual Out of Pocke		
expense	\$4,989	\$8, 180
Out of Network co-insurance rate	70%	50%
Out of network in-patient hospital co-		
DaA	50	\$350
Out of network out-patient surgical co-		
haà	S0 5	\$300
Prescription drug co-pays for generic	20% retail; \$27 generic/\$71 formulary	20% retail; \$27 generic/\$71 brand mail
drugs, formulary brand drugs	brand mail order	ja order

* Tier 1 Providers are located in Couk, OuPage, Will, Kane, McHenry, Lake, and Kankakee Counties

≄ 80S			Option 1		Option 2		Oprior 3
163	Provider	With the standard state of the	HCSC	HCSC			
	dient	City of	city of chicago	City of Chicago	Chicago	City of Chicago	hicago
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30	Plan the Bestime	PPO - In Network	PPD - Out of Network	PPD-In Network	PPO - Dut of Network	S MONSON UI - FLA	AND - DHE OF NECKLEY
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	Deductible" (see tootcoure)		53	\$21	50	575	8
003	ASOOF (Maximum out of Pocket)		8	;15	\$1,500	54,700	202
() [Combined OOP Max	Same Street	And a strength of the strength			1 4 4	
005	Inpatient Hospital - Acute	20/Stay	50	SolStay	SQSEA	5250/Day (1-7)	5250/05A (1-7)
:00	Inpetient Hospital - Psychiatric	SO/Stav		VEISION	Surstay Contraine 1 - 2015	5	COLUMNER (411-6)
502	Skilled Nursing Facility	So (citys 1-100)	\$0 (cirs 1-100)	\$60 [dam 51-100]	S60 Marc 51-100h	é	S164 S0/risv Irlave 21-100
500	Cardiac and Pulmonary Rehabilitation Services			20%	XOZ	10.10	25%
215	Emergence ("ate	5	4	\$50 copav	\$50 CODBY		20%
016	Ureent Care Facility	05	A second s	20%	20%		100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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006	Home Health Service	television of the state of the		0%	8	X02	20%
603	Primary Care Fitysician Services	50 State 1 State	and a second	\$25 copay	S25 copey	Audoo SZ\$	\$25 copay
6GV)	Chiropractic Services	protes and a start and the start and the start of the sta		Yaqoo 225	\$25 CORY	20× 10× 10× 10× 10× 10× 10× 10× 10× 10× 1	20%
	Occupational Therapy Services	3	ا - بېرىكىمىر بەرمىياتىكى يېرىكى يېرىكى ئېرىكى يېرىكى يېرىكى يېرىكى يېرىكى يېرىكى يېرىكى يېرىكى يېرىكى يېرىكى ي مەركىكىمىر بەرمىياتىكى يېرىكى يېرى	20%	30X	1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 - 1000 -	20% C
600	Physician Specialist Services Encluding Psychiatric Economy for the Bark should	8	8	\$25 copay	S25 copay	\$50 copay	\$50 copay
	and the second reaction of the second s		5	Xuz	¥1×		×.
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010	Podiatry Services	2	8	20%	20%	is ا	Ś
	Other Health Care Profession Services	55	8	8	ŝ		202
	Psychiatric Services		8	50%	2036	202	477
110	Physical Therapy and Speech Language Pathology Services	8	8	AUN But which per year?	2075 (30 visits per veze)	Ŕ	ž
	Jan Martines Lahi Sandires		\$0	8	50	202	2054
100	Dismostic Protectores	65	8	8	\$	20%	20%
	Therapu eatic Radiology	8	8	20%	52	20%	20%
	Diagnostic Radiology services / X-Ray		\$0	20%	20%	20%	XOX
	Advanced Imaging (MRI, MRA, CT Scan, PET)	8	8	20%	%02	20%	200
	Outpatient Hospital Services	5	\$	श्र	2	20%	20%
	Ambutatory Surgical Center (ASC) Services	9	8	53	8	20%	707
210	Outpatient Substance Abuse		8	30%	20%	20%	
	OP Blood	55	8	8	7	207	7004
514	Ambulance Services	3		2007	807		
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				207-202	024-20%		A to office and the second sec
020	Diabetes Supplies and Services	\$	1 3	(0% Preferred Test Strips;	(0% Preferred Test Strips;	X	20%
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024	End-Stage Renal Disease	50 mm	3	× N	407		200
	Acupuncture	Not Covered	Not Covered	Not Covered	Not Covered	I DELEAST IDAL	NOC LOVERED
	Over-the-counter RX	Not Covered	Not Lovered	Not Lovered	Not Covered Not Provine		Not Control
	Meal Benehit						
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0146		Supplemental Education / Wellness Programs	SäverSrebkers.	StherSneakers	SilverSneakers	Construction and the series of	and a silversheets and an and a silversheets and
(11014d)	272	Kidney Disease Education Services	an and a second s	8	50	STATE 1 1602 LANGE STATE	20%
Cate:		Diabetes Self-Management Training		8	aş.	20%	20%
1012 July 1012		Medicare Part B Rx Drugs		20%	20%	20%	20%
0165	016	Preventive Dental	Not Covered Not Covered	Not Covered	Contract Not Covered 11, 111	Not Covered	Not Covered
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5017a 13	820	Eye Exams	S0 Medicare Coverad S0 Medicare Covered	20% Medicare Covered	20% Medicare Covered	20% Medicate Connect	20% Medicare Covered
19410	5:0	Eye Wear	50 Medicarz Coversed	20% Medicare Concred	20% Medicate Covered	20% Medicare Covered	20% Necticare Covered
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and the second second second		Rx Tiers (Initial design)	20 2 C		PD 2		3
		Gap Coverage	See By Table 1 and 1	14 95 15 10	See Ro Tab	See Ba Tab	s Tab
		Worldwide emergency benefit	Lingent/Energent only 250; no limit.	Urgent/Energents	Urgent/Emergent only - 550; no finit	Urgent/Envergent	Urgent/Emergent only = 20%; no limit
and the second second		Travel benefit	For members that are outside of the service are for up	For members that are outside of the service are for up	de of the service are for up	Formembers that are outs	For members that are outside of the service are for up
		Incentive	S25 for up to 4 limes per year	\$25 for up to 4	\$25 for up to 4 times per year	\$25 for up to 4	\$25 for up to 4 times per year
Eeductible	e is appl	Deductible is applicable to all cers with a consurance. Deductible is	le's not applicable to any cells with a copay. The depict ble must be met before a member will pay a	the must be met before a	member will pay a		
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Option 1 Drug Coverage

City of Chicago

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Ďesoriotion of Beneiti	Retail	Retail	Retail	Mail Order	Mail Order	Mail Order
	(30-day)	(60-day)	(Ste-day)	(30-day)	(60-day)	(30-day)
Part D phase: Deductible			\$100 deductible	ctible		And an extension of the second s
	Part D phase: initial Coverage Limit (ICL) - The following copays below will apply up to the ICL amount of \$3,7%	le following copays b	elow will apply up	to the ICL amount of	53,766	
Tiar 1 - Preferred Generic	20%	20%	20%	\$10	\$20	230
Tier 2 - Non-Prafemed Generic	50%	50%	20%	01S	\$20	530
Tier 3 • Prefetted Brand	20%	20%	20%	50%	30%	20%
Tier 4 - Non-preferred Brand	50%	50%	20%	20%	50%	20%
Tier 5 - Specially	50%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%
6	Coverage Gap - The following copays will apply for the Coverage Gap until member reaches the Troop amount of 34,550	apply for the Covera	ge Gap until memb	er reaches the Troop	amount of \$4,950	
Part D phase: Coverage Gap						
Tier 1 - Preferred Generic	20%	50%	20%	\$10	\$20	025
Tier 2 - Non-Preferred Generic	20%	50%	20%	\$10	225	06\$
Tler 3 - Preferred Brand	50%	50%	20%	20%	20%	20%
Tler 4 - Non-preferred Brand	802	20%	20%	%Q2	20%	20%
Tier 5 - Speciality	20%	20%	%0Z	20%	20%	20%
Troop amount that then ns Catastrophic pitase			\$4 950			
Catastrophic Phase cost sharing amounts		Cata	strophic Phase co.	Catastrophic Phase cost sharing amounts		
	After your yearty out-of-pocket drug costs (including drugs purchased through your retail phamracy and through mail order) reach 54,950 you pay the greater of 55% of the cost, or 53.30 copay for generic (including brand drugs treated as generic) and a 58.25 copayment for all other drugs	r your yearly out-of-pocket drug costs (including drugs purchased through your re 50 you pay the greater of 5% of the cost, or 53.30 copay for generic (including brand drugs treated as generic) and a 58.25 copayment for all other drugs	ding drugs purchas. Id drugs treated a	ed through your retail p s generic} and a	hamacy and through	h mail order) reach
Account Executive's):	Date Sebmitted:					
PLEASE NOTE • Areas in red indicate amounts required by the federal of	when by the faderal government to all 2017 Medicare Part D program and are not subject to	edicare Part D program) and are not subjec	B		
inguarator. These anowns may be surped to change in 2017. • All cost-shaing presumes eligible prescriptions filled at a network phannecy or our meR-order vendor. PrimeMall • The Blue Cross Medicarefix formulary is reviewed and approved annually by the Centers for Medicare & Medical is subject to change as melidenance updates are made throughout the year.	e supex to charge in 2017. prescriptions filled at a network phannacy or our mail-order vendor, PrimeMail. Jary is reviewed and approved amually by the Centers for Medicare & Medicald Services (CMS), but e updates are made throughout the year.	our mail-cruter vendor, e Centers for Medicare	PrimeMail. & Medicard Service	s (CHS), but		
 Formulary: Expanded Formulary 	- · ·					
 Supplemental drug buy up list #2 						
^{bu} Service Mark of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Assr & Remistanci Service Marks of the Rise Cross and Blue	ind Blue Shield Association, an Association of independent Blue Cross and Blue Shield Parts Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association an Association of Independent Blue Cross and Blue	l Independent Blue Cro ssociation of Independ	es and Blue Shied and Blue Cross and			
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Blue Cross MedicaneRx(PDP) is a Medicare Prescription Drug plan offered by HCSC Insumance Services Company, an Independent Licensee of the Blue Cross and Blue Steeld Association under contract HSS34 with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.

Option 2 Drug Coverage

City of Chicago

р. Реглите	2017 2017
	Rates are per member per month for persons who have Medicare as primery coverage.

Description of Benefit	Retail	Retail	Retail	Kall Order	Mail Order	Mall Order
	(30-day)	(60-day)	(90-day)	(30-day)	(60-day)	(yeb-06)
Part D phase: Deductible			\$200 deductible	ctible		
Part D phase: Initial C	phase: Initial Coverage Limit (ICL) - The following copays below will apply up to the ICL amount of \$3,700	The following copays I	celow will apply up	to the ICL amount :	M 53,700	
Tier 1 - Preferred Generic	20%	20%	50%	01\$	\$20	005
Tier 2 - Non-Preferred Generic	20%	%0X	20%	\$10	\$29	00\$
Tier 3 - Preferred Brand	20%	20%	20%	%0X	20%	20%
Ter 4 - Non-preferred Brand	20%	20%	20%	50%	20%	20%
Tier 5 - Specialty	20%	20%	20%	20%	507	20%
80 00 11	erage Gap - The following copays will apply for the Coverage Gap until member reaches the Troop amount of 54 939	li apply for the Covera	ige Gap until memb	er reaches the Troc	ip amount of \$4,958	
Tier 1 • Preferred Generic	20%	20%	20%	410	\$20	23
Tier 2 - Non-Preferred Generic	20%	20%	50%	\$10	\$20	23
Tier 3 - Preferred Erand	20%	20%	20%	20%	%02	20%
Tier 4 - Non-preferred Brand	20%	20%	20%	20%	30%	20%
Tier 5 - Specialty	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%	20%
Troop amount that begins Catastrophic phase			38.3			
Catastrophic Phase cost sharing amounts	-	Cata	strophic Phase cos	Catastrophic Phase cost sharing amounts		
	After your yearly out-of-bocket drug costs (including drugs purchased through your retail pharmacy and through mail order)	-pocket drug costs (incl	uding drugs purchas	ed through vour reta	I pharmacy and throu	ich mai order)
	reach \$4 950 you pay the greater of:	the greater of	- 2	1		
	* 5% of the cost, or					
	* \$3.30 copay for g	\$3.30 copay for generic (including brand drugs treated as generic) and a	nd drugs treated as	generic) and a		
	\$8.25 copayment	58.25 copayment for all other drugs				
f a set in the set of	Take Suburitiends					
					. *	
PLEASE NOTE				•	:	:
* Areas in red indicate amounts required by the federal government to all 2017 Medicane Part D program and are not subject to	I government to all 2017	Medicare Part D progra	am and are not subje	d to		
hepotlation. These amounts may be subject to change in 2017	e in 2017.					
• All cost-straining presumes eligible prescriptions filled at a network pharmacy or our mail-order vendor, PrimeMail.	at a network pharmacy c	y our mail-order vendo	r, PrimeMail.			
The Blue Cross MedicareRy formulary is reviewed and approved annually by the Centers for Medicare & Medicarel Services (CMS), but	id approved annually by	the Centers for Medica	re & Medicaid Servic	es (CMS), but		
is subject to change as maintenance updates are med	odates are mede throughout the year.			:		
	•			•		
- Formulary Serm - Custom	-	-			•	
	-	.*				
²⁴ Service Mark of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass	Blue Shield Association, an Association of Independent Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans	of Independent Blue C	ross and Blue Shield	l Plans	·	
0 Rejistent Service Marks of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, an Association of Independent Blue Cross and Blue	e Shield Association, an	Association of Indepen	dent Brue Cross and	Blue	-	
Hue Cross Medicare of Plasming Plasming on Drug periodies of HCSC Institutes Services Company, an Independent Licensee	on Drug plan offered by 1	LCGC Institutes Servic	es Company, an Ind	ependent Licensee		
of the Blue Cross and Brue Shield Association under cr	station under contract H8634 with the Centers for Medicare and Medicard Services	enters for Medicate an		-		
	•			• •		

Option 3 Drug Coverage

City of Chicago

Fremiants			2017			
	Rates a	are per member per n	nonth for persons v	Rates are per member per month for persons who have Medicare as printary coverage.	s primary coverage	
			2650			
Doscription of Benefit	Retail	Retail	Retail	Mail Order	Mail Order	Mail Order
	(30-day)	(60-day)	{90-day}	(30-clay)	(EG-day)	(90-day)
Part D phase: Deductible			\$400 deductible	stible		
Part D phase: Initial (Part D phase: Initial Coverage Limit (ICL) - The following copays below will apply up to the ICL amount of \$3,796	e following copays b	elow wili apply up '	to the ICL amount of	\$3,700	
Tier 1 - Preferred Generic	%sz	25%	25%	\$10	\$20	530
Tier 2 - Non-Preferred Generic	25%	25%	25%	510	\$20	2
Tier 3 - Preferred Brand	39% S9	58%	25%	20%	25%	254
Tier 4 - Non-preferred Brand	25%	25%	25%	25%	25%	25%
Tier 5 - Speciatty	25%	25%	25%	25%	1.52	25%
Part D phase; Cove	arage Gap - The following copays will apply for the Coverage Gap until member reaches the Troop amount of 54,950	apply for the Covera	ge Cap until memb	er reaches the Troop	amount of 54,950	
Part D phase: Coverage Gap						
Tier 1 - Preferred Generic						<u>Kapr-11</u>
Tier 2 - Non-Preferred Generic			No Con Con			<u></u>
Tier 3 - Preferred Brand			inu tap contrade	afipta		
Tier 4 - Non-preferred Brand						1813; -
Tlar 5 • Specialty						
Troop amount that begins Catastrophic phase	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		055.AS			
Catastrophic Phase cost sharing amounts		Cata	Catastrophic Phase cost sharing amounts	t sharing amounts		
	After your vearly out-of-pocket drug costs (including drugs purchased through your retail pharmacy and through mail order)	ocket drug casts (incli	uding drugs purchase	ed through your retail	pharmacy and throug	th mail order)
	reach \$4 950, you pay the greater of	e greater of		•		
	 5% of the cost, or 					
	 \$3.30 copay for get 	 \$3.30 copay for generic (including brand drugs treated as generic) and a 	id drugs treated as	generic) and a		A. 18
	\$8.25 copayment for all other drugs	or all other drugs				
Account Executive(s);	Date Submitted:					
PLEASE NOTE					· · · ·	
 Areas in red indicate amounts required by the federal 	l by the federal government to all 2017 Medicare Part D program and are not subject to	ledicare Part D progra	im and are not subje	8		-
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• All cost-strainty presumes engine prescriptions alleo at a neuvolo prelimitacy of our mail-order vencion, transman, • The Shine Proce Medicare Severations is reviewed and sources the the Contract for Medicare & Martinetics & M	criptions lineo at a retwork preintacy of our intel-order version; francement, te residented and environd annihilite het the Contests for Manifestra & Mendential Services (CMIS). het	ournital-order version a Cadiars for Madicar	, ringewan. A 2 Maritari Sania	oc (CMS) hot		
is subject to characteristic constants is constant and approved annually is subject to characters as maintenance updates are made throughout the year	de throughout the year.					

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⁵⁴⁴ Service Mark of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, an Association of Independent Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans (6) Represent Service Marks of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, an Association of Independent Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans

Blue Cross MedicarePo(PDP) is a Medicare Prescription Drug plan offered by HCSC Insurance Services Company, an Independent Licensee of the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association under contract H3634 with the Centers for Medicare and Medicard Services.



DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CITY OF CHICAGO

October 2016

Important Healthcare Information for Medicare Eligible Retirees Who Retired on or After August 23, 1989

As you are aware, your City of Chicago retiree healthcare plan coverage that supplements your Medicare coverage is ending on December 31, 2016. If you want more than Medicare Parts A and B coverage, you will have to enroll for other insurance coverage that starts on January 1, 2017. If you do not enroll for other coverage, you will have no prescription drug coverage (retail or mail order) and you will be responsible for all expenses not paid by Medicare.

You may be able to obtain coverage through an employer if you are working or through your spouse's employer. You can purchase individual insurance plans offered during the Medicare open enrollment season. In addition, the City has arranged for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to offer three optional group insurance plans to City of Chicago retirees who are Medicare eligible. You should explore and compare all options before making a decision.

Medicare Open Enrollment for Individual Insurance Coverage for 2017

Every year Medicare sends a booklet to the home of each Medicare beneficiary called "Medicare & You." It includes detailed information on the types of available Medicare plan options. If you wish to download the 2017 edition of "Medicare & You" please go here: https://www.medicare.gov/medicare-and-you/different-formats/m-and-y-different-formats.html

You have an opportunity to enroll in plans during the Medicare Open Enrollment season, which starts October 15 and ends December 7, 2016, for coverage beginning on January 1, 2017. You may elect a Medicare Supplement plan, a Medicare Advantage plan, or a Medicare Advantage plan with Prescription Drug coverage included. If you elect a Medicare Supplement plan or a Medicare Advantage plan with no drug coverage, you will also need to purchase a separate Medicare Part D prescription drug plan.

Your current coverage through the City is Medicare Supplement type coverage with a separate prescription drug benefit. Your current prescription drug benefit does not have a coverage gap (the "donut hole"). The individual Medicare Part D prescription drug plans offered during the Open Enrollment season all have a coverage gap. Similarly, Medicare Advantage Plans that include coverage for prescription drugs have a coverage gap. This coverage gap puts a temporary limit on what the plan pays for drugs. This coverage gap begins when you and your drug plan have spent a certain amount for covered drugs. Then, you pay out-of-pocket for prescription drugs until an out-of-pocket cost maximum amount is reached. After the maximum out-of-pocket limit is reached, the plan then provides payment for covered drugs again. The coverage gap is becoming smaller each year until 2020 when it will be eliminated.

Any coverage you purchase during the Medicare open enrollment on Medicare.gov or through an insurance agent will be individual insurance coverage. You will pay your premium directly to the insurance company.

Blue Cross Blue Shield Group Insurance Options for 2017

In addition to the individual insurance plans available to you in the marketplace during the Medicare Open Enrollment season, the City has arranged for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to offer three different optional group Medicare Advantage plans with Prescription Drug coverage for 2017. If you elect to enroll in any of these optional insurance plans, you will be responsible for paying the premium charged by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois, and you may elect to have your premium deducted from your annuity. The three plans provide different levels of out-of-pocket expense for medical services and prescription drugs. Two of the plans cover prescription drugs including gap coverage (this means they have no "donut hole"). The third plan, the least expensive plan, does not include gap coverage.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois will be mailing information regarding the three available plans, to your home during the week of October 3rd. The information will be in an envelope marked with the note "Special Enrollment Information for 2017". Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois will have a special enrollment team available to answer your questions about the three plans, and the team can help you identify how your prescription drugs are covered by the plans. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois will also have representatives available to visit your home to help you with your plan choice.

Please note that while the City has arranged for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to offer you these options, the City is not endorsing or administering these plans.

Prescription Drug Information

In addition to the information that you will receive from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois, you will also receive a letter from Caremark, mailed October 14th, which lists all of the prescription medications you have purchased within the period of July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016. Each person covered by the City's retiree medical plans will receive an individualized letter from Caremark.

The Medicare website (www.Medicare.gov) includes a feature that allows you to enter your drug information and save it for future use, so that you can see how your drugs are covered by each insurance plan and if they are on the plan's preferred drug list. Similarly, if you call Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to talk about the group insurance plan options, please have the Caremark letter with you--the representative will ask you about the drugs you use and will be able to tell you how the drugs are covered by the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois optional plans. You also may wish to research whether your prescriptions will be covered by any coverage that may be available to you.

You Must Choose a Plan and Enroll!

To have coverage in place for January 1, 2017, you must make a decision and complete the enrollment process. *There will be NO "automatic" enrollment*. If you do not make a decision and take the steps necessary to enroll, on January 1, 2017, you will have Original Medicare Part A and Part B coverage only. You won't have prescription drug coverage and you won't have any coverage to help you pay expenses not paid by Medicare. Please review your options and make a choice before the enrollment deadlines.

Note:

1) Included with this notice is a Notice of Creditable Coverage for Prescription Drugs that you may be asked to provide when you enroll in a Medicare Part D or Medicare Advantage with Prescription Drug coverage plan. It will verify to your new insurer that your coverage under the City's retiree plan was at least as good as coverage under a Part D plan. As long as your coverage was at least as good as Part D plan coverage, you cannot be required to pay any penalty amounts associated with not having drug coverage.

2) You will not receive a general certificate of credible coverage this year. However, if you need more specific or personalized information about the coverage you or your dependents previously had through the City, please contact the Benefits Service Center at 1-877-299-5111.



DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CITY OF CHICAGO

October 2016

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Medicare Open Enrollment for Individual Insurance Coverage for 2017

Every year Medicare sends a booklet to the home of each Medicare beneficiary called "Medicare & You." It includes detailed information on the types of available Medicare plan options. If you wish to download the 2017 edition of "Medicare & You" please go here: https://www.medicare.gov/medicare-and-you/different-formats/m-and-y-different-formats.html

You have an opportunity to enroll in plans during the Medicare Open Enrollment season, which starts October 15 and ends December 7, 2016, for coverage beginning on January 1, 2017. You may elect a Medicare Supplement plan, a Medicare Advantage plan, or a Medicare Advantage plan with Prescription Drug coverage included. If you elect a Medicare Supplement plan or a Medicare Advantage plan with no drug coverage, you will also need to purchase a separate Medicare Part D prescription drug plan. Your current coverage through the City is Medicare Supplement type coverage with a separate prescription drug benefit. Your current prescription drug benefit does not have a coverage gap (the "donut hole"). The individual Medicare Part D prescription drug plans offered during the Open Enrollment season all have a coverage gap. Similarly, Medicare Advantage Plans that include coverage for prescription drugs have a coverage gap. This coverage gap puts a temporary limit on what the plan pays for drugs. This coverage gap begins when you and your drug plan have spent a certain amount for covered drugs. Then, you pay out-of-pocket for prescription drugs until an out-of-pocket cost maximum amount is reached. After the maximum out-of-pocket limit is reached, the plan then provides payment for covered drugs again. The coverage gap is becoming smaller each year until 2020 when it will be eliminated.

Any coverage you purchase during the Medicare open enrollment on Medicare.gov or through an insurance agent will be individual insurance coverage. You will pay your premium directly to the insurance company.

Blue Cross Blue Shield Group Insurance Options for 2017

In addition to the individual insurance plans available to you in the marketplace during the Medicare Open Enrollment season, the City has arranged for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to offer three different optional group Medicare Advantage plans with Prescription Drug coverage for 2017. If you elect to enroll in any of these optional insurance plans, you will be responsible for paying the premium charged by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois, and you may elect to have your premium deducted from your annuity. The three plans provide different levels of out-of-pocket expense for medical services and prescription drugs. Two of the plans cover prescription drugs including gap coverage (this means they have no "donut hole"). The third plan, the least expensive plan, does not include gap coverage.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois will be mailing information regarding the three available plans, to your home during the week of October 3rd. The information will be in an envelope marked with the note "Special Enrollment Information for 2017". Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois will have a special enrollment team available to answer your questions about the three plans, and the team can help you identify how your prescription drugs are covered by the plans. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois will also have representatives available to visit your home to help you with your plan choice.

Please note that while the City has arranged for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to offer you these options, the City is not endorsing or administering these plans.

Prescription Drug Information

In addition to the information that you will receive from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois, you will also receive a letter from Caremark, mailed October 14th, which lists all of the prescription medications you have purchased within the period of July 1, 2015 through June 30, 2016. Each person covered by the City's retiree medical plans will receive an individualized letter from Caremark.

The Medicare website (www.Medicare.gov) includes a feature that allows you to enter your drug information and save it for future use, so that you can see how your drugs are covered by each insurance plan and if they are on the plan's preferred drug list. Similarly, if you call Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to talk about the group insurance plan options, please have the Caremark letter with you--the representative will ask you about the drugs you use and will be able to tell you how the drugs are covered by the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois optional plans. You also may wish to research whether your prescriptions will be covered by any coverage that may be available to you.

You Must Choose a Plan and Enroll!

To have coverage in place for January 1, 2017, you must make a decision and complete the enrollment process. *There will be NO "automatic" enrollment*. If you do not make a decision and take the steps necessary to enroll, on January 1, 2017, you will have Original Medicare Part A and Part B coverage only. You won't have prescription drug coverage and you won't have any coverage to help you pay expenses not paid by Medicare. Please review your options and make a choice before the enrollment deadlines.

Note:

1) Included with this notice is a Notice of Creditable Coverage for Prescription Drugs that you may be asked to provide when you enroll in a Medicare Part D or Medicare Advantage with Prescription Drug coverage plan. It will verify to your new insurer that your coverage under the City's retiree plan was at least as good as coverage under a Part D plan. As long as your coverage was at least as good as Part D plan coverage, you cannot be required to pay any penalty amounts associated with not having drug coverage.

2) You will not receive a general certificate of credible coverage this year. However, if you need more specific or personalized information about the coverage you or your dependents previously had through the City, please contact the Benefits Service Center at 1-877-299-5111.

3) Retired public safety officers, as defined by federal law, are eligible to take advantage of a special tax law (the Pension Protection Act of 2006) that allows a retired public safety officer to exclude up to \$3,000 per tax year from federal taxable income for health, accident or long-term care insurance premiums that are deducted from annuity benefits. The premium deduction from the annuity check for any of the optional Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois healthcare insurance options would qualify for this purpose.



DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CITY OF CHICAGO

October 2016

Important Healthcare Coverage Information for Retirees Who Are Not Eligible for Medicare and Retired on or After August 23, 1989

As you are aware, your City of Chicago retiree healthcare plan coverage will end on December 31, 2016. To ensure that you have healthcare coverage in place for January 1, 2017, you must enroll in another plan. *There will be NO "automatic" enrollment*. You may be able to obtain coverage through an employer if you are working or through your spouse's employer. If you are unable to obtain employer sponsored healthcare coverage, you have two options. You can obtain coverage through the Health Insurance Marketplace (also known as the Exchange). Alternatively, for 2017, the City has arranged for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to offer two optional group insurance plans that include provider networks not available in the Marketplace plans. You should explore and compare all options before making a decision.

Health Insurance Marketplace Individual Insurance Plan Options for 2017

You will be able to enroll for coverage on the Health Insurance Marketplace for 2017 during the annual open enrollment which begins on November 1, 2016. The enrollment period ends on January 31, 2017, for 2017 coverage. However, if you wish to have coverage beginning on January 1, 2017 and avoid a gap in coverage, you must complete your enrollment by December 15, 2016. Any person who does not have Medicare coverage may apply for coverage on the Marketplace.

If your household modified adjusted gross income is less than 400 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL), you may be eligible for premium reductions (subsidies) for a Marketplace plan. For purposes of 2017 coverage for a household size of one, 400% of the FPL is \$47,520; for a household size of two, it is \$64,080. If your household income is less than 250% of the FPL, you may also qualify for additional reductions in the amount of co-pays, co-insurance and out of pocket expense limits.

Enrollment for Marketplace plans in Illinois and other states can be done on the Health Insurance Marketplace website at (www.healthcare.gov). Please note, however, that the healthcare plans available for 2017 will not be displayed on the Marketplace website until open enrollment begins on November 1, 2016.

Health Insurance Marketplace Individual Insurance Plan Options for 2017 (cont)

The City is in the process of arranging for easily accessible help to assist you in evaluating your health plan options and determining if you qualify for subsidies to lower the cost of your monthly premium. You will receive more information about these resources before open enrollment begins.

The Marketplace offers a variety of plans with different cost sharing requirements, co-pay amounts, coinsurance amounts, premiums, and provider networks. All Marketplace plans cover prescription drugs; however, plan terms – including co-pay amounts and the preferred drug list – will differ. Information about how Marketplace plans cover specific prescription medications is available at <u>www.healthcare.gov</u>. Any coverage you purchase on the Marketplace or through an insurance agent will be individual insurance coverage. You will pay your premium directly to the insurance company.

Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois Group Insurance Plan Options for 2017

For 2017, the City has arranged to have Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois offer two different group medical insurance plan options that are not available on the Marketplace. If you enroll in either of the two optional group plans offered by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois, you will be responsible for the premium charged by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois and you can elect to have your premium deducted from your annuity.

The first option is very similar to the plan that you have today and includes the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois PPO network. The second option is a three tiered-network plan (the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois Blue Choice OPT Network) that allows you to access all of the hospitals in the PPO network, but imposes higher out-of-pocket expenses if you obtain care from providers in Tier 2 or from an out-of- network provider. The Blue Choice OPT plan option has lower premiums, but higher out-of-pocket limits. The plan covers preventive care and includes co-pays for doctors' office visits so that you can see a doctor without having to meet the deductible.

Blue Cross will mail an informational packet to your home during the week of October 3rd. The package will arrive in an envelope marked with the notation "Important 2017 Enrollment Information." In addition, they will have a team of representatives available to answer any questions you may have about the plans or the networks.

Please note that while the City has arranged for Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois to offer you these options, the City is not endorsing or administering these plans.

Prescription Drug Information

In addition to the information that you will receive from Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois, you will also receive a letter from Caremark, mailed October 14th, which lists all of the prescription medications you have purchased within the period of July 1, 2015, through June 30, 2016. Whether you enroll in a Marketplace plan, one of the two Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois insurance plans or another employer-sponsored plan, you can use the information to help you determine how your current medications are covered by the plan and if they are on the plan's preferred drug list. Each person covered by the City's retiree medical plans will receive an individualized letter from Caremark.

You Must Choose a Plan and Enroll!

To have coverage in place for January 1, 2017, you must select a plan and complete the enrollment process. *There will be NO "automatic" enrollment*. If you do not choose a plan and do not take the steps necessary to enroll by December 15, 2016, you will not have medical coverage or prescription drug coverage beginning January 1, 2017. We encourage you to review your options and make a choice before the enrollment deadlines.

Note:

1) Included with this notice is a Notice of Creditable Coverage for Prescription Drugs that you may be asked to provide when you enroll in a Medicare Part D or Medicare Advantage with Prescription Drug coverage plan. It will verify to your new insurer that your coverage under the City's retiree plan was at least as good as coverage under a Part D plan. As long as your coverage was at least as good as Part D plan coverage, you cannot be required to pay any penalty amounts associated with not having drug coverage.

2) You will not receive a general certificate of credible coverage this year. However, if you need more specific or personalized information about the coverage you or your dependents previously had through the City, please contact the Benefits Service Center 1-877-299-5111.



DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CITY OF CHICAGO

October 2016

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The first option is very similar to the plan that you have today and includes the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois PPO network. The second option is a three tiered-network plan (the Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois Blue Choice OPT Network) that allows you to access all of the hospitals in the PPO network, but imposes higher out-of-pocket expenses if you obtain care from providers in Tier 2 or from an out-of- network provider. The Blue Choice OPT plan option has lower premiums, but higher out-of-pocket limits. The plan covers preventive care and includes co-pays for doctors' office visits so that you can see a doctor without having to meet the deductible.

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Note:

1) Included with this notice is a Notice of Creditable Coverage for Prescription Drugs that you may be asked to provide when you enroll in a Medicare Part D or Medicare Advantage with Prescription Drug coverage plan. It will verify to your new insurer that your coverage under the City's retiree plan was at least as good as coverage under a Part D plan. As long as your coverage was at least as good as Part D plan coverage, you cannot be required to pay any penalty amounts associated with not having drug coverage.

2) You will not receive a general certificate of credible coverage this year. However, if you need more specific or personalized information about the coverage you or your dependents previously had through the City, please contact the Benefits Service Center 1-877-299-5111.

3) Retired public safety officers, as defined by federal law, are eligible to take advantage of a special tax law (the Pension Protection Act of 2006) that allows a retired public safety officer to exclude up to \$3,000 per tax year from federal taxable income for health, accident or long-term care insurance premiums that are deducted from annuity benefits. The premium deduction from the annuity check for any of the optional Blue Cross Blue Shield of Illinois healthcare insurance options would qualify for this purpose.

PF NM/10-16

Notice of Prescription Drug Creditable Coverage City of Chicago Retiree Healthcare Plan

The City of Chicago has determined that Retiree Healthcare Plans prescription drug benefits are, on average, "creditable coverage," which means the City's coverage is expected to pay as much (or more in some cases) as standard Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage.

Because the City's prescription drug benefits are creditable coverage, you can enroll in a Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage plan for 2017 and not be subject to the Medicare premium penalty.

Keep this Notice. If you enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage, you may need a copy of this Notice when you enroll. This Notice verifies that you have creditable coverage and that you are not required to pay the premium penalty.

Your Choices and the Consequences

You should compare the coverage and cost of the Medicare plans in your area.

Important Note: If you or a dependent are eligible for Medicare and drop or lose your coverage with the City, and do not enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage after your current coverage ends, you may pay more for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage later. If you go 63 days or longer without prescription drug coverage that is at least as good as Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage, your monthly premium for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage will increase. The increase will be 1% per month for every month that you were eligible for but did not have coverage. For example, if you go 19 months without coverage, your monthly premium will always be 19% higher than what most other people pay. You will have to pay the premium penalty as long as you have Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage. In addition, you may have to wait until the next open enrollment period (October 15 through December 7 each year) to enroll.

Eligible individuals who are entitled to Medicare Part A or enrolled in Part B can enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage when they are first eligible or during the annual Medicare enrollment period (October 15 through December 7 each year). Medicare eligible individuals who lose or drop creditable prescription drug benefits may be eligible for a two month Special Enrollment Period to sign up for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage. Detailed information about Special Enrollment Periods is included in the *Medicare & You* handbook sent to Medicare eligible individuals each fall.

(TURN THIS PAGE OVER FOR MORE INFORMATION)

For More Information About Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage

More information about Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage is available in the "Medicare & You" handbook that Medicare publishes and sends to Medicare beneficiaries each fall. You may also be contacted directly by Medicare prescription drug plans.

To get more information, you can:

- Visit www.medicare.gov for personalized help.
- Call your State Health Insurance Assistance Program (the telephone number is in the "Medicare & You" handbook).
- Call 1-800-MEDICARE (1-800-633-4227). TTY users should call 1-877-486-2048.

For people with limited income and assets, extra help paying for a Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage is available. Additional information is available from the Social Security Administration by:

- Visiting www.socialsecurity.gov/prescriptionhelp.
- Calling 1-800-772-1213 (TTY users should call 1-800-325-0778).

For More Information About this Notice

If you have any questions about this Notice please call the Chicago Benefits Office.

You may request a copy of this Notice at any time from the Chicago Benefits Office.

Date of Notice:	September 2016
Entity/Sender:	The City of Chicago
Contact:	Chicago Benefits Office
Address:	333 South State Street, Room 400, Chicago, Illinois 60604-3978
Telephone Number:	1-877-299-5111
Web Site:	www.cityofchicago.org/benefits

Benefits under the City of Chicago Retiree Healthcare Plan may be modified, reduced, or terminated as specified in the legal documents that establish the Plan. The City expressly reserves all rights to make amendments or terminate the Plan as allowed by the legal documents that establish the Plan.



DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CITY OF CHICAGO

September, 2016

Dear City of Chicago Medicare Supplement Retiree Healthcare Plan Participant who Retired Before August 23, 1989:

This letter and the enclosed documents contain important information about your health care benefits and the premium rates that will be effective on January 1, 2017, including the following:

- 1) A new 2017 premium rate chart.
- 2) A 2017 Benefits Summary.
- 3) The Notice of Creditable Coverage for prescription drugs.
- 4) Information on the Means Test--a way for certain low income plan members to save money for premiums and/or for prescription drug co-payments.

Rate Changes: Your premium rates for 2017 are enclosed. These rates are based on the projected cost of the Plan minus the City of Chicago's contribution.

Benefit Summary: Attached is an updated Benefits Summary of the 2017 Medicare Supplement Retiree Healthcare Plan for those retired before August 23, 1989. Remember, the Plan also requires that you use the mail order pharmacy for maintenance prescriptions.

Creditable Coverage Notice: This notice verifies that you have creditable drug coverage under the Plan. This means that the coverage provided under the Plan is at least as good as the coverage under a Medicare Part D plan. Please keep this notice in your permanent records.

Means Test: Certain low income Plan participants may be eligible to have co-pays for mail order drugs and/or premiums reduced. To be eligible for these benefits, your combined household adjusted gross income, as reported to the Internal Revenue Service in the immediately preceding tax year, must be at or below 250% of the federal poverty guidelines for your family size for the year. As part of the application process, you will be required to provide a release that allows the City to receive a copy of your most recently filed tax return.

If your annual annuity amount is less than 250% of the federal poverty level for 2016, a Means Test application has been sent to you under separate cover. (250% of the federal poverty level for a single person for 2016 is \$29,700; for a couple it is \$40,050.) If your annuity is more than that but you believe that your

adjusted gross income may qualify you for the benefit based on your family size, you may call the benefits service center at 1-877-299-5111, or you may find the application at <u>www.cityofchicago.org/benefits</u> then click on "View all Supporting Documentation" and scroll down to "2016 Means Test Application".

Please call the Benefits Service Center at 1-877-299-5111 if you have any questions about this letter.

Sincerely, Chicago Benefits Office



BENEFITS SUMMARY Medicare Eligible Effective January 1, 2017

†The plan document defines and controls the terms of the benefits provided

Medicare Supplement Retiree Healthcare Plan Retired Before 8/23/89

The Medicare Supplement Retiree Healthcare Plan pays the percentages listed below after Medicare pays and you meet any annual deductibles. The maximum amount that the Plan will pay is based on the Medicare allowable charge.* Services must be medically necessary.

Medical Benefits	Coverage
Lifetime Maximum	\$1.5 million per person for medical and prescription drug benefits ¹
Plan Deductible ²	\$100 per person each calendar year (separate from Medicare Part B deductible)
Hospitalization	
Days 1 – 60	You pay \$50 of the Medicare Part A Inpatient Deductible for the first hospital stay in each calendar year. The Plan pays all but \$50 of the Medicare Part A Inpatient Deductible for the first hospital stay each calendar year.
Days 61 – 90	You pay \$0. Plan pays 100% of the Medicare daily co-payment, which is 25% of the Medicare Part A Inpatient Deductible.
Days 91 – 150	You pay \$0. Plan pays 100% of the Medicare daily co-payment, which is 50% of the Medicare Part A Inpatient Deductible.
Additional Days	Additional days may be covered under Medicare Part A and/or the Plan.
Skilled Nursing Facility	
Days 1 – 20	You pay \$0. Medicare pays 100% of first 20 days each Medicare Benefit Period.
Days 21 – 100	You pay \$0. Plan pays 100% of the Medicare daily co-payment, which is 1/8 of the Medicare Part A Inpatient Deductible.
Additional Days	You pay 100%. No Medicare or Plan benefits are paid after 100 days in a Medicare Benefit Period.
Other Covered Services	Plan pays 20% of the Medicare approved amount after Part B deductible and Plan deductible.
Out-of-Country Services	If you are in a foreign country and are hospitalized due to an emergency, the Plan pays 80% of eligible charges for medically necessary services during the first 60 days of your hospitalization. Benefits are subject to a separate \$250 calendar year deductible. The total lifetime maximum that the City's Plan pays is limited to \$50,000.
Diabetic Supplies	Medicare Part B covers diabetic supplies such as glucose testing monitors, blood glucose test strips, lancets, and glucose control solutions. There may be limits on supplies or how to get them. Ask your pharmacy or supplier if they are enrolled in the Medicare program. If they are not, Medicare will not pay and neither will the City's Plan because the City's Plan is only a supplement to Medicare. If you have paid the yearly Part B deductible as well as the City's \$100 annual deductible, the City will pay 20% of the Medicare approved amount.

¹ The lifetime maximum includes expenses paid under both the Non-Medicare and Medicare plans combined.

² Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B: No expense is covered by the Plan if Medicare does not cover it unless otherwise specified. If you are only enrolled in Medicare Part A, the Plan will pay benefits as though you are enrolled in both Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B.

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Prescription Drug Benefits	Coverage
Caremark Retail Pharmacy – up to a 30 day supply or 100 unit dose (whichever is less)	After you've met the separate \$100 annual prescription drug deductible (does not apply to Means Test Eligible Retirees**), for each prescription, you pay: • 20% of the contracted cost for generic drugs
	 20% of the contracted cost for formulary brand name drugs*** when no generic is available
	 20% of the contracted cost plus \$15 for non-formulary brand name drugs**** when no generic is available
Mail Order Program - Up to a	For each prescription, you pay:
90 day supply	• \$28 for 2017 (\$7 for Means Test Eligible Retirees) for generic drugs
	• \$75 for 2017 (\$20 for Means Test Eligible Retirees) for formulary brand name drugs when no generic is available
	Note: non-formulary brand name medications are not available through the mail order program.
Restrictions: Why choose a generic?	If a brand name drug is dispensed when a generic alternative is available, you pay the difference in cost between the generic and the brand name as well as the generic co-payment. The Plan will not pay more than it would pay for the generic medication if you buy a brand name drug when a generic alternative is available.
Generic Step Therapy Program for generics available in the therapeutic class	If you elect to purchase a brand medication without trying an appropriate generic medication in the same therapeutic class, you will pay the full cost of the medication. If you try the generic medication and your physician finds that the generic medication is not effective in treating your condition, you will be able to receive the brand medication at the co-payment applicable to non-formulary or formulary drugs.
Specialty Medications	If you do not try the preferred medication for the therapeutic class, you will pay the full cost of the medication. If you try the preferred specialty medication and it is not effective in treating your condition, you will be able to receive a non- preferred formulary drug at retail.
Mandatory Mail Order	Requiring the use of mail order will reduce costs for the City and Retirees. After 2 fills of your generic or formulary brand medication at a retail pharmacy, you will be required to use mail order for any additional fills through CVS- Caremark in Mount Prospect, IL. If you do not use the mail order program for your 3rd or any subsequent fills, you will pay the full cost of the prescription. If your medication is non-formulary, however, you must continue to use the retail pharmacy.
Out-of-network pharmacy reimbursement	If you do not go to a network retail pharmacy, you pay the full amount when you pick up your prescription. You must then submit a receipt for reimbursement. The Plan will pay 60% of the Plan's cost, after you've met the deductible (if applicable). There is no formulary list if you go to an out-of-network pharmacy.

* **Medicare allowable charge –** the amount that Medicare determines a particular service or supply should cost. The Medicare Supplement Retiree Healthcare Plan bases payment on the Medicare allowable charge.

** **Means test eligible retiree** – generally, the combined household adjusted gross income, as reported to the Internal Revenue Service in the immediately preceding tax year, must be at or below 250% of federal poverty guidelines for your family size that year.

*** **Formulary brand name drugs –** a formulary drug is a brand name drug that has been designated as a preferred drug by CVS Caremark. The preferred drug list (formulary) may change periodically at the discretion of the pharmacy benefits manager.

**** **Non-formulary brand name drug** – a non-formulary brand name drug is a brand name drug that is not on the preferred list of formulary drugs.

Retiree Healthcare Contribution Rates - 2017

Retired before 08/23/89 - Medicare Only



		MEDICARE STATUS		
PENSION CODE	ANNUITANT	SPOUSE	CHILD(REN).	RETIREE CONTRIBUTION RATES
01	MEDICARE ELIGIBLE			\$147.00
02	MEDICARE ELIGIBLE	MEDICARE ELIGIBLE		\$286.00

Notice of Prescription Drug Creditable Coverage City of Chicago Retiree Healthcare Plan

The City of Chicago has determined that Retiree Healthcare Plans prescription drug benefits are, on average, "creditable coverage," which means the City's coverage is expected to pay as much (or more in some cases) as standard Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage.

Because the City's prescription drug benefits are creditable coverage, you can enroll in a Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage plan for 2017 and not be subject to the Medicare premium penalty.

Keep this Notice. If you enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage, you may need a copy of this Notice when you enroll. This Notice verifies that you have creditable coverage and that you are not required to pay the premium penalty.

Your Choices and the Consequences

You should compare the coverage and cost of the Medicare plans in your area.

Important Note: If you or a dependent are eligible for Medicare and drop or lose your coverage with the City, and do not enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage after your current coverage ends, you may pay more for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage later. If you go 63 days or longer without prescription drug coverage that is at least as good as Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage, your monthly premium for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage will increase. The increase will be 1% per month for every month that you were eligible for but did not have coverage. For example, if you go 19 months without coverage, your monthly premium will always be 19% higher than what most other people pay. You will have to pay the premium penalty as long as you have Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage. In addition, you may have to wait until the next open enrollment period (October 15 through December 7 each year) to enroll.

Eligible individuals who are entitled to Medicare Part A or enrolled in Part B can enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage when they are first eligible or during the annual Medicare enrollment period (October 15 through December 7 each year). Medicare eligible individuals who lose or drop creditable prescription drug benefits may be eligible for a two month Special Enrollment Period to sign up for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage. Detailed information about Special Enrollment Periods is included in the *Medicare & You* handbook sent to Medicare eligible individuals each fall.

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- Call your State Health Insurance Assistance Program (the telephone number is in the "Medicare & You" handbook).
- Call 1-800-MEDICARE (1-800-633-4227). TTY users should call 1-877-486-2048.

For people with limited income and assets, extra help paying for a Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage is available. Additional information is available from the Social Security Administration by:

- Visiting www.socialsecurity.gov/prescriptionhelp.
- Calling 1-800-772-1213 (TTY users should call 1-800-325-0778).

For More Information About this Notice

If you have any questions about this Notice, please call the Chicago Benefits Office.

You may request a copy of this Notice at any time from the Chicago Benefits Office.

Date of Notice:	September 2016
Entity/Sender:	The City of Chicago
Contact:	Chicago Benefits Office
Address:	333 South State Street, Room 400, Chicago, Illinois 60604-3978
Telephone Number:	1-877-299-5111
Web Site:	www.cityofchicago.org/benefits

Benefits under the City of Chicago Retiree Healthcare Plan may be modified, reduced, or terminated as specified in the legal documents that establish the Plan. The City expressly reserves all rights to make amendments or terminate the Plan as allowed by the legal documents that establish the Plan.



DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CITY OF CHICAGO

September, 2016

Dear City of Chicago Retiree Plan Participant Who is not Medicare Eligible and Who Retired Before August 23, 1989:

This letter and the enclosed documents contain important information about your health care benefits and the premium rates that will be effective on January 1, 2017, including the following:

- 1) A new premium rate chart.
- 2) A 2017 Benefits Summary for non-Medicare eligible covered participants who retired before August 23, 1989.
- 3) The Notice of Creditable Coverage for prescription drug coverage.
- 4) Information on the Means Test--a way for certain low income plan members to save money for premiums and/or for prescription drug co-payments.
- 5) An important reminder about Medicare enrollment.

Rate Changes: Your premium rates for 2017 are enclosed. These rates are based on the projected cost of the Plan minus the City of Chicago's contribution.

Benefits Summary: A Benefits Summary for 2017. Please review the enclosed materials.

Enrollment Periods: If you, or if applicable your covered spouse and/or child(ren), want to explore other health plan options, the enrollment period for *Get Covered Illinois* for Marketplace plans will begin on November 1, 2016 and extend to January 31, 2017. The Medicare Open Enrollment period begins on October 15, 2016 and ends December 7, 2016. However, keep in mind that your coverage with the City of Chicago will continue for your lifetime or until you elect not to continue coverage with the City. Dependent children's coverage ends when their eligibility for coverage ends.

Creditable Coverage Notice: This notice verifies that you have creditable drug coverage under the Plan. This means that the coverage provided under the Plan is at least as good as the coverage under a Medicare Part D plan. This is for Medicare eligible Plan participants or those who will become Medicare eligible in 2016 or 2017. Please keep this notice in your permanent records.

Means Test: Certain low income Plan participants may be eligible to have co-pays for mail order drugs and/or premiums reduced. To be eligible for these benefits, your combined household adjusted gross income, as reported to the Internal Revenue Service in the immediately preceding tax year, must be at or below 250% of the federal poverty guidelines for your family size for the year. As part of the application process you must provide a release that allows the City to receive a copy of your most recently filed tax return.

If your annual annuity amount is less than 250% of the federal poverty level for 2015, a Means Test application has been sent to you under separate cover. (250% of the federal poverty level for a single person for 2016 is \$29,700; for a couple it is \$40,050.) If your annuity is more than that but you believe that your adjusted gross income may qualify you for the benefit based on your family size, you may call the Benefits Service Center at 1-877-299-5111, or you may find the application at <u>www.cityofchicago.org/benefits</u>, then click on "View all Supporting Documentation" and scroll down to "2016 Means Test Application".

Important Reminder About Medicare Enrollment: If you are approaching Medicare age (age 65 for most people), you need to apply for Medicare and provide the Chicago Benefits Office and your pension fund with a copy of the Medicare card. If you are not eligible for free Part A based on your work record or your spouse's or former spouse's work record, you must provide the Chicago Benefits Office with the letter from Social Security advising you of this. Failure to provide us the proper documentation does not mean that you will remain in the plan for non-Medicare eligible retirees. You will be placed in the Medicare supplement plan and you will face financial consequences for not taking the necessary steps to secure Medicare enrollment. This also applies to your spouse if your spouse is approaching Medicare age.

Please call the Benefits Service Center at 1-877-299-5111 if you have any questions about this letter.

Sincerely, Chicago Benefits Office

PPO STANDARD PLAN BENEFITS SUMMARY[†] Effective January 1, 2017 For Non-Medicare Eligible Retirees Retired Before 8/23/89

†The plan document defines and controls the terms of the benefits provided.

The PPO Standard Plan pays as shown below after you meet the annual deductible. The maximum amount that the Plan will pay is based on the Plan's PPO maximum allowance.** Services must be medically necessary. *This Plan includes the Blue Cross Blue Shield PPO Network.*

Medical Benefits	In Network PPO Providers	Out Of Network Providers	
Lifetime Maximum	\$1.5 million per covered person for medical and prescrip drugs. The lifetime maximum includes expenses paid unc Non-Medicare and Medicare plans combined.		
Deductible			
Individual	\$440	\$1028	
Family	\$1,320	\$3,084	
Out-of-Pocket Expense Limit			
Individual	\$2,572	\$5,139	
Family	\$5,144	\$10,278	
	In-network and not in net	work cannot be combined	
Coinsurance	Plan	Pays:	
Emergency Room Services	90	%**	
MRI Scans, PET Scans, CAT Scans			
Occupational and Speech Therapy			
Prosthetic Devices and Durable Medical Equipment (DME)			
Ambulance Transportation *			
Skilled Nursing Facility *	- 80%** - -		
Skilled Home Health Care *			
Hospice Care *			
Outpatient Mental Health and Substance Abuse *			
Diagnostic Testing Incentive Program**			
Diagnostic Lab Tests performed by an independent PPO lab (i.e. standing in network lab, e.g., Quest, for diagnostic tests ordered b hospital based laboratory or the claims for lab services are billed	by their physician to have the expense paid i	n full by the Plan. If a member uses a	
Other Covered Services, for example: • Hospital Inpatient * • Hospital Outpatient • Doctor (Office) Visits Note: Routine Screening Exams/Physicals are not covered Preventive care is not covered.	90%** 70%**		

*These services require pre-certification through Telligen. Call 1-800-373-3727.

**PPO maximum allowance – The amount that providers who have contracted with the claims administrator have agreed to accept as reimbursement. The maximum amount that will be considered by the plan as covered for services is the lowest of the provider's actual charge, the PPO contracted rate or the usual and customary charge.

CBO YELLOW Rev. 9/2016



BENEFITS SUMMARY RETIREE HEALTH PLAN For Retirees Who Retired Prior To 8/23/89 PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE Effective January 1, 2017

†The plan document defines and controls the terms of the benefits provided.

Prescription Drug Benefits	Coverage
Caremark Retail Pharmacy – up to a 30 day supply or 100 unit dose (whichever is less)	After you've met the separate \$100 annual prescription drug deductible (does not apply to Means Test Eligible Retirees*), for each prescription, you pay:
	 20% of the contracted cost for generic drugs 20% of the contracted cost for formulary brand name drugs** when no generic is available
	 20% of the contracted cost plus \$15 for non-formulary brand name drugs*** when no generic is available
Mail Order Program - Up to a	For each prescription, you pay:
90 day supply	• \$28 for 2017 (\$7 for Means Test Eligible Retirees) for generic drugs
	• \$75 for 2017 (\$20 for Means Test Eligible Retirees) for formulary brand name drugs when no generic is available
	Note: non-formulary brand name medications are not available through the mail order program.
Restrictions: Why choose a generic?	If a brand name drug is dispensed when a generic alternative is available, you pay the difference in cost between the generic and the brand name as well as the generic copayment. The Plan will not pay more than it would pay for the generic medication if you buy a brand name drug when a generic alternative is available.
Generic Step Therapy Program for generics available in the therapeutic class	If you elect to purchase a brand medication without trying an appropriate generic medication in the same therapeutic class, you will pay the full cost of the medication. If you try the generic medication and your physician finds that the generic medication is not effective in treating your condition, you will be able to receive the brand medication at the copayment applicable to non-formulary or formulary drugs.
Specialty Medications	If you do not try the preferred medication for the therapeutic class, you will pay the full cost of the medication. If you try the preferred specialty medication and it is not effective in treating your condition, you will be able to receive a non-preferred formulary drug at retail.
Mandatory Mail Order	Requiring the use of mail order will reduce costs for the City and Retirees. After 2 fills of your generic or formulary brand medication at a retail pharmacy, you will be required to use mail order for any additional fills through CVS-Caremark in Mount Prospect, IL. If you do not use the mail order program for your 3rd or any subsequent fills, you will pay the full cost of the prescription. If your medication is non-formulary, however, you must continue to use the retail pharmacy.
Out-of-network pharmacy reimbursement	If you do not go to a network retail pharmacy, you pay the full amount when you pick up your prescription. You must then submit a receipt for reimbursement. The Plan will pay 60% of the Plan's cost, after you've met the deductible (if applicable). There is no formulary list if you go to an out-of-network pharmacy.

** **Formulary brand name drugs –** a formulary drug is a brand name drug that has been designated as a preferred drug by CVS Caremark. The preferred drug list (formulary) may change periodically at the discretion of the pharmacy benefits manager.

*** Non-formulary brand name drug – a non-formulary brand name drug is a brand name drug that is not on the preferred list of formulary drugs.

Retiree Healthcare Contribution Rates - 2017

Retired before 08/23/89

Retiree Code F

	MEDICARE STATUS *		RETIREE CONTRIBUTION	
PENSION CODE	ANNUITANT	SPOUSE	CHILD(REN).	RATES
01	MEDICARE			\$147.00
03	NON-MEDICARE			\$147.00
02	MEDICARE	MEDICARE		\$286.00
04	MEDICARE	NON-MEDICARE		\$286.00
10	NON-MEDICARE	MEDICARE		\$286.00
05	NON-MEDICARE	NON-MEDICARE		\$286.00
09	MEDICARE	MEDICARE	CHILD(REN)	\$425.00
11	MEDICARE		CHILD(REN)	\$286.00
17	NON-MEDICARE		CHILD(REN)	\$286.00
19			CHILD(REN)	\$147.00

* All Medicare eligible retirees will be enrolled into the Medicare Supplement Plan.

Notice of Prescription Drug Creditable Coverage City of Chicago Retiree Healthcare Plan

The City of Chicago has determined that Retiree Healthcare Plans prescription drug benefits are, on average, "creditable coverage," which means the City's coverage is expected to pay as much (or more in some cases) as standard Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage.

Because the City's prescription drug benefits are creditable coverage, you can enroll in a Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage plan for 2017 and not be subject to the Medicare premium penalty.

Keep this Notice. If you enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage, you may need a copy of this Notice when you enroll. This Notice verifies that you have creditable coverage and that you are not required to pay the premium penalty.

Your Choices and the Consequences

You should compare the coverage and cost of the Medicare plans in your area.

Important Note: If you or a dependent are eligible for Medicare and drop or lose your coverage with the City, and do not enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage after your current coverage ends, you may pay more for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage later. If you go 63 days or longer without prescription drug coverage that is at least as good as Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage, your monthly premium for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage will increase. The increase will be 1% per month for every month that you were eligible for but did not have coverage. For example, if you go 19 months without coverage, your monthly premium will always be 19% higher than what most other people pay. You will have to pay the premium penalty as long as you have Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage. In addition, you may have to wait until the next open enrollment period (October 15 through December 7 each year) to enroll.

Eligible individuals who are entitled to Medicare Part A or enrolled in Part B can enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage when they are first eligible or during the annual Medicare enrollment period (October 15 through December 7 each year). Medicare eligible individuals who lose or drop creditable prescription drug benefits may be eligible for a two month Special Enrollment Period to sign up for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage. Detailed information about Special Enrollment Periods is included in the *Medicare & You* handbook sent to Medicare eligible individuals each fall.

(TURN THIS PAGE OVER FOR MORE INFORMATION)

For More Information About Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage

More information about Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage is available in the "Medicare & You" handbook that Medicare publishes and sends to Medicare beneficiaries each fall. You may also be contacted directly by Medicare prescription drug plans.

To get more information, you can:

- Visit www.medicare.gov for personalized help.
- Call your State Health Insurance Assistance Program (the telephone number is in the "Medicare & You" handbook).
- Call 1-800-MEDICARE (1-800-633-4227). TTY users should call 1-877-486-2048.

For people with limited income and assets, extra help paying for a Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage is available. Additional information is available from the Social Security Administration by:

- Visiting www.socialsecurity.gov/prescriptionhelp.
- Calling 1-800-772-1213 (TTY users should call 1-800-325-0778).

For More Information About this Notice

If you have any questions about this Notice, please call the Chicago Benefits Office.

You may request a copy of this Notice at any time from the Chicago Benefits Office.

Date of Notice:	September 2016
Entity/Sender:	The City of Chicago
Contact:	Chicago Benefits Office
Address:	333 South State Street, Room 400, Chicago, Illinois 60604-3978
Telephone Number:	1-877-299-5111
Web Site:	www.cityofchicago.org/benefits

Benefits under the City of Chicago Retiree Healthcare Plan may be modified, reduced, or terminated as specified in the legal documents that establish the Plan. The City expressly reserves all rights to make amendments or terminate the Plan as allowed by the legal documents that establish the Plan.



DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE CITY OF CHICAGO

September, 2016

Dear City of Chicago Retiree Plan Participants who retired before August 23, 1989:

- Who is not Medicare eligible but whose spouse or other covered dependent is Medicare eligible; or
- Who is Medicare eligible but whose spouse or other covered dependent is not Medicare eligible

This letter and the enclosed documents contain important information about your health care benefits and the premium rates that will be effective on January 1, 2017, including the following:

- 1) A new premium rate chart.
- 2) 2017 Benefits Summaries.
- 3) The Notice of Creditable Coverage for prescription drug coverage.
- 4) Information on the Means Test--a way for certain low income plan members to save money for premiums and/or for prescription drug co-payments.
- 5) An important reminder about Medicare enrollment.

Rate Changes: Your premium rates for 2017 are enclosed. These rates are based on the projected cost of the Plan minus the City of Chicago's contribution.

Benefits Summaries: Benefits Summaries for 2017 are enclosed: One for the Medicare eligible covered participants retired before August 23, 1989 and the other is for non-Medicare eligible covered participants retired before August 23, 1989. Please review the enclosed materials.

Enrollment Periods: If you, or if applicable, your covered spouse and/or child(ren), want to explore other health plan options, the enrollment period for *Get Covered Illinois* for Marketplace plans will begin on November 1, 2016 and extend to January 31, 2017. The Medicare Open Enrollment period begins on October 15 and ends December 7, 2016. However, keep in mind that your coverage with the City of Chicago will continue for your lifetime or until you elect not to continue coverage with the City. Dependent children's coverage ends when their eligibility for coverage ends.

Creditable Coverage Notice: This notice verifies that you have creditable drug coverage under the Plan. This means that the coverage provided under the Plan is at least as good as the coverage under a Medicare Part D plan. This is for Medicare eligible Plan participants or those who will become Medicare eligible in 2016 or 2017. Please keep this notice in your permanent records.

Means Test: Certain low income Plan participants may be eligible to have co-pays for mail order drugs and/or premiums reduced. To be eligible for these benefits, your combined household adjusted gross income, as reported to the Internal Revenue Service in the immediately preceding tax year, must be at or below 250% of the federal poverty guidelines for your family size for the year. As part of the application process you must provide a release that allows the City to receive a copy of your most recently filed tax return.

If your annual annuity amount is less than 250% of the federal poverty level for 2016, a Means Test application has been sent to you under separate cover. (250% of the federal poverty level for a single person for 2016 is \$29,700; for a couple it is \$40,050.) If your annuity is more than that but you believe that your adjusted gross income may qualify you for the benefit based on your family size, you may call the Benefits Service Center at 1-877-299-5111, or you may find the application at www.cityofchicago.org/benefits then click on "View all Supporting Documentation" and scroll down to "2016 Means Test Application".

Important Reminder About Medicare Enrollment: If you are approaching Medicare age (age 65 for most people), you need to apply for Medicare and provide the Chicago Benefits Office and your pension fund with a copy of the Medicare card. If you are not eligible for free Part A based on your work record or your spouse's or former spouse's work record, you must provide the Chicago Benefits Office with a letter from Social Security advising you of this. Failure to provide the proper documentation does not mean that you will remain in the plan for non-Medicare eligible retirees. You will be placed in the Medicare supplement plan and face financial consequences for not taking the necessary steps to secure Medicare enrollment. This also applies to your spouse, if your spouse is approaching Medicare age.

Please call the Benefits Service Center at 1-877-299-5111 if you have any questions about this letter.

Sincerely, Chicago Benefits Office



BENEFITS SUMMARY Medicare Eligible Effective January 1, 2017

†The plan document defines and controls the terms of the benefits provided

Medicare Supplement Retiree Healthcare Plan Retired Before 8/23/89

The Medicare Supplement Retiree Healthcare Plan pays the percentages listed below after Medicare pays and you meet any annual deductibles. The maximum amount that the Plan will pay is based on the Medicare allowable charge.* Services must be medically necessary.

Medical Benefits	Coverage
Lifetime Maximum	\$1.5 million per person for medical and prescription drug benefits ¹
Plan Deductible ²	\$100 per person each calendar year (separate from Medicare Part B deductible)
Hospitalization	
Days 1 – 60	You pay \$50 of the Medicare Part A Inpatient Deductible for the first hospital stay in each calendar year. The Plan pays all but \$50 of the Medicare Part A Inpatient Deductible for the first hospital stay each calendar year.
Days 61 – 90	You pay \$0. Plan pays 100% of the Medicare daily co-payment, which is 25% of the Medicare Part A Inpatient Deductible.
Days 91 – 150	You pay \$0. Plan pays 100% of the Medicare daily co-payment, which is 50% of the Medicare Part A Inpatient Deductible.
Additional Days	Additional days may be covered under Medicare Part A and/or the Plan.
Skilled Nursing Facility	
Days 1 – 20	You pay \$0. Medicare pays 100% of first 20 days each Medicare Benefit Period.
Days 21 – 100	You pay \$0. Plan pays 100% of the Medicare daily co-payment, which is 1/8 of the Medicare Part A Inpatient Deductible.
Additional Days	You pay 100%. No Medicare or Plan benefits are paid after 100 days in a Medicare Benefit Period.
Other Covered Services	Plan pays 20% of the Medicare approved amount after Part B deductible and Plan deductible.
Out-of-Country Services	If you are in a foreign country and are hospitalized due to an emergency, the Plan pays 80% of eligible charges for medically necessary services during the first 60 days of your hospitalization. Benefits are subject to a separate \$250 calendar year deductible. The total lifetime maximum that the City's Plan pays is limited to \$50,000.
Diabetic Supplies	Medicare Part B covers diabetic supplies such as glucose testing monitors, blood glucose test strips, lancets, and glucose control solutions. There may be limits on supplies or how to get them. Ask your pharmacy or supplier if they are enrolled in the Medicare program. If they are not, Medicare will not pay and neither will the City's Plan because the City's Plan is only a supplement to Medicare. If you have paid the yearly Part B deductible as well as the City's \$100 annual deductible, the City will pay 20% of the Medicare approved amount.

¹ The lifetime maximum includes expenses paid under both the Non-Medicare and Medicare plans combined.

² Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B: No expense is covered by the Plan if Medicare does not cover it unless otherwise specified. If you are only enrolled in Medicare Part A, the Plan will pay benefits as though you are enrolled in both Medicare Part A and Medicare Part B.

CBO GREEN Rev. 9/2016

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Prescription Drug Benefits	Coverage
Caremark Retail Pharmacy – up to a 30 day supply or 100 unit dose (whichever is less)	After you've met the separate \$100 annual prescription drug deductible (does not apply to Means Test Eligible Retirees**), for each prescription, you pay: • 20% of the contracted cost for generic drugs
	 20% of the contracted cost for formulary brand name drugs*** when no generic is available
	• 20% of the contracted cost plus \$15 for non-formulary brand name drugs**** when no generic is available
Mail Order Program - Up to a	For each prescription, you pay:
90 day supply	• \$28 for 2017 (\$7 for Means Test Eligible Retirees) for generic drugs
	• \$75 for 2017 (\$20 for Means Test Eligible Retirees) for formulary brand name drugs when no generic is available
	Note: non-formulary brand name medications are not available through the mail order program.
Restrictions: Why choose a generic?	If a brand name drug is dispensed when a generic alternative is available, you pay the difference in cost between the generic and the brand name as well as the generic co-payment. The Plan will not pay more than it would pay for the generic medication if you buy a brand name drug when a generic alternative is available.
Generic Step Therapy Program for generics available in the therapeutic class	If you elect to purchase a brand medication without trying an appropriate generic medication in the same therapeutic class, you will pay the full cost of the medication. If you try the generic medication and your physician finds that the generic medication is not effective in treating your condition, you will be able to receive the brand medication at the co-payment applicable to non-formulary or formulary drugs.
Specialty Medications	If you do not try the preferred medication for the therapeutic class, you will pay the full cost of the medication. If you try the preferred specialty medication and it is not effective in treating your condition, you will be able to receive a non- preferred formulary drug at retail.
Mandatory Mail Order	Requiring the use of mail order will reduce costs for the City and Retirees. After 2 fills of your generic or formulary brand medication at a retail pharmacy, you will be required to use mail order for any additional fills through CVS- Caremark in Mount Prospect, IL. If you do not use the mail order program for your 3rd or any subsequent fills, you will pay the full cost of the prescription. If your medication is non-formulary, however, you must continue to use the retail pharmacy.
Out-of-network pharmacy reimbursement	If you do not go to a network retail pharmacy, you pay the full amount when you pick up your prescription. You must then submit a receipt for reimbursement. The Plan will pay 60% of the Plan's cost, after you've met the deductible (if applicable). There is no formulary list if you go to an out-of-network pharmacy.

* **Medicare allowable charge –** the amount that Medicare determines a particular service or supply should cost. The Medicare Supplement Retiree Healthcare Plan bases payment on the Medicare allowable charge.

** **Means test eligible retiree** – generally, the combined household adjusted gross income, as reported to the Internal Revenue Service in the immediately preceding tax year, must be at or below 250% of federal poverty guidelines for your family size that year.

*** **Formulary brand name drugs –** a formulary drug is a brand name drug that has been designated as a preferred drug by CVS Caremark. The preferred drug list (formulary) may change periodically at the discretion of the pharmacy benefits manager.

**** **Non-formulary brand name drug** – a non-formulary brand name drug is a brand name drug that is not on the preferred list of formulary drugs.

PPO STANDARD PLAN BENEFITS SUMMARY[†] Effective January 1, 2017 For Non-Medicare Eligible Retirees Retired Before 8/23/89

†The plan document defines and controls the terms of the benefits provided.

The PPO Standard Plan pays as shown below after you meet the annual deductible. The maximum amount that the Plan will pay is based on the Plan's PPO maximum allowance.** Services must be medically necessary. *This Plan includes the Blue Cross Blue Shield PPO Network.*

Medical Benefits	In Network PPO Providers	Out Of Network Providers	
Lifetime Maximum	\$1.5 million per covered person for medical and prescription drugs. The lifetime maximum includes expenses paid under a Non-Medicare and Medicare plans combined.		
Deductible			
Individual	\$440	\$1028	
Family	\$1,320	\$3,084	
Out-of-Pocket Expense Limit			
Individual	\$2,572	\$5,139	
Family	\$5,144	\$10,278	
	In-network and not in net	work cannot be combined	
Coinsurance	Plan	Pays:	
Emergency Room Services	909	/o**	
MRI Scans, PET Scans, CAT Scans			
Occupational and Speech Therapy *			
Prosthetic Devices and Durable Medical Equipment (DME)			
Ambulance Transportation *	80%**		
Skilled Nursing Facility *			
Skilled Home Health Care *			
Hospice Care *			
Outpatient Mental Health and Substance Abuse [*]			
Diagnostic Testing Incentive Program**			
Diagnostic Lab Tests performed by an independent PPO lab (i.e. standing in network lab, e.g., Quest, for diagnostic tests ordered b hospital based laboratory or the claims for lab services are billed l	by their physician to have the expense paid in	full by the Plan. If a member uses a	
Other Covered Services, for example: • Hospital Inpatient * • Hospital Outpatient • Doctor (Office) Visits Note: Routine Screening Exams/Physicals are not covered Preventive care is not covered.	90%**	70%**	

*These services require pre-certification through Telligen. Call 1-800-373-3727.

**PPO maximum allowance – The amount that providers who have contracted with the claims administrator have agreed to accept as reimbursement. The maximum amount that will be considered by the plan as covered for services is the lowest of the provider's actual charge, the PPO contracted rate or the usual and customary charge.

CBO YELLOW Rev. 9/2016



BENEFITS SUMMARY RETIREE HEALTH PLAN For Retirees Who Retired Prior To 8/23/89 PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE Effective January 1, 2017

†The plan document defines and controls the terms of the benefits provided.

r you've met the separate \$100 annual prescription drug deductible (does not y to Means Test Eligible Retirees*), for each prescription, you pay: % of the contracted cost for generic drugs % of the contracted cost for formulary brand name drugs** when no generic is ailable % of the contracted cost plus \$15 for non-formulary brand name drugs*** when generic is available each prescription, you pay: 8 for 2017 (\$7 for Means Test Eligible Retirees) for generic drugs 5 for 2017 (\$20 for Means Test Eligible Retirees) for formulary brand name to generic is available e: non-formulary brand name medications are not available through the order program. Drand name drug is dispensed when a generic alternative is available, you the difference in cost between the generic and the brand name as well as the eric copayment. The Plan will not pay more than it would pay for the generic ication if you buy a brand name drug when a generic alternative is available. u elect to purchase a brand medication without trying an appropriate eric medication in the same therapeutic class, you will pay the full cost of the
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 a for 2017 (\$7 for Means Test Eligible Retirees) for generic drugs b for 2017 (\$20 for Means Test Eligible Retirees) for formulary brand name ags when no generic is available c: non-formulary brand name medications are not available through the order program. b order program. b orand name drug is dispensed when a generic alternative is available, you the difference in cost between the generic and the brand name as well as the eric copayment. The Plan will not pay more than it would pay for the generic ication if you buy a brand name drug when a generic alternative is available. u elect to purchase a brand medication without trying an appropriate eric medication in the same therapeutic class, you will pay the full cost of the
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ication. If you try the generic medication and your physician finds that the eric medication is not effective in treating your condition, you will be able eceive the brand medication at the copayment applicable to non-formulary prmulary drugs.
u do not try the preferred medication for the therapeutic class, you will pay the cost of the medication. If you try the preferred specialty medication and it is effective in treating your condition, you will be able to receive a non-preferred ulary drug at retail.
uiring the use of mail order will reduce costs for the City and Retirees. After s of your generic or formulary brand medication at a retail pharmacy, you will equired to use mail order for any additional fills through CVS-Caremark in nt Prospect, IL. If you do not use the mail order program for your 3rd or any sequent fills, you will pay the full cost of the prescription. If your medication is formulary, however, you must continue to use the retail pharmacy.
u do not go to a network retail pharmacy, you pay the full amount when you pick our prescription. You must then submit a receipt for reimbursement. The Plan bay 60% of the Plan's cost, after you've met the deductible (if applicable). re is no formulary list if you go to an out-of-network pharmacy.

** **Formulary brand name drugs –** a formulary drug is a brand name drug that has been designated as a preferred drug by CVS Caremark. The preferred drug list (formulary) may change periodically at the discretion of the pharmacy benefits manager.

*** Non-formulary brand name drug – a non-formulary brand name drug is a brand name drug that is not on the preferred list of formulary drugs.

Retiree Healthcare Contribution Rates - 2017

Retired before 08/23/89

Retiree Code F

	MEDICARE STATUS *		RETIREE CONTRIBUTION	
PENSION CODE	ANNUITANT	SPOUSE	CHILD(REN).	RATES
01	MEDICARE			\$147.00
03	NON-MEDICARE			\$147.00
02	MEDICARE	MEDICARE		\$286.00
04	MEDICARE	NON-MEDICARE		\$286.00
10	NON-MEDICARE	MEDICARE		\$286.00
05	NON-MEDICARE	NON-MEDICARE		\$286.00
09	MEDICARE	MEDICARE	CHILD(REN)	\$425.00
11	MEDICARE		CHILD(REN)	\$286.00
17	NON-MEDICARE		CHILD(REN)	\$286.00
19			CHILD(REN)	\$147.00

* All Medicare eligible retirees will be enrolled into the Medicare Supplement Plan.

Notice of Prescription Drug Creditable Coverage City of Chicago Retiree Healthcare Plan

The City of Chicago has determined that Retiree Healthcare Plans prescription drug benefits are, on average, "creditable coverage," which means the City's coverage is expected to pay as much (or more in some cases) as standard Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage.

Because the City's prescription drug benefits are creditable coverage, you can enroll in a Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage plan for 2017 and not be subject to the Medicare premium penalty.

Keep this Notice. If you enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage, you may need a copy of this Notice when you enroll. This Notice verifies that you have creditable coverage and that you are not required to pay the premium penalty.

Your Choices and the Consequences

You should compare the coverage and cost of the Medicare plans in your area.

Important Note: If you or a dependent are eligible for Medicare and drop or lose your coverage with the City, and do not enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage after your current coverage ends, you may pay more for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage later. If you go 63 days or longer without prescription drug coverage that is at least as good as Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage, your monthly premium for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage will increase. The increase will be 1% per month for every month that you were eligible for but did not have coverage. For example, if you go 19 months without coverage, your monthly premium will always be 19% higher than what most other people pay. You will have to pay the premium penalty as long as you have Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage. In addition, you may have to wait until the next open enrollment period (October 15 through December 7 each year) to enroll.

Eligible individuals who are entitled to Medicare Part A or enrolled in Part B can enroll for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage when they are first eligible or during the annual Medicare enrollment period (October 15 through December 7 each year). Medicare eligible individuals who lose or drop creditable prescription drug benefits may be eligible for a two month Special Enrollment Period to sign up for Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage. Detailed information about Special Enrollment Periods is included in the *Medicare & You* handbook sent to Medicare eligible individuals each fall.

(TURN THIS PAGE OVER FOR MORE INFORMATION)

For More Information About Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage

More information about Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage is available in the "Medicare & You" handbook that Medicare publishes and sends to Medicare beneficiaries each fall. You may also be contacted directly by Medicare prescription drug plans.

To get more information, you can:

- Visit www.medicare.gov for personalized help.
- Call your State Health Insurance Assistance Program (the telephone number is in the "Medicare & You" handbook).
- Call 1-800-MEDICARE (1-800-633-4227). TTY users should call 1-877-486-2048.

For people with limited income and assets, extra help paying for a Medicare Prescription Drug Coverage is available. Additional information is available from the Social Security Administration by:

- Visiting www.socialsecurity.gov/prescriptionhelp.
- Calling 1-800-772-1213 (TTY users should call 1-800-325-0778).


For More Information About this Notice

If you have any questions about this Notice, please call the Chicago Benefits Office.

You may request a copy of this Notice at any time from the Chicago Benefits Office.

Date of Notice:	September 2016
Entity/Sender:	The City of Chicago
Contact:	Chicago Benefits Office
Address:	333 South State Street, Room 400, Chicago, Illinois 60604-3978
Telephone Number:	1-877-299-5111
Web Site:	www.cityofchicago.org/benefits

Benefits under the City of Chicago Retiree Healthcare Plan may be modified, reduced, or terminated as specified in the legal documents that establish the Plan. The City expressly reserves all rights to make amendments or terminate the Plan as allowed by the legal documents that establish the Plan.



IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS CHANCERY DIVISION CLERK DOROTHY BROWN

Michael W. Underwood, Joseph M. Vuich, Raymond)
Scacchitti, Robert McNulty, John E. Dorn, William J.)
Selke, Janiece R. Archer, Dennis Mushol, Richard)
Aguinaga, James Sandow, Catherine A. Sandow, Marie)
Johnston, and 337 other Named Plaintiffs listed in)
Exhibit 23,)
Plaintiffs,) CLASS ACTION
VS.) COMPLAINT
CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation,)
Defendant,) JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
and)
Trustees of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund) Case No. 2013 CH 17450
of Chicago;) Calendar No. 5
Trustees of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund)
of Chicago;) Judge: Hon. Neil H. Cohen
Trustees of the Municipal Employees' Annuity and) Previous Nos. in Cook County
Benefit Fund of Chicago; and) Circuit Court
Trustees of the Laborers' & Retirement Board) 01 CH 4962
Employees' Annuity & Benefit Fund of Chicago) 87 CH 10134
Defendants.)
)

THIRD AMENDED CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT By Participants in the City of Chicago's Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan For Declaratory and other Relief Against the City of Chicago and the Trustees of the Police, Fire, Municipal Employees and Laborers Annuity and Benefit Funds

1. This Amended Complaint seeks permanent protection for participants in the City

of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan, in this continuing litigation originally initiated by

the City on October 19, 1987. Plaintiffs, for themselves and for the classes they seek to

represent, assert that the City annuitants are entitled to protect the terms and benefits of their City

Annuitant Medical Benefit Plan, permanently for each one on the best terms in effect during his

or her participation in their respective Annuity & Benefit Fund, under the Illinois Constitution, as

well as principles of contract and estoppel; that they are entitled to enforce the benefits of the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan, for their lives, against the City and the Trustees of their respective retirement systems.

2. Background of the Annuitant Benefit sought to be protected: The City of

Chicago Annuitant Health Benefits Plan. The City has provided healthcare benefits to its

annuitants since the 1960s. Since at least 1980, the City has provided it as the "City of Chicago

Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan^{"1}, explicitly for annuitants of its four annuity and benefit

Funds²; i.e., for Police, Fire, Municipal Officers and Employees, and Laborers Fund participants.

According to the City's original complaint that launched this litigation:

"7. From 1980 through the present, the City has paid the health insurance coverage for annuitants of the Policemen's, Firemen's, Municipal Employees, and, Laborers' Annuity and Pension Funds and their dependents by allowing these annuitants and their dependents to use the City's own Health Care Plan." (Ex. 2, See Count II, City Complaint in *City v Korshak*, ¶7, p. 7)

3. As the City recognizes³, it has never merely "subsidized" the Plan; it is, and has

always been self-insured, the actual provider of the benefit:

"8. The City is a self-insurer of its Health Care Plan." (Ex. 2, Id., $\P 8$)

4. During the early period, the City provided this coverage without charge.

³ Exhibit 22,December 23, 2015 testimony of City Budget Director Alexandra Holt (36:13 and 37:2) and Benefits Manager Nancy Currier (77:17 and 77:22).

¹ Exhibit 6, "Your City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan" Handbook.

² For clarity, the term "**Plan**" means the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan. The term "**Fund**" refers differently to one or more of the four Annuity and Benefit Funds created in Cities over 500,000, under the Illinois Pension Code: 40 ILCS Article 5: 5/5-101 (Police), Article 6: 5/6-101 (Firemen's), Article 8: 5/8-101 (Municipal Officers and Employees), and Article 11: 5/11-101 (Laborers and Retirement Board Employees). The term "Funds" refers to them as a group.

5. **1982 Creating a statutory funding subsidy vehicle.** When health costs rose, the City and the Police and Fire Funds, created a vehicle by which the Funds could subsidize some of these costs, by enacting legislation obligating the Funds to provide healthcare coverage for their annuitants, and subsidize the providers, funded by a separate tax, outside the City's general corporate budget.

6. Thus, in 1982, the City and the Police and Fire Funds' trustees, caused the 1983 Pension Code amendments to be enacted⁴, which created a way to offset some of the City's healthcare costs without a City Budget increase, by adding the Funds' trustees obligation to obtain health coverage for their annuitants, and authorizing them to pay a subsidy to the "provider", set intentionally in the amount that the City charged for coverage, with the subsidy funded by the Funds' corresponding financing provision (§5-168 for the Police Fund, §6-165 for the Firemen's Fund).

7. The result of this was that the Funds fulfilled that obligation by engaging the City's Annuitant Health Benefits Plan; i.e., obtaining annuitant healthcare coverage by the City's providing the benefit at a fixed rate premium (\$55 per month for NonMedicare⁵, \$21 for Medicare participants) and the Funds subsidizing it for their annuitants by paying the annuitant's

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⁴ Exhibit 8A,1983 Pension Code amendments creating §§ 5-167.5 and 6-164.2; both added by P.A. 82-1044, § 1, eff. Jan. 12, 1983.

⁵ A substantial portion of City retirees do not qualify for Medicare coverage, either (a) because they retire before age 65, or (b) Local government employees who were originally hired and began their work prior to April 1, 1986 (federal Combined Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA," PL 99-272 § 13205(a)) cannot qualify for healthcare coverage under the Medicare plan by their government employment, regardless of their length of service.

premium. Indeed, the Police Fund explicitly appointed the City the Administrator of its annuitant health plan.⁶

8. And, Fund participants were routinely and repeatedly informed, both in writing and in pre-retirement seminars conducted by the City over the following years, at least through 1987, with presentations by authorized City and Fund speakers, representing that this was their lifetime benefit; i.e., that the City charged a premium and their Fund paid it. (See e.g., Exhibit 7, Policemen's Fund "Your Service Retirement Benefits" effective January 1, 1986⁷, at 10:

Deductions

As a general rule, the City Plan, the hospitalization you had as an active member of the Police Department, may be continued only at the time you apply for annuity. (1) The hospitalization premium for the retired employee is paid by the Retirement Board. The premium for any eligible dependent would be automatically be deducted from your annuity checks, beginning with your first check.

9. And, the arrangement was that the City paid the excess costs above the Pension

Funds' subsidies:

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10. The city has, from 1980 through June 1987, provided approximately \$58.8 million on behalf of the pension funds for their annuitants over and above the premiums paid by those funds for the annuitants' health insurance costs. (Ex. 2, Count II, City's Korshak Complaint at ¶10, at p. 7).

This construct was also described in the testimony from then Policemens' Fund Board member

James McDonough (See Exhibit 18, at 30 ff, describing the structure and how it was created.).

⁶ Exhibit 24, "Defendants' Exhibit 19" PABF Minutes June 27, 1985.

⁷ It is likely that Firemens' Fund annuitants were similarly informed.

The 1985 Amendments were later added to enable the same construct for
 Municipal and Laborers Funds participants, with the subsidies for the Municipal and Laborers
 Plan set at \$25 per annuitant per month regardless of Medicare status, similarly financed.

11. Consequently, from at least 1980 through 1987, there was a contractual agreement under which the City provided the coverage, and charged a premium of either \$55 or \$21 monthly (depending on the annuitant's Medicare status), and the annuitant's premium was paid by his Fund; either fully (Police and Fire), or \$25 per month (municipal and Laborers). *See* the Funds' Verified Korshak counterclaims (Exhibit 3); as described by the Police Fund,

17. The City's actions described above gave rise to an implied contract between the Fund, the annuitants and the City under which the City agreed to include the annuitants in the Plan's coverage and to pay the cost of the annuitants' medical benefits coverage to the extent that it exceeds the rates established for the medical benefits coverage effective April 1,1982.⁸

12. **Caught converting Funds' tax receipts, the City concocts a "game plan" to offset that liability by threatening to cut off annuitant healthcare benefits.** That arrangement continued until early 1987, when the City's Byrne administration was found liable for converting pension fund tax levies, in *Ryan v Chicago*, 148 Ill.App.3d 638 (1st Dist. 1986)(participant derivative action filed for benefit of the Funds) and 274 Ill.App.3d 913(1st Dist. 1995), and faced a liability to the Funds in excess of \$25 Million. As part of a "game plan"⁹ retaliation to offset its liability for converting the Funds' assets.¹⁰ the Washington administration

⁸ Police Funds' refiled counterclaims at para. 17 Identical assertions in Firemens', Municipal and Laborers' Fund Verified Counterclaims. Exhibit 3.

⁹ Testimony by City Comptroller Ronald Picur, Ex. 9, 44:5-8

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¹⁰ Ex.1, Police Fund Trustees' Minutes of May 11, 1987, meeting with City.

approached the Funds' trustees, with a concocted threat to discontinue healthcare coverage, but would drop the matter if the trustees would forego the City's *Ryan* case liability¹¹.

13. When the trustees rejected the City's backdoor deal, the City filed the original *Korshak*¹² complaint on October 19, 1987 (*City v. Korshak, et al., (Trustees) and Ryan, et al.* (*Participants*)), Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 87 CH 10134)¹³ seeking (i) a declaration that it was not obligated to provide retiree healthcare, to enable it to terminate its Annuitant Healthcare coverage for participants in the City's four Annuity and Benefit Plans, and (ii) recover monies expended under the Plan in prior years.

ELECTRONICALLY FILED 1/13/2016 4:07 PM 2013-CH-17450 PAGE 6 of 52 14. The trustees/board members of the four affected annuity and benefit funds (the "Funds"), and the annuitant healthcare plan participants (eventually certified to proceed for the then-existing annuitant/participant classes) asserted counterclaims¹⁴, asserting that as a term of employment, and under principles of contract and estoppel, the City was obligated to continue annuitant healthcare coverage under the terms of the Annuitant Healthcare Plan as in effect on October 19, 1987, and the Funds were obligated to continue their subsidies, both for participants' lifetimes.

15. The Korshak trial and first Settlement. This Circuit Court (Hon. Albert

Green) dismissed the City's claims entirely,¹⁵ but upheld the claims asserted by both the Funds and Participants' counterclaims against the City, that the City had voluntarily agreed to be the insurer, provide the annuitant medical benefits coverage, and represented to City employees that

¹¹ Exhibit 1, Minutes of Police Fund trustees meeting May 11,1987.

¹² Named for Marshall Korshak, the first named defendant Fund trustee.

¹³ Exhibit 2, City v. Korshak, original City Complaint, Oct.19, 1987.

¹⁴ Exhibit 3, Korshak Funds Counterclaims, and Exhibit 4, Participants' Counterclaim

¹⁵ Exhibit 5, May 16, 1988 Decision by Hon. Albert Green, City v Korshak.

this was a lifetime benefit, provided by the City and subsidized by the Funds. These claims proceeded to trial before Judge Green, in June 1988. After the trial was concluded, but before Judge Green rendered his verdict, the City and Trustees entered into a 10-year settlement¹⁶ (obligating the City to continue providing the Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan and pay at least 50% of annuitant healthcare costs through 12/31/1997, allocating costs among the City, the Funds and participants over the settlement period, and preserving participants' right to revive these claims if no permanent annuitant healthcare solution was reached by the end of the settlement period). Approved by the Circuit Court over the participant class' objections, and affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court, *City v Korshak*, 206 Ill.App.3d 968 (1st Dist.1991), PLA Den., Cert.Den., the ten-year interim settlement proceeded according to its terms.

16. **The First Settlement Period Ends, without a "permanent resolution".** At the conclusion of the ten-year settlement, 12/31/1997, the participants moved to revive the litigation, were initially denied by Judge Green¹⁷, who was then reversed by the Illinois Appellate Court¹⁸, reviving the litigation, under Docket No. 01 CH 4962, which eventually was resolved in 2003 by another ten-year agreement, this time approved by all parties and the court, settling the dispute for the period through June 30, 2013; again with rights of participants to thereafter reassert their rights/entitlement to healthcare coverage in their retirement. Exhibit 13,Korshak 2003 Settlement.

17. During the course of this settlement, it was also discovered that the basis on which the City set the premiums, based on "Segal" estimates, resulted in charges to annuitants

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¹⁶ Exhibit 10, City v Korshak, December 15, 1989 Settlement between City and Funds.

¹⁷ Exhibit 5, Decision by Judge Green, May 16, 1998.

 ¹⁸ Exhibit 12, Korshak revival, Rule 23 Order, June, 15, 2000 *City v. Korshak*, Case No. 98-3465
 & 98-3667

that exceeded their settlement percentages of their healthcare costs. The City and Class Counsel entered into an Audit and Reconciliation Agreement, which produced refunds to annuitants totaling over \$51 million over the 2003-6/30/2013 Settlement period.

18. As the 2003 Settlement neared its 6/30/2013 end, class counsel requested the City to negotiate another, hopefully permanent, settlement.

Instead, the City issued a May 15, 2013, letter to annuitants declaring it would 19. extend the benefits of the settlement through the end of 2013, then "phase out" annuitant healthcare coverage over the next three years, ending it altogether by January 1, 2017.¹⁹

20. Exercising Participants' rights to revive their claims. Participant Class Counsel's 2013 motion to revive the litigation in the City v. Korshak case was denied by Hon. Neil H. Cohen (the judge then assigned to that calendar), ruling that assertion of the Participants' retained rights would have to be done in a new action.

Accordingly, undersigned counsel filed the original Complaint in this case, in 21. order to assert Participants' retained rights to permanent healthcare in their retirements. It being a new complaint, and one in which the City was now a defendant²⁰, the City removed this case to the United States District Court (N.D.Illinois). District Judge Holderman's dismissal of the complaint²¹ (in his view that healthcare benefits were *not* protected by the Illinois Constitution) was, following the Illinois Supreme Court's Kanerva v. Weems decision declaring that retiree

¹⁹ Exhibit 21, City Letter May 15, 2013.
²⁰ Plaintiffs, having chosen a forum, are ordinarily barred from removing a case.

²¹ Underwood v. City of Chicago., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174455 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 13, 2013).

healthcare benefits are protected by Illinois Constitution Art. XIII, §5, reversed, vacated and remanded with directions to remand the case to this court²².

22. Remanded back to this court, both the City and the Funds moved to dismiss the complaint, despite Judge Green's previously upholding most of the same claims in 1988, some actually asserted by the Funds; now seeking dismissal of the same claims they had asserted in the past. Regardless, on December 3, 2015, Circuit Judge Hon. Neil H. Cohen upheld Count I (Constitutional Protection) of the First Amended complaint , but dismissed Count 2 (Contract) and Count 3 (Estoppel), with leave to amend. (Exhibit 20, Decision by Hon. Neil Cohen, December 3, 2015).

ELECTRONICALLY FILED 1/13/2016 4:07 PM 2013-CH-17450 PAGE 9 of 52 23. With respect to the claims asserted herein by the participants, the participants sue as plaintiffs, seeking relief against the City as a defendant (for its actions and announced intention to reduce the healthcare benefits provided to class members), and seeking a declaration that the Funds, as additional defendants, remain obligated to obtain coverage for persons hired before 8/23/1989, and must continue their current subsidy for class members for life without reduction.

24. **Class members' uniform claim** is that the 1970 Illinois Constitution Article XIII Section 5, protects each Fund participant, for life, to the unreduced level, determined at the date they began participation in any of the four affected Annuity & Benefit Plans, of annuitant health benefits provided by the City and as best subsidized by their particular Plan.

25. Participants seek to enforce this entitlement by a number of claims:

²² Underwood v. City of Chicago., 779 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. Ill. 2015)

- i. First, that the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefit Plan (as it was in effect on August 23, 1989, and subsequent dates pertaining to particular subclasses), is a **benefit of participation** in the City's annuity and benefit plans, and thus protected by 1970 Illinois Constitution Article XIII, §5, against being diminished or impaired by reducing either the benefit or its funding appropriation;
- ii. Second, to the extent that the court views the claims as limited to the Pension Code provisions, that the Funds were and remain obligated to provide healthcare coverage for annuitants for life, and that they did so by enforceably contracting the City to provide the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan, and that that promise, as well as the Funds' subsidies, are enforceable against both the City and the Funds;
- iii. Third, that under principles of contract, the City has made the annuitant benefits a term of participants' employment, contractually binding the City, such that it may not accept the benefits of the participants work but then renege on its agreement.
- iv. Fourth, that , under principles of estoppel, the City is estopped to deny its obligation to provide the promised benefit, because it has induced participants to provide services in exchange for repeated representations that the City's Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan is a permanent benefit for life, such that the City cannot accept their services over the promised period, then renege on its commitment;

v. Fifth, that the Funds are an **instrumentality of the City**, such that the City is obligated to provide the permanent coverage permanently subsidized by the Funds.

Finally, to the extent that the City is actually nonetheless legally permitted to increase annuitant healthcare rates and/or reduce its appropriation for annuitant healthcare, the rates charged by the City are miscalculated and excessive, and should be enjoined until audited and corrected.

26. **Class/Subclass Definitions.** The overall Class would be all persons who are participants in one of the City's four annuity and benefit funds. Class members' claims are identical across the four Funds, varying only by which of the following categories/subclass the particular participant's entitlement to healthcare arises from (as the retiree or his/her spouse/dependent):

- i) **the Korshak 12/31/1987 retiree subclass:** annuitants who retired by 12/31/1987 (the "Korshak" sub class) (this was the initial class certified in the 1987 Korshak Settlement)).
- ii) **the "Window" or "Jacobson" subclass:** annuitants who retired after 12/31/1987, but before 8/23/1989 (the class that retired after the Korshak class date, but prior to the enactment of P.A.86-273 incorporating language of the Korshak settlement)).
- iii) **the 8/23/1989 Participant subclass:** persons, regardless of retirement date, who began their participation in one of the Funds (initial hiring date) before 8/23/1989 (thus entitled to benefits of participation no less than when they entered the system); and
- iv) **the Post-8/23/1989 Participant subclass:** persons who began their participation after 8/23/1989 (participants who were hired after P.A.86-273's enactment).

27. **Proposed Class Counsel**. For purposes of the Original litigation, continuing through all of the Settlements, undersigned counsel Krislov has been the court-certified class counsel for the first two subclasses. Going forward, the Krislov firm has been engaged by participants in all four categories, and the Krislov firm asserts that it is uniquely experienced, adequate, and appropriate class counsel for the court to certify for all four participant classes.

28. **Summary of the Facts and legal bases for Constitutional protection.** From before October 1987, to a period beyond August 23, 1989, the City of Chicago provided a healthcare benefit to its annuitants (annuitants of the City of Chicago's Police, Fire, Municipal Officers and Employees, or Laborers' Fund); i.e., as participants one of the four Funds.

29. The City provided the benefit itself. The City is a self-insurer under this benefit plan, engaging BlueCross or other administrators on an Administrative Services Only ("ASO") basis. Thus, the City provides the healthcare benefit; it does not subsidize it.

30. The terms of the City of Chicago Annuitant Health Benefits Plan, are set out in the Plan Handbook. Exhibit 6.

31. Eligibility is described as follows:

ELIGIBILITY

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> You will be eligible for coverage if you are:
> An Annuitant of the City of Chicago. "annuitant" means a former employee who is receiving an age and service annuity from one of four retirement funds,
> The spouse of a deceased Annuitant if you are receiving spousal annuity payments, or
> A dependent of a deceased Annuitant if you are receiving annuity payments. (Plan Handbook at 2).

32. Accordingly, the City of Chicago Annuitant Health Benefit Plan has been, at all

relevant times, a benefit of participants' participation in their respective Funds.

33. Thus, 1970 Illinois Constitution, Article XIII §5 prohibits that benefit, the City of Chicago Annuitant Health Benefit Plan, from being diminished or impaired.

34. Per the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in *Kanerva v. Weems*, the protected benefits are not just what is required by Pension Code provisions. If a public employer provides a benefit for which eligibility is a person's annuitant status, that benefit is protected permanently for that participant, by the Illinois Constitution's Article XIII §5. Per our Supreme Court, an Illinois public employer's obligation to contribute to the costs of annuitant healthcare benefits is permanent, deriving from their status as participants in the unit's retirement systems:

¶40 Although some of the benefits are governed by a group health insurance statute and others are covered by the Pension Code, eligibility for all of the benefits is limited to, conditioned on, and flows directly from membership in one of the State's various public pension systems. Giving the language of *article XIII, section 5*, its plain and ordinary meaning, all of these benefits, including subsidized health care, must be considered to be benefits of membership in a pension or retirement system of the State and, therefore, within that provision's protections.

35. The benefit's protection is not limited to requirements of the Pension Code. If

eligibility is limited to participants in a government retirement system, it is protected:

Whether a benefit qualifies for protection under *article XIII*, *section 5*, turns simply on whether it is derived from membership in one of the State's public pension systems. If it qualifies as a benefit of membership, it is protected. If it does not, it is not. (*Kanerva* at \P 54)

36. And the court's determinations of what is protected are to be liberally interpreted

in favor of the pensioners:

¶55 Finally, we point out again a fundamental principle noted at the outset of our discussion. Under settled Illinois law, where there is any question as to legislative intent and the clarity of the language of a pension statute, it must be liberally construed in favor of the rights of the pensioner. This rule of construction applies with equal force to our interpretation of the pension protection provisions set forth in *article XIII, section 5.* Accordingly, to the extent that there may be any remaining

doubt regarding the meaning or effect of those provisions, we are obliged to resolve that doubt in favor of the members of the State's public retirement systems.

37. As in *Kanerva*, dealing with retiree health benefits provided to *state* retirees, the healthcare benefit was provided legally, but not by a Pension Code provision:

¶35 The question of whether the pension protection clause applies to an Illinois public employer's obligation to contribute to the cost of health care benefits for employees covered by one of the state retirement systems presents an issue of first impression in this court.² Resolution of this issue requires that we determine the scope of the protections afforded by *article XIII, section 5*, which presents a question of constitutional interpretation.

38. As of October 19, 1987 through August 23, 1989, the benefit was knowingly provided by the City, for which it charged all participants a premium equal to the amount of the Police and Fire Fund subsidies. Consequently, for Police and Fire retirees, the annuitant was charged nothing for his or her premium; Municipal and Laborers annuitants were charged for their own coverage if the person's premium exceeded the \$25 fund subsidy.

39. <u>The 1988 Trial.</u> During June 1988, the Cook County Circuit Court conducted a

trial of the trustees' and participants' claims that existing annuitants are entitled to permanent

coverage under the City Plan as it existed on October 1, 1987. In that trial, the Participants

asserted the following claims:

- (a) <u>Contract</u>. The city bound itself contractually to cover the then-existing annuitants healthcare for life charging premiums equal to the statutory supplement paid by the pension funds; the premiums were subsidized by the Funds--the annuitants' entire premium for Police and Fire annuitants, \$25 per month for Municipal and Laborers.
- (b) <u>Detrimental Reliance/Estoppel</u>. The city, through its authorized officials, affirmatively induced the annuitants to act to their detriment, in joining and continuing their coverage the City's annuitant healthcare plan, in



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reliance upon the City's assurance of lifetime medical care coverage, and the City is now estopped from terminating or reducing those benefits.

- (c) <u>Illinois Constitution</u>. The Annuitant Healthcare Plan, as in effect on October 1, 1987 through August 23, 1989, was a benefit of participation in an Illinois statutory pension or retirement system, so 1970 Illinois Constitution, Art. 13, Section 5, prohibits the city's attempt to eliminate or reduce Lifetime fixed rate subsidized Medical Care as a retirement benefit.
 - (i) The City of Chicago Retirement Medical Plan is a pension and retirement benefit of City of Chicago employment.
 - (ii) A participant's right to coverage under the plan vests, and cannot be reduced after his entry into the system.
 - (iii) A participant's right to coverage under the City's Retiree Healthcare Plan vests no later than his retirement, and the terms of the benefits cannot be reduced thereafter.
- (d) Illinois Constitution, Special Legislation. The statutory provisions (P.A. 86-273 and P.A. 90-32/June 27, 1997) as they purport to change the terms or protection of class members' healthcare coverage are invalid special legislation because they apply only from employment by a named municipality. (1970 Ill. Const. Art. IV, Sec. 13).
- 40. After the trial, but prior to a decision being rendered by the Court, the City and

the Pension Fund trustees reached an agreement between themselves which, through 1997,

reduced the City's share of annuitant healthcare coverage from 100% of the cost in excess of the

healthcare levy, to "at least" 50% overall; increased the Pension Funds' subsidy or healthcare

levy; and substantially increased the cost to annuitants.

41. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, in the event no "permanent resolution" of

the retiree healthcare issue was reached by the end of the settlement period, the participants, at

the end of 1997, were restored to whatever rights they held at the beginning of the case.

42. No permanent resolution of the retiree healthcare issue was reached by the end of

1997. Consequently, the litigation revived once again thereafter, culminating in a series of

Settlements which though reaching the end of their terms on June 30, 2013 for the 2003

Settlement, all explicitly preserve Class members' rights to assert:

"any claims with regard to the provision of annuitant healthcare benefits, other than claims arising under the prior settlement of this Action or under the 1989, 1997, or 2002 amendments to the Pension Code, or for damages relating to the amounts of premiums or other payments that they have paid relating to healthcare under any prior health care plans implemented by the City, including this Settlement Agreement." (2003 Settlement Agreement, Sec. IV.J) Ex. 13.

43. Accordingly, Plaintiffs, for themselves and the Participant class-members,

respectfully ask this Court to declare the rights of participants under the Illinois Constitution, the

Illinois Pension Code, and common law, as follows:

- (i) Declare that *all* participants are entitled to permanent coverage under the plan in effect on the day they joined the system, with any improvements as were added thereafter.
 - (a) For the participants by a person who retired prior to 8/23/1989:

Order the City to restore the annuitant healthcare plan to the terms in effect during the period October 1, 1987 through August 22, 1989, for persons who have been continuous participants during the class period to the present. (The "Korshak" class, or "1987 Participant Class", defined as all persons who were participants on December 31, 1987; plus the Jacobson or Window class of those participants who first became annuitant healthcare plan participants after December 31, 1987 but on or before August 23, 1989, are also entitled to participate on the same basis.

(b) For those participants who began their participation in one of the City's Annuity and Benefit Funds (i.e., initial hire date) prior to 8/23/1989:

permanent coverage under the plan then in effect—i.e., a fixed-rate plan subsidized by the participant's Fund at the premium or no less than the highest rate in effect at any time.

(c) For those participants who began their participation after 8/23/1989:

permanent coverage under the plan in effect on their hire date, with Fund subsidy at the highest rate in effect during their participation.

44. Facts about the Retiree Healthcare Plans for City of Chicago Retirees, from the Original <u>Korshak</u> litigation.

Plaintiffs, Class Members believe that there is no material dispute as to the following facts:²³

Parties:

45. <u>Plaintiffs</u>. Each of the Named Plaintiffs listed in Exhibit 23 hereto is a participant in one of the four City of Chicago Annuity and Benefit Funds, having the indicated hire and retirement date.

46. The CITY OF CHICAGO (the "City") is a municipal corporation organized in accordance with Section 1-1-1 of the Illinois Municipal Code, 65 ILCS ¶1-1-1; and a Home Rule Unit, as defined by 1970 Illinois Constitution, Art.VII, §6, with full powers to engage in the actions described herein, including acting as a self-insured provider of healthcare benefits to its annuitants. The City is sued as a defendant.

47. <u>The Pension Funds</u>. The POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY & BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO (the "Police Fund"), the FIREMEN'S ANNUITY, BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, (the "Firemen's Fund" or the "Fire Fund"), the MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, OFFICERS AND OFFICIAL ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND (the "Municipal Fund"), and the LABORERS' AND RETIREMENT BOARD EMPLOYEES' AND

²³ <u>References and Authorities Cited</u>. Unless otherwise described:

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All statutory references are to either the provisions of Illinois law in effect during the period October 1, 1987 through August 23, 1989, including generally, provisions of the Illinois Municipal Code, Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 24 ("Municipal Code §____") or to the Illinois Pension Code, Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 108-1/2 ("Pension Code §____")(1986), or to their subsequent provisions under the Pension Code under the current ILCS format 40 ILCS 5/.

BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO (the "Laborers Fund") were each created and operate under, respectively, Articles 5, 6, 8 and 11 of the Illinois Pension Code. Previously contained in Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 108-1/2, the "Pension Code's current provisions are contained in 40 ILCS 5/Arts. 5, 6, 8 and 11).

48. <u>The Funds as Necessary Parties and as Defendants</u>. The Funds are necessary parties in any event because, since 1983 for Police and Firemens' funds, 1985 for Municipal and Laborers Funds, their applicable statute requires them to obtain healthcare coverage for their annuitant participants, spouses and dependents, plus their applicable statute requires them to subsidize the rates charged their participants at a set rate, that Article XIII Section 13 prohibits from being diminished or impaired.

49. The City's obligation has at least three sources for its obligations asserted here: i) as the provider of a protected benefit of participation, ii) as the contracted insurer, and iii) estoppel, either promissory or equitable, such as to obligate it to provide a benefit promised to its employees, because it induced them and received the benefit of their work, or should be estopped from denying its obligation to them.

50. Additionally, where the particular statutory provision requires the Trustees to provide health insurance, Plaintiffs assert that the trustees did so by enforceably contracting with the City to provide such coverage under the City of Chicago Annuitant Health Benefit Plan. In the event that the City is relieved or excused of that obligation, then the Participants assert that their respective Fund's trustees are obligated to obtain equivalent coverage.

ELECTRONICALLY FILED 1/13/2016 4:07 PM 2013-CH-17450 PAGE 18 of 52 51. The Trustees, *et. al.*, and their successor trustees were or are the Members/Trustees of their respective Fund's Board of Trustees, sued in their official capacities, and may be retitled for their current trustees.

52. <u>City Officials</u>. By their offices with the City, (i) the City Comptroller is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Firemen's and Municipal Fund and his designee sits as a member of the Laborers' Fund. Pension Code §§6-174, 8-192 and 11-181; (ii) The City Treasurer, City Clerk and City Fire Marshall are also <u>ex officio</u> members of the Firemen's Fund Board (§6-174); (iii) the City Treasurer also sits on the Police Fund's Board (§5-178) and Municipal Fund's Board (§8-192). Each Board has one annuitant member (5-178, 6-174, 8-192, 11-181). The rest of each Board is either appointed by the Mayor or elected by the active employees who participate in the Fund.

53. <u>The City's Annuitant Medical Benefits Program</u>. Since approximately 1964, the City has provided a medical benefits program (the City of Chicago Annuitant Health Benefit Plan) in which participation is explicitly provided for City Funds annuitants, their spouses and dependents. That program, since the mid-1970's, has been a benefit provided by the City itself; administered on a <u>self-funded</u> (*i.e.*, the City pays these claims itself rather than obtaining "insurance" coverage from an outside third party provider), "<u>claims made</u>" basis (meaning that sufficient money is appropriated each year for claims expected in that year only).

54. The City engages private carriers solely to administer the City's Annuitant Health Benefits Plan. (often referred to as "ASO" for "Administrative Services Only".)

55. <u>Annuitant Participation</u>. Based on the most recent reconciliation report for the period ended 6/30/2013, the participants in the Plan (that is, annuitants who were then enrolled in

ELECTRONICALLY FILED 1/13/2016 4:07 PM 2013-CH-17450 PAGE 19 of 52 the City's Annuitant Health Benefits Plan²⁴ total approximately 23,800; including annuitants of all four Annuity & Benefit Funds, plus survivors and dependents who participate in the City's Annuitant Medical Plan for their primary medical coverage.; Policemen's Fund participants in the Annuitant Health Plan: 8,965, Firemen's Fund: 3,023, Municipal Employees' Fund: 9,245 and Laborers' Fund: 2,584.

56. Although many of these annuitants are over age 65, some very old, with serious medical problems, many people who began working for the City before April 1, 1986 (thus cannot qualify at all from their City employment), many are still well below age 65.²⁵ Due to age and existing medical conditions, some (probably most of them) would be unable to obtain their own medical coverage at an affordable cost or to qualify for alternative medical coverage at all. Based on their initial hire date, many of them cannot qualify for Medicare coverage from their City employment; some are without sufficient qualifying employment quarters at all, and can obtain Medicare coverage only by paying additional premiums.

Relevant Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

57. <u>Illinois Constitution</u>. Under the 1970 Illinois Constitution, municipal pension membership benefits are enforceable contractual relationships which may not be diminished or impaired:

"Membership in any pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government . . . or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable contractual

²⁴ The number of "Class members" is a much greater number, because many of them are still working for the City, so are not yet annuitants. That said, the number of participants in the Annuitant Health Benefits Plan probably does not vary that much, owing to natural attrition. ²⁵ Anyone who began their City work in 1986 before reaching age 35 have still not reached age 65, even if they obtained qualifying quarters from other employment.

relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired."

1970 Illinois Constitution, Art. 13, §5.

58. <u>The City Has Historically Paid For Retiree Healthcare Costs</u>. Since the mid-1970's, when the City health benefits plan became self-funded, the City has provided a retiree health benefit paying all or a significant portion of the costs of the annuitants' medical benefits. Indeed, the City has actually functioned as the self-insured carrier for the annuitants' health care plans for all four relevant Funds.

59. The current <u>Group Health Benefits for City Annuitants, the City of Chicago</u> Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan, was created by a "handshake" agreement, incorporated into the statutes, and have thereafter been a benefit of participation in the City's Annuity & Benefit <u>Funds since at least 1980, subsidized by the Funds since 1982.</u> The City of Chicago's Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan in existence from 1982 through at least 1989, was the statutory result of a "handshake" agreement between the City's Byrne administration, the Police and Fire Unions and/or Funds trustees, under which the City agreed to provide healthcare coverage to annuitants at a fixed-rate monthly premium(\$55 for non-Medicare qualified, \$21 for Medicare-qualified persons) that was to be subsidized by the Police and Fire Funds' payment of the annuitant's monthly premium, that was financed by a special tax levy for the Funds. This was understood and intended to be both a benefit of a person's employment by the City and participation in the annuitant's respective annuity and benefit fund. (Exhibit 18, McDonough declaration and Testimony at 30ff)

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60. Participation in the Plan is explicitly provided for annuitants of the City's

Funds. Under the Plan, eligibility is determined by one's being a participant or annuitant in one

of the City's four annuity and benefit funds:

ELIGIBILITY

You will be eligible for coverage if you are:
An Annuitant of the City of Chicago. "Annuitant" means a former employee who is receiving an age and service annuity from one of four retirement funds,
The spouse of a deceased Annuitant if you are receiving spousal annuity payments, or
A dependent of a deceased Annuitant if you are receiving annuity payments. (Plan Handbook, at 2)

Exhibit 6.

61. <u>Statutory Levy/Subsidy</u>. Incorporating this agreement, P.A.82-1044 was

enacted into the Illinois Pension Code obligating the Policemen's Fund (5-167.5) and the Firemen's Fund (6-164.2) to contract to provide group health insurance for all annuitants, and subsidize the basic monthly premium in an amount of \$55.00 per month for annuitants who are not qualified for the Medicare program; \$21.00 for Medicare-qualified annuitants. The amount of the Funds' subsidies were most recently raised to \$65.00 per month for Medicare qualified individuals, \$95.00 per month for those not qualified for Medicare coverage.

62. No Medicare coverage for existing subclass of Funds' participants whose

original hire date precedes April 1, 1986. Local government employees who were originally hired and began their work prior to April 1, 1986 (federal Combined Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA," PL 99-272 § 13205(a)) cannot qualify for healthcare coverage under the Medicare plan by their government employment, regardless of their length of service.

ELECTRONICALLY FILED 1/13/2016 4:07 PM 2013-CH-17450 PAGE 22 of 52 63. Accordingly, since all of the class members of the 1987 Participant Class and the Pre-8/23/89 retiree participants began their City employment prior to April 1, 1986, none of them can qualify for Medicare coverage by reason of their employment for the City of Chicago. <u>Arenz</u> at 29 (as to 1987 Class).

64. Additionally, many of the current retirees were hired before August 23, 1989, many of whom have still not retired, but are all entitled to the benefit of their earned City of Chicago Annuitant Health Benefit Plan.

65. Existing City workers who were first hired <u>after</u> March 31, 1986, have accrued or are accruing qualifying calendar quarters of employment towards the required 29 quarter condition for full coverage under the Medicare program upon reaching age 65. <u>Arenz</u> at 29.

66. Other existing government employees can be subjected to the Medicare program by an agreement between the City and the federal government, if the City desires to do so.

67. <u>Unique Position of these retirees, and their substantial numbers</u>. Consequently, the class member annuitants who began their service for the City prior to April 1, 1986 are the last class of City workers who will not be protected by the Medicare program. Although the number of these participants is currently known only to the City and the Funds, it certainly numbers a substantial portion of the class, since even with only twenty years of service, the earliest of the Medicare-qualified by government work would not have begun retiring before 2006, and many have not yet retired.

68. <u>Statutory Subsidy: Police and Firemen's Funds</u>. Since January 12, 1983, and continuing through 8/22/1989 (the date of enactment of P.A.86-273) Pension Code Sections 5-167.5, 6-164.2, respectively, required the Police and Firemen's Funds' Boards to each contract

for group health insurance and required the City to pay for a portion of its cost, for electing

annuitants, out of the City's levy for its contribution to the Police Fund.

* * *

(b) The Board shall contract with one or more carriers to provide health insurance for all annuitants.

* * *

(d) The Board shall pay the premiums for such health insurance for each annuitant with funds provided as follows:

The basic monthly premium for each annuitant shall be contributed by the city from the tax levy prescribed in Section 5-168 [6-165 for Firemen's Fund], up to a maximum of \$55 per month if the annuitant is not qualified to receive Medicare benefits, or up to a maximum of \$21 per month if the annuitant is qualified to receive Medicare benefits.

If the basic monthly premium exceeds the maximum amount to be contributed by the city on his behalf, such excess shall be deducted by the Board from the annuitant's monthly annuity, unless the annuitant elects to terminate his coverage under this Section, which he may do at any time.

69. The three-way Agreement benefited (and constituted "consideration" for) all

three affected groups. The City was able to provide a valuable benefit without having to fund a

pay increase out of its budget; the Funds were able to contract for the healthcare coverage (with

the City as the carrier) without invading their pension assets, and the Police and Fire employees

and annuitants could anticipate and rely on adequate healthcare for life at no net cost to the

annuitant, fixed-rates for coverage of spouses and dependents.

- 70. This is precisely what the Funds alleged in their 1987 Korshak counterclaims:
- 71. <u>Statutory Subsidy: Municipal and Laborers' Funds</u>. During 1984, legislation was

added to the Illinois Pension Code, P.A. 84-23, establishing similar Group Health Care Plans

under the Pension Code for Municipal and Laborers Funds annuitants.

72. The Municipal and Laborers' Funds statutory directive for group health benefits differed from Fire and Police. The Municipal and Laborers' Boards are directed to "approve" a plan and the subsidy is equal to a flat \$25.00 per month. Section 11-160.1 Ill.Rev.Stat. Ch. 108-1/2, Sec. 11-160.1 (eff. August 16, 1985) for the Laborers' Fund; Pension Code Section 8-164.1, Ill.Rev.Stat Ch. 108-1/2, Sec. 8-164.1 (eff. July 19, 1985) for the Municipal Fund. Those statutes provide in relevant part:

"Each employee annuitant in receipt of an annuity on the effective date of this Section and each employee who retires on annuity after the effective date of this Section, may participate in a group hospital care plan and a group medical and surgical plan approved by the Board if the employee annuitant is age 65 or over with at least 15 years of service. The Board, in conformity with its regulations, shall pay to the organization underwriting such plan the current monthly premiums up to the maximum amounts authorized in the following paragraph for such coverage.

As of the effective date the Board is authorized to make payments up to \$25 per month for employee annuitants age 65 years or over with at least 15 years of service.

If the monthly premium for such coverage exceeds the \$25 per month maximum authorization, the difference between the required monthly premiums for such coverage and such maximum may be deducted from the employee annuitant's annuity if the annuitant so elects; otherwise such coverage shall terminate."

73. <u>Municipal and Laborers provisions purport to create non-protected benefits</u>.

Different from the earlier provisions for Police and Firemen, the 1984 legislation creating

Pension Code Sections 8-164.1 and 11-160.1 characterizes the group hospital and medical care

benefits provided for Municipal and Laborers' Funds participants as not being pension or

retirement benefits under Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

74. Legal issue of the legality of creating a non-protected benefit of participation.

Per the decisions of our Supreme Court and this court, the statutory language provisions purporting to characterize healthcare benefits as *not* protected by Art. XIII, Sec.5's protection against diminution or impairment, are unenforceable. *Kanerva v. Weems*, 2014 IL 115811 (July 3, 2014) at ¶ 37-41, 54 and 55 and *Underwood v. City of Chicago*, December 3, 2015 ruling by Hon. Neil H. Cohen, at 8-9. Ex. 20.

75. Regardless, prior to August 23, 1989, the Police and Fire provisions had never contained such limiting language. See Pension Code §§5-167.5 and 6-164.2.

76. <u>Premiums Charged To Funds/Annuitants</u>. Effective April 1, 1982, the City established the following monthly rates for the Funds' annuitants' medical benefits coverage:

	+
Under Age 65 – Single	\$ 55.00
Under Age 65 – Family of Two	110.00
Under Age 65 – Family of Three or more	150.00
Medicare Eligible – Single	21.00
Medicare Eligible – Two	42.00
One Over Age 65, One Under Age 65	76.00

77. These rates for the Funds' annuitants' medical benefits coverage remained unchanged to a date beyond August 23, 1989.

78. Thus, from April 1, 1982 through August 23, 1989, annuitants received their healthcare coverage as a benefit of participation in their Funds, who obtained that coverage from the City, who acted as the self-insured provider of the plan, and paid all of the "insurer's" costs of the Funds' annuitants medical benefits program to the extent that they have exceeded the premium rates.

79. <u>Communication of Coverage to Annuitants</u>. In approximately 1984, the City prepared a booklet advising individual annuitants of their rights, benefits and the terms of the City's annuitant medical care plan. This document was distributed to employees at or about the time of their retirement and was also submitted to existing annuitant participants as part of the re-enrollment process. **THE CITY OF CHICAGO ANNUITANT MEDICAL BENEFITS PLAN (Exhibit 6).**

80. <u>Pre-Retirement Seminars</u>. From at least 1984 until sometime in 1987, the City also presented a series of "Pre-Retirement Seminars" to employees. Employees near retirement were invited to attend to inform them as to the terms of various benefits upon retirement including the City's annuitant medical benefit plan. <u>Ogonowski</u> at 60 ff; DX 24, 26.

81. City officials of the Health and Benefits Office were present, in person, at the seminars to explain the terms of these provisions.

82. In describing these provisions, referring City employees and their attendees were told that they would be able to participate in the health plan <u>for life</u>, that their own coverage was to be for life at no cost; and that they would only have to pay for additional coverage for spouse and dependents. <u>*Jandersits</u> at 40, 42; <u>Wilhelm</u> at 55; <u>Ogonowski</u> at 61; <u>Sweeney</u> at 72; <u>Mrs. Hester</u> at 95-96.

83. It thus became widely understood among City employees that they could rely on this subsidized fixed-rate plan for their lifetime following retirement from their City employment; at no out-of-pocket premium cost for Police and Fire annuitants own coverage, subsidized at \$25 per month for Municipal and Laborers annuitants.

84. These "pre-retirement seminars" were repeatedly conducted by City officials over a number of years, such that the rendition was done with the City's full knowledge and authorization; at least apparent, more probably actual authority to so speak.

85. <u>Actions by Retirees</u>. Many employees worked, retired and made plans on the basis of the representations made to them in these seminars, *e.g.*, <u>Jandersits</u> at 40. Additionally, it was the common understanding among City employees that the City would provide medical coverage for life upon retirement, (<u>Wilhelm</u> at 55-6; <u>Scacchitti</u> at 68; <u>Hince</u> at 85) and that was a significant factor for many individuals in choosing to work for the City, rather than work for a private sector employee, *e.g.*, <u>Gayne</u> at 44-45.

86. Many individual employees retired on the basis that this coverage existed, <u>Carlisle</u> <u>Moore</u>, Fire Stip. #1; <u>Feinberg</u>, Fire Stip. #3, and did not seek medical coverage elsewhere.

87. Many employees made retirement plans in reliance on that promise. <u>Sweeney</u> at 72-73; <u>Zalley</u> (Fire Stip. #5).

88. Some people purchased property elsewhere in reliance on the continued existence of medical coverage upon the terms described. <u>Shackleton</u> at 82-83.

89. Most of the pre-8/23/1989 retiree class member annuitants who survive, are now over age 74; some are in ill health (*e.g.*, <u>Scacchitti</u> at 66ff) or have family members whose condition is such that they would have great difficulty qualifying for separate individual medical coverage either at affordable cost or at all, (*e.g.*, <u>Wilhelm</u> at 56; <u>Ralicki</u>, Fire Stip. #2).

90. The usual practice in the Chicago area during the pre-8/23/1989 class period was that large public sector employers paid the entire cost for retiree medical coverage premiums, <u>Arenz</u> at 19, and did not retroactively change healthcare benefits for retirees. <u>Arenz</u> at 23, 28.

91. <u>The City's Budget/Appropriations for Retiree Healthcare Benefits</u>. The City funds used for annuitants' healthcare benefits in the years 1980 through 1987 were included in the City Budget, under line items designated under the decimals ".042," generally under Department 9112: Department of Finance-General.

92. <u>Appropriation Language: 1980-84; 1986-87</u>. In the 1980 through 1984, 1986 and

1987 City Budgets, line item .042 was described in the following terms:

For health maintenance organization premiums or cost of claims and administration for hospital and medical care provided to eligible employees and their families including employees on duty disability leave. (Source DX37, 40, 41.)

93. <u>1985 Appropriation Language</u>. In the 1985 City Budget, line item .042 was

described as:

For the health maintenance organization premiums or cost of claims and administration for hospital and medical care provided to eligible employees and their families including employees on duty disability leave and for partial payment of the cost of claims and administration for hospital and medical care provided to certain participants in the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund, Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Laborers' and Retirement Fund. Board Employees' Annuity and Benefit Fund, and Municipal Employees Annuity and Benefit Fund. (DX39, emphasis added.)

94. The 1985 language was inserted by the City Council's Budget Committee to clarify the annuitant medical coverage under line item .042. <u>Kubasiak</u> at 89.

95. <u>Manner of Budgeting</u>. Each year beginning at least 1980, the line item .042 budget appropriation was accomplished by taking the previous year's actual expenditure (to the extent already spent, plus estimated cost through the end of the current year) and increase it by an amount reflecting anticipated healthcare inflation or cost increase for the coming budget year. <u>Gilliam</u> at 8-9ff, 39-40.

96. The previous year's expenditure included expenditures paid by the City for annuitant medical claims without any dispute as to their authorization under the annual appropriation. <u>Gilliam</u> at 10-11.

97. Thus, the appropriated dollars for each budget year included annuitant medical expenses. This was known to the City's Budget Office (<u>Gilliam</u> at 10-11, 18; <u>Fattore</u> at 179) and Council members believed that the annuitants were covered under the City's plan (<u>Gilliam</u> at 18-19) although the City disputes whether the <u>language</u> of the appropriation legally extends to annuitant medical expenditures.

98. The amounts requested, recommended, appropriated and expended for active and annuitant medical expenses (in excess of the "premiums" received from the Pension Funds and the annuitants in each year) were:

Year	Dept. Request	Mayor's Recom.	Appropriation	Actual Expenditures
1979	[open]	[open]	[open]	\$37,002,963
1980	[open]	\$48,000,000	[open]	\$46,742.071
1981	\$56,906,000	\$56,906,000	\$56,225.00	\$64,569.800
1982	\$66,200,000	\$66,200,000	\$65,870,000	\$75,100,196
1983	\$75,250,000	\$75,250,000	\$74,650,000	\$86,289,215
1984	\$88,500,000	\$88,500,000	\$87,200,000	\$84,465,869
1985	\$89,288,200	\$89,288,200	\$89,438,000	\$91,506,685

Year	Dept. Request	Mayor's Recom.	Appropriation	Actual Expenditures
1986	\$97,942,000	\$97,942,000	\$97,942,000	\$83,705,038
1987	\$107,158,500	\$107,158,500	\$107,158,000	

Source: DX37-43.

99. Calculation and Deletion of 1988 Annuitant Healthcare Appropriation. For

1988's requested appropriation, the City Risk Management Department calculated the cost of

annuitant healthcare to be approximately \$18 million and the Budget Department eliminated it

from the budget request at Ms. Gilliam's direction. Gilliam at 37; Fattore at 184-187.

100. Communication of Plan to Annuitants: Regarding Termination of Coverage.

During the period preceding August 22, 1989, the City of Chicago's Annuitant Medical

Benefits Plan provides as follows regarding "Termination of Coverage:"

Coverage for you and your eligible dependents will terminate the first of the month following:

- the month a deduction is <u>not</u> taken from your annuity, or
- the month you reach the limiting age for City-paid benefits, if you have not arranged for deductions from you annuity check.

In addition, coverage for you and your eligible dependents will terminate the earliest of

- the date it is determined that you have knowingly submitted false bills or bills for ineligible dependents for reimbursement under this Plan
- the date the Plan is terminated, or
- the date the Plan is terminated for the class of annuitant of which you are a member

for hospital and medical care provided to eligible employees and their families including employees on duty disability leave.

Source: DX33, City X3.

101. At least to August 23, 1989, there had never been any explicit reservation by the City of any right to amend or terminate the Plan, nor any explicit reservation of any right of the funds to reduce the subsidy.

102. <u>Cost and Loss Experience</u>. During the early years of the program the premiums paid by the funds or the annuitants generally covered the costs of claims for reimbursement of annuitant medical costs.

103. During 1984, the costs of medical coverage for active employees and annuitants began to exceed the amount of premiums that were being charged. DX33.

104. Regardless of whether the costs were greater or less than the "premiums" charged, the City had never changed the rates charged as premiums under the Plan from April 1, 1982 to date after August 23, 1989.

105. <u>No Premium Charge for Annuitant</u>. The operation of the Plan was that Police and Fire Funds' annuitants were not required to pay anything out-of-pocket as premiums for their own coverage,²⁶ Municipal and Laborers' Funds' annuitants had to pay either nothing or \$30.00 per month (depending on their Medicare qualification) and paid their own funds for only the additional cost of family dependent coverage.

106. <u>City's Past Efforts to Contain Costs</u>. Beginning in 1984, various members of the City administration began to focus on containing healthcare costs. <u>Gilliam</u> at 20, 31; Carmody Memo 04/15/83 DX9, DX11 and 12.

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²⁶ In fact, annuitants <u>do</u> pay a portion of each <u>claim</u> as with usual insured plans. <u>Picur</u> at 142-3; <u>Williams</u> at 154-64. The City's plan requires the insured to "coinsure" (i.e., pay a percentage of each claim after the first X hundred dollars), 20% of the following X thousand dollars insuring that individuals do share in the actual out-of-pocket costs of their medical care.

107. <u>Re-Enrollment</u>. One effort to contain costs was to require re-enrollment of plan participants both active and retired. By this all plan participants were required to produce evidence of their continued qualifications to participate in the City's medical plan. <u>Gilliam</u> at 40; DX17.

108. The City actively solicited annuitants to re-enroll in the plan. <u>Gilliam</u> at 40;DX18.

109. During enrollment, the City did not suggest that annuitants seek or investigate the desirability of obtaining coverage elsewhere. <u>Gilliam</u> at 40-41.

110. Nor did the City ever advise the annuitants that their plan had been or would be considered terminated, by this re-enrollment requirement. <u>Gilliam</u> at 79, 81. Moreover, although there is some assertion that this re-enrollment actually constituted a "termination" of the old plan and institution of a new plan, <u>Gilliam</u> at 80-81, the City's termination of its annuitant healthcare plan could have been achieved only by terminating both the active and annuitant plan together, <u>Arenz</u> at 27, which was not done.

111. The annuitant re-enrollment took place during 1985.

112. <u>1984 "Trial Balloon" to Raise Costs of Coverage</u>. A proposal was also submitted under which the premiums would be increased for participation under the City's plan. <u>Gilliam</u> at 20; DX15.

113. A certain September 10, 1984 report called "City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Care Benefits," DX12, noted that expenditures were exceeding the "premiums" received, and proposed that the rates paid by the annuitants be increased by 100% effective two months

later, in November of 1984, and increased by another substantial percentage three months after that, in January of 1985. DX33; CX52.

114. This proposed rate change was communicated to representatives of the four pension funds. However, the response of the funds and their participants was so strong and negative that the effort was abandoned. <u>Gilliam</u> at 52-53.

115. As a result, the premiums charged annuitants for participation in the City's annuitant medical plan had not changed since April 1, 1982, and the annuitants and their families reasonably expected and relied on that situation to remain unchanged for their lives in retirement.

116. <u>The Ryan Case</u>. In late 1986 or early 1987, the City administration became aware of a substantial liability that would soon have to be paid to the City's pension funds as a result of the decision in <u>Ryan v. Chicago</u>, 148 Ill.App.3d 638, 499 N.E.2d 517 (Ill. App. 1986) (petition for leave to appeal denied, 505 N.E.2d 361 (1987). In the <u>Ryan</u> case, the City had converted pension tax levies to its own benefit, investing the money while in its hands and retaining the earnings it had made when turning over the principal months later. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the city would have to repay all earnings made on pension fund tax monies used by it during the period 1979 through 1983 and would have to restore similar earnings made in subsequent years. <u>Picur</u> at 143-4.

117. <u>The City's Reaction</u>. Among City officials, the expectation was that this "<u>Ryan</u>" liability would total approximately \$20 million. <u>Gilliam</u> at 76.

118. In the spring of 1987, a meeting was held among certain members of the City administration to develop a strategic plan for handling the City's financial problems, medical costs, and the <u>Ryan</u> case. <u>Gilliam</u> at 19ff; <u>Picur</u> at 118-9.

119. At that meeting, were Sharon Gilliam, the City's then Chief Administrative Officer and Chief Operating Officer; then-Corporation Counsel, Judson Miner; his Assistant Corporation Counsel, Matthew Piers; then-Comptroller Ronald Picur; and other individuals.

120. At that meeting, a strategic "game" plan was developed to counteract the effect of the <u>Ryan</u> decision. <u>Picur</u> at 144; DX28 at p. 2 Margin Notes by <u>Gilliam</u>.

121. At that meeting, the Legal Department advised the others of the argument that the appropriations in the line item ".042" for healthcare would be asserted as not permitting payments to annuitants. <u>Picur</u> at 119.

122. A plan was developed to approach the pension funds, advise them that the City would sue the pension funds to recover the monies spent on annuitant healthcare going back at least to 1980 unless the pension funds agreed to give up their claim to recovery under the <u>Ryan</u> case. <u>Picur</u> at 143-4.

123. <u>Ronald Picur</u>. While this was being planned, then-City Comptroller Ronald D. Picur continued to sit as a trustee of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund, the Municipal Fund and the Laborers' Fund without advising the other trustees of the City's intentions. <u>Picur</u> at 120.

124. Subsequently, on or about May 8, 1987, the City's Corporation Counsel contacted each of the pension funds, advised them of the <u>Ryan</u> judgment's \$25 million potential, and the City's belief that the medical payments (in similar \$25 million amount) had been illegally paid

and would have to be recovered from each pension fund unless they agreed to waive the <u>Ryan</u> claim. Each fund rejected the offer.

125. Thereafter, on October 19, 1987, the City Corporation Counsel sent each Fund a letter in which he advised the Fund that he had directed the City's benefits Office to cease making healthcare payments to pension fund annuitants as soon as each of the respective pension funds enters contracts for health insurance, but in no event later than January 1, 1988.

126. The City actually did seek to assert these issues as an offset in the Ryan case, but was denied by the presiding judge in that case.

127. <u>Suit Filed by the City</u>. On October 19, 1987, the City then filed suit seeking to terminate the coverage, force the pension funds to take over the annuitant medical cost obligation and reimburse the City for the \$58,000,000.00 it had spent on annuitant medical coverage through September, 1987.

128. <u>Participants' Intervention and Class Certification</u>. Martin Ryan and the other individual plaintiffs in the <u>Ryan</u> case sought and were granted leave to intervene for annuitants' interest, represented by Krislov. May 5, 1988 Order. Their motions for certification of the class as a class action on behalf of the annuitants were granted by the Illinois Court, with undersigned counsel as class counsel.

129. The pension funds each moved to dismiss the City's claim and moved to file counterclaims of their own against the City to continue the coverage unchanged or at least provided a reasonable period in which the plans could obtain alternative medical coverage.

130. On May 16, 1988, this Court dismissed the City's claim against the Pension Fund's Trustees but left standing the counterclaims against the City to force the City's annuitant healthcare coverage to continue.

131. The matter was tried on an expedited basis before this Court during the summer of 1988, and then continued just prior to the filing of briefs when the parties appeared to be near settlement.

132. The settlement was itself delayed since the necessary enabling amendments to the Illinois Pension Code were initially vetoed by the Governor and were not enacted and signed into law until August 23, 1989, P.A.86-273.

133. <u>The Settlements' Expiration and explicit preservation of participants' rights to</u> assert their entitlement to lifetime protection of their benefits. Participants' claims for coverage during the periods thereafter through June 30, 2013 were resolved by interim settlements which have now expired, but all of them explicitly preserving participants' rights to assert their claims to permanent retiree healthcare thereafter. Ex. 13, Korshak 2003 Settlement at Section IV. J., and *see* <u>Ryan v. City and Korshak</u>, Ill. App. Court Nos. 1-98-3465 and 1-98-3667, June 15, 2000 Rule 23 Order, reversing the Circuit Court's refusal to hear the Participants' claims, as revived following the 1997 end of the first settlement.

Back to the Present:

134. On May 15, 2013, the City declares its intention to reduce benefits beginning
January 1, 2014, and to eliminate all of the City's retiree healthcare plans by January 1,
2017. Exhibit 21, City Letter dated May 15, 2013. Anticipating the June 30, 2013 end of the

applicable settlement periods, the City issued a letter to all retiree healthcare participants that it intends to:

- (i) extend current retiree healthcare benefits to the end of 2013;
- (ii) maintain the current level of benefits for pre-8/23/1989 retirees for their lifetimes;
- (iii) make changes beginning January 1, 2014 to the plans with respect later participants, and terminate their coverage entirely, by January 1, 2017.

Ex. 21, City Letter dated May 15, 2013.

135. <u>The Funds Subsidies after June 30, 2013</u>. Whether P.A. 86-273 and its following statutes would support continuation of the Funds' subsidies, or whether 1970 III. Const. Art. XIII, §5 would prohibit their being reduced or ended, the Funds' statutory authority to subsidize retiree healthcare was extended by P.A.98-43, signed into law June 28, 2013, extending the current statutory authorization of the subsidies at their current levels "until the earlier of January 1, 2017, or such date as the City terminates its retiree healthcare plans."

136. The Funds' trustees have declared that they will not continue subsidies beyond any time period provided in the applicable statute, and otherwise refuse to continue the subsidies as benefits of participation protected solely by Ill. Const. Art. XIII, Section 5.

137. Participants assert that the Funds' obligations to provide and subsidize healthcare coverage for annuitants are themselves benefits of participation in their respective Funds protected by the Illinois Constitution Article XIII, Section 5 from being diminished from the levels in existence during any Participant's lifetime.

138. The City's Post-2013 Unilateral Reduction in the Benefit.

139. Beginning with the 2014 Appropriation, the City has unilaterally reduced the annuitants' healthcare benefit.

ELECTRONICALLY FILED 1/13/2016 4:07 PM 2013-CH-17450 PAGE 38 of 52 140. The New "Rates" are flawed; both in the manner of their calculation and from the City's unilateral diminution in the benefit provided.

141. The "new rates" imposed by the City for the post- 6/30/2013 Settlement period are unlawful on at least three grounds. They are not entitled to enforcement, first, since they are calculated by a flawed method that systematically overcharges annuitants, and also results from the City's unilateral diminution in its annuitant healthcare benefit. Additionally, there are two unilateral diminishment actions by the City: (i) increasing the premiums by an estimated costs factor that has been overstated in every previous year going back to its 2003 inception²⁷ and (ii) reducing its appropriation for the benefit, viewed either individually or in the aggregate, from the \$102,326,353 aggregate appropriation and expenditure in in 2013, to \$80,609,808 in 2014, reduced to \$62,912,845 in 2015, reducing it by a further 50% or \$31 million in just the 2016 appropriation alone²⁸; (a total diminutions result in corresponding increases in premiums to annuitants.

142. As a result annuitants have seen their annuitant healthcare premiums increased by the City as much as 300% or more, over just the period since 2013. Indeed, some annuitants are faced with health insurance premiums that exceed the amount of their annuities. Many face

²⁷ See Exhibit 7, Motion for Audit of 2013-2d half, documenting how City's use of estimated premiums has resulted in post-audit refunds, when compared to actual experience for each year, totaling more than \$50 million over the last ten-year settlement period.

²⁸ Exhibit 25, comparison of City Appropriations for Annuity Healthcare 2012-2016. Source: City's 2016 and 2014 Budget Books, portions showing \$31 million cut from city's line item 0052 expenditures for Hospital and Medical Care to Eligible Annuitants and their Dependents for 2016; following \$21.7 million reduction in 2014, and \$17.7 million reduction in 2015, for a cumulative reduction of \$69,625,443, to date which has been entirely borne by annuitants. Confirmed by testimony of City Budget Director Holt, Ex. 22, 19:13-30:24, and City Benefits Manager Currier. Ex. 22, 80:15-20.

premiums exceeding 30% of their entire gross annuity. Some, especially the nonMedicare qualified who have families, spouse and dependents, face premiums exceeding \$25,000 per year.

143. Nor are the "cost saving" alternatives offered by the City equivalent by any means. Participants who wish to save money, are offered a selection from plans that either (a) exclude from the covered network the (NorthShore, Northwestern, University of Chicago, Advocate, and Rush) institutions and physicians who make up the overwhelming percentage of healthcare providers in the region, or (b) carry vastly increased out-of-pocket costs for participants, or (c) both. Exhibit 22, December 23, 2015 testimony of Nancy Currier, at 65:4-9, and 121:10 ff.

144. The City's flawed calculation of premiums.

145. During the course of the 2003-2013 Settlement, it was discovered that the Segal projections, on which the City based its settlement period "rates" for retiree healthcare were substantially more than actually experienced during the settlement period.

146. Accordingly, an audit and reconciliation process was ordered, in order to conform rates charged to annuitants with the actual experienced costs of annuitant healthcare. Over the ten-year period of the settlement, the audit and reconciliation process identified overcharges to participants in each and every year. Total overcharges to participants during the 2003-6/30/2013 exceeded \$51 million, which were refunded as part of the audit and reconciliation process.

ELECTRONICALLY FILED 1/13/2016 4:07 PM 2013-CH-17450 PAGE 40 of 52 147. Since the June 30 2013 expiration of the 2003 Settlement, the City has refused to audit and reconcile the rates charged to actual experience; refused for the last half of 2013, and will not audit or reconcile the rates to actual charges for 2014, 2015 or 2016.²⁹

148. Moreover, the process by which the City continues to calculate annuitant healthcare rates is based on the same estimating source and method.³⁰ Participants assert that the rates charged for 2014, 2015 and 2016 are excessive, even before considering the City's unilateral reduction of its appropriation for annuitant healthcare.

149. The City's erroneous and UnEqual recognition of its obligations.

In the City's May 15, 2013 letter, it acknowledges its obligation, and agrees to continue retiree healthcare for the Korshak and Window Retirees Subclasses:

2. After January 1, 2014, the City will provide a healthcare plan with a continued contribution from the City of up to 55% of the cost for that plan for their lifetimes to the City retirees who are members of the Korshak and "Window" Sub-Classes, meaning those City annuitants who retired prior to August 23, 1989. In short, the City will continue to substantially subsidize these retirees' healthcare plan as it does today.

150. In spite of that assurance, the City is actually diminishing the benefit for those subclasses, as well, raising their premiums, albeit in lesser amounts.

151. Contrary to the City's previous commitment to contribute "*at least*" 55% of the costs of retiree healthcare for those classes, the City surreptitiously changes its commitment to a much diminished "*up to*" 55%. Thus, even if the rates were correctly calculated, the City is now "capping", rather than "flooring" its commitment to these two classes. Indeed, their rates are in fact being increased.

²⁹ Exhibit 26, Chart of City Rate Changes for 2016.

³⁰ Testimony of Nancy Currier, Exhibit 22 at 80-82.

152. Inducement, Reasonable Reliance, Harm, Inadequate Remedy at Law. As described above, the City's and Funds' actions have knowingly induced the City's employees to work their entire careers, reasonably relying on the existence of the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan, and its protection for life, in their retirement, such that the City cannot in good conscience accept the participants' conferred consideration without fulfilling its own promised obligation to them.

153. As evidenced only in part by their attached submissions, the participants are suffering irreparable injury, in having to either pay exorbitant premiums, forego the City plan altogether, or choose other plans inferior in their costs or available providers, or both.

Class Allegations

154. **The "Korshak" subclass-12/1/1987 Retiree Participants.** The claims for these participants are the same ones that have been certified to proceed as a class action with respect to the 1987 participants (the "Korshak" subclass).

155. <u>The "Window" or Jacobson subclass-Retirees during the 1/1/1988-8/23/1989</u> "window". As part of the 2003 Settlement, the action was also certified for the additional or expanded group to include the participants via a person who retired after 1987, but prior to August 23, 1989, who share the Korshak class' claim to common law vesting (entitlement to permanence for the benefits as they existed on one's retirement date), plus statutory and constitutional protections against diminution of benefits which have already begun at a certain level. (This group, who had filed a parallel case in federal court, led by the Retired Chicago Police Assn. and participant plaintiffs led by first named plaintiff Jacobson, are commonly referred to as the "window" retirees; persons who retired during the 1/1/88-8/23/89 "window" period, after the Korshak class date and before 86-273 was enacted.)

156. <u>Pre-8/23/1989 Hirees' subclass.</u> The third group of class members, who share common legal issues, are those who "vested" in their retirement benefits by their joining one of the relevant Funds on or before August 23, 1989, regardless of their retirement date. (This group might be called the "Pre-8/23/89 Hiree Vesters"). Their entitlement is based primarily on their claim to the 1970 Constitution, Art. XIII, Section 5's protection against diminution or impairment of their benefits of participation in one of the four Funds determined at their entry into the system, i.e., their hire date. *Buddell v. Bd. of Trustees, State Universities Retirement System*, 118 Ill.2d 99, 103 (1987).

157. **Subclass 3a-Pre-4/1/1986 hires.** This subclass of Subclass 3 has unique hardship status, because, under federal law, their work for the City, no matter how long, does not earn qualifying employment quarters to qualify the person for coverage under the federal Medicare program.³¹ Although some of these persons may earn the required quarters by other employment, most of these subclass members (especially Municipal and Laborers participants) simply do not qualify for Medicare coverage, and thus will face the largest premiums imaginable in their retirement and separately pay for Medicare coverage that most people get free. Because of the long duration of City employment, it is believed that a substantial portion of this subclass is still yet to retire.

³¹ Local government employees who were originally hired and began their work prior to April 1, 1986 (federal Combined Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 ("COBRA," PL 99-272 § 13205(a)) cannot qualify for healthcare coverage under the Medicare plan by their government employment, regardless of their length of service.

158. <u>Subclass 4-Post 8/23/1989 Hires</u>. The last subclass are those individuals who began their participation (by initial hired date) after the passage of P.A.86-273, which added the questionable language to the statute purporting to label the retiree healthcare benefits as not protected by Art. XIII, Section 5, whose claim to permanence of their benefits will turn on the purely legal issue whether the legislature can legally create a benefit of participation that is not protected by Article XIII Section 5.

159. All four participant groups, as classes or subclasses, readily qualify for class certification as to many issues of entitlement and to a fixed-rate subsidized retiree healthcare program against the City and their respective Fund, and no participants' entitlement conflicts with any others.

160. <u>Numerosity</u>. Each group numbers in the thousands, so joinder of all members of each class or subclass is impracticable.

161. <u>Common Questions</u>. Each group shares, internally and with each other group, the common issues of whether their right to a fixed-rate subsidized plan is protected from being diminished or impaired by the Illinois Constitutional protections of benefits of participation in an Illinois pension fund. Differences between each group's entitlement under other theories may arise. However, they do not conflict with each other. For example, pre-1988 retirees might additionally claim detrimental reliance that may not be available to pre-1989 vesters who have not yet retired. But the entitlement claims made for any one of the three groups would not conflict with either other group's entitlement claims.

162. <u>Adequacy of Representation</u>. Undersigned counsel Krislov has been engaged by hundreds of participants and will present representative parties for each of the four participant

categories, who will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the classes. The proposed participant class representatives understand the nature of the claim, the purpose of the litigation, their role in it, and have no interests antagonistic to the class. And participants' undersigned counsel is well experienced and capable of representing the class or classes, and has long acted as the certified class counsel in this specific case, already.

163. <u>Appropriateness</u>. This court has already appropriately found that the class action is an appropriate method for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy, and it remains so.

COUNTS AND CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT I – State Constitution: Diminution of Pension Benefits, Impairment of Contract,

164. Plaintiffs re-allege the foregoing paragraphs 1-163.

165. The 1970 Illinois Constitution Article XIII, §5 declares that participants'

memberships in their retirement systems are contractual relationships, the benefits of which

shall not be diminished or impaired:

"membership in any pension or retirement system of the State... shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired." (Illinois Constitution of 1970, Art. 13, §5).

166. Participants' healthcare coverage under the City of Chicago Annuitant Medical Benefits Plan, terms and Fund subsidy under the Illinois Pension Code, as they existed on a participant's entry into their particular retirement system (and with improvements thereafter) are benefits of membership in a pension or retirement system of a unit of Illinois local government, that are enforceable for life, by the protections of 1970 Illinois Constitution, Art. 13, §5, which prohibits them from being diminished or impaired. 167. **Illegal diminution or impairment of Benefits of Participation in a local government pension or retirement system.** The defendants' actions and declared rights to reduce that benefit constitute unlawful impairment of the participants' contractual rights under Art. 13 §5 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.

168. **Illegal Impairment of contract.** The defendants' actions and declared rights to reduce that benefit also constitute unlawful impairment of Contract, under Art. I §16 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.

COUNT II - Common Law Breach of Contract

169. Plaintiffs re-allege paragraphs 1 through 163.

170. As per the 1970 Illinois Constitution, Art. XIII, §5, the plaintiffs and class members have a contractual right to the fixed-for-life subsidized healthcare premiums in effect on their retirement date.

171. Also, independent of the Art. XIII, §5 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, under common law principles of contract, the plaintiffs and pre-8/23/1989 retirement or hire date class members have a contractual right to the plan in effect during the period October 1, 1987 to August 23, 1989, at the \$55/21 fixed-rate-for-life healthcare premiums, subsidized by their respective Funds (the entire annuitant premium for Police and Fire annuitants, the \$25 or higher subsidy paid at any time for Municipal or Laborer annuitants) without reduction.

172. The plaintiffs and the class members have performed all the duties and obligations required of them under the terms of the contract.

173. The defendant City of Chicago has breached its contractual obligation by unilaterally requiring the plaintiffs and class members to pay increased healthcare premiums.

COUNT III - Common Law Estoppel

174. Participants re-allege paragraphs 1 through 163.

175. The City and funds are estopped by their own conduct from changing or terminating the annuitant coverage to a level below the highest level of benefit during a participant's participation in the group healthcare benefits.

176. The City is estopped from changing or terminating the coverage for class period retirees without affording the Funds a reasonable time in which to obtain alternative coverage from another carrier.

COUNT IV - U.S.C. § 1983 For Record Purposes Only-No Answer is Required.

177. Plaintiffs re-allege the forgoing paragraphs of the complaint.

178. Each plaintiff and class member has a property right to a lifetime healthcare plan, unreduced from the best terms during a person's participation in one of the retirement funds.

179. Each healthcare premium charged to the annuitants by the defendants which exceeds the person's best entitled premium, is a deprivation of a property right secured under the Fourteenth Amendment and actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

180. Each increase in the healthcare premiums, beyond the fixed-for-life subsidized amount, is a violation of a property right secured under the Fourteenth Amendment and actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

181. The City's actions were and are performed knowingly and under the color of law by the City of Chicago and its officials, for whom the City is liable herein.

182. The City of Chicago is a "person acting under the color of law" for purposes of 42U.S.C. § 1983.

183. The actions of each of the defendant pension Funds were and are performed knowingly and under the color of law by the Pension Fund officials for whom the fund is liable herein.

COUNT V - Impairment of Contract – Federal and State Constitution No Answer is Required with regard to Federal Constitution Contract Clause Violation

184. Plaintiffs re-allege the foregoing paragraphs.

185. Art. 13, § 5 of the Illinois Constitution states that membership in any pension or retirement system of the state shall be an enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.

186. By increasing the healthcare premiums charged to annuitants, or adversely changing the terms or subsidy, the City and the Funds have denied or impaired the plaintiffs' and class members' contractual rights.

187. The stripping of the Illinois Constitution's protection of group health benefits provided under the Pension Code, by reducing them or re-labeling them as "not benefits of participation" under P.A. 86-273 and other statutes impairs contractual rights of participants.

188. The United States Constitution prohibits States from passing laws impairing the obligations of contract:

"No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts...." (United States Constitution, Art. I, Section 10).

189. Each such adverse change in the group health statutory provisions of the Pension Code, including, as well, increases in_healthcare premiums, is an impairment of a contractual right in violation of Art. I, § 10, cl. 1 of the Federal Constitution, secured under the Fourteenth Amendment and actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

190. <u>Korshak and Window Retirees</u>. With respect to the class members who retired before August 23, 1989, the statutory recharacterization of group health benefits for Fund participants, and each healthcare premium charged in excess of the fixed-for-life subsidized rate alleged herein are thus impairments of a contractual right in violation of the United States Constitution.

Count VI-Denial of Equal Protection Illegal Discrimination between 8/23/1989 retirees and "hireds"

191. Plaintiffs re-allege the foregoing paragraphs.

192. The City's differing treatment of *pre-8/23/1989 retirees* (rightfully recognizing

their lifetime entitlement) from pre-8/23/1989 Fund participants (i.e., denying protection for

participants based on their pre-8/23/1989 hiring by the City), constitutes, since entitlement to

protection of benefits of participation is based on hire date, not date of retirement, the City's

denial of equal protection to pre-8/23/1989 hirees is a denial of the Illinois Constitution's

Article I, §2 Equal Protection Clause:

Section 2. Due Process and Equal Protection. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.

Count VII-Invalid Special or Local Legislation.

- 193. Plaintiffs re-allege the foregoing paragraphs.
- 194. 1970 Illinois Constitution Article IV, Section 13 prohibits special or local

legislation:

Section 13. Special Legislation.

The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is or can be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial determination. 195. The provisions of P.A. 86-273, 90-32, 93-42, and 98-43, insofar as they purport to condition healthcare entitlement in a Fund for a City of over 500,000 to annuitants who participate in any of the Funds "by reason of" or "as a direct result of" "employment by the City of Chicago", are invalid special or local legislation, triggering the reinstatement of their predecessor valid provisions.

Conclusion

196. For the above reasons, participants in each class are protected by the Illinois Constitution, principles of contract and estoppel, are entitled to judgment declaring their rights to a lifetime healthcare coverage under the best terms in effect during their participation in one of the City's four Annuity and Benefit Plans against both the City of Chicago and the Trustees of their respective Annuity and Benefit Funds.

Prayer for Relief

Wherefore, Plaintiffs, on behalf of themselves and the class members, demand judgment against the City of Chicago and the defendant pension Funds as follows:

- A. Certify the case as a class action for City of Chicago Retiree Healthcare Plan Participants, with the following proposed subclasses:
 - i. Korshak subclass-12/31/1987 annuitant participants,
 - ii. Window subclass-retired Post-Korshak, but pre-8/23/1989,
 - iii. Pre-8/23/1989 Hirees,
 - iv. And Pre-4/1/1986 Hirees;
 - v. Participants –First hired date after 8/23/1989;

all represented by undersigned Counsel;

- B. Declare the pre 8/23,1989 retiree participants' entitlement to resumption of the fixed-rate subsidized \$55/\$21 monthly premium retiree healthcare plan, fully subsidized by the Funds;
- C. Declare that PA 86-273 and PA 90-32 are (i) invalid to the extent the statutes purport to either create a class of non-protected benefits of membership or (ii) invalid as applied to the class to convert existing protected benefits into non-protected benefits;
- D. Declare that the 1989 and later statutory annuitant healthcare statutory amendments are invalid, for (i) unconstitutionally stripping the benefits of the protections of Article XIII, Section 5, (ii) invalidly diminishing their benefits by their time limitations, and (iii) invalidly limiting their benefits to persons who are annuitants "by reason of employment by the City of Chicago".
- E. Issue a preliminary, and eventually a permanent injunction prohibiting the City and Funds from reducing the group health benefits provided to class members from the level any of them have been provided as a participant, from when plaintiffs and the class members began their participation in the Plan to the present;
- F. Award Plaintiffs' Attorneys fees and costs;
- G. Any and all other relief the Court deems just and proper.

Dated: January 13, 2016

By: <u>/s/ Clinton A. Krislov</u> Attorney for Plaintiffs, Participants Clinton A. Krislov

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


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S.A. 249

ILLINOIS PENSION CODE GROUP HEALTH BENEFIT PROVISIONS AS IN EFFECT PRIOR TO ENACTMENT OF P.A. 86-273

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S.H.A. ch. 108 1/2 ¶ 5-167.5

SMITH-HURD ILLINOIS ANNOTATED STATUTES COPR. © WEST 1988 No Claim to Orig. Govt. Works CHAPTER 108 1/2, PENSIONS PENSION CODE

ARTICLE 5. POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND--CITIES OVER 500,000

Pension Code § 5-167.5

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5-167.5. Group health benefit

§ 5-167.5. Group health benefit. (a) For the purposes of this Section:

"Annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity or a prior service annuity under this Article on or after January 1, 1983.

"Carrier" means an insurance company, or a corporation organized under the Nonprofit Hospital Service Plan Act, [FN1] the Medical Service Plan Act [FN2] or the Voluntary Health Services Plan Act, [FN3] which is authorized to do group health insurance business in Illinois.

(b) The Board shall contract with one or more carriers to provide group health insurance for all annuitants. Such group health insurance shall provide for protection against the financial costs of health care expenses incurred in and out of hospital including basic hospital-surgical-medical health care expenses incurred in and out of hospital including basic hospital-surgical-medical coverages and major medical coverage. The program may include such supplemental coverage out- patient diagnostic X-ray and laboratory expenses, prescription drugs and similar group be to the group health insurance program may also include: (1) prepaid preventive health care through health maintenance organizations; (2) coverage for those who rely on treatment by prayer or spiritual means alone for healing in accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized religious denomination; (3) ontional coverage for dependents of the approximate. Socoverages and major medical coverage. The program may include such supplemental coverages as out- patient diagnostic X-ray and laboratory expenses, prescription drugs and similar group benefits.

(3) optional coverage for dependents of the annuitant;

(4) other optional coverage, such as for dental, psychological, or optometric services.

(c) The group contract shall be on terms deemed by the Board to be in the best interest of the Fund and its annuitants, based on, but not limited to, such criteria as administrative cost factors, the service capabilities of the carrier, and the premiums charged.

The term of any contract made under authority of this Section may not extend beyond 2 fiscal years, with such renewal options, for not more than 2 one-year periods, as may be deemed by the Board to be most advantageous to and in the best interest of the Fund and its annuitants. No renewal may be exercised without the conclusion of a qualified independent actuary that any increase in premium requested by a carrier is justified on the basis of audited experience data, increases in the cost of health care services, carrier performance, or any combination thereof.

(d) The Board shall pay the premiums for such health insurance for each annuitant with funds provided as follows:

The basic monthly premium for each annuitant shall be contributed by the city from the tax levy prescribed in Section 5-168, up to a maximum of \$55 per month if the annuitant is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, or up to a maximum of \$21 per month if the annuitant is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

If the basic monthly premium exceeds the maximum amount to be contributed by the city on his behalf, such excess shall be deducted by the Board from the annuitant's monthly annuity, unless the annuitant elects to terminate his coverage under this Section, which he may do at any time. The full cost of any optional coverage elected by the annuitant shall be deducted from his monthly annuity.

S.A. 251

Laws 1963, p. 161, § 5-167.5, added by P.A. 82-1044, § 1, eff. Jan. 12, 1983.

[FN1] Chapter 32, ¶ 551 et seq.

[FN2] Chapter 32, ¶ 563 et seq.

[FN3] Chapter 32, ¶ 595 et seq.

REFERENCES

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General States c=93, States c=93, C.J.S. States § 156. Words and Phrases (5013/5010 11/2020 1 Words and Phrases (Perm. Ed.) \$. H. A. ch. 108 1/2 ¶ 5-167.5

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ARTICLE 6. FIREMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND -- CITIES OVER 500,000

Pension Code § 6-164.2

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6-164.2. Group health benefit

§ 6-164.2. Group health benefit. (a) For the purposes of this Section:

"Annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity or a prior service annuity under this Article on or after January 1, 1983.

"Carrier" means an insurance company, or a corporation organized under the Nonprofit Hospital Service Plan Act, [FN1] the Medical Service Plan Act [FN2] or the Voluntary Health Services Plan Act, [FN3] which is authorized to do group health insurance business in Illinois.

(b) The Board shall contract with one or more carriers to provide group health insurance for all annuitants. Such group health insurance shall provide for protection against the financial costs of health care expenses incurred in and out of hospital including basic hospital-surgical-medical The attrictive expenses incurred in and out of hospital including basic hospital-surgical-medical coverages and major medical coverage. The program may include such supplemental coverages as to ut-patient diagnostic X-ray and laboratory expenses, prescription drugs and similar group benefits.
The group health insurance program may also include:
(1) prepaid preventive health care through health maintenance organizations;
(2) coverage for those who rely on treatment by prayer or spiritual means alone for healing in accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized religious denomination;
(3) optional coverage for dependents of the annuitant;
(4) other optional coverage, such as for dental psychological or optometric services

(4) other optional coverage, such as for dental, psychological, or optometric services.

(¢) The group contract shall be on terms deemed by the Board to be in the best interest of the Fund and its annuitants, based on, but not limited to, such criteria as administrative cost factors, the service capabilities of the carrier, and the premiums charged.

The term of any contract made under authority of this Section may not extend beyond 2 fiscal years, with such renewal options, for not more than 2 one-year periods, as may be deemed by the Board to be most advantageous to and in the best interest of the Fund and its annuitants. No renewal may be exercised without the conclusion of a qualified independent actuary that any increase in premium requested by a carrier is justified on the basis of audited experience data, increases in the cost of health care services, carrier performance, or any combination thereof.

(d) The Board shall pay the premiums for such health insurance for each annuitant with funds provided as follows;

The basic monthly premium for each annuitant shall be contributed by the city from the tax levy prescribed in Section 6-165, up to a maximum of \$55 per month if the annuitant is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, or up to a maximum of \$21 per month if the annuitant is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

If the basic monthly premium exceeds the maximum amount to be contributed by the city on his behalf, such excess shall be deducted by the Board from the annuitant's monthly annuity, unless the annuitant elects to terminate his coverage under this Section, which he may do at any time. The full cost of any optional coverage elected by the annuitant shall be deducted from his monthly annuity.

Page 1 of 2

Laws 1963, p. 161, § 6-164.2, added by P.A. 82-1044, § 1, eff. Jan. 12, 1983.

[FN1] Chapter 32, ¶ 551 et seq.

[FN2] Chapter 32, ¶ 563 et seq.

[FN3] Chapter 32, ¶ 595 et seq.

REFERENCES

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S.H.A. ch. 108 1/2 ¶ 8-164.1

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ARTICLE 8. MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES', OFFICERS' AND OFFICIALS' ANNUITY AND

BENEFIT

FUND--CITIES OVER 500,000 INHABITANTS

Pension Code § 8-164 1

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8-164.1. Group Health Care Plan

§ 8-164.1. Group Health Care Plan. Each employee annuitant in receipt of an annuity on the effective date of this Section and each employee who retires on annuity after the effective date of this Section, may participate in a group hospital care plan and a group medical and surgical plan approved by the Board if the employee annuitant is age 65 or over with at least 15 years of service. The Board, in conformity with its regulations, shall pay to the organization underwriting such plan the current monthly premiums up to the maximum amounts authorized in the following paragraph for such coverage.

As of the effective date the Board is authorized to make payments up to \$25 per month for employee $\frac{1}{2}$ annuitants age 65 years or over with at least 15 years of service.

 $\stackrel{\circ}{\leftarrow}$ If the monthly premium for such coverage exceeds the \$25 per month maximum authorization, the $\stackrel{\circ}{\leftarrow}$ difference between the required monthly premiums for such coverage and such maximum may be $\stackrel{\circ}{\leftarrow}$ deducted from the employee annuitant's annuity if the annuitant so elects; otherwise such coverage shall terminate.

Amounts contributed by the city as authorized under Section 8-189 for the benefits set forth in this Section shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits and all such premiums shall be charged to it.

The group hospital care plan and group medical and surgical plan established under this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

Laws 1963, p. 161, § 8-164.1, added by P.A. 84-23, § 1, eff. July_18, 1985.

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Municipal Corporations $\approx 186(1), 187(2)$. C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 586, 588 et seq.

S. H. A. ch. 108 1/2 ¶ 8-164.1 IL ST CH 108 1/2 ¶ 8-164.1 END OF DOCUMENT

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S.H.A. ch. 108 1/2 ¶ 11-160.1

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ARTICLE 11. LABORERS' AND RETIREMENT BOARD EMPLOYEES' ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND--CITIES OVER 500,000 INHABITANTS

Pension Code § 11-160.1

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11-160.1. Group health care plan

§ 11-160.1. Group Health Care Plan. Each employee annuitant in receipt of an annuity on the effective date of this Section and each employee who retires on annuity after the effective date of this Section, may participate in a group hospital care plan and a group medical and surgical plan approved by the Board if the employee annuitant is age 65 or over with at least 15 years of service. The Board, in conformity with its regulations, shall pay to the organization underwriting such plan the current monthly premiums up to the maximum amounts authorized in the following paragraph for such coverage,

As of the effective date the Board is authorized to make payments up to \$25 per month for employee \Im annuitants age 65 years or over with at least 15 years of service.

 $\vec{\Sigma}$ If the monthly premium for such coverage exceeds the \$25 per month maximum authorization, the difference between the required monthly premiums for such coverage and such maximum may be deducted from the employee annuitant's annuity if the annuitant so elects; otherwise such coverage $\vec{\Sigma}$ shall terminate.

Amounts contributed by the city as authorized under Section 11-178 for the benefits set forth in this Section shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits and all such premiums shall be charged to it.

The group hospital care plan and group medical and surgical plan established under this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

Laws 1963, p. 161, § 11-160, 1, added by P.A. 84-159, § 1, off. Aug. 16, 1985.

S. H. A. ch. 108 1/2 ¶ 11-160.1 IL ST CH 108 1/2 ¶ 11-160.1 END OF DOCUMENT

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EXHIBIT 8B

ILLINOIS PENSION CODE GROUP HEALTH BENEFIT PROVISIONS AS AMENDED BY P.A. 86-273 EFFECTIVE AUGUST 23, 1989

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40 ILCS 5/5-167.4

P.A. 82-342, in the second paragraph, in the first sentence, inserted "from January 1, 1976 to July 1, 1981, and \$250 per month"; and at the end of cl. (a), added "or who dies in the service after June 30, 1981".

Section 2 of P.A. 82-342 provided:

"The General Assembly finds that the changes made by this amendatory Act of 1981 relating to Articles 5 and 6 of the Illinois Pension Code accommodate a request from local governments or organizations thereof, and therefore relimbursement of local governments is not required of the State under the State Mandates Act, by reason of the exclusion specified in clause (1) of subsection (1) of Section 8 of that Act."

P.A. 84-1104, in the second paragraph, substituted "January 1, 1986, the minimum amount of widow's annulty shall be \$325 per month for the following classes of widows", for "July 1, 1975 the minimum amount of PENSION CON

widow's annuity shall be \$175 per mont July 1, 1975 to January 1, 1976 and \$200 month from January 1, 1976 to July and \$250 per month thereafter for all with hereinafter described"; inserted "of 1985 ceding "(b)", inserted "and"; and in "ti substituted "and does" for "who does",

P.A. 86-273, in the first paragraph, subed "\$200 per month, without regard to which the deceased policeman was in service of effective date of this amendatory Act of 199 for "\$150 per month"; in the second pigraph, substituted "1990" for "1986", "\$400" "\$325", "whether the deceased policeman" in service on" for "the fact that the death of in service on" for "the fact that the death of it policeman occurred prior to" and "1989" for "1985".

P.A. 87-849 inserted the paragraph increasing the minimum amount of a widow's annuiti effective Jan. 1, 1992.

Library References

Municipal Corporations ⇔187(7). WESTLAW Topic No. 268.

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C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 588, 589.

5/5-167.5. Group health benefit

§ 5-167.5. Group health benefit. (a) For the purposes of this Section, "annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity, a prior service annuity, a widow's annuity, a widow's prior service annuity, or a minimum annuity on or after January 1, 1988, under Article 5, 6, 8 or 11, by reason of previous employment by the City of Chicago (hereinafter, in this Section, "the city").

(b) The city shall continue to offer to annuitants and their dependents the same basic city health care plan available as of June 30, 1988 (hereinafter called the basic city plan), and may offer additional plans at its sole discretion.

(c) Effective the date the initial increased annuitant payments pursuant to subsection (g) take effect, the city shall pay 50% of the aggregated costs of the claims or premiums, whichever is applicable, of annuitants and their dependents under all health care plans offered by the city. The claims or premiums of all annuitants and their dependents under all of the plans offered by the city shall be aggregated for the purpose of calculating the city's payment required under this subsection, as well as for the setting of rates of payment for annuitants as required under subsection (g).

(d) From January 1, 1988 until December 31, 1992, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of the city's plans the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$65 per month for each such annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and up to a maximum of \$35 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits. From January 1, 1993 until December 31, 1997, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of the city's plans the

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following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for each such annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and up to a maximum of \$45 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

For the period January 1, 1988 through the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1989, payments under this Section shall be reduced by the amounts paid by or on behalf of the board's annuitants covered during that period.

The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy authorized under Section 5–168; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be charged against it.

(e) The city's obligations under subsections (b) and (c) shall terminate on December 31, 1997, except with regard to covered expenses incurred but not paid as of that date. This subsection shall not affect other obligations that may be imposed by law.

(f) The group coverage plans described in this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

(g) The aggregate cost of claims and premiums for each calendar year from 1989 through 1997 of all annuitants and dependents covered by the city's group health care plans shall be estimated by the city, based upon a written determination by a qualified independent actuary to be appointed and paid by the city and the board. If such estimated cost is more than the estimated amount to be contributed by the city during that year plus the estimated amounts to be paid pursuant to subsection (d) and by the other pension boards on behalf of other participating annuitants, the difference shall be paid by all participating annuitants. The city, based upon the determination of the independent actuary, shall set the monthly amounts to be paid by the participating annuitants. The initial determination of such payments shall be prospective only and shall be based upon the estimated costs for the balance of the year. The board may deduct the amounts to be paid by its annuitants from the participating annuitants' monthly annuities,

If it is determined from the city's annual audit, or from audited experience data, that the total amount paid by all participating annuitants was more or less than the difference between (1) the cost of providing the group health care plans, and (2) the sum of the amount to be paid by the city under subsection (c) and the amounts paid by all the pension boards, then the independent actuary and the city shall account for the excess or shortfall in the next year's payments by annuitants.

(h) An annuitant may elect to terminate coverage in a plan at any time, which election shall terminate the annuitant's obligation to contribute toward payment of the excess described in subsection (g).

Laws 1963, p. 161, § 5-167.5, added by P.A. 82-1044, § 1, eff. Jan. 12, 1983. Amended by P.A. 86-273, § 1, eff. Aug. 23, 1989. Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 108 ¹/₂, § 5-167.5.

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40 ILCS 5/6-164.1

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above 4% a year, to the extent necessary and available to finance the cost of such increases for the following year, shall be transferred each year beginning with the year 1969 to a fund account designated as the Supplementary Payment Reserve from the Interest and Investment Reserve set forth in Section 6-203,

If the money in the Supplementary Payment Reserve in any year arising from interest income above 4% a year as defined in this Section accruing in the preceding year; and the contributions by retired persons, are insufficient to make the total payments to all persons entitled to the annuity under this Section; and any investment earnings over 4% a year beginning with the year 1969 not previously used to finance such increases and transferred to the Prior Service Annuity Reserve, may be used to the extent necessary and available to provide sufficient funds to finance such increases for the current year. Such sums shall be transferred from the Prior Service Annuity Reserve. If the total money available in the Supplementary Payment Reserve from such sources are insufficient to make the total payments to all persons entitled to such increases for the year, a proportionate amount computed as the ratio of the money available to the total of all the payments specified for that year shall be paid to each person for that year.

No part of any such increase under this Section is an obligation of the fund otherwise established under this Article 6.

Laws 1963, p. 161, § 6-164.1, added by P.A. 76-1163, § 1, eff. Aug. 29, 1969. Amended by P.A. 77-1496, § 1, eff. Sept. 8, 1971; P.A. 79-633, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 1975; P.A. 82-971, Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 1081/2, ¶ 6-164.1.

Historical and Statutory Notes

P.A. 77-1496 substituted "2%" for "11/2%" in the first and second sentences of the first para-P.A. 79-633 substituted "The provisions of

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r.A. 79-033 substituted The provisions of the preceding paragraph of this Section apply" for "This Section applies" at the beginning of the second paragraph, inserted the third and fourth paragraphs, and in the fifth paragraph, substituted "the increases indicated in the preceding part of this Section" for "such increas-'es".

P.A. 82-971, in the third paragraph, made the following substitutions: "in July, 1982" for "on July 1, 1975"; "1976" for "1967"; and "\$400" for "\$350.00 a month thereafter"; in the fourth paragraph, inserted "minimum"; substituted "specified in the preceding paragraph" for "of \$350.00"; and following "6-128.1", inserted a

For retroactive application of P.A. 82-971, see note following 40 ILCS 5/5-167.2.

5/6-164,2. Group health benefit

§ 6-164.2. Group health benefit. (a) For the purposes of this Section, "annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity, a prior service annuity, a widow's annuity, a widow's prior service annuity, or a minimum annuity on or after January 1, 1988, under Article 5, 6, 8 or 11, by reason of previous employment by the City of Chicago (hereinafter, in this

(b) The city shall continue to offer to annuitants and their dependents the same basic city health care plan available as of June 30, 1988 (hereinafter called the basic city plan), and may offer additional plans at its sole discre-

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(c) Eff subsectio claims or dents unc of all anı city shall required for annui (d) Fro the city or in any of 1 month fo: benefits, z who is gu December board's an following annuitant maximum receive me

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(c) Effective the date the initial increased annuitant payments pursuant to subsection (g) take effect, the city shall pay 50% of the aggregated costs of the claims or premiums, whichever is applicable, of annuitants and their dependents under all health care plans offered by the city. The claims or premiums of all annuitants and their dependents under all of the plans offered by the city shall be aggregated for the purpose of calculating the city's payment required under this subsection, as well as for the setting of rates of payment for annuitants as required under subsection (g).

(d) From January 1, 1988 until December 31, 1992, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of the city's plans the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$65 per month for each such annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and up to a maximum of \$35 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits. From January 1, 1993 until December 31, 1997, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of the city's plans the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for each such annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and up to a maximum of \$45 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

For the period January 1, 1988 through the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1989, payments under this Section shall be reduced by the amounts paid by or on behalf of the board's annuitants covered during that period. The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy authorized under Section 6–165; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be charged against it.

(e) The city's obligations under subsections (b) and (c) shall terminate on December 31, 1997, except with regard to covered expenses incurred but not paid as of that date. This subsection shall not affect other obligations that may be imposed by law.

(f) The group coverage plans described in this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

(g) The aggregate cost of claims and premiums for each calendar year from 1989 through 1997 of all annuitants and dependents covered by the city's group health care plans shall be estimated by the city, based upon a written determination by a qualified independent actuary to be appointed and paid by the city and the board. If such estimated cost is more than the estimated amount to be contributed by the city during that year plus the estimated amounts to be paid pursuant to subsection (d) and by the other pension boards on behalf of other participating annuitants, the difference shall be paid by all participating annuitants. The city, based upon the determination of the independent actuary, shall set the monthly amounts to be paid by the participating annuitants. The initial determination of such payments shall be prospective only and shall be based upon the estimated costs for the balance

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of the year. The board may deduct the amounts to be paid by its annuitants from the participating annuitants' monthly annuities.

If it is determined from the city's annual audit, or from audited experience data, that the total amount paid by all participating annuitants was more or less than the difference between (1) the cost of providing the group health care plans, and (2) the sum of the amount to be paid by the city under subsection (c) and the amounts paid by all the pension boards, then the independent actuary and the city shall account for the excess or shortfall in the next year's payments by annuitants.

(h) An annuitant may elect to terminate coverage in a plan at any time, which election shall terminate the annuitant's obligation to contribute toward payment of the excess described in subsection (g).

Laws 1963, p. 161, § 6-164.2, added by P.A. 82-1044, § 1, eff. Jan. 12, 1983. Amended by P.A. 86-273, § 1, eff. Aug. 23, 1989.

Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 1081/2, § 6-164.2.

Historical and Statutory Notes

P.A. 86-273 rewrote this section which, prior thereto, provided:

"(a) For the purposes of this Section:

"'Annuitant' means a person receiving an age and service annuity or a prior service annuity under this Article on or after January 1, 1983.

"'Carrier' means an insurance company, or a corporation organized under the Nonprofit Hospital Service Plan Act, the Medical Service Plan Act or the Voluntary Health Services Plan Act, which is authorized to do group health insurance business in Illinois.

"(b) The Board shall contract with one or more carriers to provide group health insurance for all annuitants. Such group health insurance shall provide for protection against the financial costs of health care expenses incurred in and out of hospital including basic hospital-surgleal-medical coverages and major medical coverage. The program may include such supplemental coverages as out-patient diagnostic X-ray and laboratory expenses, prescription drugs and similar group benefits,

"The group health insurance program may also include:

"(1) prepaid preventive health care through health maintenance organizations;

"(2) coverage for those who rely on treatment by prayer or spiritual means alone for healing in accordance with the tenets and practice of a recognized religious denomination;

"(3) optional coverage for dependents of the annuitant;

"(4) other optional coverage, such as for dental, psychological, or optometric services.

"(c) The group contract shall be on terms deemed by the Board to be in the best interest of the Fund and its annulants, based on, but not limited to, such criteria as administrative cost factors, the service capabilities of the carrier, and the promiums charged.

"The term of any contract made under authority of this Section may not extend beyond 2 fiscal years, with such renewal options, for not more than 2 one-year periods, as may be deemed by the Board to be most advantageous to and in the best interest of the Fund and its annuitants. No renewal may be exercised without the conclusion of a qualified independent actuary that any increase in premium requested by a carrier is justified on the basis of audited experience data, increases in the cost of health care services, carrier performance, or any combination thereof.

"(d) The Board shall pay the premiums for such health insurance for each annultant with funds provided as follows:

"The basic monthly premium for each annuitant shall be contributed by the city from the tax levy prescribed in Section 6-165, up to a maximum of \$55 per month if the annuitant is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, or up to a maximum of \$21 per month if the annuitant is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

"If the basic monthly premium exceeds the maximum amount to be contributed by the city on his behalf, such excess shall be deducted by the Board from the annuitant's monthly annuity, unless the annuitant elects to terminate his coverage under this Section, which he may do at any time. The full cost of any optional coverage elected by the annuitant shall be deducted from his monthly annuity."

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Municipal Corporations ⇔220(6), 220(9). WESTLAW Topic No. 268. C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 722, 727.

5/8-164.1. Group health benefit

§ 8-164.1. Group health benefit. (a) For the purposes of this Section, "annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity, a prior service annuity, a widow's annuity, a widow's prior service annuity, or a minimum annuity on or after January 1, 1988, under Article 5, 6, 8 or 11, by reason of previous employment by the City of Chicago (hereinafter, in this Section, "the city").

(b) The city shall continue to offer to annuitants and their dependents the same basic city health care plan available as of June 30, 1988 (hereinafter called the basic city plan), and may offer additional plans at its sole discretion.

(c) Effective the date the initial increased annuitant payments pursuant to subsection (g) take effect, the city shall pay 50% of the aggregated costs of the claims or premiums, whichever is applicable, of annuitants and their dependents under all health care plans offered by the city. The claims or premiums of all annuitants and their dependents under all of the plans offered by the city shall be aggregated for the purpose of calculating the city's payment required under this subsection, as well as for the setting of rates of payment for annuitants as required under subsection (g).

(d) From January 1, 1988 until December 31, 1992, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of the city's plans the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$65 per month for each such annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and up to a maximum of \$35 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits. From January 1, 1993 until December 31, 1997, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of the city's plans the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for each such annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and up to a maximum of \$45 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

For the period January 1, 1988 through the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1989, payments under this Section shall be reduced by the amounts paid by or on behalf of the board's annuitants covered during that period.

Commencing on the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1989, the board is authorized to pay to the board of education on behalf of each person who chooses to participate in the board of education's plan the amounts specified in this subsection (d) during the years indicated. For the period January 1, 1988 through the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1989, the board shall pay to the board of education annuitants who participate in the board of education's health benefits plan for annuitants the following amounts: \$10 per month to each annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare

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benefits, and \$14 per month to each annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy authorized under Section 8–189; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be charged against it.

(e) The city's obligations under subsections (b) and (c) shall terminate on December 31, 1997, except with regard to covered expenses incurred but not paid as of that date. This subsection shall not affect other obligations that may be imposed by law.

(f) The group coverage plans described in this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

(g) The aggregate cost of claims and premiums for each calendar year from 1989 through 1997 of all annuitants and dependents covered by the city's group health care plans shall be estimated by the city, based upon a written determination by a qualified independent actuary to be appointed and paid by the city and the board. If such estimated cost is more than the estimated amount to be contributed by the city during that year plus the estimated amounts to be paid pursuant to subsection (d) and by the other pension boards on behalf of other participating annuitants, the difference shall be paid by all participating annuitants. The city, based upon the determination of the independent actuary, shall set the monthly amounts to be paid by the participating annuitants. The initial determination of such payments shall be prospective only and shall be based upon the estimated costs for the balance of the year. The board may deduct the amounts to be paid by its annuitants from the participating annuitants' monthly annuities.

If it is determined from the city's annual audit, or from audited experience data, that the total amount paid by all participating annuitants was more or less than the difference between (1) the cost of providing the group health care plans, and (2) the sum of the amount to be paid by the city under subsection (c) and the amounts paid by all the pension boards, then the independent actuary and the city shall account for the excess or shortfall in the next year's payments by annuitants.

(h) An annuitant may elect to terminate coverage in a plan at any time, which election shall terminate the annuitant's obligation to contribute toward payment of the excess described in subsection (g).

Laws 1963, p. 161, § 8-164.1, added by P.A. 84-23, § 1, eff. July 18, 1985. Amended by P.A. 86-273, § 1, eff. Aug. 23, 1989.

Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 108 1/2, [8-164.1.

Historical and Statutory Notes

P.A. 86-273 rewrote the section which prior thereto, provided:

"Each employce annuitant in receipt of an annuity on the effective date of this Section and each employee who retires on annuity

after the effective date of this Section, may participate in a group hospital care plan and a group medical and surgical plan approved by the Board if the employee annuitant is age 65 or over with at least 15 years of service. The

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Board, in conformity with its regulations, shall pay to the organization underwriting such plan the current monthly premiums up to the maximum amounts authorized in the following paragraph for such coverage,

"As of the effective date the Board is authorized to make payments up to \$25 per month for employee annuitants age 65 years or over with at least 15 years of service.

"If the monthly premium for such coverage exceeds the \$25 per month maximum authorization, the difference between the required monthly premiums for such coverage and such maximum may be deducted from the employee PENSION CODE

annuitant's annuity if the annuitant so elects; otherwise such coverage shall terminate.

"Amounts contributed by the city as authorized under Section 8-189 for the benefits set forth in this Section shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits and all such premiums shall be charged to it.

"The group hospital care plan and group medical and surgical plan established under this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970."

Library References

Municipal Corporations = 186(1), 187(2). WESTLAW Topic No. 268.

C.J.S. Municipal Corporations §§ 586, 588, 589,

5/8-165. Re-entry into service

§ 8-165. Re-entry into service. (a) When an employee receiving age and service or prior service annuity who has withdrawn from service after the effective date re-enters service before age 65, any annuity previously granted and any annuity fixed for his wife shall be cancelled. The employee shall be credited for annuity purposes with sums sufficient to provide annuities equal to those cancelled, as of their ages on the date of re-entry; provided, the maximum age of the wife for this purpose shall be as provided in Section 8-155 of this Article.

The sums so credited shall provide for annuities to be fixed and granted in the future. Contributions by the employees and the city for the purposes of this Article shall be made, and when the proper time arrives, as provided in this Article, new annuities based upon the total credit for annuity purposes and the entire term of his service shall be fixed for the employee and his wife.

If the employee's wife died before he re-entered service, no part of any credits for widow's or widow's prior service annuity at the time annuity for his wife was fixed shall be credited upon re-entry into service, and no such sums shall thereafter be used to provide such annuity.

(b) When an employee re-enters service after age 65, payments on account of any annuity previously granted shall be suspended during the time thereafter that he is in service, and when he again withdraws, annuity payments shall be resumed. If the employee dies in service, his widow shall receive the amount of annuity previously fixed for her.

Laws 1963, p. 161, § 8-165, eff. July 1, 1963. Amended by P.A. 81-1187, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1981; P.A. 81-1536, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1981. Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, cb. 108 1/2, ¶ 8-165.

Historical and Statutory Notes

P.A. 81-1187 inserted "or on behalf of" in the Prior Laws: second paragraph of subd. (a). Laws 1921

P.A. 81-1536 in the second sentence of the second paragraph of subd. (a), following "Contributions by", deleted "or on behalf of".

Laws 1921, p. 203, § 34. Laws 1935, p. 303, § 34. Laws 1935, p. 303, § 38¹/₂, added by Laws 1949, p. 829, § 1.

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EXHIBIT 8C

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EXHIBIT 8C

ILLINOIS PENSION CODE GROUP HEALTH BENEFIT PROVISIONS AS AMENDED BY P.A. 90-32 EFFECTIVE JUNE 27, 1997

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) any interest earnings over 4% a year sly used to finance such increases and , Reserve, may be used to the extent finance such increases for the current rior Service Annuity Reserve. In the y Payment Reserve from such sources sons entitled to such increases for the the money available to the total of the each person for that year.

increases in annuity as provided for in purpose are available. 7, 5 67, eff. July 29, 1999.

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rect patent and technical errors, to revise references, to resolve multiple actions in the <u>Jeneral Assembly</u> and to make certain technirections in P.A. 90-567 through P.A. 90-810.

Artice, beginning January 1; 1996, the resent who is entitled to receive a contragard to whether the deceased of the same datary Act of 1995. the beginning January 1, 1999, the ryphism who is entitled to receive a wither regard to whether the deceased date of this amendatory Act of 1998, m of widow's annuity shall be \$700 per gard to whether the deceased policeman indatory Act of 1993: (1) the widow of a of service cradit, or who dies in service a who withdraws from service with 20 or w a refund, provided that the widow is service.

therwise made by it under the other tions as are necessary for the minimum he manner prescribed in Section 5-175, -12, § 5, eff. April 20, 1995; P.A. 90-786, § 5,

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the deceased policeman was in service on the tive date of P.A. 86-273. Effective January 1, 1990, the minimum amount idow's annuity shall be \$400 per month for thewing classes of widows, without regard to ther the deceased policeman was in service on affective date of P.A. 86-273: (a) the widow of diceman who dies in the service with at least 10

s of service credit at date of death in the import of who dies in the service after June 30,

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'1981; ''and. (b) ' the widow of a 'policeman who withdraws after 20 or more years of service and vdoes not withdraw a refund; provided the widow is married to the policeman before he withdraws from the service. The mean of the service and the an Effective January 1/ 1992, the minimum amount. of widow's annuity shall, be \$500 per month for the following classes of widows, without regard to whether the deceased policeman is in service on or "after the effective date of P.A. 87-849; (1) the widow of a policeman who dies. In service with at least 10 years of service credit; or who dies in service after June 30, 1981; and (2) the widow of a policeman who withdraws from service with 20 or more years of service credit and does not withdraw a rohind, provided that the widow is married to the -policeman before he withdraws from service, สอส เร้า - 1 A

5/5-167.5. Group health benefit

§ 5-167.5. Group health benefit.

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"Effective January 1, 1993, the minimum amount of widow's annuity shall be \$600 per month for the following classes of widows, without regard to whether the deceased policeman is in service on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1993; (1) the widow of a policeman who dies in service with at least 10 years of service credit, or who dies in service after June 30, 1981; and (2) the widow of a policeman who withdraws from service with 20 or more years of service credit and does not withdraw a refund, provided that the widow is married to the policeman before he withdraws from service,";

inserted subsec. (a); and inserted subsection designations for the former fifth and sixth paragraphs. P.A. 90-766, in subsec. (a), added the second paragraph.

(a). For the purposes of this Section: (1) "annuitant" means a person receiving an age and sorvice annuity, a prior service annuity, a widow's annuity, a widow's prior service annuity, or a minimum annuity, under Article 5, 6, 8 or 11,¹ by reason of previous employment by the City of Chicago (hereinafter, in this Section, "the city"); (2) "Medicare Plan annuitant" means an "annuitant described in item (1) who is eligible for Medicare benefits; and (3) "non-"Medicare Plan annuitant" means an annuitant described in item (1) who is not eligible for Medicare benefits,

³⁷³(b). The city shall offer group health benefits to annuitants and their eligible dependents "through June 30, 2002: The basic city health care plan available as of June 30, 1988 (hereinafter called the basic city plan) shall case to be a plan offered by the city, except as trapedide in subparagraphs (4), and (5) below, and shall be closed to new enrollment or stransfer of coverage for any non-Medicare Plan annuitant as of the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1997. The city shall offer non-Medicare Plan annuitants and their eligible "dependents the option of enrolling in its Annuitant Preferred Provider Plan and may offer additional plans for any annuitant. The city may amend, modify, or terminate any of its additional plans at its sole discretion. If the city offers more than one annuitant plan, the city shall allow annuitants to convert coverage from one city annuitant plan to another, except the basic city plan, during times designated by the city, which periods of time shall occur at least fannually. For the period dating from the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1997 through June 30, 2002; monthly premium rates may be increased for annuitants during the time of their participation in non-Medicare plans, except as provided in subparagraphs (1) through (4) of this subsection.

(1) For non-Medicare Plan annuitants who retired prior to January 1, 1988, the annuitant's share of monthly premium for non-Medicare Plan coverage only shall not exceed the highest premium rate chargeable under any city non-Medicare Plan annuitant coverage as of December 1, 1996,

(2) For non-Medicare Plan annuitants who retire on or after January 1, 1988, the annuitant's share of monthly premium for non-Medicare Plan coverage only shall be the rate in effect on December 1, 1996, with monthly premium increases to take effect no sconer than April 1, 1998 at the lower of (i) the premium rate determined pursuant to subsection (g) or (ii) 10% of the immediately previous month's rate for similar coverage.
(3) In no event shall any non-Medicare Plan annuitant's share of monthly premium for non-Medicare Plan coverage exceed 10% of the annuitant's monthly annuity.

(4) Non-Medicare Plan annuitants who are enrolled in the basic city plan as of July 1, 1998 may remain in the basic city plan; if they so choose, on the condition that they are not entitled to the caps on rates set forth in subparagraphs (1) through (3), and their premium rate shall be the rate determined in accordance with subsections (c) and (g).

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.40 ILCS 5/5-167.5

Medicare Plan annuitants who are currently enrolled in the basic city plan for Medicare eligible annuitants may remain in that plan, if they so choose, through June 30, 2002. Annuitants shall not be allowed to enroll in or transfer into the basic city plan for Medicare eligible annuitants on or after July 1, 1999. The city shall continue to offer annuitants a supplemental Medicare Plan for Medicare eligible annuitants through June 30, 2002, and the city may offer additional plans to Medicare eligible annuitants in its sole an discretion. All Medicare Plan annuitant monthly rates shall be determined in accordance with subsections (c) and (g).

(c) The city shall pay 50% of the aggregated costs of the claims or premiums, whichever is applicable, as determined in accordance with subsection (g), of annuitants and their dopendents under all health care plans offered by the city. The city may reduce its obligation by application of price reductions obtained as a result of financial arrangements with providers or plan administrators,

se (d) From January 1, 1993 until June 30, 2002, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of the city's plans, the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for each such annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and up to a maximum of \$45 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy authorized under Section 5-168; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be charged against it.

except with regard to covered expenses incurred but not paid as of that date. This subsection ehall not affect other obligations that may be imposed by law.

De pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII. of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

(g) For each annuitant plan offered by the city, the aggregate cost of claims, as reflected in "the claim records of the plan administrator, shall be estimated by the city, based supon a written determination by a qualified independent actuary to be appointed and paid by the city "and the board. If the estimated annual cost for each annuitant plan offered by the city is more than the estimated amount to be contributed by the city for that plan pursuant to subsections (b) and (o) during that year plus the estimated amounts to be paid pursuant, to is ubsection (d) and by the other pension boards on behalf of other participating annuitants, the difference shall be paid by all annuitants participating in the plan, except as provided in subsection (b). The city, based upon the determination of the independent actuary, shall set the monthly amounts to be paid by the participating annuitants. The board may deduct the amounts to be paid by its annuitants from the participating annuitants, monthly amounts to amounts to be paid by its annuitants from the participating annuitants.

If it is determined from the city's annual audit, or from andited experience data, that the total amount paid by all participating annuitants was more or less than the difference between (1) the cost of providing the group health care plans, and (2) the sum of the amount to be paid by the city as determined under subsection (c) and the amounts paid by all the pension boards, then the independent actuary and the city shall account for the excess or shortfall in the next year's payments by annuitants, except as provided in subsection (b).

(b) An annuitant may elect to terminate coverage in a plan at the end of any month, which election shall terminate the annuitant's obligation to contribute toward payment of the excess described in subsection (g).

(i) The city shall advise the board of all proposed premium increases for health care at least 75 days prior to the effective date of the change, and any increase shall be prospective only.

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Amended by P.A. 90-32, § 5, eff. June 27, 1997.

Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 108 ½, 15-167.5.

1 40 ILCS 5/5-101 et seq., 5/6-101 et seq., 5/8-101 et seq. or 5/11-101 et seq.

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January of the year following the year he attains the age of 65, or in January, 1970, if he is then over age 65, his then fixed and payable monthly annuity increased by an amount equal to 2% of the original grant of annuity, for each year he received annuity payments after the year in which he attains age 65. An additional 2% increase in such fixed and payable original granted annuity shall accrue in each January thereafter.

However, beginning January 1, 1996; the increases payable under this subsection (a) to a fireman born before January 1, 1945 shall be at the rate of 3% of the originally granted annuity amount, notwithstanding that the fireman terminated service prior to the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1995. (a) of this Section apply only to a retired fireman eligible for such increases in his annuity if he contributed to the find a sum equal to 1% of the final "average monthly salary used in the computation of the annuity for each full year of credited service upon which his annuity was computed. All such sums contributed shall be placed in a Supplementary Payment Reserve and used for the purposes of such fund account.

(c) Beginning with the monthly annulty payment due in July, 1982, the monthly annulty payment for any fireman who retired from the service before September 1, 1976 at age 50 or over with 20 or more years of service or who was granted duty disability benefits prior to September 1, 1957 and entitled to an annuity or duty disability benefits on July 1, 1975 shall be not less than \$400.

(d) The difference in amount between the minimum monthly annuity specified in subsection (c) and the minimum monthly annuity to which the fireman was entitled before July 1, 1975, in accordance with the provisions of Section 6-128.1, shall be paid as a supplement in the minimum set forth in subsection (s).

(a) (6) To defray the annual cost of the increases indicated in the preceding part of this Section, the annual income accruing from investments held by this fund, above 4% a year, to the extent necessary and available to finance the cost of such increases for the following year, shall be transferred each year beginning with the year 1969 to a fund account designated as "the Supplementary Payment Reserve from the Interest and Investment Reserve set forth in Section 6-203; "in the last of the last of the last of the last of the supplementary for the last of the last

If the money in the Supplementary Payment Reserve in any year arising from interest income above 4% a year as defined in this Section accruing in the preceding year; and the contributions by retired persons, are insufficient to make the total payments to all persons entitled to the annuity under this Section; and any investment earnings over 4% a year beginning with the year 1969 not previously used to finance such increases and transferred to the Prior Service Annuity Reserve, may be used to the extent necessary and available to provide sufficient funds to finance such increases for the current year. Such sums shall be transferred from the Prior Service Annuity Reserve. If the total money available in the "Supplementary Payment Reserve from such sources are insufficient to make the total 'payments to all persons entitled to such increases for the year, a proportionate amount computed as the ratio of the money available to the total of all the payments specified for that year shall be paid to each person for that year:

No part of any such increase under this Section is an obligation of the fund otherwise established under this Article 6.

Amended by P.A. 89–186, § 15, eff. July 14, 1995. Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 1082, 76–164.1.

Historical and Statutory Notes

P.A. 89-136 inserted the section heading; designated the subsections; in subsec. (a), in the first paragraph, in the first sentence, inserted "on or"; added the second paragraph; in subsec. (b), in the first sentence, substituted "subsection (a)" for "the

preceding paragraph"; and in subsec. (d), substituted "subsection (c)" for "the preceding paragraph" and "subsection (e)" for "the immediately following paragraph". d

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5/6-164.2. Group health benefit

§ 6-164.2. Group health benefit.

(a) For the purposes of this Section: (1) "annultant" means a person receiving an age and service annulty, a prior service annuity, a widow's annuity, a widow's prior service annuity, or 124

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e of 65, or in January, 1970, if he is uity increased by an amount equal to yed annuity payments after the year in such fixed and payable original

yable under this subsection (a) to a ite of 3% of the originally granted nated service prior to the effective

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V H S Syyaar arising from interest in the preceding year; and the Here arising over 4% a year statent earnings over 4% a year buch increases and transferred to extent necessary and available to current year. Such sums shall be if the total money available in the re insufficient to make the total the year, a proportionate amount f all the payments specified for that

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saragraph"; and in subsec. (d), substituttion (c)" for "the preceding paragraph" :tion (c)" for "the immediately following

eans a person receiving an age and a widow's prior service annuity, or PENSIONS

a minimum annuity, under Article 5, 6, 8 or 11,¹ by reason of previous employment by the City of Chicago (hereinafter, in this Section, "the city"); (2) "Medicare Plan annuitant" means an annuitant described in item (1) who is eligible for Medicare benefits; and (3) "non-Medicare Plan annuitant" means an annuitant described in item (1) who is not eligible for Medicare benefits.

(b) The city shall offer group health benefits to annuitants and their eligible dependents through June 30, 2002. The basic city health care plan available as of June 30, 1988 (hereinafter called the basic city plan) shall cease to be a plan offered by the city, except as specified in 'subparagraphs (4) and (5) below, and shall be closed to new enrollment or transfer of coverage for any non-Medicare Plan annuitant as of the effective date of this amenidatory Act of 1997. The city shall offer non-Medicare Plan annuitants and their eligible dependents the option of enrolling in its Annuitant Preferred Provider Blan and may offer additional plans for any annuitant. The city may amend, modify, or terminate any of its additional plans for any annuitant. If the city offers more than one annuitant plan, the city shall allow annuitants to convert coverage from one city annuitant plan to another, except the basic city plan, during times designated by the city, which periods of time shall occur at least annually. For the period dating from the effective date of this amendatory. Act of 1997 through June 30, 2002; monthly premium rates may be increased for annuitants during the time of their participation in non-Medicare plans; except as provided in subparagraphs (1)

(1) For non-Medicare Plan annuitants who retired prior to January 1, 1988, the annuitant's share of monthly premium for non-Medicare Plan coverage only shall not exceed the highest premium rate chargeable under any city non-Medicare Plan annuitant coverage as of December 1, 1996.

(2) For non-Medicare Plan annuitants who retire on or after January 1, 1938, the annuitant's share of monthly premium for non-Medicare Plan coverage only shall be the rate in effect on December 1, 1996, with monthly premium increases to take effect no sooner than April 1, 1998 at the lower of (i) the premium rate determined pursuant to subsection (g) or (ii) 10% of the immediately previous month's rate for similar coverage. (3) In no event shall any non-Medicare Plan annuitant's share of monthly premium for non-Medicare Plan coverage exceed 10% of the annuitant's monthly annuity.

(4) Non-Medicare Plan annuitants who are enrolled in the basic city plan as of July 1, 1998 may remain in the basic city plan, if they so choose; on the condition that they are not entitled to the caps on rates set forth in subparagraphs (1) through (3), and their premium rate shall be the rate determined in accordance with subsections (c) and (g).

(5) Medicare Plan annuitants who are currently enrolled in the basic city plan for Medicare eligible annuitants may remain in that plan, if they so choose, through June 30, 2002. Annuitants shall not be allowed to enroll in or transfer into the basic city plan for Medicare eligible annuitants on or after July 1, 1999. The city shall continue to offer annuitants a supplemental Medicare Plan for Medicare eligible annuitants through June 30, 2002, and the city may offer additional plans to Medicare eligible annuitants in its sole discretion. All Medicare Plan annuitant monthly rates shall be determined in accordance with subsections (c) and (g).

(c) The city shall pay 50% of the aggregated costs of the claims or premiums, whichever is applicable, as determined in accordance with subsection (g), of annuitants and their dependents under all health care plans offered by the city. The city may reduce its obligation by application of price reductions obtained as a result of financial arrangements with providers or plan administrators.

(d) From January 1, 1993 until June 30, 2002, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of the city's plans the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for each such annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and up to a maximum of \$45 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy authorized under Soction 6-165; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be charged against it.

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40 ILCS 5/6-164.2

ILCS 5/6-164.2

(e). The aity's obligations under subsections (b) and (c) shall terminate on June 80, 2002. except with regard to covered expenses incurred but not paid as of that date. This subsection shall not affect other obligations that may be imposed by law. (f) The group coverage plans described in this Section are not and shall not be construed to

be pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. (g) For each annuitant plan offered by the sity, the aggregate cost of claims, as reflected in

the claim records of the plan administrator, shall be estimated by the gity, based upon a written determination by a qualified independent actuary to be appointed and paid by the dity and the board ... If the estimated annual cost for each annuitant plan offered by the city is more than the estimated amount to be contributed by the city for that plan pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) during that year plus the estimated amounts to be paid pursuant to subsection.(d) and by the other pension boards on behalf of other participating annuitants, the. differences shall; be; paid, by all annuitants participating in the plan, except, as provided in subsection. (b). 'The city, based upon the determination of the independent actuary, shall set the monthly amounts to be paid by the participating annuitants, . The board may deduct the amounts to be paid by its annuitants from the participating annuitants monthly annuities.

"If it is determined from the city's annual audit; or from audited experience data, that the total amount paid by all participating annuitants was more or less than the difference between (1) the cost of providing the group health care plans, and (2) the sum of the amount to" be paid by the dity as determined under subsection (c) and the amounts paid by all the pension boards, then-the independent actuary and the city shall account for the excess or shortfall in the next year's payments by annuitants, except as provided in subsection (b). "(h) An annuitant may elect to terminate coverage in a plan at the end of any month, which effection shall terminate the annuitant's obligation to contribute toward payment of the excess described in subsection (e): "hat star grand of a rate in premium increases for heath care at interprete the board of all proposed premium increases for heath care at

and any other thank and Historical and Statutory Notes and a state of the state of this Section, 'annuitant' means a person receiving. 1992, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of an age and service annuity, a prior service annuity, "seach of the board's annuitants, who chooses to a widow's annulty, a widow's prior service annuity, or a minimum annuity on or after January 1, 1988; under Article 5, 6, 8 or 11, by reason of previous employment by the City of Chicago (hereinafter, in-

this Section, 'the city'). (1) in the city'), (b) The city shall continue to offer to annuitants and their dependents the same basic city. health care plan available as of June '30, 1988 (hereinafter called the basic city plan), and may offer additional plans at its sole discretion.

"(c) Effective the data the initial increased annuitant payments purguant to subsection (g) take. effect, the city shall pay 50% of the aggregated. costs of the claims or premiums, whichever is applicable, of annuitants and their dependents under all health care plans offered by the city.' The claims orpremiums of all annultants and their dependents under all of the plans offered-by the city shall be aggregated for the purpose of calculating the city's payment required under this subsection, as well as

participate, in any of the city's plans the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$65 per, month for cach such annuitant who'ls not qualified to receive medicaro benefits, and up to a maximum of \$35 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive: medicare benefits. . From January 1, 1993 until December 31, 1997, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of the city's plans the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for each such annultant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and up to a maximum of \$45 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

"For the period January 1; 1988 through the effective date of this amendatory"Act of 1989, payments under this Section shall be reduced by the amounts paid by or on behalf of the board's annuitants covered during that period.

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> 6-165; s sorve for and sure city requi against it "(e) T and (c) except wi not paid affect of law.' "(በ) ፐ፣ Section 1 pension (tion 5 of 1970. (g) Ti for each all'annuit group he: city, baser fied, indep by the cit more that by the c

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c) shall terminate on June 30, 2002; paid as of that date. This subsection law. are not and shall not be construed to ion 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois

The second second second second second second second second second second second second second second second s gregate cost of claims, as reflected in stimated by the city, based upon a to be appointed and paid by the city? innuitant plan offered by the city is ' the city for that plan pursuant to; ited amounts to be paid pursuant to of other participating annuitants, the ; in the plan, except as provided in. of the independent actuary, shall set auitants. The board may deduct the sating annuitants' monthly annuities. om audited experience data, that the 1 more or less than the difference plans, and (2) the sum of the amount (c) and the amounts paid by all the city shall account for the excess or xcept as provided in subsection (b). plan at the end of any month, which tribute toward payment of the excess E A S g reinternet intereases for health care at

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rom January 1, 1988 until December 31, board shall pay to the city on behalf of the board's annultants who chooses to te in any of the city's plans the following up to a maximum of \$65 per month for annultant who is not qualified to receive benefits, and up to a maximum of \$35 per ir each such annuitant who is qualified to nedicare benefits: From January 1, 1993 tember 31, 1997, the board shall pay to the shalf of each of the board's annuitants who to participate in any of the city's plans the , amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per it each such annuitant who is not qualified s medicare benefits, and up to a maximum or month for each such annuitant who is to/receive medicare benefits.

the period January 1; 1988 through the dato of this amendatory Act of 1989, t under this Soction shall be reduced by the paid by or on behalf of the board's annuiered during that period.

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"The payments described in this subsection shall, , amounts to be paid pursuant to subsection (d) and be paid from the tax levy authorized under Section 6-165), such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group, hospital care and group modical and surgical plan benefits, and all paymonts to the : city required under this subsection shall be charged

against it. (e) The city's obligations under subsections (b) and (c) shall terminate on December 31, 1997,11 except with regard to covered expenses incurred but not paid as of that date. This subsection shall not affect, other, obligations that may be imposed by law.

"(f) The group coverage plans described in this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Sec. tion 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970/

vill(g) The aggregate cost: of claims and premiums for each calendar year from 1989 through 1997 of all'annuitants and dependents covered by the city's group health care plans shall be estimated by the city, based upon a written determination by a qualified independent actuary to be appointed and paid by the city and the board. If such estimated cost is more than the estimated amount to be contributed toward payment of the by the city during that year plus the estimated tion (g).

40 ILCS 5/6-165

by the other pension boards on behalf of other participating annuitants, the difference shall be paid by all participating annuitants. The city, based upon the determination of the independent actuary, shall set the monthly amounts to be paid by the participating annuitants. The initial determination of such payments shall be prospective only and shall be based upon the estimated costs for the balance of the year.: The board may deduct the amounts tobe paid by its annultants from the participating. annuitants' monthly annuities.

"If it is determined from the city's annual audit. or from audited experience data, that the total amount, paid by all participating annuitants was more or less than the difference between (1) the cost of providing the group health care plans, and' (2) the sum of the amount to be paid by the city under subsection (c) and the amounts paid by all the pension boards, then the independent actuary and the city shall account for the excess or shortfall in the next year's payments by annuitants.

. "(h) An annultant may elect to terminate coverage in a plan at any time, which election shall terminate, the annuitant's obligation to contribute toward payment of the excess described in subsec-.

Construction with other law 1 city to contribute specified amount for annuitants health care coverage focused upon governmental licalth care coverage focused upon governmental purpose and plainly did not place the city in the 1. Gonstruction with other law structure of the insurance of the contemplated by the Insur-, City did not engage in, "any kind of insurance or space Code. City of Chicago v. Korshak, App. 1 surety business" so as to entitle allorney for class of the Dist. 1995, 213 III, Dec. 144, 276 III, App.3d 597, 658 annuitant Intervenors to award of fees under, IIII - N.E.2d 1165, Tehraring denied, appeal denied 217 able Insurance of the structure of

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(a) Except as expressly provided in this Section, each city shall levy a tax annually upon all taxable property therein for the purpose of providing revenue for the fund. For the years prior to the year 1960; the tax rate shall be as provided for in the "Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of the Illinois Municipal Code".1, The tax, from and after January 1, 1968 to and including the year 1971, shall not exceed .0868% of the value, as equalized or assessed by the Department of Revenue, of all taxable property in the city. Beginning with the year 1972 and each year thereafter the city shall levy a tax annually at a rate on the dollar of the value, as equalized or assessed by the Department of Revenue of all taxable property within such city that will produce, when extended, not to exceed an amount equal to the total amount of contributions by the employees to the fund made in the calendar year 2 years prior to the year for which the annual applicable tax is levied, multiplied by 2.23 through the calendar year 1981, and by 2.26 for the year 1982 and for each year thereafter.

...To provide revenue for the ordinary death benefit established by Section 6-150 of this Article, in addition to the contributions by the firemen for this purpose, the city council shall for the year 1962 and each year thereafter annually levy a tax, which shall be in addition to and exclusive of the taxes authorized to be levied under the foregoing provisions of this Section, upon all taxable property in the city, as equalized or assessed by the Department of Revenue, at such rate per cent of the value of such property as shall be sufficient to produce for each year the sum of \$142,000.

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huily at the rate of 1% throughout his irest on such amounts at the effective · · · 5 p. 63 1.1.

90-655, § 48, off, July 80, 1998.

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1983 (increasing the maximum from \$400 to \$500 a month), shall be offective as of January 1, 1984, and upply in the case of every qualifying widow whose suspand dies in the service on or after January 1, 984 or withdraws and enters on annuity on or after anuary 1, 1984," 12.1

P.A. 90-655, "the First 1998 General Revisory ict, amended various Acts to delete obsplete text, o correct patent and technical errors, to revise ross references, to resolve multiple actions in the 9th and 90th General Assemblies and to make ertain technical corrections in P.A. 89-708 through A. 90-566.

is payable monthly after the death of an

attainment of ago 18, under the following yee attained age, 65, and before he withdrew

in the performance of an act of duty;

erthan injury incurred in the performance rears of period after the date of his original d Sflis about re-entry;

12 20 after June 27, 1997) and who has 1002102, eff. Abg. 14, 1998.

utory Notes 44 4 4 4 1 P.A. 90-766 incorporated the amendment by P.A.

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; on the effective date of this amendatory e \$220 per month for each child while the nd \$250 per month for each child when no lowing limitations: $a^{*}b$ 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. id children of an employee whose death

f duty, or for the children where a widow nonthly salary, the annuity for each child uities for the family shall not exceed such ٠. ·

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40 ILCS 5/8-164.1

(2) For the family of an employee whose death is the result of any cause other than injury incurred in the performance of duty, in which the combined annuities for the family, exceed. 60% of the employee's final monthly salary, the annuity for each child shall be reduced pro rata so that the combined annuities for the family shall not exceed such limitation.

(3) The increase in child's annuity provided by this amendatory Act of 1997 shall apply to all child's annuities being paid on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1997. The limitations on the combined annuities for a family in parts (1) and (2) of this Section do not apply to families of employees who died before the effective date of this amendatory. Act

(4) The amendments to parts (1) and (2) of this Section made by Public Act 84-1472 (eliminating the further limitation that the monthly combined family amount shall not exceed \$500 plus 10% of the employee's final' monthly salary) shall apply in the case of every qualifying child whose employee parent dies in the service or enters on annuity on or after January 23, 1987.

Amended by P.A: 90-82, § 5, eff. June 27, 1997; P.A. 90-511, § 2, eff. Aug. 22, 1997

Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 108 ½, 1 8-159,

'Historical and Statutory' Notes

The amendments by P.A. 90-32 and P.A. 90-511, which were identical, in the introductory paragraph, substituted "on the effective date of this amendato-ry Act of 1997" for "January 1, 1988", "\$220" for "\$120", and "\$250" for "\$150"; in subpar. (3), in the first sentence, substituted "1997" for "1987" and "this effective date of this amendato. and "the effective date of this amendatory Act of

1997." for "January 1, 1988, subject to"; 'In the second' sentence, deleted "above" preceding "fimitations" and added "in parts (1) and (2) of this Section do not apply to families of employees who died before the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1997",

5/8-160. Duty disability benefit-Child's disability benefit

Cross References

Early retirement incentive, see 40 ILCS 5/8-188.1.

5/8–161. Ordinary disability benefit

Cross References

Early retirement incentive, see 40 ILCS 5/8-138.1, .

5/8-164.1. Group bealth benefit

. § 8-164.1. Group health benefit,

(a) For the purposes of this Section: (1) "annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity, a prior service annuity, a widow's annuity, a widow's prior service annuity, or a minimum annuity, under Article 5, 6, 8 or 11, by reason of previous employment by the City of Chicago (hereinafter, in this Section, "the city"); (2) "Medicare Plan annuitant" means an annuitant described in item (1) who is eligible for Medicare benefits; and (3) "non-Medicare Plan annuitant" means an annuitant described in item (1) who is not eligible for

(b) The city shall offer group health benefits to annuitants and their eligible dependents through June 30, 2002. The basic city health care plan available as of June 80, 1988 (hereinafter called the basic city plan) shall cease to be a plan offered by the city, except as specified in subparagraphs (4) and (5) below, and shall be closed to new enrollment or transfer of coverage for any non-Medicare Plan annuitant as of the effective date of this aniondatory Act of 1997. 'The city shall offer non-Medicare Plan annuitants and their eligible dependents the option of enrolling in its Annuitant Preferred Provider Plan and may offer additional plans for any annultant. The city may annual; modify; or terminate any of its additional plans at its sole discretion. If the city offers more than one annuitant plan; the city shall allow annuitants to convert coverage from one city annuitant plan to another, except the

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40 ILCS 5/8-164.1

basic city plan, during times designated by the city, which periods of time shall occur at least annually. For the period dating from the effective date of this amendatory. Act of 1997 through June 80, 2002, monthly premium rates may be increased for annuitants during the time of their participation in non-Medicare plans, except as provided; in subparagraphs. (1) through (4) of this subsection..., https://www.com/action.com/action/a

.164 (1). For non-Medicare Plan annuitants who retired prior to January 1, 1988, the annuistant's share of monthly premium for non-Medicare Plan coverage only shall not exceed the "bighest premium rate chargeable under any city non-Medicare Plan annuitant coverage as of December 1, 1996.

(2) (For non-Medicare, Plan annuitants who ratire on or after January, 1, 1988, the annuitant's share of monthly premium for non-Medicare Plan coverage, only shall be the rate in effect on December 1, 1996, with monthly premium increases to take effect no sooner than April 1, 1998 at the lower of (1) the premium rate determined pursuant to subsection (g) or (ii) 10% of the immediately previous month's rate for similar coverage.
(3) In no event shall any non-Medicare Plan annuitant's share of monthly premium for non-Medicare Plan coverage exceed 10% of the annuitant's monthly annuity.

(4) Non-Medicare Plan annuitants who are enrolled in the basic city plan as of July 1, 1998 may remain in the basic city plan, if they so choose, on the condition that they are not entitled to the caps on rates set forth in subparagraphs (1) through (3), and their premium rate shall be the rate determined in accordance with subsections (c) and (g).
(5) Medicare Plan annuitants who are currently enrolled in the basic city plan for medicare entities of the caps of the condition that they are not accordance with subsections (c) and (g).

Medicare eligible annuitants may remain in that plan, if they so choose, through June 30, 2002. Annuitants shall not be allowed to enroll in or transfer into the basic city plan for Medicare eligible annuitants on or after July 1, 1999. The city shall continue to offer annuitants a supplemental Medicare Plan for Medicare eligible annuitants through June 30, 2002, and the city may offer additional plans to Medicare eligible annuitants in its sole discretion. All Medicare Plan annuitant monthly rates shall be determined in accordances with subsections (c) and (g).

(c) The city shall pay 50% of the aggregated costs of the claims or premiume, whichever is applicable, as determined in accordance with subsection (g), of annuitants and their dependents under all health care plans offered by the city. The city may reduce its obligation by application of price reductions obtained as a result of financial arrangements with providers or plan administrators.

(d) From January 1, 1993 until June 30, 2002, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of the city's plans tho following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for each such annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and up to a maximum of \$45 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

Commencing on the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1989, the board is authorized to pay to the board of education on behalf of each person who chooses to participate in the board of education's plan the amounts specified in this subsection (d) during the years indicated. For the period January 1, 1988 through the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1989, the board shall pay to the board of education annuitants who participate in the board of education's health benefits plan for annuitants the following amounts: \$10 per month to each annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and \$14 per month to each annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy authorized under Section 8-189; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be charged against it.

(e) The city's obligations under subsections (b) and (c) shall terminate on June 30, 2002, except with regard to covered expenses incurred but not paid as of that date. This subsection shall not affect other obligations that may be imposed by law.

(f) The group coverage plans described in this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. PEN

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prior to January 1, 1988, the annulin coverage only shall not exceed the Medicare Plan annuitant coverage as

on or after January 1, 1988, the are Plan coverage only shall ba the remium increases to take effect no mium rate determined pursuant to s month's rate for similar coverage, ant's share of monthly premium for nt's monthly annuity.

I in the basic city plan as of July 1, se; on the condition that they are not s (1) through (3), and their premium basections (0) and (g). if they so choose, through June 80; transfor into the basic city plan for 9. The city shall continue to offer eligible annultants through June 30, licare eligible annuitants in its sole s shall be determined in accordance

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Act of 1989, the board is authorized n who chooses to participate in the is subsection (d) during the years ffective date of this amendatory Act mitants who participate in the board llowing amounts: \$10 per month to benefits, and \$14 per month to each

I from the tax levy authorized under eserve for group hospital care and ints to the city required under this

) shall terminate on June 30, 2002, said as of that date. This subsection AW.

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in (g) For each annuitant plan offered by the dity; the aggregate cost of claims; as reflected in the claim records of the plan administrator, shall be estimated by the city; based upon a written determination by a qualified independent actuary to be appointed and paid by the city and the board. If the estimated annual cost for each annuitant plan offered by the city is more than the estimated amount to be contributed by the city for that plan pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) during that year plus the estimated amounts to be paid pursuant to subsection (d) and by the other pension boards on behalf of other participating annuitants, the difference shall be paid by all annuitants participating in the plan; except as provided in subsection (b): "The city, based upon the determination of the independent actuary, shall set the monthly amounts to be paid by the participating annuitants. The board may deduct the amounts to be paid by its annuitants from the participating annuitants; monthly annuities, "If it is determined from the city's annual audit, or from audited experience data, that the total amount paid by all participating annuitants was more or less than the difference between (1) the cost of providing the group health care plans, and (2) the sum of the amount to be paid by the city as determined under subsection (c) and the amounts paid by all the pension boards, then the independent actuary and the city shall account for the excess or shortfall in the next year's payments by annuitants, except as provided in subsection (b). (h) An annuitant may elect to terminate coverage in a plan at the end of any month, which election shall terminate the annuitant's obligation to contribute toward payment of the excess described in subsection (g).

's (i) The bity shall advises the board of all proposed premium increases for health care at least 175 days prior to the effective date of the change, and any increase shall be prospective only.

Amended by P.A. 90-82, § 5, eff. June 27, 1997.

Formerly Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 108 %, 18-164.1.

' 11.240 ILCS 3/5-101 et seq., 5/6-101 et seq., 5/8-101 et seq. or 5/11-101 et seq.

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Group health benefit (a) For the purposes of 'this 'Section; 'annuitant' means a 'person receiving an age and service annuity, a prior service annuity, a widow's annuity, a widow's prior service annuity, on a minimum annuity on or after January 1, 1988, under Article 5, 6, 8 or 11, by reason of previous employment by the City of Chicago (hereinafter, in, this Section, 'the city'),

"(b) The city shall continue to offer to annuitants and their dependents the same basic city health care plan available as of June 30, 1988 (hereinafter called the basic city plan), and may offer additional plans at its sole discretion.

"(c) Effective the date the initial increased anmultant payments pursuant to subsection (g) take effect; the city shall pay 50% of the aggregated "Commencing on the effective date of this amencosts of the claims or premiums, whichever is applicable; of annuitants and their dependents under alles. health care plans offered by the city. The claims or promiums of all annuitants and their dependenta; a cation's plan the amounts specified in this subsecunder all of the plans offered by the city shall be aggregated for the purpose of calculating the city's payment required under this subsection, as well as for the setting of rates, of payment for annullants as required under subsection (g),

"(d) From January 1, 1988 until December 31, 1992, the board shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of the city's plans the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$65 per month for . effis,

month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits, ... From January 1, 1993 until December: 31, 1997; the beard shall pay to the city on behalf of each of the board's annuitants whochooses to participate in any of the city's plans the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for each such annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and up to a maximum of \$45 per month for each such annuitant who is qualified to receive medicare benefits.

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"For the period January 1, 1988 through the effective date of, this amendatory, Act of 1989, payments under this Section shall be reduced by the amounts paid by or on behalf of the board's annui-

datory Act of 1989, the board is authorized to pay to the board of education on behalf of each person who chooses to participate in the board of edution (d) during the years indicated. For the period January 1, 1988 through the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1989, the board shall pay to the board of education annuitants who participate in the board of education's health benefits plan for annuitants the following amounts: \$10 per month to each annuitant who is not qualified to receive medicare benefits, and \$14 per month to each annultant who is qualified to receive medicare ben-

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"The payments described in this subsection shall) hamounts to be hald pursuant to subsection. (d) and

and (c) shall terminate off December 31, 1797, 1866, based, upon the estimated costs for the balance except with regard to covered expenses theurred bury "vof the year. The board may deduct the amounts to not paid as of that date. This subsection shall not usbe paid by its annultants from the participating affect: other obligations: that; may, by imposed, by annuitants monthly annuities. So, St. 11 11 statement

tion 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of | cost of providing the group health care plans) and

for, each calendar year from good and by the city's and the city shall account for the excess of shortant all annuitants and dependents covered by the city's "and the city shall account for the excess of shortant battle error plane shall be estimated by the "Win the next year's payments by annuitants." With the city, based upon a written determination by a qualified independent actuary to be appointed and paid: by the city and the beards. If such estimated cost is more than the estimated amount to be contributed by the city during that year plus the estimated

Construction with other law 1

be paid from the tax jevy authorized under Section shall 1, amounts to be paid pursuant to subsection. (d), and be paid from the tax jevy authorized under Section. by the other pension boards on behalf, of, other 8-189; such amounts, shall, be, credited, to the re- participating amuitants, the difference shall be paid serve, for group hospital care and group medical by all participating amuitants. The city, based and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the " upon the determination of the independent actuary city required under this subsection shall be charged. Shall set the monthly amounts to be paid by the against it. The city's obligations under subsections (b). The city amounts to be paid by the super city reduced under this subsections (b).

law, "If it is determined from the city's annual audit, "If it is determined from the city's annual audit, "(1) The group coverage plans discribed in this to Thom audited experience data, that the total Section are and shall not be construed to be the amount paid by all participating annultants was pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Section and or lass than the difference between (1) the "(g) The aggregate cost of claims and premitims... under subsection (c) and the amounts paid by all for each calendar year from 1989 through 1997 of the pension boards, then the independent actuary all annuitants and dependents covered by the city's and the city shall account for the excess of shorifall

> "(h) An annuitant may elect to terminate coverrage. In a plan at any time, which, election shall Notes of Decisions: All of the state of the

are M. 101 - " R var 'city to' contribute specified "amount for annultants" health care coverage focused upon governmental purpose and plainly did not place the city in the insurance business, as contemplated by the Insurance Code, City of Chicago v. Korshak, App. 1 Dist,1995, 213 III.Dec, 144, 276 III.App.1d, 597, 658 N.B.2d 1165, rehearing denied, appeal denied 217 III. Dec. 663, 167 III.2d, 551, 667 N.E.2d, 1056. Yu

"City/did not/engage.in "any kind of insurance, or surely business? so as to entitle attorney for class of annultanty intervenors: to, award 'of fees under Illinois Insurance Code where Pension Code requiring

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Early retirement incentive, see 40 ILCS 5/8-188.1. And the set of the set o

a tax annually upon all taxable property in the city at a rate that will produce a sum which, when added to the amounts deducted from the salaries of the employees or otherwise contributed by them and the amounts deposited under subsection (f), will be sufficient for the requirements of this Article, but which when extended will produce an amount not to exceed the greater of the following: (a) the sum obtained by the levy of a tax of 1093% of the value, as equalized or assessed by the Department of Revenue, of all taxable property within such city, or (b) the sum of \$12,000,000. However any city in which a Fund has been established and in operation under this Article for more than 3 years prior to 1970 shall levy for the year 1970 a tax at a rate on the dollar of assessed valuation of all taxable property that will produce, when extended, an amount not to exceed 1.2 times the total amount of contributions made by employees to the Fund for annuity purposes in the calendar year 1968, and, for the year 1971 and 1972 such levy that will produce, when extended, an amount not to exceed 1.3 times the total amount of contributions made by employees to the Fund for annuity purposes in the calendar years 1969 and 1970, respectively; and for the year 1973 an amount not to

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*** THIS SECTION IS CURRENT THROUGH PUBLIC ACT 91-712 *** *** ANNOTATIONS CURRENT THROUGH 721 N.E.2d 1118 ***

CHAPTER 40. PENSIONS ILLINOIS PENSION CODE

TICLE 11'. LABORERS' AND RETIREMENT BOARD EMPLOYEES' ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND -- CITIES OVER 500,000 INHABITANTS

40 ILCS 5/11-160.1 (2000)

[Prior to 1/1/93 cited as: Ill. Rev. Stat., Ch. 108 1/2, para. 11-160.1]

40 ILCS 5/11-160.1. Group health benefit

Sec. 11-160.1. Group health benefit. (a) For the purposes of this Section:) "annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity, a prior rvice annuity, a widow's annuity, a widow's prior service annuity, or a nimum annuity, under Article 5, 6, 8 or 11, by reason of previous employment the City of Chicago (hereinafter, in this Section, "the city"); (2) "Medicare an annuitant" means an annuitant described in item (1) who is eligible for dicare benefits; and (3) "non-Medicare Plan annuitant" means an annuitant scribed in item (1) who is not eligible for Medicare benefits.

 (\underline{b}) The city shall offer group health benefits to annuitants and their gible dependents through June 30, 2002. The basic city health care plan izzyle as of June 30, 1968 (hereinafter called the basic city plan) shall 1 5 Body a plan offered by the city, except as specified in subparagraphs (4) $(\overline{\triangleleft} \stackrel{\bullet}{\rightarrow} \underline{M} a di)$ are Plan annuitant as of the effective date of this amendatory Act 1925 The city shall offer non-Medicare Plan annuitants and their eligible er antet he option of enrolling in its Annuitant Preferred Provider Plan and / 🚧 🛱 🛃 ditional plans for any annuitant. The city may amend, modify, or manate any of its additional plans at its sole discretion. If the city offers withan one annuitant plan, the city shall allow annuitants to convert remage from one city annuitant plan to another, except the basic city plan, ing times designated by the city, which periods of time shall occur at least ually. For the period dating from the effective date of this amendatory Act 1997 through June 30, 2002, monthly premium rates may be increased for uitants during the time of their participation in non-Medicare plans, except provided in subparagraphs (1) through (4) of this subsection,

(1) For non-Medicare Plan annuitants who retired prior to January 1, 1988, annuitant's share of monthly premium for non-Medicare Plan coverage only all not exceed the highest premium rate chargeable under any city non-Medicare annuitant coverage as of December 1, 1996.

(2) For non-Medicare Plan annuitants who retire on or after January 1, 1988, ; annuitant's share of monthly premium for non-Medicare Plan coverage only (11 be the rate in effect on December 1, 1996, with monthly premium increases take effect no sooner than April 1, 1998 at the lower of (i) the premium

PAGE

te determined pursuant to subsection (g) or (ii) 10% of the immediately evicus month's rate for similar coverage.

In no event shall any non-Medicare Plan annuitant's share of monthly en. M for non-Medicare Plan coverage exceed 10% of the annuitant's monthly nuity.

(4) Non-Medicare Plan annuitants who are enrolled in the basic city plan as July 1, 1998 may remain in the basic city plan, if they so choose, on the ndition that they are not entitled to the caps on rates set forth in bparagraphs (1) through (3), and their premium rate shall be the rate termined in accordance with subsections (c) and (g).

(5) Medicare Plan annuitants who are currently enrolled in the basic city an for Medicare eligible annuitants may remain in that plan, if they so oose, through June 30, 2002. Annuitants shall not be allowed to enroll in or ansfer into the basic city plan for Medicare eligible annuitants on or after ly 1, 1999. The city shall continue to offer annuitants a supplemental dicare Plan for Medicare eligible annuitants through June 30, 2002, and the ty may offer additional plans to Medicare eligible annuitants in its sole scretion. All Medicare Plan annuitant monthly rates shall be determined in cordance with subsections (c) and (g).

(c) The city shall pay 50% of the aggregated costs of the claims or premiums, ichever is applicable, as determined in accordance with subsection (g), of nuitants and their dependents under all health care plans offered by the city. e city may reduce its obligation by application of price reductions obtained the presult of financial arrangements with providers or plan administrators.

The From January 1, 1993 until June 30, 2002, the board shall pay to the city behave of each of the board's annuitants who chooses to participate in any of a splans the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for contraind the following amounts: up to a maximum of \$75 per month for \$

The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy therized under Section 11-178 [40 ILCS 5/11-178], such amounts shall be edited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical an benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall charged against it.

(e) The city's obligations under subsections (b) and (c) shall terminate on ne 30, 2002, except with regard to covered expenses incurred but not paid as that date. This subsection shall not affect other obligations that may be posed by law.

(f) The group coverage plans described in this Section are not and shall not construed to be pension or retirement benefits for purposes of Section 5 of ticle XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

(g) For each annuitant plan offered by the city, the aggregate cost of aims, as reflected in the claim records of the plan administrator, shall be timated by the city, based upon a written determination by a qualified dependent actuary to be appointed and paid by the city and the board. If the

40 ILCS 5/11-160.1

stimated annual cost for each annuitant plan offered by the city is more than ne estimated amount to be contributed by the city for that plan pursuant to tions (b) and (c) during that year plus the estimated amounts to be paid J. nt to subsection (d) and by the other pension boards on behalf of other 11 arcucipating annuitants, the difference shall be paid by all annuitants articipating in the plan, except as provided in subsection (b). The oity, based oon the determination of the independent actuary, shall set the monthly amounts) be paid by the participating annuitants. The board may deduct the amounts to » paid by its annuitants from the participating annuitants' monthly annuities.

If it is determined from the city's annual audit, or from audited experience ita, that the total amount paid by all participating annuitants was more or iss than the difference between (1) the cost of providing the group health care ans, and (2) the sum of the amount to be paid by the city as determined under bsection (c) and the amounts paid by all the pension boards, then the dependent actuary and the city shall account for the excess or shortfall in he next year's payments by annuitants, except as provided in subsection (b).

(h) An annuitant may elect to terminate coverage in a plan at the end of any mth, which election shall terminate the annuitant's obligation to contribute ward payment of the excess described in subsection (g).

(i) The city shall advise the board of all proposed premium increases for alth care at least 75 days prior to the effective date of the change, and any crease shall be prospective only.

STORY :

ugee; P.A. 86-273; 90-32, @ 5.

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OF LAMENDMENTS .

amendment by P.A. 90-32, effective June 27, 1997, added the b伯與爲m (a)(1) designation; in subdivision (a)(1) deleted "on or after hiary 1, 1988" preceding "under Article 5"; added subdivisions (a)(2) and [0]"; rewrote subsections (b) and (c); in subsection (d), in the first ragraph, deleted the former first sentence regarding payments from January 1, 88 until December 31, 1992 and substituted "June 30,2002" for "December 31, 97" and deleted the former second paragraph which read "For the period January 1988 through the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1989, payments der this Section shall be reduced by the amounts paid by or on behalf of the ard's annuitants covered during that period"; in subsection (e) substituted une 30, 2002" for "December 31, 1997"; rewrote subsection (g); in subsection) substituted "the end of any month" for "any time"; and added subsection (i).

SE NOTES

TY NOT INSURER

The Illinois Pension Code, which specifically provides that a city must atribute a specified amount for an annuitant's health care coverage, focuses on a governmental purpose and plainly does not place the city in the insurance siness as contemplated by the Code. City of Chicago v. Korshack, 276 Ill. App. 597, 213 Ill. Dec. 144, 658 N.E.2d 1165 (1 Dist. 1995), appeal denied, 167

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EXHIBIT 8D

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EXHIBIT 8D

ILLINOIS PENSION CODE GROUP HEALTH BENEFIT PROVISIONS AS AMENDED BY P.A. 93-42 EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2003

5/11-160.1. Payments to city a gor yo becare of task 11-160.1 Payments to city a longed with white (a) For the purposes of this Section, "city annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity, a widow's annuity, a child's annuity, or a minimum annuity under this Article as a direct result of previous employment by the City of Chicago (the city) and in margin and and (b) The board shall pay to the city, on behalf of the board's city annuitants who participate in any of the city's health care plans, the following amounts:

(1) From July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2008, \$85 per month for each such annuitant who is not eligible to "receive Medicare benefits and \$55 per month for each such annuitant, who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits "1.1"(2) From July 1, 2008 through June 50, 2013, \$95/per month for each such annuitant who is not eligible to receive Medicare benefits and \$55 per month for each such annuitant who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits. The payments described in this subsection shall be paid

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PAGE :

from the tax levy authorized under Section 11-169; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be charged against it. 27 5. C2 1 inder this subsection shall be

(c) The city health care plans referred to in this Section and the board's payments to the city under this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for the purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

Laws 1963, p. 161, § 11–160.1, added by P.A. 84–159, § 1, eff. Aug. 16, 1985. Amended by P.A. 86–273, § 1, eff. Aug. 23, 1989; P.A. 90-32, § 5, eff. June 27, 1997; P.A. 92-599; § 10, eff June 28, 2002; P.A. 93-42, § 5, eff July 1, 2003. Formerly III Rev Stat 1991, ch. 108 2, T 11-160.1. (Station of the

ELECTRONICALLY FILED 1/13/2016 4:07 PM 2013-CH-17450 PAGE 39 of 46 5/5-167.5. Payments to city action 100 sr5-167.5. Rayments to city action 100 attach For the purposes of this Section "city amuitant" means at person receiving ran tage, and service, amuity, a

widow's annuity, a child's annuity, or a minimum annuity under this Article as a direct result of previous employment by the City of Chicago ("the city").

(b) The board shall pay to the city, on behalf of the board's city annuitants who participate in any of the city's health care plans, the following amounts:

(1) From July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2008, \$85 per month for each such annuitant who is not eligible to receive Medicare benefits and \$55 per month for each such annuitant who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits. (2) From July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2013, \$95 per month for each such annuitant who is not eligible to receive Medicare benefits and \$65 per month for each such annuitant who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits. The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy authorized under Section 5-168; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be

charged against it. (c) The city health care plans referred to in this Section and the board's payments to the city under this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for the purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

Laws 1963, p. 161, § 5–167.5, aidded by P.A. 82–1044, § 1, eff Jan. 12, 1983, Amended by P.A. 86–273, § 1, eff, Aug. 22, 1989, P.A. 90–32, § 5, eff, June 27, 1997, P.A. 92–599, § 10, eff, June 28, 2002; P.A. 93–42, § 5, eff, July 1, 2003, ja Formerly, III. Rev. Stat: 1991, ch. 108 ½, 1.5–167.5... ELECTRONICALLY FILED 1/13/2016 4:07 PM 2013-CH-17450 PAGE 40 of 46 5/6-164.2.

Payments to city and the different of the o § 64-164.2. Eayments to city: 1 1991 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 (a) For the purposes of this Section, "city annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity, a widow's annuity, a child's annuity, or a minimum annuity under this Article as a direct result of previous employment by the City of Chicago ("the city") if a Bada socat born (d) (b) The board shall pay to the city, on behalf of the board's city annuitants who participate in any of the city's health care plans, the following amounts: (1), From July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2008, \$85 per monthefor each such annuitant who is not eligible to receive Medicare benefits and \$55 per month for each such annuitant who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits. 101 (2) From July 1, 2008 through June 30, 2013, \$95 per month for each such annuitant who is not eligible to d receive Medicare benefits and \$65 per month for each such annuitant who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits. The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy authorized under Section 6-165; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be pharged against it, man more the second state in set I. (b) (c) of the city health care plans referred to in this Section and the board's payments to the city under this Section are not and shall not be construct to be pension of retirement benefits for the purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the e in asadus p. Illinois Constitution of 1970. Laws 1963, p. 161, § 6-1642, added by P.A. 82-1044, § 1, eff.

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Jan. 12, 1983. Amended by R.A. 86-273, § 1, eff. Aug. 23, 1989; P.A. 90-32, \$ 5, eff. June 27, 1997; P.A. 92-599, \$ 10, eff. June 28, 2002; P.A. 93-42, \$ 5, eff. July 1, 2003, astro. Adv

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EXHIBIT 8E

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EXHIBIT 8E

40 ILCS 5/5-167.5) (from Ch. 108 1/2, par. 5-167.5) Sec. 5-167.5. Payments to city.

(a) For the purposes of this Section, "city annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity, a widow's annuity, a child's annuity, or a minimum annuity under this Article as a direct result of previous employment by the City of Chicago ("the city").

(b) The board shall pay to the city, on behalf of the board's city annuitants who participate in any of the city's health care plans, the following amounts:

> From July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2008, \$85 per month for each such annuitant who is not eligible to receive Medicare benefits and \$55 per month for each such annuitant who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits.

(2) Beginning July 1, 2008 and until such time as the city no longer provides a health care plan for such annuitants or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first, \$95 per month for each such annuitant who is not eligible to receive Medicare benefits and \$65 per month for each such annuitant who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits.

The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy authorized under Section 5-168; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be charged against it.

(c) The city health care plans referred to in this Section and the board's payments to the city under this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for the purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

(Source: P.A. 98-43, eff. 6-28-13.)

(40 ILCS 5/6-164.2) (from Ch. 108 1/2, par. 6-164.2)

Sec. 6-164.2. Payments to city.

(a) For the purposes of this Section, "city annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity, a widow's annuity, a child's annuity, or a minimum annuity under this Article as a direct result of previous employment by the City of Chicago ("the city").

(b) The board shall pay to the city, on behalf of the board's city annuitants who participate in any of the city's health care plans, the following amounts:

 From July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2008, \$85 per month for each such annuitant who is not eligible to receive Medicare benefits and \$55 per month for each such annuitant who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits.

(2) Beginning July 1, 2008 and until such time as the city no longer provides a health care plan for such annuitants or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first, \$95 per month for each such annuitant who is not eligible to receive Medicare benefits and \$65 per month for each such annuitant who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits.

The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy authorized under Section 6-165; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be charged against it.

(c) The city health care plans referred to in this Section and the board's payments to the city under this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for the purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970. (Source: P.A. 98-43, eff. 6-28-13.) (40 ILCS 5/8-164.1) (from Ch. 108 1/2, par. 8-164.1)

Sec. 8-164.1. Payments to city.

(a) For the purposes of this Section, "city annuitant" means a person receiving an age and service annuity, a widow's annuity, a child's annuity, or a minimum annuity under this Article as a direct result of previous employment by the City of Chicago ("the city").

(b) The board shall pay to the city, on behalf of the board's city annuitants who participate in any of the city's health care plans, the following amounts:

> From July 1, 2003 through June 30, 2008, \$85 per month for each such annuitant who is not eligible to receive Medicare benefits and \$55 per month for each such annuitant who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits.

(2) Beginning July 1, 2008 and until such time as the city no longer provides a health care plan for such annuitants or December 31, 2016, whichever comes first, \$95 per month for each such annuitant who is not eligible to receive Medicare benefits and \$65 per month for each such annuitant who is eligible to receive Medicare benefits.

The payments described in this subsection shall be paid from the tax levy authorized under Section 8-173; such amounts shall be credited to the reserve for group hospital care and group medical and surgical plan benefits, and all payments to the city required under this subsection shall be charged against it.

(c) The city health care plans referred to in this Section and the board's payments to the city under this Section are not and shall not be construed to be pension or retirement benefits for the purposes of Section 5 of Article XIII of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

(Source: P.A. 98-43, eff. 6-28-13.)

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